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ABSTRACT 
The role that agriculture should play in economic development has been recognised for years. In 
recent years, concern has been expressed over rising agricultural and food prices. The world market 
prices for major food commodities have risen sharply to historic highs of more than 60 percent above 
levels just two years ago. Many factors have contributed to the rise in food commodity prices. Some 
factors reflect trends of slower growth in production and more rapid growth in demand that have 
contributed to a tightening of world balances of grains and oilseeds over the last decade. Other 
factors that have added to global food commodity price inflation include the declining value of the US 
dollar, rising energy prices, increasing agricultural costs of production, growing foreign exchange 
holdings by major food-importing countries, and policies adopted recently by some exporting and 
importing countries to mitigate their own food price inflation (Trostle, 2008). 
Mozambique  has  a  vast  extension  of  land  and  diversity  of  natural  resources.  Resources  are 
inadequately used, the rural income continues to fall, and poverty is increasing. The rural standard of 
living  has  been  deteriorating  year  by  year.  To  date,  estimations  reveal  that  between  60  and  80 
percent of cultivated land in all the provinces is concentrated in areas between 0.2 and 1 ha. For a 
sample of 192 farmers, using a translog stochastic production frontier like that of Bravo-Ureta and 
Pinheiro (1993), who estimated a Cobb-Douglas total value product frontier for analysis purposes, 
the study found that the average economic efficiency (EE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative 
efficiency (AE) for the sample were 11.6%, 83.0% and 13.7% respectively. These results suggest 
that there is considerable room to maximise resource usage and increase agricultural output without 
additional input and given the existing technology. 
The  adoption  of  new  technologies  designed  to  enhance  farm  output  and  income  has  received 
particular attention as a means to accelerate economic development. However, output growth is not 
only  determined  by  technological  innovations,  but  also  by  the  efficiency  with  which  available 
technologies are used in the absence of inefficiency factors. As Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) 
noted, the evidence presented in this study suggests that there is much room for improving the 
efficiency of natural resource management in general.  The results based on frontier methodology 
are generally consistent with the notion that local actors play an important role in the management of 
local resources; consequently, public investments designed to enhance human and social capital at 
local level can be expected to generate additional skills and output even in the absence of new 
technologies.  The participation of citizens in all stages is crucial. 
It  is  recognised  that  qualitative  variables  have  influence  and  potential  importance  in  efficiency. 
Governance is considered within the framework of power, process and practice and how these have 
shaped peasant access to and control and use of natural resources. Over the years, state visions of 
appropriate agriculture development have largely been extended to the peasant sector through a POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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centrally directed structure and process. Pioneering efforts at decentralising entrustments over the 
use  and  management  of  resources  to  the  peasant  communities  have  largely  resulted  in 
recentralisation at the district level, where such efforts are still practised in the trickle-down mode. 
This is in part because the policy thrust seeking to empower the peasant communities is supply-led, 
and thus defined according to the terms and processes of external agents, including funders and 
central governments. 
The research found that by improving institutions’, citizens’ and communities’ capacity to address 
local  governance  and  decision-making  through  prominent,  decentralised  natural  resources 
management policies, they could participate more effectively in local development, gain experience 
in democratic processes, and hold local officials responsible for their decisions. The study concluded 
that natural resources play a strategic role in rural economies both as a potential source of long-term 
development  and  as  the  essential  contributor  to  sustained  food  security.  Access  by  the  poor  to 
natural resources (land, forests, water, fisheries, pastures, etc.) is essential for sustainable poverty 
reduction.  Many  rural  communities  are  dependent  on  natural  resources  in  one  way  or  another. 
Decentralising natural resource management and using local decision-making power is critical to 
improve the revenue generation of citizens and local authorities. Local representative bodies need 
power over the resources that affect rural sustainable livelihoods in order to become legitimate actors 
around which civic organisations and citizens rally for justice, sustainable livelihoods and economic 
improvement.  Decentralising  natural  resource  management  (NRM)  can  give  local  governments 
allocative  powers  over  lucrative  opportunities,  both  of  which  can  help  build  local  government 
legitimacy. In short, local development can emerge. 
 
Keywords:  Data  envelopment  analysis,  Efficiency,  Decentralisation,  Natural  resource 
management,  Land  reform,  Agricultural  development,  Governance,  Participation,  Local 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  BACKGROUND  
World  market  prices  for  major  food  commodities  such  as  grains  and  vegetable  oils  have  risen 
sharply to historic highs - more than 60 percent above levels just two years ago. Retail food prices 
in many countries have also risen in the last two years, raising concerns around the world. No one 
factor has been the cause of the rise in food commodity prices. Some factors reflect underlying 
trends in supply and demand for agricultural commodities that began more than a decade ago. 
Other developments that have contributed to the price increase have occurred more recently. Some 
factors  reflect  significant  structural  changes  in  supply-and-demand  relationships;  others  can  be 
interpreted as short-term shocks to global supply and demand for agricultural products. 
 
Reduced agricultural research and development by governmental and international institutions may 
have contributed to the slowing growth in crop yields. Stable food prices over the past two decades 
have led to some complacency about global food concerns and to a reduction in research and 
development funding levels. Although private sector funding of research has grown, private sector 
research  has  generally  focused  on  innovations  that  private  companies  could  sell  to  producers. 
These have often been cost-reducing rather than yield-enhancing technological developments. The 
demand for agricultural commodities has also been affected by some long-term trends. Over the 
last decade, strong global growth in average income combined with rising population to increase 
the demand for food, particularly in developing countries. As per capita incomes rose, consumers in 
developing countries not only increased their per capita consumption of staple foods, they also 
diversified  their  diets  to  include  more  meat,  dairy  products  and  vegetable  oils,  which  in  turn 
amplified the demand for grains and oilseeds (Trostle, 2008). 
 
International pricing, natural disasters and deteriorating of weather conditions (climate changes) are 
not the only factors that affect the stability of the agricultural sector. Institutional constraints and the 
role of local authorities in many African countries are the second important elements determining 
productive output. Low agricultural productivity associated with institutional and policies frameworks 
have pushed food prices beyond the reach of a significant number of the rural poor. The livelihoods 
of rural people without access, or with very limited access, to natural resources are vulnerable 
because  they  have  difficulty  obtaining  food,  accumulating  other  assets,  and  recuperating  after 
natural  or  market  shocks  or  misfortunes.  Any  discussion  of  food  prices  must  make  mention  of 
agricultural structures, production systems, rural development, and access by the poor to natural 
resources (land, forests, water, fisheries, pastures, etc.) as being essential for sustainable poverty 
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Despite the implementation of governance reforms and agricultural restructuring over the past 12 
years, no recent institutional and rural development model of natural resource management has 
explicitly considered these new issues. This research discusses these factors and illustrates how 
they have contributed to the deterioration of rural livelihoods and the food crisis. This thesis is 
developed  as  a  framework  to  consider  how  policies  related  to  natural  resources  affect  local 
development  and  how  effective  natural  resource  governance  strategies  can  be  addressed  to 
support communities, organisations and local authorities (traditional) to jointly define and efficiently 
implement local development based on existing resources, local potential and opportunities. 
 
The matter of efficiency has been of interest since Adam Smith’s era and prior thereto (Farrell, 
1957; Lovell, 1993). However, a rigorous analytical approach to the measurement of efficiency in 
production can be said to have originated with the work of Koopmans in 1951. The formal definition 
provided by Koopmans (1951) considers efficiency to be the measure of a unit’s ability to produce 
outputs from a given set of inputs. Efficiency represents “best performance” and is made up of the 
units in the data set that are most efficient in transforming their inputs into outputs. Units classified 
as being 100% (optimal level of the productive frontier) are considered efficient, while those less 
than 100% are regarded as inefficient. 
 
While efficiency and sustainable agricultural development in Africa has been studied extensively 
(Hayami & Ruttan, 1985; Churchill 1991; Bruce & Migot-Adholla, 1994), far less attention has been 
devoted  to  qualitative  aspects,  e.g.  public  policies  (agriculture  efficiency  analysis  and  how 
institutional frameworks affect local development), particularly in Mozambique, where more than 
80% of the population lives in rural areas where institutions are weak and agriculture is considered 
as the main source of income and family subsistence for more than 90% of the rural labour force.  
Many researchers and policymakers have focused their attention on the impact that the adoption of 
new technology can have on the effort to improve farm productivity and income (Schultz, 1964; 
Kuznets, 1966; Hayami & Ruttan, 1985). During the past two decades, major technological gains 
stemming from the green revolution seem to have been largely introduced across the developing 
world.  Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) emphasised that there is considerable agreement with the 
notion that effective economic development strategy depends critically on promoting productivity 
(efficiency) and output growth in the agricultural sector, particularly among small-scale producers. 
This suggests that attention to productivity gains arising from the more efficient use of existing 
technology is justified. 
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The  presence  of  shortfalls  in  efficiency  means  that  output  can  be  increased  without  requiring 
additional conventional inputs and without the need for new technology. If this is the case, empirical 
measures of efficiency are necessary in order to determine the magnitude of the gains that could be 
obtained by improving performance in agricultural production with a given technology.  An important 
policy  implication  stemming  from  significant  levels  of  inefficiency  is  that  it  might  be  more  cost 
effective  to  achieve  short-run  increases  in  farm  output,  and  thus  income,  by  concentrating  on 
improving  efficiency  rather  than  on  the  introduction  of  new  technologies.  Bingxin,  Fulginiti  and 
Perrin (2002) hypothesised that African countries are poorer not because of cultural or geographic 
factors, but mostly because of poorer institutions and development policies that affect production. 
This suggests that these factors should be considered in determining the causes of agricultural 
productivity performance. 
 
1.2.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
After decades of research, institutional analysis became a prominent area of development.  The 
combination of policies and institutions seems to bring a new analytical direction to non-market-
oriented analysis, where the traditional analytical framework (demand and supply) seems to have 
limitations.  In agriculture analysis particularly, more factors influencing efficiency are qualitative, 
and mostly related to institutions, politics and policies. In Africa in general, and Mozambique in 
particular, it is recognised that agriculture plays an important role in rural development and food 
security. It is a potential factor for structural change and transformation of the rural economy. 
 
Poor and food-insecure households are being forced to plant crops on steep slopes or are unable to 
afford to keep land fallow, invest in land improvements, or use costly inputs such as fertiliser or to 
capitalise on existing potential in terms of natural resources. A crop and food supply assessment, 
conducted by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) of 
the United Nations (UN) found in Mozambique that the production of food crops forecast cereal 
import requirements for 1997/2000 and determined the likely food aid needs. The mission found 
encouraging developments in the crop and food supply situation, but nevertheless estimated that 
considerable amounts of food aid would still be needed. Roughly 75% of the population in rural 
areas still remains mired in poverty, suffering from chronic malnutrition (FAO, 2000). 
 
As a result of the civil war the main infrastructure has been destroyed and is in the process of 
reconstruction. The rural population therefore has "limited" access to markets. Alternative off-farm 
income sources are, for instance, seasonal labour and, in declining order, other forms of wage 
labour, fishing trade, and sales of farm products. Throughout the country, supply rehabilitation or 
construction  was  and  is  carried  out  by  several  development  cooperation  organisations.  Water POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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sources are quite often between 10 and 20 km away from communities and villages. Irrigated areas 
are  limited,  and  the  rain-fed  production  pattern  throughout  the  country  is  dependent  on  the 
regularity of the annual rainy season. A delay of one month, followed by, for instance, excessive 
rains,  may  lead  to  serious  harvest  losses.  Households  with  no  crop  varieties  (mono-cropping 
system) are therefore most severely affected by droughts and/or floods due to the distribution of risk 
to one single crop. 
 
Mozambique possesses sufficient primary resources, land and labour to reduce dependence and 
alleviate  absolute  poverty.  The  agro-ecological  production  systems  allow  deferent  crops  and 
multiple land-use systems. The resources are not efficiently capitalised to promote productivity, 
economic growth, local development, and food security. Soto (2000) considers it as the mystery of 
capital, when the resources are abundant but continue, without any contribution and added value, 
to act as incentive for investment and to improve agriculture productivity as rural capital. Agriculture 
contributes  less  than  30%  to  the  country’s  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)
2.  Problems  of  soil 
nutrient depletion, erosion, and other manifestations of land degradation appear to be increasing. 
Declining agricultural productivity contributes to poverty and food insecurity. Resource degradation 
can in turn contribute to poverty and food insecurity. Poor and food-insecure households may be 
forced to plant crops on steep slopes or be unable to afford to keep land fallow, invest in land 
improvements, or use costly inputs such as fertiliser. The resources are being inadequately used, 
rural income is continually falling, poverty is increasing, and food security has been decreasing 
rapidly, thus increasing the rate of mortality. 
 
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 168 out of 177 countries on the 
2005  United  Nations  Human  Development  Index.  Mozambique  faces  serious  constraints  to 
development. These include: HIV/AIDS, pronounced gender inequality, vulnerability to drought and 
flooding,  income  and  regional  disparities,  and,  the  lack  of  capacity  in  all  levels  and  sectors  of 
government,  chronic  poverty,  hunger  and  pandemics  mostly  associated  with  malnutrition,  food 
insecurity and extreme dependence. In general, resource allocation and institutional mechanisms 
for its management seem to be the limitation. The rural standard of living has been deteriorating 
year by year. Net incomes and livelihoods are dependent on informal systems and subsistence 
agriculture.  Agro-climatic  production  systems  allow  for  deferent  crops  and  a  multiple  land-use 
system. The extensions of rivers and lakes are potential mechanisms to improve land productivity, 
with large irrigation systems and vast drainage, but hunger and misery affects more than half of the 
                                                       
2 Agriculture (21% of GDP; annual growth 7.9%): Exports: cotton, cashew nuts, sugarcane, tea, cassava (tapioca), corn, 
coconuts, sisal, citrus and tropical fruits, potatoes, sunflowers, beef and poultry. View more country profiles online at 
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population, with major incidences thereof in rural areas. Many of the rural poor depend directly on 
shared natural resources (NRs), yet they often live in ecologically marginal areas and have limited 
and insecure rights to NRs. A recurrent question in the rural development debate has been: How 
are poverty, local governance and access to NRs linked and what are the policy implications of 
these linkages?  
 
1.3.  OBJECTIVES  
Over the past years, rapid population growth  and a decrease in food production have affected 
Mozambique to a serious extent. This study is a qualitative analysis, as many of the most important 
factors influencing success in the process are not quantifiable. However, the qualitative analysis will 
also  be  supplemented  by  some  quantitative  empirical  analysis.  The  research  aims  to  provide 
evidence concerning the extent of inefficiency of natural resource management on agriculture and 
to  reflect  a  careful  examination  of  the  influence  of  variables  affecting  local  development  in 
Mozambique, specifically: 
￿  The primary objective of this study is to obtain empirical evidence with regard to the allocation, 
use  and  utility  of  natural  resources  (governance  and  management)  over  time  to  explain 
variations  in  policies  and  variables  that  influence  its  efficient  use  in  promoting  agricultural 
growth,  agrarian  relationships  and  social  welfare  across  the  country.  It  explores  theory  to 
measure  resource  allocation  efficiency  and  non-market  frameworks  to  measure  the  optimal 
current social development theory for a wide range of studies in developing countries. 
￿  The second objective is to conduct a quantitative analysis to capture the magnitude of the 
above-mentioned  influence  by  analysing  the  efficiency  theory  and  models  to  determine  and 
estimate a non-parametric and deterministic production frontier using the linear programming 
solver  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)
3.  This  objective  is  pursued  first  by  estimating  a 
stochastic  production  frontier,  which  provides  the  basis  for  measuring  farm-level  technical 
efficiency (TE), economic efficiency (EE), and allocative efficiency (AE). 
￿  The  third  objective  is  to  analyse  qualitative  effects,  e.g.  governance  and  policies  vs. 
institutional  perspective,  to  determine  influences  and  the  relationship  associated  with 
inefficiency effects between access to and utility of natural resources at the household level. 
This study has policy implications, because it not only provides empirical measures of different 
efficiency indices, but also identifies some key variables that are correlated with these indices. 
In  this  regard,  the  analysis  is  intended  to  provide  information  on  how  efficiency  could  be 
improved by improving related policies and institutional constraints. 
                                                       
3 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a nonparametric method in operations research and econometrics for multivariate 
frontier  estimation  and  ranking.  DEA  offers  a  variety  of  useful  results  such  as  benchmarking,  productivity  index, 
inefficiency, or slack of each input and output. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  6 
￿  Finally,  the  fourth  objective  is  to  use  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  analysis  as  basis  to 
explore and discuss policy implications in local development. The implications of these findings 
for local development and rural poverty alleviation strategies are explored. 
￿   
1.4.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Farrell  (1957)  defined  overall  productive  efficiency  (also  called  cost  or  total  efficiency)  as  the 
product of technical and allocative, or price, efficiency. Implicit in the notion of allocative efficiency is 
a  specific  behavioural  assumption  about  the  goal  of  the  producer;  Farrell  considered  cost 
minimisation  in  competitive  input  markets,  although  other  behavioural  assumptions  can  be 
considered.  Technical  efficiency  has  been  decomposed  into  the  product  of  measure  of  Scale 
Efficiency (SE), input congestion and “pure” technical efficiency (Färe, Grosskopf & Lovell, 1994). 
 
De Meza and Gould (1992) measured technical efficiency through a deterministic Cobb-Douglas 
production frontier obtained by linear programming. This study addresses efficiency by applying 
Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA),  a  popular  benchmarking  methodology  developed  by 
management scientists (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 1978). DEA is a non-parametric approach that 
can  deal  with  multiple  inputs  and  multiple  outputs  and  involves  the  use  of  linear  programming 
methods  to  construct  a  non-parametric  piecewise  surface  (or  frontier)  over  the  data.  Efficiency 
measures are calculated relative to this surface. Based on recent studies of efficiency, since none 
of  the  production  frontier  models  used  in  empirical  analyses  of  production  efficiency  is  without 
limitations, it is very important to choose a model carefully.  Coelli (1996a) discusses the strengths 
and weaknesses of different types of production frontier models. 
 
Sexton (1986) argues that an appropriate non-parametric method for analysing efficiency is the 
DEA method, which is useful in situations where (a) there are multiple outputs and multiple inputs; 
(b) there is no objective way to determine the efficiency of a unit based upon one efficiency index 
formula, and in such cases, more than one unit may be technically efficient while producing different 
amounts of products and using different input levels; and (c) where for multiple inputs to determine 
qualitative  influence  (political  and  governance),  aspects  seem  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  this 
method. 
 
In  order  to  determine  the  factors  affecting  efficiency,  regression  estimations  are  measured. 
Variables  are  desegregated  to  measure  the  influence  in  overall  efficiency  using  the  Maximum 
Likelihood  Estimates  (MLE)  of  the  production  function  parameters  based  on  econometric 
specifications. The regression coefficients are the average amount the dependent increases when 
the independent increases by one unit and other independents are held constant.  MLE has been POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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used in past technical efficiency studies (as prescribed by Sexton, 1986), and is used here.  A 
censored  two-limit  tobit  model  (as  discussed  in  Greene,  1993),  with  limits  of  0  to  1  on  the 
dependent technical efficiency variable, is also used. Basic and descriptive statistics are used, with 
yield being a partial productivity measure, considering the relationship of output to the input. 
 
1.5.  SAMPLE, DATA USED AND PROCESSING 
The  data-collection  strategy  for  the  survey  had  two  objectives.  Firstly,  a  territorial  sample  was 
chosen with the intention to increase the generalisability of the findings. At the same time, it was 
necessary that certain marketing skills should be present among the families in the sample. The 
second objective of the data-collection strategy was to collect the required information only from the 
policymakers in order to collect detailed and lengthy data. In doing so, particular emphasis was 
placed on avoiding leading information, as well as complex or sensitive questions (especially in the 
beginning of the survey) that could influence the results negatively. The analysis is based on the 
data of a rural household survey conducted by the Direcção Nacional de Agricultura (DINA)  – or 
National Directorate of Agriculture – and the results of a 1996-2006 agricultural campaign (MADER, 
2005). 
 
The study covered 20 districts in 10 different provinces subdivided into three macro regions: South, 
Centre and North. The survey targeted the answers to its questions to be 95% accurate with a 10% 
error margin. Using a structured survey of 192 farms, which were selected by random sampling, the 
input-output data used in this study was collected. Focused group interviews were used to evaluate 
the validity and reliability of the survey. 
 
Figure 1.1: Agro-ecological distribution 
Data  was  collected  in  different  regions  of 
Mozambique  covering  all  10  agro-ecological 
zones,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  1.1.  To  capture 
agro-ecological and climatic conditions, a variable 
representing land quality was constructed based 
on the percentage of land within a given Decision-
Making  Unit  (DMU)  that  was  of  good  or  regular 
quality, and suitable for production with handling 
levels  A,  and  B,  as  classified  by  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture.  Good-quality  land  did  not  face  any 
significant  production  limitations.  Regular-quality 
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which could reduce productivity or substantially increase the need for inputs to overcome these 
limitations. 
 
For data processing and efficiency estimations, the study adopted the DEA linear programming 
application, the Data Envelopment Analysis Program (DEAP), developed by Coelli (1996b), and 
subsequently  for  the  factors  affecting  efficiency  for  the  regression  estimations  Ordinary  Least 
Squares (OLS) and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) using Stata 6.0. 
 
1.6.  OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter  one  is  the  introduction  to  the  thesis,  which  presents  the  context  of  the  research,  the 
problems  to  be  analysed  and  the  key  objectives  in  Section  1.  Section  2  gives  the  conceptual 
framework and the data analysis methodology applied, and finally Section 3 gives the quantitative 
analytical model and the qualitative institutional framework. One would expect higher productivity 
from land suitable for production with such simple techniques, if it is cultivated using more modern 
methods. The research extends the previous analysis of rural family incomes and examines the 
relationship of productivity and efficiency to farm size in the individual farming sector, with emphasis 
on  how  inputs  and  outputs  should  be  adjusted  in  order  to  transform  inefficient  producers  into 
efficient producers and to maximise the utility of resources to improve livelihoods, particularly at 
local level. 
 
Chapter two reviews aspects related to agricultural development and rural livelihoods, with special 
emphasis on international and national perspectives. The first section looks at aspects related to 
agricultural  development  in  Africa,  its  performance  during  the  period  under  review,  and  food 
production in sub-Saharan countries. Public investment in the agricultural sector is one area of 
concern that is reviewed. The second section reviews Mozambique as a case study. To understand 
the dynamics of the agricultural sector, this section considers agricultural policies and strategies, 
production and basic indicators during the period in question. Also discussed are issues related to 
land and its influences in agriculture, particularly in Mozambique. The last section summarises the 
empirical evidence of policies, discussing the role of institutions in agricultural development, as well 
as the role of the local authorities with emphasis on traditional and community structures. 
 
Chapter  three  reviews  aspects  related  to  natural  resources  (policies  and  management), 
decentralisation  and  agricultural  development.  This  chapter  investigates  how  governance  and 
institutional  framework  on  natural  resource  management  could  be  improved  in  rural  areas.  It 
describes the concept of decentralisation and participation, as well as access to and management 
of  natural  resources,  and  how  the  security  of  property  influences  investment  in  agriculture POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  9 
development. It describes customary tenure systems, analyzing different countries at regional level 
(Southern Africa). 
 
Chapter four describes the conceptual and analytical framework using frontier function methodology 
that arises in empirical analysis and the theoretical concept of efficiency. Non-parametric techniques 
derived from DEA are applied to micro data to construct the best-practice or technological frontiers 
of  production  within  the  examined  DMUs.  The  chapter  highlights  the  theory  and  the  model  of 
efficiency  analytical  framework,  based  on  Farrell’s  DEA.  The  objective  function  of  the  linear 
programming formulation for determining efficiency is reviewed and factors determining a unit’s 
efficiency and affecting productivity are identified. 
 
Chapter  five  estimates  the  efficiency  based  on  the  nonparametric  model  and  investigates  the 
factors influencing the efficiency at the output level of farms. The chapter gives estimations on the 
technical,  scale  and  allocative  efficiency,  as  well  as  the  institutional  constraints  based  on  the 
investigation carried out in 10 provinces of Mozambique. Quantitative and qualitative influences are 
discussed with emphasis on the influence of public policies at local level (grassroots). 
 
Chapter six looks at institutional frameworks and describes how qualitative variables could affect 
natural  resource  governance.  This  chapter  discusses  agricultural  development  and  policy 
implications as the essential contributors to sustained food security. It discusses policy implications 
and how livelihood strategies could be addressed by looking at the influence of natural resources 
and the contribution of local community and actors in the management of their resources. Evidence 
relating to the improvement of rural incomes and investment incentives (land) is analysed based on 
the measurements. 
 
Finally  in  conclusion,  Chapter  seven  summarises  the  key  findings  and  presents  policy 
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2.  REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS  
“Commercial  farms  in  South  Africa  could  become  significantly  more  efficient  if  they 
became smaller. The government could encourage that trend by removing policies and 
distortions that favour large over small farms”. 
Johan van Zyl, Hans Binswanger and Colin Thirtle (1995) 
 
2.1.  COUNTRY PROFILE  
The Republic of Mozambique shares borders with Tanzania to the north, and Malawi, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa and Swaziland to the west and south. Total land area is 786,380 square kilometres, 
with a long and largely undeveloped Indian Ocean coastline of some 2000 kilometres, and 13 000 
square kilometres of inland water including part of Lake Niassa and the Cahora Bassa Reservoir. 
Population is now around 21.4 million (INE, 2007). The last 30 years of Mozambique's history have 
reflected political developments elsewhere in the 20th century. Following the April 1974 coup in 
Lisbon,  Portuguese  colonialism  collapsed.  In  Mozambique,  the  military  decision  to  withdraw 
occurred within the context of a decade of armed anti-colonial struggle, initially led by American-
educated Eduardo Mondlane, who was assassinated in 1969. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Mozambique 
After  independence  from  Portugal  in  1975,  the 
leaders of the military campaign of the Liberation 
Front  of  Mozambique  (FRELIMO)  rapidly 
established a one-party state allied to the Soviet 
bloc  and  outlawed  rival  political  activity. 
FRELIMO eliminated political pluralism, religious 
educational institutions, and the role of traditional 
authorities.  The  FRELIMO  government  began  a 
rural  policy  of  collectivisation  and  state-farm 
agriculture. The Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO)  opposition  forces  initiated  a 
destructive 15-year civil war which, together with 
droughts in the 1980s and early 1990s, ravaged 
the  resource  base  of  rural  families.  Some  6.5 
million people fled to neighbouring countries, or 
were internally displaced, and the rural economy 
and infrastructure collapsed. 
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The majority, namely 80%, of the population of Mozambique is active in agriculture and fisheries. Of 
these, about 90% work in the family farm sector. The other nationally defined sectors, which are not 
part  of  the  study,  are  the  state-farm  sector  and  the  commercial  sector.  The  family  agriculture 
system is characterised by family labour force and low mechanisation grade. Agricultural inputs 
such as tractors, ploughs, fertilisers, pesticides and others are low, or almost zero. The number of 
irrigated  areas  is  mainly  limited  to  larger  farms  in  lowland  areas  (rice)  and  mainly  directed  at 
vegetable production in small areas. 
 
FRELIMO abandoned Marxist-Leninism in 1989, and a new democratic constitution in November 
1990 allowed press freedoms and other political parties. The Civil War ended in October 1992. The 
first  multi-party  elections  in  October  1994  gave  FRELIMO  a  new  democratic  mandate,  but 
RENAMO won in the centre and north and now has over 30% of Republic Assembly seats.  Around 
60% of Mozambicans live in a 50-kilometre wide strip along the coast. Some 75% are rural, 90% of 
whom live on small farms using mostly family labour which, despite their size and low technology, 
account for some 50% of Gross National Product (GNP) and a high share of exports. Over 60% of 
Mozambicans also live in absolute poverty. Years of failed economic policy, war and drought have 
left  Mozambique  totally  dependent  upon  foreign  assistance  and  struggling  to  achieve  the  rapid 
economic growth needed to counter poverty and high demographic growth. Structural adjustment 
began in 1987, with deeper market and fiscal reforms since 1992. 
 
After  a  post-war  (1992)  surge  in  GNP  of  19%,  an  'enabling  environment'  of  fiscal,  legal  and 
administrative reforms, including integrated employment, rural and urban development policies, was 
needed to promote the investment and internal economic linkages required for sustainable growth. 
Government reserves were measured in days rather than months, and the government appeared to 
have  temporarily  lost  control  of  spending.  The  government  has  since  initiated  a  strong  macro-
economic stabilisation programme.  The programme appears to be having a stabilising effect and 
inflation  is  falling  sharply,  while  domestic  and  international  debt  is  being  restructured  with 
Mozambique  opting  to  be  classified  as  a  Heavily  Indebted  Poor  Country  (HIPC).  Government 
borrowing  has  fallen  sharply  and  the  interest  rate  is  moving  towards  affordable  levels.    These 
measures are laying the foundation for a move forward with development and poverty reduction 
policies and programmes. 
 
In terms of potential, around 34 million hectares (42%) have been assessed as being suitable for 
various  types  of  agricultural,  livestock  and  agro-forestry  activity.  Between  12  and  16  million 
hectares (15-20% of total surface area) are suitable for cultivation. Inland, there is huge untapped 
potential for all types of farming. Nine large rivers cross the country from west to east, of which the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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largest are the Zambezi (820 km) and the Limpopo. Rich alluvial soils bordering the major rivers 
can support highly productive agriculture, and river valley land is now a major focus of external 
investor activity. Soil fertility is patchier in other areas, and mainly rain-fed agriculture is vulnerable 
to cyclical droughts. The government inherited an unhealthy economy, with an unstable currency, 
inflation close to 20%, domestic debt interest payments consuming half of all revenue, and very 
high effective interest rates of over 45%. 
 
Table 2.1: Structure of Mozambique’s Economy 
% of GDP  1985  1995  2004  2005 
Agriculture  47.5  36.9  23.3  22.3 
Industry  13.2  15.5  29.2  29.8 
    Manufacturing  …  8.1  14.8  14.2 
Service  39.3  47.7  47.5  47.9 
         
Household final consumption expenditure  92.2  85.2  75.3  79.1 
General gov. final consumption expenditure  12.9  9.8  10.4  10.3 
Imports of goods and services  11.5  41  39.2  42.3 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
 
A sector-wide support programme for agricultural and rural development, the Agricultural Sector 
Public  Expenditure  Programme  (PROAGRI),  in  place  since  1999,  and  the  Action  Plan  for  the 
Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA), adopted in 2002, have both established principles and 
priorities  in  respect  of  natural  resource  usage  that  are  intended  to  ensure  a  reduction  in  the 
vulnerability and an improvement in the livelihoods of the rural poor. In 2006
4 Mozambique exported 
US $2.43 billion worth of goods and imported US $2.82 billion worth of goods. Support programmes 
provided by foreign donors and private financing of foreign direct investment mega-projects and 
their associated raw materials have largely compensated for balance-of-payment shortfalls. 
 
Between 15 and 20% of the total surface area is suitable for cultivation. The country’s extension of 
rivers  and  lakes  and  significant  river  basins  provides  great  potential for  improvement  of  capital 
productivity
5 through large irrigation systems and drainage. Despite sufficient potential, land fertility, 
a  large  extension  of  arable  land,  the  diversity  of  natural  resources  and  suitable  agro-climatic 
conditions, agriculture contributes less than 25% to the country’s gross value added (UNDP, 2001). 
                                                       
4 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7035.htm  
5 Capital productivity is defined as physical output divided by the physical units of capital services used to generate that 
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Food  insecurity  is  reported  as  critical.  Declining  agricultural  productivity  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
mentioned as associated with inefficient usage of production inputs. 
 
Annual  rainfall  in  the  north  and  west  is  adequate  and  reasonably  reliable,  having  produced 
surpluses of major crops such as maize in recent years. Rainfall of 400-600 mm in the south is less 
dependable, with the exception of upland areas in the west of the Maputo Province. Extensive cattle 
production  and  exploitation  of  natural  forest  and  other  resources  traditionally  complement 
agriculture in local farm systems, but herds decimated by war and drought are only now beginning a 
slow recovery. With tsetse prevalent in most of the country, few savings and no access to credit, 
most peasants are now limited to raising goats, sheep and poultry. 
 
Figure 2.2: Growth of capital and GDP, and growth of exports and imports 
 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
 
The tables above show that the level of imports tends to increase. The medium-term outlook for 
exports is encouraging, as a number of recent foreign investment projects have improved the trade 
balance. Traditional Mozambican exports include cashews, shrimp, fish, copra, sugar, cotton, tea, 
and  citrus  and  exotic  fruits.  Most  of  these  industries  are  being  rehabilitated.  In  addition, 
Mozambique is less dependent upon imports for basic food and manufactured goods as the result 
of steady increases in local production. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  perception  that  it  is  associated  with  resources  that  are  largely 
unexplored,  inadequately  used  and  not  being  capitalised  to  promote  investment  with  collateral 
effect in productivity. Of around 36 000 000 hectares of fertile land, only about 10% of the total is 
being  cultivated  (MADER,  2002).  Problems  of  soil  nutrient  depletion,  erosion,  and  other 
manifestations  of  land  degradation  appear  to  be  increasing.  Resources  are  worthless  in  rural 
development efforts and rural community livelihoods. Food insecurity is reportedly increasing in 
many rural areas, with low and declining yields of food crops. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  14
 
The different types of land tenure and the land administration system prevailing in Mozambique 
today evolved over time from the interplay of the socio-political organisations of the various tribes, 
clans  and  families  through  trade,  wars  and  incorporation;  the  advent  of  colonial  rule  and 
subsequent introduction of tree-crop agriculture, as well as commercial exploitation of timber and 
mineral resources; post-independence politics; and urbanisation.  The basic land laws and land 
tenure practices in Mozambique are, therefore, deeply embedded in the socio-cultural systems and 
political  institutions  of  its  indigenous  societies  even  though  they  have  been  fundamentally 
influenced by administrative and statutory rules of the modern state. Over time, as land became 
scarcer, indigenous arrangements under which individual members of the lineage enjoyed general 
rights of access to land have been rendered untenable. 
 
The landed property belongs to the state, and indigenous tenancies have generally been replaced 
by sharecropping that enabled local landowners to gain labour for their farms.  Post-independence 
governments enacted a multiplicity of legislation to deal with specific problems on an ad hoc basis, 
not forming part of a comprehensive policy of land acquisition or land use administration. It was the 
realisation of the need for more coherent long-term land policy and its effective administration that 
instigated the GoM (Government of Mozambique) to develop a national land policy in 1999 and 
seek  ways  of  implementing  it.  A  number  of  issues  that  require  immediate  attention  have  been 
identified in many previous land administration-related studies and are summarised in the 1999 
National  Land  Policy  document.  Commercial  transactions  in  land  and  the  transformation  of 
inheritance rules compounded by population pressure have given rise to increased litigation over 
land as individuals sought to exclude those they believed to hold illegitimate claims, and especially 
migrant farmers. 
 
2.2.  RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Over the past 30 years Mozambique has suffered long periods of disruption as a result of war, 
severe drought and extensive flooding. As a result it remains one of the poorest countries in the 
world. The poverty index in 2006 was approximately 54% (UNDP, 2006). Those living on less than 
US $1 per day form 38% of the population and almost 80% survive on less than US$ 2 per day 
(UNDP, 2003). The spatial distribution of poverty is not uniform: on aggregate, poverty is more 
predominant in the centre of the country and less so in the north and south and there are significant 
differences between provinces. Mozambique remains heavily dependent on the international donor 
community with the net disbursement of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2001 totalling 
US $934.8 million (US $51 per capita). POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Major changes have occurred in the context in which rural livelihoods have been constructed in 
Mozambique over the last 20 years, many of which have increased the vulnerability of the majority 
of the rural population. These changes have impacted upon the natural, physical and social capital 
that  is  available  to  the  rural  poor.    They  include  the  widespread  destruction  of  the  war,  the 
introduction  of  economic  structural  adjustment  policies,  the  advent  of  market  forces  and  a 
liberalised economy at the end of the war, the increasing onset of a severe HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
prolonged  periods  of  drought,  and  more  recently,  devastating  floods  and  climatic  events.  The 
demand for agricultural commodities has also been affected by some long-term trends. Over the 
past decade, strong global growth in average income combined with rising population to increase 
the demand for food, particularly in developing countries. As per capita incomes rose, consumers in 
developing countries not only increased their per capita consumption of staple foods, they also 
diversified  their  diets  to  include  more  meat,  dairy  products  and  vegetable  oils,  which  in  turn 
amplified the demand for grains and oilseeds. 
 
Global economic growth has been strong since the late 1990s. For developing countries, growth 
has been quite strong since the early 1990s. Growth in Asia has been exceptionally strong for more 
than a decade. Unusually rapid economic growth in China and India, with nearly 40% of the world’s 
population, has provided a powerful and sustained stimulus to the demand for agricultural products. 
The world’s population growth rate has been trending down since before the 1970s. This declining 
trend applies to nearly all countries and regions of the world. However, the number of people on 
earth is still rising by about 75 million (1.1%) per year. This rising population adds to the global 
demand for agricultural products and energy. The impact on demand is amplified, because the most 
rapid population growth rates tend to be in developing countries. Many of these have rapidly rising 
incomes, again particularly important for agricultural demand due to diet-diversification. 
 
Smallholder farmers face a range of hazards that pose a threat to their productivity and farm-based 
livelihood strategies. These hazards include declining soil fertility through the practice of slash-and-
burn  agriculture.  There  are  significant  threats  to  crops  and  livestock  from  disease,  insect 
infestations,  weeds  and  storage  pests.
  Cattle  and  goats  were  decimated  by  the  war,  and  as 
populations recover there are concerns about the capacity of veterinary support services. External 
shocks such as global commodity price volatility and the continuing shrinkage in migrant labour 
opportunities in South Africa have the potential to significantly reduce rural incomes. Other threats 
include  flood  and  drought.  The  areas  most  vulnerable  to  drought  are  those  in  the  central  and 
southern parts of the country (Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, northern Manica and southern Tete). It is 
estimated that around 60% of the country has a probability higher than 30% of drought occurrence.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Flood risk affects over 1.7 million hectares at an altitude of less than 20 metres above sea level and 
within 10 kilometres of the principal hydro-basins. The areas most at risk of flood are those around 
the Zambezi, Pungue and Buzi rivers, and, to a lesser extent, those surrounding the Limpopo and 
Incomati (GoM 1998). 
 
Mozambique’s  agricultural  sector  has  suffered  from  several  changes  in  direction  since 
independence, as well as the massive disruption from the war. At the end of the war, the severe 
lack of basic services and rural infrastructure was a binding constraint on agricultural growth. Many 
rural areas with large populations and considerable agricultural potential continue today to have 
extremely  difficult  access  to  the  national  road  network.  The  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
review of the implementation of the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) in 
2003 stated that the “nationwide coverage of transitable highways is still fragile, however, which has 
discouraged private-sector investment and slowed the development of rural markets for agricultural 
inputs and products” (IMF, 2003). According to agriculture authorities, despite this progress there 
are still severe obstacles hindering growth in agricultural production and productivity. These include 
vulnerability to pests and plant diseases, low use of modern inputs such as improved seeds, and 
insufficient use of irrigation and of animal traction. 
 
Figure 2.3: Maize crop production (in MT) 
 
Source: MADER/SIMA (2005) 
 
The  graphic  shows  the  maize  crop  production  by  province,  at  household  level,  in  the  2005/06 
agriculture  season  compared  to  the  previous  season  and  average.  In  all  10  provinces  of  the 
country,  maize  production  at  household  level  had  surpassed  the  previous  season’s  total  maize POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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production and the five-year average, except in Sofala, which did not reach the average but was 
near the average. The government’s efforts to restock livestock over the past decade have also 
showed encouraging results in terms of increased meat production, which in 2005 was 12% higher 
than in 2004. This has allowed Mozambique to cut its beef imports, which were 22% lower in 2005 
than in the previous year. 
 
Rural  trading  is  therefore  beset  with  problems  of  transport  availability,  at  costs  that  make 
Mozambican trading comparatively disadvantaged. A number of studies (INE, 2002; IMF, 2003; 
MADER, 2004) have identified market access and prices as the most important determinant for 
agricultural production. Physical capital in the form of the network of small stores (cantinas) that 
existed during the colonial period has been decimated – these used to offer the option of bartering 
agricultural produce for consumer goods and agricultural inputs, and provided an important bulking-
up  function.  They  may  also  have  offered  small-scale  production  or  consumption  credit  to  local 
people. Now, many farmers have to travel long distances to local markets where their bargaining 
position is weak. 
 
The impact of HIV/AIDS over the coming years is likely to raise the vulnerability levels of many 
households, as families are affected by illness. HIV prevalence rates were estimated at 12.2% in 
2002, with the highest rates in the Central region (INE, 2002). Some families are likely to lose land, 
or  to  get  much  less  benefit  from  the  land  than  was  assumed.  The  burden  of  care  for  family 
members who fall ill will largely be placed upon female members of the household, who are also 
predominantly  those  involved  in  agricultural  production.  Family  savings  will  be  consumed  and 
assets sold to help pay for medical expenses. It is noticeable that the higher rates of infection also 
coincide  with  those  areas  where  there  is  most  competition  for  land  –  the  major  international 
transport corridors and the peri-urban areas. In addition, HIV/AIDS has already begun to affect the 
people working within land and natural resource administrations and related institutions, as well as 
those involved in the supply of essential goods and services or those that provide markets. The 
implications  for  institutional  capacity  to  carry  out  functions  will  be  several:  impacts  in  terms  of 
productivity, on finances and on human resources. The effect in Mozambique is that a much higher 
percentage of the population lives in isolated communities that are directly dependent on access to 
surrounding natural resources. 
 
2.2.1.  NATURAL RESOURCE USE AND LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
Mozambique  is  essentially  an  agriculture-based  economy,  and  the  contribution  of  agriculture  in 
1999 was almost 28% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and in 2005 reported as 35%. More than 
75% of the population is employed in the agricultural sector. It is estimated that of the total land POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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area of 78.6 million hectares, about 46% is considered suitable for arable use. Around 36 million 
hectares (42%) are assessed as being suitable for various types of agricultural, livestock and agro-
forestry activity. Between 12 and 16 million hectares (15-20% of total surface area) are suitable for 
cultivation. Inland, there is huge untapped potential for all types of farming. Nine large rivers cross 
the country from west to east, of which the largest are the Zambezi (820 Km) and the Limpopo. 
Rich alluvial soils bordering the major rivers can support highly productive agriculture, and river 
valley land is now a major focus of external investor activity. Soil fertility is patchier in other areas, 
and  mainly  rain-fed  agriculture  is  vulnerable  to  cyclical  droughts.  But  even  with  this  favourable 
picture of natural potential, Mozambique faces daunting challenges that are threatening the nation, 
its people and its partners. Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world (MADER, 
2005). 
 
The war resulted in increased pressure on land near major towns of the coastal zones and safe 
rural areas, but out-migration to areas of origin has since occurred. With improvements to rural 
security and the tertiary road network has come increasing clearance of land for cultivation. Of the 
total area cultivated, it is estimated that about 90% is under production systems of the so-called 
“family sector”. The remainder is used by other agents: agribusiness firms (particularly sugar, tea 
and  cotton)  state/private  joint  ventures,  cooperatives  and  private  individual  farmers.  Most 
agriculture is rain-fed, and in the southern and central provinces of Mozambique rain falls erratically 
and most of it only during a short period of the year (Pereira & Cossa, 2001). 
 
The use of natural resources in livelihood strategies is not limited to agriculture and the full-time 
cultivation of land, i.e. the low level of land that is cultivated paints a false picture of the actual area 
that  is  important  to  the  rural  poor.  Other  natural  resources  are  collected,  processed  and/or 
marketed by many families, either as a predominant activity or as part of a diversified portfolio of 
livelihood strategies designed to spread and minimise specific risks. These include resources such 
as bush-meat, honey, clay, roots and tubers, medicinal plants, building materials, thatching grass, 
firewood,  and  the  production  of  charcoal  and  salt.  Forests,  in  particular,  provide  a  range  of 
resources central  to  people’s livelihoods.  The  majority  of  the  population  remains  in settlements 
dispersed  widely  throughout  the  country’s  forests.  This  is  in  marked  contrast  to  other  African 
countries,  where  colonial  policy  had  been  to  relocate  people  from  the  forests  to  roadside 
communities. 
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2.2.2.  RURAL FARMERS AND VULNERABILITY HOUSEHOLDS  
Most  of  the  population  lives  within  a  40-kilometre-wide  coastal  strip  extending  over  2  000  km, 
making artisan coastal fishing a major livelihood strategy for a huge part of the population. The 
main freshwater fishery in central and northern Mozambique is Lago Niassa (Lake Malawi). There 
are also a number of major rivers (e.g. Rovuma, Zambezi) which also host significant fisheries 
resources (although in some cases these are in decline due to destructive fishing techniques), and 
fishing in smaller rivers and water sources is also prevalent. The Sofala Bank (a wide extension of 
the continental shelf fed by the Zambezi Delta) extends from Beira in Sofala along Zambézia to 
Nampula in the north. This fishery is rich in prawns. Inland fishing in rivers and lakes and the 
production of dried fish will very often be part of rural people’s subsistence or informal commercial 
activities. It is estimated that direct employment in this sector provides up to 80 000 jobs (SLSA, 
2003). 
 
In contrast to other countries in the region, there are far fewer other opportunities for cash-earning 
activities and consequently a much higher reliance upon agriculture, alongside hunting, fishing and 
the gathering of other natural resources for sale. Although remittances from migrant, seasonal and 
casual labour are important elements of many livelihood portfolios, many of these opportunities are 
in turn linked to the provision of agricultural labour (except in the case of migrants to the mines of 
South Africa, which is a phenomenon that is decreasing as the labour demands from this sector 
contract). 
 
In many rural areas the only opportunities for the provision of paid labour are through the system 
known as win-win, where services, usually for the heavy work of clearing previously uncultivated 
land, are provided to families that are able to provide remuneration in the form of consumer items 
unavailable on the local markets, food, beer and, less commonly, cash. It has been estimated that 
less  than  20%  of  rural  households  use  hired  labour  (Cramer  &  Pontara,  1997).  Even  those 
livelihood strategies that include involvement in local crafts and trades, which in some areas have 
assumed an international dimension, are heavily based on access to natural resources. Natural 
resources also play a major part in the coping strategies that people adopt during times of crisis or 
shocks (Pereira & Cossa, 2001). 
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Figure 2.4: Small-scale farms, by province 
 
                    Source: Estimated from INE (2001) 
 
2.2.3.  FARM SIZE AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Since the mid-1990s state farmland was distributed to private enterprises and, to a much lesser 
extent, smallholders. Many of the state-operated farms near to the major population centres were 
occupied during the war by displaced people, often with the permission and encouragement of the 
authorities. These landholdings have been returned to the now privatised companies that formerly 
operated  them  or  to  new  entrants  to  the  scene,  leading  to  the  loss  of  land,  trees  and  other 
resources that had formed a major part of rural people’s wartime livelihood strategies. Many of the 
companies  have  little  capital  and  investment  potential,  however,  and  the  landholdings  in  many 
cases are being held for speculative rather than productive reasons. 
 
According to a detailed assessment of land cover carried out in 1995 by the FAO, which forms the 
basis of the estimates reported in the previous paragraph, that only one million hectares were under 
permanent  cultivation  while  a  further  10  million  hectares  was  used  for  short-fallow-shifting 
cultivation
6 and 9.1 million hectares for long-fallow-shifting cultivation – see Table 2.2.  Areas of 
open and wooded grassland and shrub account for 21.5 million hectares, much of which is suitable 
for livestock if not for conversion to permanent cropping. 
                                                       
6 This is defined as land used regularly for cropping with short fallow periods and at least one-third being cropped each 
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Table 2.2: Land use by province (sq km) 










Cabo Delgado    82 625  50 000  148  18 760  1 684  8 280  4 692 
Gaza    75 709  4 000  2 760  14 100  6 724  15 760  11 252 
Inhambane    68 615  9 000  672  15 336  1 748  8 284  2 832 
Manica    61 656  29 000  68  11 456  2 404  11 524  8 092 
Maputo    26 358  5 000  1 668  6 984  2 784  3 184  2 732 
Nampula    81 606  48 000  864  43 524  796  2 876  2 060 
Niassa  129 061  84 000  40  22 124  2 344  14 608  15 976 
Sofala    68 018  22 000  836  10 336  7 072  10 840  8 648 
Tete    100 724  49 000  16  16 724  4 940  18 176  19 256 
Zambezia    105 008  60 000  3 072  31 876  5 060  6 612  4 000 
Total  799 380  360 000  10 144  191 220  35 556  100 144  79540 
 
The total area cultivated for food crops increased by only 0.9% per year from 1997-98 to 2003-04.  
Data on land use for food and cash crops presented in Table 2.2 show that about 42,500 sq km of 
land was cultivated in 2003-04 including land used for sugar cane, coconut and cashew plantations. 
Over 90% of this area – 39,300 sq km - was cultivated for food crops.  Indeed, the area of food 
crops is reported as having declined in Maputo and Inhambane provinces.  This may either be the 
result  of  misreporting  or  part  of  the  longer  terms  consequences  of  the  severe  floods  in  2000.  
Pressure on cultivable land is relatively low.  For the whole country, the ratio of cultivated land to 
cultivable land is only 12%.  There are large variations between provinces.  At one extreme is Gaza 
with a cropping rate of 72%, whereas Niassa and Tete have use rates of 3% and 7% respectively.  
In large part, these cropping rates mirror the share of cultivable land in total land area – only 5% of 
the land in Gaza but 65% of the land in Niassa is classified as cultivable.  Cropping rates for land 
devoted to shifting agriculture are also modest. On average the cropping rate in shifting agriculture 
is 17%, equivalent to a rotation period of about 1 year in 6.  At the provincial level, Cabo Delgado 
has the highest cropping rate in shifting agriculture with a rotation period of about 1 year in 4.
7  
Grassland  is  defined  as  land  covered  with  non-woody  vegetation.    Wooded  Grassland  (WG) 
consists of grassland with a woody component that covers no more than 10% of the area. Shrub (S) 
is defined as land with a predominant woody component of between 0.5 and 3 m.  
 
                                                       
7  The use rate for Maputo is reported as zero because the area of land cultivated for food and cash crops in the province (about 870 
sq km) is little more than one half of the reported area under permanent agriculture (about 1670 sq km).  The discrepancy may 
either be the result of land used for permanent pasture or under-reporting of land cultivated in 2003-04.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Table 2.3: Land use for food and cash crops by province (sq km) 
Province  Crop areas planted 2003-04  Cropping rates for 
  Food 
crops 




Cabo Delgado  4,606  352  10%  26% 
Gaza    2,820  69  72%  1% 
Inhambane    3,300  531  43%  21% 
Manica    2,782  37  10%  24% 
Maputo    715  151  17%  0% 
Nampula    8,760  1,046  20%  21% 
Niassa  2,857  51  3%  13% 
Sofala    2,373  506  13%  20% 
Tete    3,319  46  7%  20% 
Zambézia    7,697  501  14%  16% 
Total  39,230  3,290  12%  17% 
Source: FAO; INE (2001) 
 
The area of land required for livestock grazing is subject to a large degree of uncertainty, because 
reported estimates of the total stock of domestic livestock differ dramatically – including figures 
reported  by  separate  divisions  of  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organisation  (FAO)  of  the  United 
Nations – both over time and for different species.  To illustrate the point, it is widely stated that the 
total stock of cattle reached about 1.4 million in 1975, then fell by as much as 80% during the civil 
war and its aftermath, and is now gradually recovering.  However, the FAO statistical database – 
FAOSTAT – reports that the total number of cattle peaked at 1.42 million in 1975 and declined to a 
trough of 1.24 million in 1994.  According to these figures, the number of cattle rose slowly to 1.32 
million in 2003.  On the other hand, statistics reported by the FAO’s Animal Production and Health 
Division (APHD) give the total stock of cattle as being only 0.24 million in 1994 with rapid growth to 
0.52 million in 2000.  Finally, the FAO’s most recent food supply evaluation (based on a survey of 
smallholder agriculture) reports that the total number of cattle in 2003 was about one million (TIA or 
Rural Income Survey). Table 2.4 below summarises the land use and distribution in Mozambique. 
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Table 2.4: Land distribution in Mozambique 




Title  Area 
cultivated 
< 0,1  38.358  309  2.248  1.094  584  420.083 
0,1 < 0,2  109.733  933  16.677  1.212  2.314  1.210.201 
0,2 < 0,5  553.420  4.741  196.852  9.030  4.755  2.620.483 
0,5 < 1,0  932.618  14.413  683.990  26.068  5.888  1.781.596 
1,0 < 2,0  922.508  20.908  1.297.898  40.779  5.756  711.392 
2,0 < 3,0  272.107  9.507  655.457  19.784  1.984  124.453 
3,0 < 4,0  108.504  7.124  317.129  9.099  1.122  33.960 
4,0 < 5,0  46.107  4.188  205.292  3.882  478  11.065 
5,0 < 10,0  49.916  3.884  316.869  3.254  1.257  8.965 
10,0 < 20,0  3.903  960  47.745  394  119  764 
20,0 < 50,0  420  132  12.154  124  41  75 
50,0 < 100,0  19  8  3.618  36  0  0 
TOTAL  3.037.613  67.107  3.755.929  114.756  24.298  6.923.037 
Source: CAP – INE/MADER 2005 
 
Farmland utilisation is likely to decline as the inputs become unaffordable and the household labour 
supply is reduced. Land rights of women may also become increasingly insecure under patriarchal 
customary  tenure  systems  (which  predominate  in  Mozambique,  despite  their  nominal 
unconstitutionality in this respect); widows may be required to return to their own families and lose 
the land to which they had access whilst married. 
 
In South Africa, Groenewald (1991) cited by Van Zyl et al. (1995) suggests that even beyond the 
indivisibility of capital and managerial inputs, economies of scale may result from scale efficiencies 
induced by the existing agricultural marketing system through volume discounts on the purchase of 
inputs and volume premiums on the sale of outputs. However, he ascribes most of the perceived 
economies of scale to management, with larger farms having better managers.  Roth et al. (1992) 
cited by Van Zyl et al. (1995) econometrically tested a number of models explaining the reduction in 
the number of farms between 1972 and 1988. They found the number of farms to be positively 
correlated with the ratio of real machinery costs to real gross revenue, but negatively correlated with 
the ratio of farm requisites (mainly non-labour inputs) to output prices. This suggests that scale 
efficiencies in agriculture are strongly associated with a decline in machinery cost and an increase 
in  the  profitability  of  non-labour  inputs.  Both  correlations  suggest  that  the  appearance  of  scale 
efficiencies in South African agriculture is rooted in the policy distortions that led to the reduction of 
the real cost of capital in the agricultural sector. 
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Chavas and Van Zyl (1993), using non-parametric analysis and accounting for quality differences in 
land, found a highly significant negative correlation between farm size efficiencies and debt burden, 
while size efficiency and managerial ability were positively correlated. 
 
The results show that the issue of Scale Efficiency (SE) is a complex one and is influenced by a 
variety of factors, of which managerial ability – the basic indivisible input in agriculture – seems to 
be dominant. A whole range of farm sizes, in both extensive and intensive commercial farming, was 
found to be scale efficient, depending on how farmers organise their specific variable- and fixed-
input mix, as well as the combination of outputs they produce. Their results are consistent with the 
findings of Sartorius von Bach and Van Zyl (1992), who conclude that better managers have larger 
farms.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  small  farms  will  in  general  require  less  sophisticated 
management than large farms, which would explain why Chavas and van Zyl (1993) found efficient 
farms in all size categories. On the other hand, these results can be interpreted to mean that farm 
size is not really the central, but rather managerial ability. 
 
Land distribution in South Africa is among the most highly skewed in the world. Four centuries of 
conquest,  occupation, annexation,  land  acquisitions,  land  transfers  and  land  consolidation  have 
resulted in a land distribution that is comparable in its inequality to those of many Latin American 
counties that often experienced a similar history of European conquest and settlement. What sets 
South Africa apart from the rest of the world, however, is the relative emptiness of much of its rural 
landscape, with the exception of some high-potential areas along the eastern seaboard. In most of 
the country, rural villages, settlement, scattered firms and homesteads of farm labourers such as 
those found in the rural areas of Europe, Latin America, Asia and elsewhere in Africa are rare 
Approximately  86%  of  agricultural  land  is  held  by  67,000  mostly  White,  large-scale  farmers, 
supporting a rural population of 5.3 million. Consequently, the large-scale farming areas have a 
very low population density (about 16.2 hectares of agricultural land per rural resident). In contrast, 
a rural population of about 13.1 million resided in the homelands in 1988, on an area of 17.1 million 
hectares. Thus, 29% of South Africa's rural population (mostly farm workers and their dependants) 
lived on nearly 86% of the agricultural land, while 71% of its rural population lived on the remaining 
14% (World Bank, 1994). 
 
2.3.  AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT  
Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) emphasised that there is considerable agreement with the notion 
that an effective economic development strategy depends critically on promoting productivity and 
output  growth  in  the  agricultural  sector,  particularly  among  small-scale  producers.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that small-scale farmers are desirable not only because they provide a means of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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reducing unemployment, but also because they provide a more equitable distribution of income, as 
well  as  an  effective  demand  structure  for  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  Consequently,  many 
researchers  and  policymakers  have  focused  their  attention  on  the  impact  that  adoption  of  new 
technology can have on increasing farm productivity and income (Schultz, 1964; Kuznets, 1966; 
Hayami & Ruttan, 1985). 
 
Figure 2.5: Production, yield, area harvested, population, and per capita production 
There  is  evidence  that  farm 
consolidation  could  improve  family 
incomes  in  rural  areas.  Thus,  both 
cash  family  income  and  imputed 
family income (including the value of 
farm  products  from  own  production 
consumed  in  the  household) 
increase  with  the  amount  of  land 




During the last decade in particular, major technological gains stemming from the green revolution 
seem  to  have  been  largely  introduced  across  the  developing  world.  However,  in  Africa  and 
particularly Southern Africa, the population is still affected by chronic food insecurity. This suggests 
that attention to productivity gains arising from more efficient use of existing technology is justified. 
After 2001, prices began to rise slowly and by 2004 reached the level at which they had been in the 
mid-1980s.  In  early  2006,  world  market  prices  for  major  food  commodities  such  as  grains  and 
vegetable rose sharply to historic highs and they have now reached levels more than 60% above 
what they were just two years ago. Retail food prices in many countries have also risen in the last 
two years, raising concerns around the world. No single factor has been the cause of the price run-
up  in  food commodity  prices.  Some  factors  reflect  underlying  trends in  supply  and  demand  for 
agricultural  commodities  that  began  more  than  a  decade  ago.  Other  developments  that  have 
contributed to the price increase have occurred more recently.  
 
Some factors reflect significant structural changes in supply and demand relationships; others can 
be interpreted as short-term shocks to global supply and demand for agricultural products. Figure 
2.6 shows an index of monthly prices for food commodities, e.g. grains, vegetable oils, meats, 
seafood, sugar, bananas, and various other commodities that are the basis for human consumption 
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of staple foods. Although prices, measured in nominal dollars, trended slightly downward between 
1980 and 2008, there were several brief periods (1980, 1983, 1988, and 1996) when prices did rise 
from the previous year.  
 
Figure 2.6: Food commodity prices 
 
Rural  households  with  land  enjoy  higher 
incomes  than  those  without  land.  Larger 
individual  farms  produce  higher  incomes 
and achieve higher levels of family welfare 
than  smaller  farms.  This  finding  has 
naturally  led  to  the  conclusion  that 
consolidation  of  individual  farms  (within 
the range of up to about 100 hectares) is 
a  desirable  process  and  has  produced 
certain policy recommendations relating to land markets as a medium for farm size adjustment. In 
light of the difficulties of effecting meaningful impacts on the plight of poor people, there is mounting 
search for the ‘missing link’ in poverty-focused interventions, and the multidimensional nature of 
poverty is slowly being appreciated. For instance, poverty is no longer viewed as primarily material-
cum-income deprivation. For an increasing number of observers, it also means powerlessness, 
voicelessness, vulnerability, exposure to risk and fear, humiliation and social exclusion.   
social exclusion.   
 
For a long time, the worsening rural poverty levels in Southern African Countries (SACs) were 
explained principally in terms of poor economic performance, and externally prescribed economic 
remedies predominated in policy prescriptions. Emerging evidence, however, shows that economic 
growth alone is not sufficient to bring about, in a sustainable way, the needed poverty reduction. It 
is particularly worthy to observe that SACs possess extremely low growth elasticities of poverty 
reduction8.  This  recognition  does  not  minimise  the  importance  of  economic  growth  in  poverty 
reduction and rural development. For poor countries, rapid growth is a necessary, essential and 
powerful tool for poverty reduction in the medium to long term. Without growth, the objective of 
increasing the capacities and expanding the opportunities for the poor will continue to be severely 
constrained  by  the  lack  of  public  and  private  resources.  Growth  does  raise  the  poor  people’s 
productivity and incomes and it expands their opportunities and choices in a number of important 
ways.  
                                                       
8 Elasticities in the developing economies of Asia are, on average, much higher than those in SACs. This has led to the 
argument that while economic growth is important for poverty reduction in SACs, it is definitely not sufficient. 
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2.3.1.  FARM SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Agriculture  plays  a  strategic  role  in  these  economies  both  as  a  potential  source  of  long-term 
development  and  as  the  essential  contributor  to  sustained  food  security.  While  agricultural 
productivity gains in the industrialised countries have averaged two percent per year or more in 
recent decades, and frequently more than that in some developing countries, most studies of SAC 
agriculture  have  indicated  agricultural  productivity  losses  during  the  1970's  and  1980's.  On  the 
other hand, a study by the FAO used input weights for Brazil and India to weight agricultural input 
changes in 47 Sub-Saharan African countries. Using this approach, the analysts calculated average 
annual SAC productivity gains of about 0.5% from 1961 to 1996.  
 
In interventions that target poverty, one of the primary conceptual hurdles is to define who the poor 
are and, consequently, how to target them. Proper targeting of the poor has generally proved to be 
elusive and this is one area where more work is still required. The other challenge regards how best 
to ensure that there is local ownership of the interventions. This consideration brings to the fore the 
issues  of  local  governance.    One  of  the  lessons  from  the  past  failures  of  poverty-focused 
interventions  is  the  importance  of  avoiding  a  ‘top  down’  approach  to  project  design  and 
implementation,  as  this  invariably  results  in  ineffectiveness  of  the  interventions,  while  a 
decentralised and participatory approach has resulted in poverty reduction. The global community 
has recognised the development of Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, as the world’s foremost 
development challenge.  In Southern African countries, agriculture contributes about 35% of the 
regional GNP and employs more than two-thirds of the total labour force. In most of these countries, 
agriculture is the largest contributor to foreign exchange, averaging about 40% in the region (Bravo-
Ureta & Pinheiro, 1993). 
 
2.3.2.  ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES   
Progress  in  recent  years  in  the  ongoing  government  programme  of  road  construction  and 
rehabilitation  has  resulted  in  improved  movement  of  goods  among  the  different  regions  of  the 
country,  and  now  more  maize  from  the  centre  is  found  in  the  structurally  deficit  south.  This 
notwithstanding, transport costs still remain very high and make it uncompetitive to move maize 
from surplus areas of the north, and from central districts situated above the Zambezi River, to 
southern provinces, when compared with imported South African maize. At the same time, it is 
more profitable for these surplus areas to export maize to Malawi or Zambia, which, due to their 
proximity appear to be the most natural markets (Salomão, 2001).  
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The same problem clearly afflicts local (non-government) community organisations in management 
of  the  commons.  Extreme  social  fragmentation  in  India,  for  example,  makes  cooperation  in 
community institution-building much more difficult than in socially more homogeneous countries like 
Korea, Taiwan or Japan. One beneficial by-product of land reform, underemphasised in the usual 
economic analysis, is that such reform, by changing the local political structure in the village, gives 
more ‘voice’ to the poor and induces them to get involved in local self-governing institutions and 
management of local commons (World Bank, 2000).  
 
In terms of sequencing of reforms there is some general agreement that price reforms (movement 
towards  market-determined  prices)  should  be  attempted  before  the  removal  of  marketing 
regulations  and  that  measures  should  be  initiated  to  promote  a  competitive  private  sector  long 
before dismantling the public sector. For example, in order to reduce the high storage costs of large 
public sector marketing boards, long before attempts at privatisation, tenders can be invited from 
private  traders  to  supply  grains  and  other  produce  at  given  times  and  at  given  places,  and  in 
general encourage futures trading. In order to prevent the conversion of a public monopoly into a 
private monopoly, it is important to strengthen the public regulatory framework before attempts are 
made at privatisation (Wuyt, 2001). 
 
Competition  between  public  agencies  and  between  public  and  private  agencies  should  be 
encouraged.  In  the  Chinese  reform  process,  competition  among  public  agencies  of  different 
localities was encouraged, but this competition was enforced with a hard budget constraint, i.e. 
bailouts of failing local enterprises in rural areas by supra-local authorities were ruled out in general. 
In countries heavily dependent on export crops for income, foreign exchange and public revenue, 
reduction of restrictions on external trade should occur only at the later stages of reform – later than 
domestic trade liberalisation. Imports of critical agricultural inputs like fertilisers should be liberalised 
at an early stage (in any case, in countries like India, the fertiliser subsidy has been less to help 
farmers and more to prop up inefficient domestic fertiliser firms). 
 
Issues of land reform, credit reform and decentralisation of governance in the matter of delivery of 
local public goods and infrastructure that have been emphasised in this and preceding sections are, 
of course, to be carried out with a longer horizon in mind. Private investment in infrastructure is not 
likely to be forthcoming until the reforms in the pricing and user fees of infrastructural services are in 
operation.  In  post-reform  India  there  has  been  a  dearth  of  private  investment  in  electricity 
generation and distribution, in spite of many inducements by the government, since the electricity 
rate structure for farmers remains extremely low under pressure of powerful farm lobbies (Salomão, 
2001).  Partnerships  between  the  government,  private  sector  and  community  organisations  or POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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cooperatives sometimes facilitate the reform process in these matters. There are fixed costs in the 
building of local community organisations; once some organisation gets going in some particular 
aspect of rural development, the marginal cost of extending the functions of the organisation to 
cover other aspects may be relatively low, and there are externalities across different organisational 
domains. The State can act as a catalyst in the initial stages of such institution building, covering 
losses,  pooling  risks,  and  supplying  technical  and  professional  services  towards  building  local 
capacity (Salomão, 2001).  
 
The Chinese case also suggests that in the beginning the process should start with legitimising de 
facto changes already taking place in the fringes of the system before the formal onset of reforms. 
In the de-collectivisation (and the introduction of the household responsibility system) of 1978 the 
Chinese rulers were merely formalising what some farmers had already started doing on their own. 
It started with several households in a village in Fengyang County of Anhui Province (Wuyt, 2001). 
The practice was then imitated by other counties in the province and promoted by the provincial 
government before it was promoted by the central government. By 1984 almost all households in 
China were covered by this reform. In other respects decentralisation also allowed the Chinese 
rulers  to  try  out  new  experiments  in  market  reforms  in  some  localised  coastal  areas  first,  long 
before other regions came to learn from the demonstration effects of reform success. This paved 
the road to reform elsewhere and made it easier for them to overcome opposition. 
 
Even  with  all  its  limitations  (of  administrative  capacity,  as  well  as  vulnerability  to  wasteful  rent-
seeking processes) the State can play at least the role of catalyst in the initial stages in pump-
priming agricultural finance and in underwriting risks (while being careful to avoid the associated 
moral  hazard  of  encouraging  dependency).  It  can  take  the  initiative  in  establishing  commodity 
exchanges,  generating  and  disseminating  information,  allowing  for  contingent  contracts,  and 
arbitrating in contract disputes. While the process of deregulation should continue, the regulatory 
powers  of  the  State  have  to  be  enhanced  in  some  respects,  for  example  in  ensuring  the 
implementation of the avowed purpose of reforms to increase competition. Otherwise privatisation 
often involves replacement of a public monopoly with a private monopoly (World Bank, 2000).  
 
2.3.3.  AGRICULTURAL REFORMS 
In the reform literature there is considerably more emphasis on agricultural pricing and marketing 
reforms.  In  developing  countries  both  agricultural  output  and  input  prices  have  been  heavily 
regulated  for  many  years,  and  import-substituting  industrialisation  under  trade  protection  and 
overvalued exchange rates have often turned the internal terms of trade against the agricultural 
sector. Domestic farmers in India, for example, have been largely shut out of export markets in rice POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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and wheat, and in Africa export taxation and restrictions have yielded for the commercial farmers a 
low  share  of  the  border  prices  (particularly  for  crops  like  coffee).  On  the  other  hand,  import 
restrictions have artificially raised prices for some crops (oilseeds in India, maize in Africa) and 
diverted significant amounts of cultivated land to low-productivity uses. On the input front, water, 
electricity, diesel, etc. are often provided at heavily subsidised prices, inevitably leading to wasteful 
use of these inputs (often depleting fragile aquifers, and causing problems of water-logging, salinity, 
etc.). 
 
When  reform  of  the  agricultural  sector  in  Southern  Africa  began  in  the  1960s,  many  analysts 
predicted that farmers would become profit maximisers and, consequently, improve the productivity 
and efficiency of their operations. After an initial dip in agricultural production, therefore, Southern 
African agriculture was supposed to recover significantly. Several important investigations on Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in SACs have been made during the last decades. Block (2002) 
estimated a system of aggregated production functions with equal slope coefficients and computed 
TFP growth from the difference between intercepts of two consecutive production functions. He 
reported average annual TFP changes between -0.5% and 1.6% for Southern African countries. 
 
There were (and still are) many restrictions on internal trade and crop movements across regions, 
State procurement and distribution of food grains, and requirements for storage and channelling of 
agricultural  trade  through  State-controlled  agencies,  parastatals  and  marketing  boards.  The 
rationale was in terms of curbing speculation in food prices, controlling excessive price fluctuations 
and sudden shortages, and providing subsidised food for the poor. Some of these agencies were 
originally established to serve the perceived need for ensuring food security or supporting producer 
prices during periods of war or commodity price collapse, but, as often happens with organisational 
residues of history, these agencies ended up as political milch cows for powerful lobbies (Deininger 
&  Olinto,  2000).  These  State  agencies  have  often  been  chronically  afflicted  by  operational 
inefficiencies,  unreliable  deliveries  and  payments,  and  low  prices  for  farmers.  Under  the 
stabilisation programmes the prices offered were often much too low even compared to the benefits 
of more stable prices.
 In export crops, costs of marketing and taxation have been substantially 
higher  for  the  same  crop  under  marketing  boards  and  stabilisation  funds  than  under  the  free 
marketing system, depressing the share of border prices received by producers under the former 
systems. 
 
Subsidised food distribution often catered, at high cost to the government, to the vocal urban middle 
classes, not the rural poor. India, for example, has a large programme of public food distribution 
through ‘fair price' shops, using a significant part of the government’s budgetary subsidies. It is an POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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extremely costly programme, as an estimated 72% of the food subsidy is used up in overheads, 
storage, freight and interest costs, etc. borne by the highly inefficient Food Corporation of India – 
yet  it  reaches  only  a  tiny  fraction  of  the  rural  poor.  It  has  been  estimated  that  for  each  rupee 
transferred to the poor in India under the public food distribution scheme, the total cost for the 
administration is more than five times that amount (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996). 
 
Although  many  restrictions  remain,  food  markets  have  been  extensively  deregulated  in  recent 
years, and controls over movements of crops have been somewhat relaxed. With a reduction in 
industrial protection and depreciation of the real exchange rate, the relative price of agricultural 
products  has  improved.  The  overall  tax  burden  on  agriculture  has  diminished  significantly.  The 
opening up of markets to private traders has lowered marketing and distribution costs, smoothed 
prices between local markets, and improved market integration. Price and market reforms have, 
however,  turned  out  to  be  highly  inadequate  for  boosting  agricultural  productivity.  The  price 
response of supply presumed in some of the reform programmes has been over-optimistic. Output 
depends a great deal on what happens to the rural infrastructure (roads, transport, irrigation, power 
and telecommunications, research and extension services), credit and input delivery systems, etc., 
not all of which will improve with better prices, without significant and autonomous institutional and 
organisational changes (Deininger & Olinto, 2000). 
 
The importance (and difficulties) of asset redistribution measures like land reforms have already 
been mentioned. Small-scale farmers are potentially more productive in many crops, and better 
access to assets would have mitigated the severe problem of insufficient credit collaterals that they 
inevitably face. Redistributive land reforms can also provide a safety net to poor people facing the 
displacement effects of market reforms (loss of jobs and business, frictional unemployment, etc.). 
China has undergone massive and successful market reforms in the last two decades, and it can be 
argued that the wrenching effects on society were partly cushioned by the highly egalitarian land 
distribution (following the land reforms and de-collectivisation of 1978), so that even the poorest 
rural family bearing the brunt of reforms could fall back upon some land as a last resort. In relatively 
land-abundant countries, provision of credit to enable acquisition of productive assets like cattle is 
particularly important. For example, using a large panel dataset from rural households in Zambia, 
Deininger  and  Olinto  (2000)  econometrically  analysed  the  factors  that  explain  the  relatively 
lacklustre performance of the country's agricultural sector since liberalisation, and concluded that 
ownership  of  productive  assets  like  draught  animals  is  the  key  constraint  to  higher  agricultural 
productivity.  The  role  played  by  the  State  and  community  organisations  in  enabling  adequate 
provision of the non-price factors mentioned in general in the preceding paragraph becomes crucial 
in deciding the fate of even the price and market reforms.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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One (though obviously not the only) reason why the latter reforms have to date been slow and 
halting  in  many  developing  countries,  much  to  the  disappointment  of  many  of  the  reform 
missionaries of international lending organisations, is that some of the real problems which provided 
the  rationale  of  government  intervention  in  the  first  place  (and  gave  rise  to  the  domination  of 
inefficient State agencies) have not yet been fully resolved. In particular there are many market 
failures (particularly in the provision of credit, insurance, information, and infrastructural services) 
that  remain  unaddressed  even  as  the  State  withdraws  itself.  It  has  been  quite  common,  for 
example, to find in some African countries that under the fiscal austerity programmes mandated by 
the international lenders, agricultural productivity has stagnated or declined, as State support to 
small producers (in credit, output procurement, input subsidies, etc.) has shrunk and the private 
sector has not quite filled the gap, particularly in activities catering to remote regions and vulnerable 
groups (Bardhan, 2001). 
 
2.4.  RETROSPECTIVE OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN MOZAMBIQUE 
With a total area of 786 300 km
2 and a population of 21.4 million (INE, 2007), Mozambique has a 
relatively low population density. It is richly endowed with natural resources, including arable land, 
forests,  grasslands  and  inland  water  resources  from  its  network  of  rivers  including  the  mighty 
Zambezi, marine fisheries, minerals and hydroelectricity. As a result the economy is diversified, and 
agriculture,  transport,  manufacturing,  energy,  fisheries,  tourism  and  wage  remittances  all  make 
important contributions to the economy (INE, 2002). 
 
Market liberalisation policies have been implemented since 1992 in cooperation with the IMF and 
the World Bank. Under a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), renewed at the end of 
2003, Mozambique continues to benefit from debt relief and renewed loans. At the same time, 
foreign grants continue to cover about one-half of public expenditure. The economic reforms have 
been remarkably successful in terms of the important macro-economic goals. Sustained by strong 
foreign investment, real GDP has been growing at rates in excess of 7% for four consecutive years 
following the severe economic setback caused by devastating floods (Salomão, 2001). Despite all 
these gains, the impact on employment and incomes has been limited, as economic growth has 
mainly stemmed from a few large capital-intensive projects, with the support of huge inflows of 
foreign investment.  This includes the Mozal Aluminium Smelter in Maputo, whose production is 
oriented mainly to the European market; the natural gas pipeline from the coastal port of Beira to 
South  Africa;  the  rehabilitation  of the  power  lines  from  the  Cahora  Bassa  hydroelectric  dam  to 
South Africa and Zimbabwe; and several projects funded by donors for road construction and other 
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Forty-five percent of Mozambique’s total land area is suitable for agriculture, but only 11% – around 
four million hectares – is estimated to be cultivated. Farming is conducted by some 3.04 million 
peasant families, with a small number of commercial farmers cultivating a total of less than 60,000 
hectares  and  refurbished  agro-industrial  units  growing  30  000  hectares  of  sugarcane. 
Consequently, agriculture provides food security and is an important source of income for 75% of 
the  20  million  inhabitants.  Mozambique’s  diverse  soils  and  climatic  conditions,  influenced  by 
latitude,  variations  in  altitude,  topography  and  proximity  to  the  coast,  offer  a  wide  range  of 
production opportunities. However, as agricultural systems are predominantly rain-fed, the temporal 
and  spatial  distributions  of  rainfall  are  critical  to  crop  performance,  resulting  in  wide-ranging 
fluctuations in annual crop harvests from year to year (Wuyt, 2001). In most parts of the country, the 
main production season extends from September to March with a short second season in the south 
from April to August. The farming system is characterised by aggregations of near-subsistence farm 
families  holding  an  average  1.2  hectares  each,  who  practise  a  manually  cultivated  bush  fallow 
system, the intensity of which varies with population pressure. The extreme vulnerability of rural 
livelihoods was generated in part by the Mozambican civil war that lasted for 17 years after the 
country became independent in 1975. This war caused demographic upheavals, especially in the 
rural areas. About 3.5 million people were internally displaced or became refugees in bordering 
countries. Other consequences included the loss of lives of approximately one million people, while 
landmines planted throughout the countryside made it almost impossible for rural people to access 
their cropping lands (Devereux & Palmero, 1999). 
 
2.4.1.  AGRICULTURAL POLICY BACKGROUND  
Mozambique has made tremendous policy strides in the past few years. A sound economic reform 
programme has been implemented, with substantial support from external partners. The transition 
from war to peace and from a central planning system to a market economy is reaping results. 
Mozambique's growth rate has accelerated and was among the highest in the world in 2001. After 
being heavily reliant on food aid just a decade ago, in 2003 Mozambique ranked first among 20 
countries on the "optimism index" in a survey of business people active in Africa. Around 60% of 
Mozambicans live in a 50-kilometre-wide strip along the coast. Some 80% are rural, 90% of which 
live on small farms using mostly family labour which, despite their size and low technology, account 
for some 50% of GNP and a high share of exports. Yet, over 60% of Mozambicans live in absolute 
poverty. Years of failed economic policy, war and drought have left Mozambique totally dependent 
upon foreign assistance and struggling to achieve the rapid economic growth needed to counter 
poverty and high demographic growth. Structural adjustment began in 1987, with deeper market 
and fiscal reforms since 1992. After a post-war surge in GNP of 19%, an 'enabling environment' of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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fiscal,  legal  and  administrative  reforms,  including  integrated  employment  and  rural  and  urban 
development policies, is needed to promote the investment and internal economic linkages required 
for sustainable growth (Wuyt, 2001). 
 
Poverty, isolation, illiteracy and disease characterise the everyday life of most Mozambicans, who 
often feel that the benefits of growth are not reaching them and that they are still dependent on NR. 
The country is also vulnerable to floods and droughts. In February and March 2000 and 2001, 
devastating  floods  killed  700  people,  displaced  250  000  and  put  about  two  million  people  into 
severe economic difficulties (MADER, 2004). Annual rainfall in the north and west is adequate and 
reasonably reliable, producing surpluses of major crops such as maize in recent years. Rainfall of 
400-600 mm in the south is less dependable, with the exception of upland areas in the west of 
Maputo  Province.  Extensive  cattle  production  and  the  exploitation  of  natural  forest  and  other 
resources traditionally complement agriculture in local farm systems, but herds decimated by war 
and drought are only now beginning a slow recovery (Salomão, 2001). 
 
Mozambique has an estimated 19 million hectares of productive woodland. Tropical hardwoods are 
the  most  valuable  products,  although  pine  and  eucalyptus  plantations  also  exist.  The  more 
important species include umbila, jambirre, chanfuta and African sandalwood. The country’s logging 
capacity is estimated at around 500 000 cubic metres per year. Current off-take is well below this 
level. Apart from the natural forests, there is potential for the development of plantation forests with 
around one million hectares of land with suitable conditions available. The natural potential of the 
sector,  coupled  with  the  present  underdevelopment,  offers  a  wide  range  of  opportunities  for 
investors to meet the expanding local and international demand for timber, construction materials, 
furniture, and pulp for the paper industry.  
 
Rural development will benefit from actions to develop capital and infrastructure, amongst others. It 
can also be promoted through increased rural production, especially in agriculture. Many areas of 
rural  development  can  be  discussed.  Expansion  in  production  of  the  agricultural  sector  will  be 
carried  out  with  the  support  of  rural  extension  programmes  based  on  specific  crops  and 
technologies, as well as improvements in the financial system, whose role will be analysed.  The 
strategy  for  rural  and  agricultural  development  will  also  focus  on  food  security  policy,  which  is 
fundamental to reducing poverty and risks to the poor. During the last few years, rapid population 
growth and diminished food production have affected rural areas. Food security, life expectation 
and human immune systems have declined rapidly, increasing the rate of infant mortality. Rural 
living standards have deteriorated year by year (Bardhan, 2001). 
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2.4.2.  PERIOD BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 
The  overall  colonial  policy  of  strengthening  macro-economic  reform  also  extended  to  the 
agricultural sector. Privatisation continued to be a major policy objective as a means to improve 
productivity and reduce government subsidies on public enterprises that ran at a loss. However, the 
overall degree of government intervention in the economy and in agricultural markets remained 
significant.  As  a  Portuguese  colony,  Mozambique’s  economy  functioned  predominantly  as  a 
supplier of raw material for Portuguese-based agro-industries (e.g. cotton, copra, tea, sisal and 
cashew) with a few notable exceptions, such as sugar, which was processed locally (Salomão, 
2001).  The  agricultural  sector  comprised  a  few  plantations,  several  thousand  commercial 
concessions  (settler  farms  with  long-term,  liberal  usufruct  rights)  and  approximately  1.5  million 
African smallholder farms. The colonialist economy operated on a system of forced labour.  
 
Mozambican  peasants  were  obligated  to  provide  free  labour  to  cotton  and  rice  production  or, 
alternatively, to public work projects located in various and often distant regions of the country. The 
institution of rural taxes induced Mozambicans to seek employment on plantations and at the mines 
in neighbouring South Africa. In addition to the exploitation of agriculture, the colonial authorities 
extracted significant revenue from transport services provided to neighbouring British landlocked 
colonies (presently Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya) as well as from the export of prawns. 
 
The civil war destroyed significant parts of the physical and commercial infrastructure in rural areas. 
Numerous roads, bridges, shops, schools and healthcare institutions were destroyed (Devereux & 
Palmero,  1999),  causing  US  $15  billion  worth  of  damages  (Pitcher,  1996).  According  to  UN 
calculations, the cost of the physical destruction during the 1980s amounted to 250 years’ worth of 
exports at the 1992 level, and twice the annual influx of foreign aid (Abrahamsson & Nilsson, 1996; 
Devereux & Palmero, 1999). With the uncontrolled dispersion of communities, rural households lost 
their social networks, families were split up, and individuals were taken away from a context in 
which they could draw on mutual support, an important base for rural livelihoods. Mechanisms such 
as  local  norms  and  values,  traditional  rules,  taboos  and  ceremonies  that  had  influenced  the 
sustainable  use  of  natural  resources  and  environmental  protection  were  all  abandoned,  and 
traditional authorities that had been responsible for the dissemination of values and knowledge, 
especially to the younger generation, collapsed and lost their legitimacy. Indigenous knowledge of 
farming  techniques,  livestock  production,  and  disaster  prevention  and  preparedness  were 
completely lost or replaced by others acquired from abroad or from other areas within the country, 
not always suitable for the local physical environment. As an indirect consequence the vulnerability 
of rural livelihoods increased, placing these communities at greater risk of natural hazards. 
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2.4.3.  POST-INDEPENDENCE POLICIES 
Post-independence policies adhered to the principle of large-scale State farming and instituted the 
collectivisation  of  peasant  agriculture.  The  economic  result  was  that  the  marketed  agricultural 
output halved between 1981 and 1986. Alternative policies were thereafter implemented with new 
economic  reforms  and  a  new  emphasis  on  market  incentives.  The  primacy  of  smallholder 
agriculture now prevails. Some larger export crop farms have been revived through foreign direct 
investment  and  joint  venture  companies,  such  as  the  cotton  and  citrus  producer  Lonrho 
Mozambique Agriculture Company (LOMACO), which operates in several regions of Mozambique. 
Rehabilitation of the existing agriculture-related infrastructure, including roads, railway lines, ports, 
irrigation  systems,  and  water  and  power  supply,  is  a  priority  of  the  government  and  of  the 
international aid agencies assisting the Mozambican agricultural sector (Negrão, 1999).  
 
In order to provide greater production and marketing incentives to this sector, price controls on fruits 
and vegetables were removed and fixed prices on other agricultural commodities were increased. 
Mozambique joined the IMF and the World Bank and, within three years, had launched a structural 
adjustment  package  of  broad  market  reforms  known  as  the  Programme  of  Ecopnomic 
Rehabilitation  (PRE).  The  programme  addressed  macro-economic  distortions  and  imbalances, 
market liberalisation and privatisation (FAO, 1997).  The development of commercial agriculture in 
suitable areas of existing water resources and irrigation networks such as Chokwe and Massingir in 
the  Gaza  province,  and  Corrumana  in  Maputo  province,  is  another  priority  of  the  government. 
Mozambique began a process of market liberalisation in the early 1980s (Salomão, 2001). 
 
Market  liberalisation:  Beginning  in  1988,  producer  and  consumer  prices  were  gradually 
liberalised.  Many  fixed  prices  were  replaced  by  mandatory  minimum  prices  and  later  by 
recommended minimum prices. The latter were to serve merely as a reference to traders and to 
provide  some  leverage  for  farmers.  Prices  of  22  agricultural  products  were  freed  in  1993,  and 
consumer price controls were retained only on bread and wheat flour. A number of non-agricultural 
consumer  goods,  such  as  cooking  fuel,  remained  and  still  remain  subject  to  price  controls. 
International trade was progressively liberalised during the same period. Cotton and cashew prices 
have always been controlled, even during the colonial era. However, the method of calculating 
border prices of cashew and cotton was adjusted to reflect the international market more closely. In 
accordance with the 1991 tariff code, import tariffs were simplified into five rates ranging from 5 to 
35 percent. The definition of product groups was clarified and exemption criteria minimised in order 
to reduce the need for discretion to be used in applying tariffs. The code also stipulated that all 
export taxes, with the exception of those levied on raw cashews, would be limited to 0.5% in 1991 
and be completely eliminated at a later stage. The government also instituted a significant reduction POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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in the export tax on raw cashews, which was expected to result in improved farm gate prices and 
increased production. Under PRE provisions, there should be no export tax on any commodity 
beyond the year 2000. Currently, the raw cashew tax is the only one remaining. Although export 
licence restrictions have been substantially reduced, the application process for import licences 
continues to be complex and cumbersome (MADER, 2002). 
 
In 1996 the Mozambican government launched an ambitious commercial agricultural joint venture 
between South African farmers and Mozambique (MOZAGRIUS, coordinated by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development), a broadly successful scheme to attract farmers from South 
Africa  to  the  largest  and  most  fertile  northern  province  of  Niassa.  Farmers  participating  in  the 
scheme have already settled in Niassa. There is also an influx of farmers from Zimbabwe who have 
settled in the Manica province. The sugar industry in Mozambique currently comprises six different 
companies with their own factories and cane plantations. Açucareira de Maragra and Açucareira de 
Xinavane are located in the south of the country. The total plantation area of about 52 800 hectares 
is equipped with suitable irrigation systems (Salomão, 2001).  
 
Privatisation: The 1989 privatisation programme launched the process of selling off State farms 
and enterprises. To date, nearly all State farms and more than 500 small-, medium- and large-scale 
enterprises have been privatised, including all cashew processing plants and the customs offices. 
Lojas do povo
9 have also been abolished, and the government has become progressively more 
tolerant  of  private  traders.  The  State  still  has  interests  in  sugar  production,  cotton  ginning  and 
fishing.  Ginneries  historically  had  contracting  relationships  with  small-scale  cotton  producers. 
Currently, these ginneries operate under joint venture concessions with the government. The 1991 
law providing for the restructuring of all State enterprises changed those firms that had not yet been 
privatised  into  "public"  enterprises  that  are  required  to  operate  along  commercial  lines  with 
improved recordkeeping and greater financial accountability.  
 
The Foreign Investment Law, enacted in June 1993, cleared the way for greater foreign investment 
in Mozambique. The largest investors have to date been from Portugal and South Africa, and the 
most favoured sectors have been agriculture and tourism.  While traditionally supplied by large 
estates, joint-venture sugar mills are considering contracting arrangements also with small farmers. 
It is important to note that while farming operations have been privatised, all land is still owned by 
the State (MADER, 2004). 
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Correcting  macro-economic  distortions  and  imbalances:  In  an  effort  to  address  macro-
economic  distortions  and  imbalances,  the  Mozambican  Government  has  enacted  a  series  of 
standard structural adjustment measures. Devaluation of the national currency has reduced the 
difference  between  the  parallel  and  official  exchange  rates  from  2  100  percent  in  1989  to  3.6 
percent  in  1995.  While  devaluation  makes  Mozambican  export  crops  more  attractive  to  foreign 
buyers, there is a cost in terms of the increased burden of importing equipment and other material 
required for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Such is the case for revitalising sugar mill operations. 
The Mozambican government has instituted a hiring freeze, expanded and improved tax collection 
and  reduced  the  level  of  spending  on  certain  programmes  in  order  to  close  the  gap  between 
government revenue and spending and to decrease the deficit.  
 
Mozambique has good agricultural potential for basic grains, as well as a number of cash crops 
such as cashew, cotton, sisal, tea, tobacco, groundnuts, sunflower oil, citrus and vegetables. The 
northern portion of the country has more reliable rains and better soils, while livestock is limited to 
tsetse fly-free areas of the south. Communications and transport links between the north and the 
south  are  weak:  at  present  each  region  is  better  connected  to  international  markets.  The  vast 
majority of Mozambican farmers have approximately one hectare of land; yet, together, these plots 
comprise 95% of all cultivated land area. Most farmers are very poor and seasonally food-insecure. 
Fewer than 30% have off-farm income opportunities (MADER, 2004). 
 
The peace accord to end the protracted civil war was finally signed in 1992. Vestiges of the war, 
however, haunt rural areas in the form of hidden landmines, banditry, demolished infrastructure, 
poverty  and  virtually  non-existent  markets  for  producer  and  basic  consumer  goods  (Salomão, 
2001). Exacerbating the problem was a severe drought in 1992. As a result, approximately 80% of 
total cereals available in 1992 were derived from food aid (72%) and commercial imports (8%). 
Since  then,  food  aid  has  been  slowly  tapering  off  with  lingering  programmes  for  the  extremely 
vulnerable, such as food-for-work arrangements on specific rehabilitation projects and the provision 
of seeds and agricultural tools for resettlement (MADER, 2004). 
 
Marketing: Less than 30% of Mozambican farmers market surplus production. Groundnuts and 
then maize are the most commonly traded commodities. A number of significant constraints impede 
the diversification and expansion of agricultural marketing. Transport costs are very high,  while 
movement throughout the country is still restricted by instances of banditry. Owing to war-related 
sabotage and neglect of maintenance, only 30% of the road network is suitable for travel, and 
storage facilities are severely limited. Warehouses of the Instituto Moçambicano de Cereais (IMC), 
the  Mozambican  Grain  Marketing  Board,  are  seriously  underutilised.  Irregularly  enforced  pan-POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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territorial minimum reference prices prejudice the marketability of produce. The lack of liquidity and 
absence of rural credit limit the volume and geographic spread of trade, and transaction costs are 
soaring  as  traders  resort  to  the  use  of  barter.  Circulation  taxes  and outdated  and  burdensome 
licensing requirements discourage new entrants to rural markets. 
 
Land tenure: Mozambique’s current land law dates back to the colonial period. All land is currently 
owned by the State, which issues 50-year renewable leases granting liberal usufruct rights whereby 
the holder may sell and bequeath improvements and access rights. Authority to assign access 
rights and the issuance of a title depends on the size of the landholding. Although the actual limits 
vary according to land use, smallholdings are under the jurisdiction of provincial authorities and do 
not require titles, while larger holdings are titled and administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries.  Holdings  exceeding  10  000  hectares  are  in  the  domain  of  the  Land  Commission. 
Although Mozambique is generally considered a land-abundant country, only three to four million of 
an estimated 36 million cultivable hectares are classified both as high-quality soil and as easily 
accessible to markets. The more densely populated Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces have 
imminent land constraints, especially when fuel wood is collected (Negrão, 1999). 
 
The different types of land tenure and the land administration system prevailing in Mozambique 
today evolved over time from the interplay of the socio-political organisations of the various tribes, 
clans  and  families  through  trade,  wars  and  incorporation;  the  advent  of  colonial  rule  and 
subsequent introduction of tree crop agriculture, as well as commercial exploitation of timber and 
mineral resources; and post-independence politics and urbanisation.  The basic land laws and land 
tenure practices in Mozambique are, therefore, deeply embedded in the socio-cultural systems and 
political  institutions  of  its  indigenous  societies,  even  though  they  have  been  fundamentally 
influenced by administrative and statutory rules of the modern State.  Over time, as land became 
increasingly  scarce,  indigenous  arrangements  under  which  individual  members  of  the  lineage 
enjoyed general rights of access to land have been rendered untenable (Salomão, 2001). 
 
Mozambique has immense agricultural potential, with an estimated 36 million hectares of arable 
land, of which only 10% is presently in productive use. The wide diversity of soil types and the 
diverse  climatic  conditions  in  the  country  are  suitable  for  a  large  variety  of  crops.  Most  of  the 
agriculture practised in Mozambique is non-irrigated. However, Mozambique’s network of more than 
60 rivers has allowed for the construction of irrigation schemes. Total potential irrigated area is 
estimated  at  3.3  million  hectares.  The  main  irrigation  systems  are  at  Chokwe  and  the  sugar 
plantations in Incomati, Maragra, Buzi, Mafambisse and Luambo, covering a total of some 59,000 
hectares. The Zambezi Valley has great investment potential in the agricultural sector, offering both POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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excellent arable land and readily available irrigation. To assist in the development of this area, the 
government set up the Zambezi Planning Office in 1997 to promote and coordinate social and 
economic development. Special tax incentives are also offered (MADER, 2004).  
 
The economic and political changes introduced in the early 1990s also exacerbated the situation of 
vulnerability.  In  1987,  when  structural  adjustments  were  introduced,  State  enterprises  were 
privatised, leading to a decrease in the provision of goods and services to the poorest people, with 
negative  impacts  mostly  on  poor  Mozambican  households.  Politically,  the  country  observed 
changes of legislation in response to global economic and political changes. Several policies were 
amended and some new ones approved specifically to include a livelihood component, especially in 
rural  communities  (Salomão,  2001).  The  severe  2000,  2001  and  2007  floods  in  southern  and 
central Mozambique, for instance, affected about 150 000 hectares of crop production. Livestock 
losses were estimated at about 30% of the total cattle stock in the three southern provinces (Gaza, 
Inhambane and Maputo provinces). Oxfam reported that 522 000 people were displaced or in areas 
cut off by flooding
10. 
 
2.4.4.  AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION GROWTH 
Agriculture is the backbone of the economy, providing employment for over 75% of the workforce 
and contributing 20.1% to GDP in 2003. The main export crops include copra, cashew nuts, sugar 
cane,  cotton  fibre  and  tea.  Other  crops  such  as  sisal,  tobacco,  mafurra  and  girassol  are  also 
cultivated commercially (Salomão, 2001). At present the agricultural sector is still dominated by the 
family  sub-sector,  which  accounts  for  90%  of  the  cultivated  areas  and  includes  2.5  million 
households. This sub-sector relies on rain-fed farming and has very basic techniques resulting in 
low yields. The remaining arable land is cultivated by large commercial farms that concentrate on 
cash  and  export  crops.  In  2007  the  agricultural  sector  engaged  approximately  81%  of  the 
Mozambican  labour  force  (INE,  2007)  and  contributed  34%  of  GDP.  Mozambique's  major 
agricultural products include millet, maize, sorghum, rice, cassava and wheat. Agricultural exports 
include prawns, which are a type of shellfish similar to large shrimp, cashews, cotton, tropical fruits, 
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Table 2.5 shows the sector annual growth rates 1980 – 2004. In general it is noted that the volume 
of imports is increasing while the agricultural labour force is decreasing. The information suggests 
that  there  is  an  increased  need  for  public  regulation  and  investments  in  new  inputs  and 
technologies. The laws, rules and regulations that govern the interaction of various actors in the 
political arena are slowly being recognised as significantly influencing the nature of the relationships 
that emerge in countries’ attempt to find solutions to the poverty dilemma.  This is particularly the 
case for some export crops where private marketing chains tend to be monopolistic (in contrast to 
the case of many domestic food crop markets where there is usually more competition and lower 
entry barriers).  
Table 2.5: Agricultural sector – Average annual growth rates (%) 












Population and Agriculture Labour 
Force 




0.9  3.0  1.8    Import Value  7.9  -3  10 
Rural Population  0.0  1.5  -0.1    Import quantity  6.7  -2.5  10.1 
Agriculture Labour 
Force 
0.1  2.9  1.5    Export Value  -12.2  2  22.2 
          Export Quantity  -11.7  3.5  15.5 
Agricultural Production                 
Cassava  1.1  4.8  3.9           
Maize  0.0  17.6  10.3           
Indigenous Cattle Meat  1.2  -0.5  0.3           
                 
Agriculture and Food Production Indices             
Agricultural Production  -0.6  4.8  3.5    Food Supply       
Agricultural Production, 
per person 
-1.5  1.8  1.7    Per person  -0.1  1.6  1.7 
Food Production  0.0  4.7  3.2    Total  0.9  4.6  3.6 
Food Production, per 
person 
0.9  1.7  1.4                
Source: ESSGA, 2006               
 
Mozambique's growth and poverty reduction strategy is based on environmentally sustainable and 
inclusive  private  sector  growth.  But  the  country’s  public  administration  remains  weak,  despite 
significant reform and improvement, and it continues to face challenges of capacity and resources 
to  deliver  basic  infrastructure  and  services  and  to  properly  enforce  the  consistent  legal  and 
regulatory  framework  essential  for  investment  and  private  sector  development.  In  2000,  for 
example,  production  of  corn  –  Mozambique's  most  important  crop  produced  for  domestic 
consumption – fell to 1 019 000 tons from 1 246 000 tons the year before. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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The productive decline related largely to devastating floods, which lasted from January to March. 
Conversely, debilitating droughts also frequently afflict the country, and two crippling droughts in the 
post-war period alone led to severe declines in agricultural production. Such weather imbalances 
lead  to  oscillating  (fluctuating)  patterns  of  production,  which,  in  addition  to  destabilising  export 
revenue, severely restrict the country's ability to gain self-sufficiency in food production. Yields were 
down all over the southern region and parts of central region. 
 
Figure 2.7: Production zones of Mozambique 
The World Food Programme
11 reported that severe dry weather in 
some of Mozambique's central and southern provinces placed 355 
000  people  in  immediate  need  of  food  aid,  rising  to  515  000. 
International pricing is not the only factor that affects the stability 
of the agricultural sector. Weather conditions are a second, albeit 
just as important, element determining productive output. Further 
exacerbating  the  problem,  only  four  percent  of  all  land  in 
Mozambique is arable. As a result of these problems, the country 
must import large amounts of rice and wheat every year. To make 
matters worse, shortages in neighbouring countries have pushed 
food prices beyond the reach of a significant number of the rural 
poor.  In  the  southern  region  (Gaza,  Inhambane  and  Maputo) 
some  good  initial  rains  were  followed  by  a  long  dry  spell  – 
resulting in virtually no rains for half the growing season.  In the 
affected areas, a drop of more than 60% of the total expected output of cereals and grains is due to 
drought. The emerging domestic private sector needs access to infrastructure and finance, and 
must also acquire the skills, experience and innovation required to exploit new sources of growth 
and to compete successfully in the new world economy. Mozambique's young democracy remains 
fragile,  and  underlying  political  tensions  continue  to  task  nation-building  and  threaten  national 
stability.  The  Government  estimates  that  60,000  hectares  yielded  less  than  10%  of  their  usual 
output. Absence of rain has also affected the second seasonal harvest (mid-June to August), which 
only represents 10% of annual production, but accounts for 40-50% of annual production in the 
lower Limpopo districts of Gaza.  
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2.4.5.  POPULATION GROWTH AND FARMING SYSTEMS 
Population density is expected to influence the labour intensity of agricultural production, including 
the choice of products, as well as production technologies and land management practices, by 
affecting the land-labour ratio (Pender, Jagger, Nkonya & Sserunkuuma, 2002). Population growth 
may cause expansion of cultivated agriculture into forest and/or grazing areas and reductions in 
fallow,  or  it  may  induce  adoption  of  land-saving  products  or  technologies,  investments  in  land 
improvement,  and  adoption  of  labour-intensive  land  management  practices,  amongst  other 
changes. For example, an area with suitable climate and soils may have an absolute advantage in 
producing high-value perishable vegetables, but have little comparative advantage in this if it is 
remote from markets and roads. Improvements in market or road access are thus expected to 
favour production of higher value perishable commodities, as well as non-farm activities, and should 
contribute to higher incomes and welfare.  Improved access to markets and infrastructure has more 
ambiguous theoretical impacts on land use, land management practices and resource conditions, 
depending on the relative impacts on costs of productive factors, and because of ambiguous effects 
of output prices on incentives to conserve land. 
 
One-third of the population is considered to be 'ultra poor', with consumption expenditure 60% or 
less  below the  poverty  line.  About  seven  in  ten  Mozambicans  reported  consumption  below  the 
national poverty line (US $0.40 per day). About 80% of Mozambique's poor live in rural areas; about 
70% of the rural population is poor, and over 90% of rural adults work in agriculture. There is 
significant regional variation in poverty.  Sofala, Tete, and Inhambane have the highest poverty 
incidences, but 40% of the poor live in densely populated Nampula and Zambézia. Food insecurity, 
prevalent during the war, continues to contribute to malnutrition (World Bank, 2000). 
 
This concept is similar to the concepts of farming systems and livelihood strategies, but is more 
general than farming systems since it incorporates non-farm as well as farm activities (as does the 
concept  of  livelihood  strategies),  and  is  dynamic  since  it  refers  to  changes  and  not  merely  to 
livelihood strategies pursued at a particular point in time. In this research, these concepts are used 
to  guide  the  research  questions  addressed  and  the  methods  used  to  answer  those  research 
questions.  A  preliminary  report  by  Pender  et  al.  (2002)  indicates  some  positive  differences  in 
investment and credit for titled farmers over non-titled farmers. Farmers’ yields are typically less 
than one-third of potential yields found on research stations, and yields of most major crops have 
been stagnant or declining since the early 2000s (Tanui, Russel & Alinyo, 2006). Low and declining 
agricultural productivity in turn contributes to poverty and food insecurity. Poor and food-insecure 
households may be forced to plant crops on steep slopes or may be unable to afford to keep land 
fallow, invest in land improvements, or use costly inputs such as fertiliser.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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2.4.6.  PUBLIC INVESTMENTS IN AGRICULTURE 
In many developing countries, public investment in agriculture has been on the decline in the post-
reform period. Given the undoubted complementarities between public and private investment in 
this field, it is not surprising that private investment has been slow to make up for this deficiency. 
The  issue  of  public  investment  will  be  increasingly  important  also  in  the  case  of  biotechnology 
research to develop technologies in plant and livestock breeding and in native crops suited to local 
conditions (sorghum in Africa, millets in India) – a need that is likely to be neglected by the patent-
protected  multinational  biotechnology  companies.  Funding  cuts  for  international  public 
organisations like the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), once the 
leaders in Green Revolution research and development, have made it particularly difficult for them 
to serve the special needs of poor farmers.  With regard to public investments in agriculture, the 
emphasis  is  shifting  from  massive  State  investment  in  large  dams  (that  often  cause  major 
displacements of people, environmental damage, water-logging and salinity, and arbitrary water 
control operations run by a corrupt and distant bureaucracy) to better local management of existing 
irrigation systems and minor irrigation projects under some form of community control to improve 
the effectiveness of investments (Wuyt, 2001).  
 
The Indian canal systems are large, centralised hierarchies in charge of all functions (operations 
and  maintenance,  as  well  as  design  and  construction).  Their  ways  of  operation  (including  the 
promotion  and  transfer  rules  for  officials,  rules  designed  to  minimise  identification  between  the 
irrigation  patrollers  and  the  local  farmers,  and  the  frequent  use  of  low-trust  management  and 
supervision methods) and source of finance (most of the irrigation department's budget comes in 
the form of a grant from the State treasury) are totally insensitive to the need for developing and 
drawing upon local social capital. In contrast, in Korea there are functionally separate organisations 
in  the  canal  systems:  the  implementation  and  routine  maintenance  tasks  (as  opposed  to 
policymaking and technical design work) are delegated to the Farmland Improvement Associations, 
one  per  catchment  area,  which  are  staffed  by  local  part-time  farmers  (selected  by  the  village 
chiefs), knowledgeable about changing local conditions, dependent for their salary and operational 
budget  largely  on  the  user  fees  paid  by  the  farmers,  and  continually  drawing  upon  local  trust 
relationships. 
 
In Mozambique, declining public investment in agricultural research and development is slowing the 
rate of technological progress in agriculture, and the decline of investments in maintenance and 
repair of irrigation and drainage systems and rural roads, and in the prevention of soil erosion, has 
curtailed  the  effectiveness  of  earlier  investments  in  agriculture.  The  table  below  shows  the 
proportional level of investment in agriculture compared with other sectors. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Table 2.6: Proportion of agricultural investment 2006 – 2010  
Sectors  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
State Bodies   9.9%  11.6%  9.8%  10.3%  8.6% 
Basic Education   18.9%  18.0  19.0  19.8  21.2 
High Education and Technology  3.1%  3.4  3.8  3.8  3.9 
Health  19.0%  18.1  18.1  18.0  18.3 
Roads  12.5%  13.4  13.8  13.6  13.9 
Water and Sanitation  5.3%  5.3  5.9  5.8  5.5 
Justice  8.1%  7.6  7.4  7.3  7.3 
Agriculture and Natural Resources  7.2%  7.6  7.6  7.3  7.2 
Others  16.0%  15.0  14.7  14.2  14.1 
TOTAL  44.21%  46.46  48.03  50.75  52.83 
Source: PARPA 
 
The same problems of low accountability to the local population afflict the volume and particularly 
the quality of provision of local public goods and services in many developing countries. Moser and 
Norton  (2001)  calculated  scores  from  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  institutional  arrangements  for 
decision-making and resource allocation in six important aspects of rural development in nineteen 
developing countries (rural primary education, rural primary healthcare, rural roads maintenance, 
agricultural extension, rural water supply and forestry management). Of the nineteen cases in the 
sample, the scores of decentralisation are particularly low for Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, 
Senegal,  Bangladesh,  Egypt,  and  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania.  Fisman  and  Gatti  (1999) 
documented a significant negative correlation in cross-country data between the sub-national share 
of  total  government  spending  and  various  measures  of  corruption,  controlling  for  other  factors, 
suggesting that decentralisation can mitigate corruption. Of course, the adverse effects of lack of 
local accountability on the quality of public goods and services show up in even less tangible forms 
of leakages and targeting failures than what the measures of corruption indicate. 
 
There are also many cases of failure of cooperation in the management of common resources in 
poor  countries,  leading  to  an  anarchical  regime  in  the  scramble  for  these  resources.  With  the 
erosion of the local commons – decimation of forests and grazing lands, silting and increasing 
toxicity of rivers and ponds, depletion of aquifers and soil erosion and desertification – life for the 
rural poor in many parts of the world has become more insecure and impoverished in ways that are 
not captured in the usual poverty estimates based on private consumer expenditure data. Many of 
these  countries  actually  have  a  long  history  of  balanced  resource  management  under  highly 
informal local community arrangements. Going beyond the impact of local accountability on the 
quality  of  service  in  publicly  supplied  facilities,  it  is  important  to  note  that  a  local  community 
organisation, if it has a stable membership and well-developed structures for transmitting private POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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information  and  norms  among  the  members,  may  have  the  potential  for  better  management  of 
common  property  resources  (like  forests,  grazing  lands,  fisheries  and  minor  surface  irrigation 
works), on which the rural poor depend vitally for their daily livelihood and also for insurance in the 
form of a fallback source of food and fodder in bad crop years. There are several documented 
examples  in  different  parts  of  the  world  of  successful  and  autonomous  local  community-level 
management of the commons (Platteau, 1996).  
 
2.5.  THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS  
The role that institutions should play in agricultural development has been recognised for years. 
Agricultural policies and the adoption of new technologies designed to enhance farm output and 
income  have  received  particular  attention  as  a  means  to  accelerate  economic  development. 
However,  output  growth  is  not  determined  only  by  technological  innovations,  but  also  by  the 
efficiency  with  which  available  technologies  are  used  (Nishimizu  &  Page,  2004).The  classic 
example of inefficient institutions persisting as the lopsided outcome of distributive struggles relates 
to the historical evolution of land rights in developing countries. In most of these countries the 
empirical evidence suggests that economies of scale in farm production are insignificant (except in 
some plantation crops), and the small family farm is often the most efficient unit of production. Yet 
the violent and tortuous history of land reform in many countries suggests that there are numerous 
roadblocks on the way to a more efficient reallocation of land rights put up by vested interests for 
generations.  
 
Institutions are generally categorised into formal and informal institutions. The formal institutions are 
largely  governed  by  the  pre-decided  legal  setup  in  the  form  of  formal  norms.  In  certain 
circumstances these norms are flexible and can change over time, whereas in other circumstances 
they  can  be  static  in  nature.  Therefore  there  are  two  types  of  categories:  One  is  the  dynamic 
characteristic of the institution whereas, the other is static and inflexible in nature. The informal 
institutions, on the other hand, emerge out of the spontaneous requirements based on the needs of 
society. Here again some of the institutions may have a structure that may not change over time; in 
certain other cases the informal institutions can be highly flexible.  With agriculture being a subject 
very  close  to  the  cultural  setting  and  sensitive  to  changes  in  society  at  large,  flexible  informal 
institutions are more effective in agriculture. It is interesting to observe the changes that have taken 
place in the institutional structure, especially after independence. The institutional structure has 
changed due to various factors, mainly concerning technology, the process of commercialisation, 
and organisational structure.  
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The profile of development is influenced and also determined by the institutional setup. Institutions 
shape human interaction and define the choices and decisions made by the individual, community 
or society to achieve a satisfactory lifestyle under the given constraints. Thus institutions play a 
significant role in shaping and regulating human activities to optimise production and to minimise 
the risks associated with production systems. Any development process presumes three levels in 
achieving its goal. Of these, the first stage begins at the preparation for the process of development 
that essentially requires inducing growth in the first place. The erosion of the commons set in only 
with  major  demographic  and  institutional  changes  in  recent  decades,  often  accelerated  by 
commercial  or  bureaucratic  appropriation  of  the  common  resources,  supplanting  the  traditional 
historical  rights  of  local  communities  over  these  resources.  Devolution  of  power  back  to  these 
communities  can  succeed  in  regulating,  conserving  and  maintaining  these  resources.  In  some 
cases – for example, in forest protection and regeneration and wasteland development in India – 
there  are  now  some  successful  instances  of  joint  management  by  the  State  and  the  local 
community, with the latter taking major responsibility. 
 
2.5.1.  ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS 
The economic institutions are induced and sustained with the help of economic parameters such as 
price, market, exchange and monetary interlocked interests. These institutions involve combinations 
of the formal and informal institutions, and are stable on the ground until economic interests change. 
Introduction  of  markets  as  the  driving  force  of  growth  in  the  developing  countries  can  be 
categorised as one of the major institutional departures. This assumes importance in the context of 
the meagre marketing infrastructure developed in these countries and the existing imperfections 
due to the proverbial conduit called ‘middleman’. There are attempts to meet the situation arising 
out of the changing institutional structure under the pressure of the forces of liberalisation and the 
market-led growth initiatives. Some of these essentially have to be in the crucial sectors like market 
and credit (Rihoy, 1998). 
 
With a view to reviving the agricultural credit delivery system, there is a need to adopt innovative 
approaches like the linking of self-help groups (SHGs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
with mainstream financial institutions. In order to rejuvenate rural credit delivery systems, the twin 
problems facing the system, viz. high transaction costs and poor repayment performance, need to 
be  tackled  with  more  fiscal  jurisprudence,  reserving  exemplary  punishment  for  wilful  defaults, 
especially by large-scale farmers. In fact, insofar as the rural credit delivery system is concerned, 
the focus should be on strategies that are required for tackling issues such as sustainability and 
viability, operational efficiency, recovery performance, small-scale farmer coverage, and balanced 
sectoral development. Another alternative coming forth is the introduction of the futures markets. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Futures  trading  existed  in  south  Asia  especially  for  a  few  commercial  crops  such  as  cotton 
(Rondinelli, 1981). Kalirajan, Obwona and Zhao (1996) state that futures markets play an important 
role in determining the inventory decisions in the cash market. These act as the nerve centre for the 
collection  and  dissemination  of  information  about  the  agent’s  expectations  of  the  futures  cash 
market. The major role for futures markets appears to be in reducing inter-seasonal volatility as 
opposed  to  intra-seasonal  volatility.  The  results  suggest  that  futures  markets  may  indeed  be  a 
viable  policy  alternative  for  policymakers  to  reduce  uncertainty  in  agricultural  markets.  The 
liberalisation of State support policy, which was designed to stabilise farmers’ income, will increase 
risk and uncertainty to market participants, whereas the futures market, through its information role, 
may vastly improve storage across the seasons, thereby stabilising cash prices. 
 
2.5.2.  INSTITUTIONALISING COMMON POOL RESOURCES 
Why don't the large landlords voluntarily lease out or sell their land to small family farmers and grab 
much of the surplus arising from this efficient reallocation? There clearly has been some leasing out 
of land, but problems of monitoring, insecurity of tenure and the landlord's fear that the tenant will 
acquire occupancy rights on the land have limited efficiency gains and the extent of tenancy. The 
land sales market has been particularly thin (and in many poor countries sales go the opposite way, 
from distressed small farmers to landlords and moneylenders). With low household savings and 
severely imperfect credit markets, the potentially more efficient small farmer is often incapable of 
affording the going market price of land. Deininger (1995) explains it in terms of land as a preferred 
collateral  (and  also  carrying  all  kinds  of  tax  advantages  and  speculation  opportunities  for  the 
wealthy) often having a price above the capitalised value of the agricultural income stream for even 
the more productive small farmer, rendering mortgaged sales uncommon (since mortgaged land 
cannot be used as collateral to raise working capital for the buyer). Under these circumstances and 
if  public  finances  (and  the  state  of  the  bond  market)  are  such  that  landlords  cannot  be  fully 
compensated, land redistribution will not be voluntary (Meier & Stiglitz, 2001). 
 
Landlords also resist land reforms, because the levelling effects reduce their social and political 
power and their ability to control and dominate even non-land transactions. Large land holdings 
may give their owner special social status or political power in a lumpy way (the status or political 
effect from owning 100 hectares is larger than the combined status or political effect accruing to 50 
new buyers owning TWO hectares each). Thus the social or political rent of land ownership for the 
large landowner will not be compensated for by the offer price of numerous small buyers. Under 
these circumstances the former will not sell, and inefficient (in a productivity sense, not in terms of 
the Pareto criterion) land concentration persists. 
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Of course, even in the context of increasing returns to land ownership in terms of political rent, land 
concentration is not always the unique or stable political equilibrium. Much depends on the nature 
of political competition and the context-specific and path-dependent formations of political coalitions 
(Meier & Stiglitz, 2001). An interesting example of this in terms of comparative institutional-historical 
analysis is provided by Nugent and Robinson (1998). Holding constant both colonial background 
and crop technology, the divergent institutional (particularly in terms of smallholder property rights) 
was compared with the growth trajectories of two pairs of former Spanish colonies in the same 
region (Costa Rica and Colombia on the one hand, and El Salvador and Guatemala on the other) 
producing the same principal crop (coffee). Institutional economics will be richer with more such 
comparative  historical  studies  (instead  of  more  cross-country  regressions)  (Deininger  &  Olinto, 
2000). 
 
2.5.3.  LAND REFORM AND ITS IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE 
In many countries land reform is not high on the list of priorities in the reform agenda. Even the few 
economists or policy people who are persuaded by the desirability of land reforms are despondent 
about  their  feasibility.  This  is  particularly  because  some  of  the  conditions  under  which  poor 
peasants work – seasonal crop cycles, spatial dispersion, covariate risks and extreme dependence 
on the landlords – make collective action on their part much more difficult than in the case of urban 
workers. Given this and the strength of opposition of vested interests, many regard the political 
prospects for land reform in most poor countries as bleak, and therefore drop it altogether from the 
agenda of poverty alleviation.  
 
Some aspects of land reform (like extension of tenure security) may be less difficult to implement 
than  others  (like  land  ceilings).  Besides,  in  the  dynamics  of  political  processes  and  shifting 
coalitions, the range of feasibility often changes, and options kept open contribute to the political 
debate  and  may  influence  the  political  process.  Some  policy  advisors  (in  international  lending 
agencies)  who  rule  out  land  reform  as  politically  infeasible  are  at  the  same  time  enthusiastic 
supporters of other policies that may be no less politically difficult; an example is the strict targeting 
of food subsidies and thus the cutting of the substantial present subsidies to the vocal urban middle 
classes.  In  the  game  of  political  coalition  formation,  a  radical  policy  sometimes  becomes 
implementable if it helps to cement strategic alliances, say between sections of the urban upper 
classes (including white-collar workers) and the rural poor. 
 
Of course, some methods of land reform can be counterproductive, particularly in situations of land 
scarcity and weak organisation of the land-poor. Well-intentioned measures like abolition of tenancy 
often end up driving tenancy underground or leading to the large-scale eviction of tenants, and take POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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away a part of the agricultural ladder that the landless could formerly aspire to use to climb out of 
poverty.  Redistributing  land  without  adequate  provision  of  credit  and  marketing  facilities  and 
extension services may make land recipients worse off, as they are obliged to burn their bridges 
with the erstwhile landlord-creditor patron. In recent years there is increasing support for ‘market-
assisted land reforms' (as opposed to confiscatory land reforms), whereby the government assists 
voluntary transactions in the land market through credit and subsidies to the small buyers (Bardhan, 
2001). 
 
A major problem that hinders most schemes of decentralised governance is related to distributive 
conflicts.  In  areas  of  high  social  and  economic  inequality,  the  problem  of  ‘capture'  of  the  local 
governing agencies by the local elite can be severe, and the poor and the weaker sections of the 
population  may  be  left  grievously  exposed  to  their  mercies  and  their  malfeasance.  The  central 
government can also be ‘captured', but there are many reasons why the problem may be more 
serious at the local level. For example, there are certain fixed costs of organising resistance groups 
or lobbies, and as a result the poor may sometimes be more disorganised at the local level than at 
the national level where they can pool their organising capacities. Similarly, collusions among the 
elite groups may be easier at the local level than at the national level. Policymaking at the national 
level  may  represent  greater  compromise  among  the  policy  platforms  of  different  parties,  while 
capture at the national level may be subject to greater media attention, and so on. When the local 
government is captured by the powerful and the wealthy, instances of subordinate groups appealing 
to supra-local authorities for protection and relief are not uncommon (Meier & Stiglitz, 2001).  
 
2.5.4.  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN AGRICULTURE  
In  the  immediate  post-war  decades,  underdevelopment  was  largely  attributed  to  deficiencies  in 
factor endowments, particularly of capital (physical and human) and of foreign exchange to buy 
essential intermediate and capital goods. In the last couple of decades it has been increasingly 
recognised that the escape routes out of poverty are often blocked by various kinds of institutional 
impediments that go far beyond deficiencies in factor endowments (and are more difficult to resolve 
than by simple infusions of foreign aid or even increases in domestic saving). These institutions 
include those in the form of legal structures, customary rules, property rights, implicit or explicit 
contracts, and governance systems. These define the framework in which factors of production are 
utilised and developed (Wuyt, 2001).  
 
Two recent strands of institutional economics have been influential in development literature. One is 
associated with the theory of imperfect information: the first, underlying rationale of institutional 
arrangements and contracts (formal or informal) are explained in terms of strategic behaviour under POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  51
asymmetric information among the different parties involved. This theory has been fruitfully used in 
modelling many key agrarian and other institutions in poor countries, which are seen to emerge as 
substitutes for missing credit, insurance and futures markets in an environment of pervasive risks, 
information asymmetry, and moral hazard. It started with the literature on sharecropping, then on 
interlocking of transactions in labour, credit, marketing, and land lease, on labour tying, on credit 
rationing, on joint liability in group lending schemes, and so on.  
 
The  second  is  associated  with  analysis  of  development  processes  and  concentrates  on 
comparative historical development (mainly in Western Europe and North America). North (quoted 
by  Negrão,  1999)  pointed  to  the  inevitable  trade-off  in  the  historical  growth  process  between 
economies of scale and specialisation on the one hand, and transaction costs on the other. In a 
small,  closed,  face-to-face  peasant  community,  for  example,  transaction  costs  are  low,  but  the 
production costs are high, because specialisation and division of labour are severely limited by the 
extent of market defined by the personalised exchange process of the small community. In a large-
scale  complex  economy,  as  the  network  of  interdependence  widens,  the  impersonal  exchange 
process  gives  considerable  scope  for  all  kinds  of  opportunistic  behaviour  and  the  costs  of 
transacting  can  be  high.  Greif  (2006)  examined  the  self-enforcing  institutions  of  collective 
punishment for malfeasance in long-distance trade in the late medieval period and in a comparative 
study of the Maghribi and the Genoese traders explored the institutional foundations of commercial 
development. Beyond the face-to-face village community the institutions a society develops (or fails 
to  develop)  for  large-scale  commercial  operations,  long-distance  trade,  credit  and  other 
intertemporal and interspatial markets, where the transactions are not self-enforcing, provide an 
important indicator of that society's capacity for development. 
 
In Western societies, complex institutional (legal and corporate) structures have been devised over 
time  to  constrain  the  participants,  to  reduce  the  uncertainty  of  social  interaction  in  general  to 
prevent the transactions from being too costly, and thus to allow the productivity gains of larger 
scale and improved technology to be realised. These institutions include elaborately defined and 
effectively enforced property rights, formal contracts and guarantees, trademarks, limited liability, 
bankruptcy  laws,  large  corporate  organisations  with  governance  structures  to  limit  problems  of 
agency, and what North has called ex-post-opportunism. Some of these institutional structures are 
non-existent  or  weak  or  poorly  devised  and  implemented  in  less  developed  countries.  In  these 
countries the State is either too weak to act as a guarantor of these rights and institutions and/or 
much too predatory in its own demands, posing a threat to them (Negrão, 1999). 
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One  of  the  as-yet  inadequately  resolved  issues  in  institutional  economics  in  the  context  of 
underdevelopment is why dysfunctional institutions often persist for a long period of time. Unlike the 
followers of the property rights school, who often displayed a naive presumption of the survival of 
the ‘fittest' institution, the two strands of institutional economics identified earlier are quite clear in 
not ascribing optimality properties to the institutions as (Nash) equilibrium outcomes. Anstey (2000) 
and  others  have  pointed  to  the  self-reinforcing  mechanisms  for  the  persistence  of  socially 
suboptimal institutions when path-dependent processes are at work. Borrowing an idea from the 
literature on the history of technological change, one can see that there are increasing returns to 
adoption of a particular institutional form – where the more it is adopted, the more it is attractive or 
convenient for the others to conform on account of infrastructural and network externalities, learning 
and coordination effects, and adaptive expectations – and a path chosen by some initial adopters to 
suit their interests may ‘lock in' the whole system for a long time to come, later denying perhaps 
potentially more appropriate institutions a footing (Wuyt, 2001).  
 
In this path-dependent process, North (1990) more than others has emphasised how the interaction 
between the ‘mental models' or social norms the members of a society possess and the incentive 
structure provided by the institutions shapes incremental change. One related example may be 
cited  from  the  comparative  study  in  Gallant  (1999)  of  credit  cooperatives  in  German  and  Irish 
history.  The  path-dependent  process  is  also  made  more  complicated  by  the  frequent  cases  of 
unintended consequences in history. Gallant made a distinction between ‘pragmatic' and ‘organic' 
institutions.  The  former  are  the  direct  outcome  of  conscious  contractual  design  –  as  in  the 
institutional models in the theory of imperfect information or transaction cost – while the latter, like in 
Menger's theory of the origin of money, are comparatively undersigned, and they evolve gradually 
as the unintended and unforeseeable result of the pursuit of individual interests.  
 
2.6.  THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES 
Mozambique’s law no. 2/97 is vague concerning traditional authorities and does not specify areas 
or sectors of collaboration or the bases for interaction between the administration and traditional 
authority. However, article 28, par. (2) makes it clear that "the local authority bodies may sound out 
the  opinions  and  suggestions  of  the  traditional  authorities  who  are  recognized  as  such  by  the 
communities, so as to coordinate with them activities which seek to satisfy the specific needs of 
these communities". Other than for the 33 urban areas that have been municipalized, there is no 
law,  decree  or  diploma  that  mentions  any  institution  that  could  substitute  the  municipality  in 
"sounding out" the traditional authorities. The situation is even more complicated in the majority of 
districts, where the extension of local State bodies down to the communities is rare or is absent. In 
the urban areas, traditional authority is less evident than in rural ones, where institutionally, below POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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the Head of the Post, the physical presence of the State declines and there is more room for the 
manoeuvring of traditional leaders. 
 
2.6.1.  SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT 
The organisations promoting development have increasingly sought to interact directly with lower-
level  counterparts  in  government.  With  the  pulling  out  of  the  State  from  the  provision  of  most 
services and from direct involvement in productive activities, and the rise in importance of civil 
society and the private sector, more interaction is sought with local and regional-level organisations 
and institutions. The emergence and consolidation of small-scale local initiatives has been placed at 
the core of many current development programmes and has led to a much more important role for 
intermediaries, facilitators and ‘brokers’ of development. These actors, mediating between the rural 
population and project staff, are typically people who comprehend the ‘project language’. Often, 
they  are  relatively  younger  persons  who  have  migrated,  learnt  the  national  language  well,  are 
functionally literate and have recently returned to their village (in the case of former civil servants, 
frequently as a result of the downsizing of the State apparatus). In the best of cases they are the 
local  school  teachers  (or  extension  agents),  but  often  these  intermediaries  do  not  have  much 
legitimacy in the eyes of the villagers, and have during their absence from the community lost touch 
with the natural resource base and, especially, the norms and institutions that govern it. 
 
They  are  in  effect  the  local  ‘development  facilitators’  and  are  important  personalities  who  will 
influence  local  institutional  development.  Process  documentation  is  one  methodological  tool  to 
investigate the issues revolving around their brokerage function. There are also other clues that 
emerge from participatory exercises, for example a qualitative assessment of the way in which the 
project language finds its way into local idioms. Intermediaries may be agents or agencies (go-
between institutions, favoured by most development agencies), and their role may be one of acting 
as filters who translate the project rhetoric not just into the local dialect but into reality on the ground 
– an undertaking that may appear successful to the outside, by superficially complying to donor 
conditions.  The  study  of  development  brokerage  has  recently  intensified  in  the  anthropological 
literature. It is a function that may, of course, also be positive, as agents or catalysts of change 
through a demonstration effect of “how to do things differently”. 
 
The issue of the relationship between the rise of the new type of intermediary and the traditional 
community leaders, structures and institutions is particularly interesting and complex. Historically, 
the latter are the "classic" facilitators who have assured the mediation between the (colonial, then 
often but not always postcolonial) State and the local population, whereas, increasingly, the former 
are  occupying  the  role  of  mediation  between  development  agencies  and  the  local  population. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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However, traditional community leaders do not normally master the tools, first of all linguistically, to 
bridge the rift with "modern" institutions and have thus, arguably against their will, "allowed" the 
appearance of the new category of intermediaries.  
 
Platteau (1996) concluded that "collective action is probably most satisfactory when it is led by 
relatively young, literate persons who have been exposed to the outside world and who can find 
some way of collaborating with traditional structures of authority and leadership". But policymakers 
must bear in mind that this new type of intermediary generally follows a different agenda – in other 
words,  he  or  she  is  usually  motivated  by  self-interest  rather  than  by  a  desire  to  preserve  the 
"common wellbeing" of the community, and is not always a direct stakeholder in Natural Resource 
Management (NRM). The strategies of both categories of intermediaries will diverge even more 
substantially  in  areas  in  which  cash  crop  production  has  led  to  significant  financial  gains  (for 
example, cotton production in southwest Mali and the northeast of Mozambique) and incentives for 
intermediaries to take advantage of their role to (re)gain influence in community affairs (possibly 
after a prolonged absence). 
 
With  increasing  commercialisation,  miniaturisation  and  commoditisation,  there  has  been  a 
concurrent  increase  in  the  levels  and  expansion  of  accumulation  strategies  of  an  individualistic 
("profit-maximising") type, often opposed to the customary community strategies of the subsistence 
and moral economy. However, the rationale behind the former is not necessarily in contrast with the 
relations of production inscribed in traditional community institutions, as a number of authors in the 
development literature would argue. However, since its origin lies not with traditional community 
institutions, but usually outside the village and generally outside of subsistence agriculture, this 
implies that decentralisation policy, if it is to increase access to resources for a wider percentage of 
the rural population, must take this into account. Private accumulation is also a quest for prestige 
and draws its thrust and financial support primarily from commerce, (increasingly) migration, and 
(decreasingly) the civil service. 
 
In Mozambique, traditional rules and practices have not been codified into law nor spelled out, but 
nonetheless their respect is legally binding. Experience in Mozambique with the land demarcation 
process,  which  includes  considering  the  boundaries  of  the  former  colonial  chieftaincies,  the 
régulados,  with  the  local  community  definition  and  production  systems  analysis  process  in  the 
context of the National Land Programme, has highlighted the important role of the FAO and other 
partners when it comes to stepping in as "neutral" mediators, by bringing in international experts 
with a legal anthropology background to articulate Western statutory law with customary rules and 
practices. Such personnel, who should be socially neutral – also by way of nationality, language POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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and  technical  background  –  may  draw  on  the  symbolic  and  political  capital  of  an  international 
agency to bridge the substantial social distance between actors at the national and local levels, as it 
can easily access most decision-making levels, from village civil society to the national polity. 
 
Areas  of  confusion  arise  because one  of  the specific  issues  that  are  a  subject  of  engagement 
between these representatives and the local administrative authorities is that of the “use and benefit 
of land”. However, the definition of a local community in the regulations to the decree varies from 
that  in  the  Land  Law  and  is  strictly  related  to  territorial  administrative  divisions:  district, 
administrative post and locality. Community representatives of these groups are therefore State-
appointed, State-remunerated and of a public character, whereas local community groups in terms 
of the Land Law are private landholding entities.  
 
 
2.6.2.  DIMENSIONS OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Traditional community leaders have status (legitimacy), based on the lineage (or tribe) as a social 
unit and on religious grounds, as mediators between a given ethnic group and its natural and social 
environment. Their prime function is to ensure peace and harmony in the rural communities within 
their territory. Given the vast heterogeneity of traditional community institutions, which reaches well 
beyond  the  simplistic  dichotomies  taken  as  parameters  within  the  confines  of  the  definition 
employed  in  the  present  context,  the  present  study  focuses  on  the  existing  dimensions  of 
leadership in  a  given  rural  area,  and  on  the membership  dynamics  of  their  attributes.  In  many 
traditional agricultural and pastoral societies there is the custom of not passing decisions unless 
there is an absolute consensus among the local elite that in effect act as watchmen over natural 
resource management at the village level. This unanimity rule presupposes important qualities in 
conflict  resolution,  mediation,  and,  especially,  in  negotiation  and  conciliation.  These  skills  will 
depend much on experience, charisma, prestige and status, and are thus embodied by traditional 
leaders, and are the very mechanism by which one can aspire to traditional leadership. Although 
status may be ascribed at birth through the lines of inheritance, it will often be challenged over time, 
and, unless a traditional leader lives up to expectations, he or she may be relieved of his/her duty. 
 
According to Lundin (1998), traditional authority in Mozambique includes: persons who hold local 
traditional power – the traditional chiefs, lower (lineage) chiefs, and chiefs of social groups; those 
who  hold  spiritual  power  –  spirit  mediums  and  traditional  doctors,  and,  in  Islamic  areas,  the 
machehe; those with knowledge of how to cure psychological, physical and social ills – traditional 
doctors; those who know about plants, leaves, roots, fruits, etc. - herbalists; those who know the 
skills  for  the  physical  survival  of  the  agricultural  community  –  traditional  midwifes,  rainmakers, 
ironsmiths, clay and straw workers, those who know about animal habits, the movement of water, POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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plant cycles, etc. and those who, to some extent, hold economic power; those who know and can 
work with social control mechanisms and those who control cultural transmission – chiefs, those 
officiating rituals, judges, elders, spirit mediums, traditional doctors, and so on. These skills or tasks 
can, and often do, overlap. 
 
In north-western Mozambique, the political structure of the vangoni in Banga (Tsangano district, 
Tete central province) uses ngoni terminology, and includes: the abambo – head of the family unit 
(banja); the ankhoswe – head of the lineage (limana); the nyakwawa – head of the lineage territory 
(mudzi, or group of lineages); and the mfumo – head of a group of lineage territories, and of his own 
banja,  limana,  and  mudzi.  Within  this  territory,  called  "regulado"  by  the  Portuguese  colonial 
administration, the mfumo was appointed as its head, as régulo (a derogatory term, meaning "little 
king"). The mfumo is the head of the hierarchically highest lineage which first occupied a larger 
territory, and from where the occupation of relatively smaller plots by lower lineages took place. In 
the case of Banga and the mfumo Gimo, local history can be traced back to the conquest of the 
territory of Angônia by the vangoni. For the case of the vangoni, there exists a nkhoswe wa makossi 
– a paramount chief – who at present is Mr Sebastião M. Dahama who lives in Ulongwe in Angónia. 
This  is  a  title  of  nobility  of  a  formerly  centralised  political  structure,  which  has  mostly  lost  the 
differences to the great chiefs, but with much symbolism by way of the respect it commands. 
 
Normally, as in the case of Banga, the nyakwawa is a member of the dominant lineage in the 
lineage  territory  where  the  population  resides,  with  a  history  dating  back  to  the  period  of  the 
occupation of the territory. The nyakwawa is the uppermost representative of the population. In 
north-eastern  Mozambique  the  nyakwawa  is  the  paramount  representative  of  the  population 
groups. It is the basic traditional political authority in the village, responsible for the wellbeing of the 
village. When the territory is divided into two or more neighbourhoods, in reality two or more lineage 
territories, two azinyakwawa also exist, one hierarchically above the other. The ankhoswe is a small 
"nyakwawa" within the village (aldeia) whose tasks are restricted to his lineage. Delegated by the 
nyakwawa, he is in charge of all tasks to be carried out in the community. The ankhoswe is the first 
instance appealed to in the event of land conflict, being the person who best knows the traditional 
forms of resolution of these conflicts and the boundaries of the lineage-held lands (Lundin, 1998). 
 
The social organisation of the populations of the administrative post of Netia is also based on the 
lineage as a social unit (called nloko), and the lineage chief is called nanloko or humu. Normally, 
the name of the nloko is the same as that of its chief, and is the name that will be taken on by its 
offspring. For example, if the humu is called "mweri", his or her nloko will be called nloko na mweri 
(the lineage of mweri); its members will be called ananloko-a-mweri (the members of the lineage of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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mweri), or an-anloko-a-humu mweri (the members of the lineage of the humu of mweri). Below the 
lineage level we find the erukulu (or irukulu, in the plural), which in Emakhuwa means "belly"), 
which refers to the family unit or to the group consisting of all the children of the same mother, a 
feature of matrilinear social organisation. The father is the head of the erukulu, but his authority 
over the children is limited by the brother of the mother of the children, because by custom it is he 
who is responsible for most of the problems of the children of his sister. For the children of the 
couple it is the atata (or azitata, in the plural). The makhulupale (the elders) of the nloko constitute 
the council of elders, with the basic role of advising the humu and deliberating on his decisions. 
Each elder in the council is generally representative of the members of his erukulu, within which he 
makes decisions and may decide on minor social quarrels without previously consult the nanloko. 
 
This means that in the nloko some elders have the status of humu (or mahumu, in the plural) at the 
level of their erukulu, and therefore play an important role. Other elders hold the right to succeed 
the nanloko, but may prefer not to and leave the position to a younger brother, while they take on 
the role of counsellors. This is interesting because it allows for the existence of young and formally 
educated  chiefs,  under  the  tutelage  of  the  elders,  who  hold  more  symbolic  authority  within  the 
community, because of their "proximity" to the ancestors. Some azitata hold the status of humu. It 
may happen that, through their chief, a many-member erukulu splits from the founding nloko to 
constitute a new nloko, in which case segmentation takes place. However, the force of kinship 
relations will ensure that the new lineage and its new leader will continue to depend on the humu of 
the founding lineage. This influence in more than one lineage leads to a situation whereby the 
status of humu is raised or changes to mwene – the chief of the lineage territory (Lundin, 1998). 
 
2.6.3.  TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS’ SUPPORT OF LOCAL LIVELIHOODS 
In  lineage-based  hierarchical  societies,  mechanisms  for  redistribution  are  an  expression  of  the 
moral obligations of the senior members of the community who are responsible for ensuring social 
and  spiritual  reproduction,  as  well  as  its  junior  members,  responsible  for  ensuring  economic 
welfare.  They  are  essentially  networks  of  mutual  support  and  solidarity,  as  well  as  clientelistic 
relations among kinship groups of unequal social status, nested in historical power relations and 
priority rights for some lineages, which are largely the consequence of who occupied the land first. 
The descendants of the first to settle and cultivate the land will claim superior social status, as will 
those who are members of a lineage who came to dominate others by battle and conquest. This 
leads to the configuration of local property relations and differentiated rules of access to land and 
other natural resources, in turn leading to the subordination and poverty of certain groups. 
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The privileges of one particular lineage and clan, therefore, have their roots in the ancestral domain, 
legitimised  through  religious  ideology  and  ritual  by  means  of  the  symbolic  capital  embodied  in 
traditional  authorities  (Bourdieu,  1977).  Arguments  are  made  in  favour  of  bypassing  traditional 
structures and authority in NRM programme design precisely on the grounds of them not including 
such population groups adequately into decision-making, as working within these structures would 
amount to an inadmissible formal sanctioning and "institutionalising" customary male chauvinism. 
 
Likewise,  several  cooperation  mechanisms  are  at  work  in  the  relations  between  farmers, 
blacksmiths  and  pastoralists  (concerning,  for  example,  the  fertilisation  of  land,  the  security  of 
productive activities, and the lending of inputs), and those between users of land and its customary 
owners, autochthonous and allogenous. Many of the farmers – both holders of land rights under the 
customary regime and sharecroppers – have recently turned to rice cultivation and are increasingly 
engaged  in  the  rearing  of  draught  animals  (bulls)  and  the  "conversion"  of  surplus  livestock  to 
draught animals. These animals are given in trust to the transmigrating pastoralists, who engage in 
barter  arrangements  with  the  sedentary  villagers  (rice  against  custody  and  against  milk).  The 
pastoralists also enjoy access to some plots for rice cultivation themselves, and lend draught bulls 
to the dafing rice farmers. 
 
In their role as “economic police”, the ton(déni) in the Mopti region in the northeast of Mali support 
village  solidarity  and  mutual  support  networks.  Their  sphere  of  action  reaches  from  works  of 
collective interest, in the fields, to the management of the rice (and cereal) storage banks and 
emergency stock facilities to ensure food security at the village level. The relationships between 
traditional and State-appointed local leaders vary across regions, and there is continuing dispute 
over power and space. The major traditional chief in the area considers himself by tradition the "lord 
of the land", according to a legitimacy that is related to the symbolic power flowing from the diverse 
traditional norms of each region. However, with the armed conflict (1984-1992), a lot of land in 
Mozambique was abandoned when populations were dislocated to other areas within the country or 
took refuge in neighbouring countries, and in some cases the collective memory of a given area, in 
respect to who has customary rights over which land, was "lost". The political secretary considers 
him- or herself the person sanctioned by political power, claiming to have taken over leadership 
ever  since  independence  in  order  to  involve  the  population  in  development  activities  and  to 
consolidate national unity and independence. 
 
In  rural  Mozambique,  the  forms  of  interaction  between  community  leaders  and  development 
managers vary considerably between regions and local settings, according to the manner in which 
each  institution  involves  the  communities  to  establish  programme  objectives.  Since  it  is  not POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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regulated,  the  relationship  between  traditional  leaderships  and  the  State  depends  heavily  on 
personal  attitudes.  In  Tsangano  district,  for  example,  the  head  of  the  Mtengo-wa-Mbalame 
administrative post interacts with the mfumo Gimo, but complains of the lack of definition at a higher 
level of governance, which creates problems also at the local level. It would seem as if relationships 
between traditional leaders and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are good – at least in the 
study districts of Tsangano (Tete province), Monapo (Nampula province) and Matutuíne (Maputo 
province).  For  the  most  part,  harmonious  interactions  can  be  traced  back  to  the  fact  that  the 
majority of NGOs have deliberately chosen to associate traditional leaders in their activities. This 
usually goes beyond using the participation of traditional authority to call for meetings with the local 
populations, and includes not only a more permanent role as intermediary, but also, beyond that, 
their being assigned concrete implementing responsibilities in a number of domains upon which 
NGOs intervene, notably land use planning and common property resource management. 
 
In the communities of Banga and Djavula (Matutuíne district, Maputo province), since the State is 
de facto "absent", the traditional chief functions to the full extent of his or her customary range of 
responsibilities. In Banga there is a chairman of the locality, but not in Djavula. In Netia a political-
administrative  chief  (the  chefe  de  posto)  is  present,  and  there  is  an  overlap  in  the  same 
geographical  space  between  the  traditional  chiefs  and  the  political  secretaries,  as  well  as  a 
duplication of tasks both in the rural areas and in the administrative post headquarters. The party 
secretaries fulfilled a major political role up until mid-1980, since they were linked to the village 
structure of the communal village’s policy – an attempt to group dispersed farmers into centralised 
and previously demarcated areas where there would be a school, health units and other State 
services.  
 
With  the  disintegration  of  the  communal  (collective)  villages  (aldeias)  and  the  return  of  the 
population to their former habitat by occupying geographical space according to traditional patterns, 
the sphere of influence of the political secretaries diminished, or even disappeared, along with their 
basis of authority. At the political level, the deputies of the provincial, district and local "People’s 
Assembly", elected in 1986 in the last general elections held under the one-party system, had as of 
1999 still not been formally "demobilised". The enthroning ceremony (mukelampa em emakhuwa) is 
another way of raising the status of the head of the lineage from humu to mwene. It is a moment of 
learning, qualification and civic education on what from now on will be the mwene’s behaviour and 
socio-political functions (Bourdieu, 1977). 
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2.6.4.  COMMUNITY INCENTIVES AND SECURE RIGHTS 
It is necessary to consider the nature of the interface between the “community representatives” 
recognised by the State in terms of Decreto 15/2000 and the representatives of the community as a 
private  entity  with  co-title  over  local  land  resources.  Confusion  between  public  and  private 
representative  roles  has  arisen  as  a  result  of  the  implementation  of  State  decentralisation 
processes  combined  with  a  parallel  devolution  of  rights  to  community  groups  in  terms  of,  in 
particular, the Land Law. This has marginalised the role of those that represent the community as a 
private  entity.  Although  this  issue  has  been  raised  in  natural  resource  discussions  on  several 
occasions,  it  is  little  understood  within  the  broader  realm  of  decentralisation  programmes  and 
initiatives. A statement that clarifies the differences between these representative roles is needed; 
this could come as a result of a tightly focused policy seminar that brings together policymakers 
working  on  natural  resource  policies  and  those  involved  in  decentralisation  programmes,  with 
participation  also  from  NGOs  that  are  helping  to  support  the  implementation  of  both  policy 
initiatives. 
 
Indeed, there are several areas where natural resource and decentralisation policy overlap; this is 
possibly enough reason to justify the creation of a semi-permanent forum to debate and discuss 
areas of overlap and synergy. In this way some of the pitfalls of implementation to date (e.g. the 
proliferation  of  different  institutions  at  a  local  level,  confusion  between  public  and  private 
representation, etc.) might be avoided or minimised. Harmonisation of policy in this way might prove 
to be more effective than the present system whereby completed drafts of policies and laws are 
submitted for formal comment by other sector ministries. An important aspect of local community 
involvement in the formal management systems of natural resources is the perceived benefit to 
their livelihood strategies in doing so, and the incentive regime in this regard is therefore important 
to analyse. Institutional capacity at community level is also a key element. While the legal system 
and policy framework may define and enforce some rights, the administrative structures and service 
deliverers are often the primary institutions through which entitlements are delivered or withheld. 
 
Knight (2002) states that information regarding the Land Law has had the effect of making people 
more aware of this process, a first step towards improving their capacity to challenge local actors 
who distort messages or withhold entitlements. Teaching villagers about national laws is allowing 
them to clearly see the differences between national policy and local governance. One woman 
interviewed stated that: “In my opinion the local government is totally wrong, because it changes 
what was approved by the central government and puts it in their own words.” (Quoted in Knight, 
2002). Such a distinction between local officials and national policy is important, as it has made 
clear to communities that local corruption can be fought (Knight, 2002). Similar conclusions were POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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drawn  by  Anstey  (2000)  in  his  observations  regarding  the  willingness  of  the  Sanga  community 
guards  to  locally  challenge  powerful  interests  who  were  flouting  the  law.    The  FAO  (2002) 
acknowledges problems of both incentive structures and capacity: “The incentives for participation 
may not be sufficient to compensate the costs of engagement in community organization including 
the imposition for charcoal making restriction even understanding the advantage of sustainability of 
forests  for  present  and  future  generations.  Currently,  there  is  a  lot  of  enthusiasm  among 
communities while the project exists to support the initiatives, but the alternative activities have not 
yet  produced  incomes  to  sustain  people  expectations  and  confidence  to  drop  dependence  on 
charcoal making. We should acknowledge the strength of organization of Goba Community and the 
capacity to make it work, but on the other hand, the level of illiteracy is very high and may create 
some limitation on communication with other stakeholders and investors”. 
 
Even  the  flagship  Tchuma  Tchato  project  was  criticised  from  a  similar  perspective:  “The  major 
problem with Tchuma Tchato was that the role of local authorities was not clearly defined, although 
it  is  recognized  that  they  should  be  involved  and  directly  benefit  from  the  revenue  distribution 
process. Tchuma Tchato shows us that a weak legal framework is one of the critical constraints for 
productive  collaborative  interaction  between  necessary  parties  (government  institutions, 
communities and the private sector)” (Foloma, 2000).  Nhantumbo and McQueen (2003) point out 
that poverty and illiteracy militate against the participation of local communities in management 
regimes  for  natural  resources;  the  need  to  satisfy  basic  necessities  means  that  poor  forest 
communities do not often have the luxury of a long planning horizon for the use of resources. They 
highlight the fact that there are only ad hoc initiatives in respect to building capacity for natural 
resource management and that there is no national strategy for this. The main problem was the 
perceived  uneven  distribution  of  responsibility  and  mechanisms  of  distribution  which  did  not 
integrate the equity principles for the benefit of the community. 
 
Land tenure rights as they operate in customary systems in Mozambique are, as in many other 
areas, highly dynamic and complex. They intersect with other forms of relationships in myriad ways. 
The  implication  of  their  recognition  in  formal  law  is  that  inequalities,  where  these  exist  in  the 
“customary” systems, can be reinforced. Some, such as gender inequalities, are nominally excluded 
from this reinforcement since they are contrary to the constitution. However, in the absence of 
legislated State support for the new institutions, which steers them towards practices that do not 
unfairly discriminate against any group, this counts for little. The recognition of customary tenure 
must  be  done  in  such  a  manner  that  ensures  that  there  is  a  choice  available  beyond  narrow 
definitions of “traditional authority” mechanisms. In Mozambique this has been provided for through 
the  very  broad  definition  allowed  to  groups  that  wish  to  call  themselves  a  “local  community” 
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2.7.  SUMMARY OF POLICY ISSUES 
It is recognized that natural resources play a special role in local democratization, because local 
populations rely thereon for their daily livelihoods and governments rely thereon as a source of 
wealth. Rural living conditions have been deteriorating year by year. Recovery and progress will 
take time and patience to build within the Mozambican context, where both the justice system and 
civil society organisations are weak and disorganised and have tended to be socially removed from 
the community groups that they are intended to serve. However, the ability to address restrictive 
informal  institutions  is  an  important  element  in  achieving  a  policy  context  that  is  supportive  of 
livelihoods for marginalised sections of the community. 
 
Two recent strands of institutional economics have been influential in development literature. One is 
associated  with  the  theory  of  imperfect  information:  the  underlying  rationale  of  institutional 
arrangements and contracts (formal or informal) are explained in terms of strategic behaviour under 
asymmetric information among the different parties involved. This theory has been fruitfully used in 
modelling many key agrarian and other institutions in poor countries, which are seen to emerge as 
substitutes for missing credit, insurance and futures markets in an environment of pervasive risks, 
information asymmetry, and moral hazard. Because of her role and social status, the apiyamwene 
is always invited to provide feedback in the meetings between the chiefs and the council of elders, 
where the decisions that affect the lineage are taken. In this way, the customary tenure that is being 
recognised is nothing more than a set of rules and institutions that derive their legitimacy from 
within the community. 
 
Another is associated with the rural theory of development: It is recognised that effective natural 
resource management could improve socio-economic rural status, the familiar rural incomes, yields, 
and  local  economic  development.  It  has  become  more  evident  that  while  natural  resources 
remained  relatively  abundant,  participatory  and  decentralised  systems  are  a  precondition  to 
promote  practices  and  adopt  mechanisms  that  contribute  to  providing  sufficient  security  and 
ownership to the local communities. Given the importance of agriculture, the development strategy 
for  Mozambique  logically  centres  on  the  agricultural  sector.  In  cooperation  with  donors,  the 
Government has designed a five-year sector-wide programme, PROAGRI, which lays out priorities 
and  strategies  in  dealing  with  the  expansion  of  agricultural  production,  poverty  alleviation  and 
natural resource conservation.  
 
State  agencies  have  often  been  chronically  afflicted  by  operational  inefficiencies,  unreliable 
deliveries and payments, and low prices for farmers. Under the stabilisation programmes the prices 
offered were often much too low even compared to the benefits of more stable prices.
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crops, the costs of marketing and taxation have been substantially higher for the same crop under 
marketing boards and stabilisation funds than under the free marketing system, depressing the 
share  of  border  prices  received  by  producers  under  the  previous  systems.  Although  many 
restrictions remain, food markets have been extensively deregulated in recent years, and controls 
over movements of crops have been somewhat relaxed. With a reduction in industrial protection 
and depreciation of the real exchange rate, the relative price of agricultural products has improved. 
The overall tax burden on agriculture has diminished significantly (Salomão, 2001). The opening up 
of  markets  to  private  traders  has  lowered  marketing  and  distribution  costs,  smoothed  prices 
between local markets, and improved market integration. 
 
As market integration advances, there is a concomitant increase in market risks, in the need for 
credit for investment in crop production, storage and transportation, and in coordination among 
different branches of a more specialised production and marketing process. Farmers' organisations 
and cooperatives can play a significant role in group lending schemes (as they can overcome the 
inherent enforcement and information problems facing official credit agencies), in input and output 
marketing activities, in collecting and disseminating market information or technical knowledge, and 
in  enhancing  the  collective  bargaining  power  of  small  farmers  in  markets.  While  much  of  the 
discussion in the literature is in terms of broad generalities of institutional change, the next step has 
to  be  an  intensive  exploration  of  context-specific  institutional  details  relating  to  property  right 
systems, governance structures, social networks, and labour relations that work in synergy with 
community  norms  and  technological  and  ecological  compulsions.  This  calls  for  comparative-
historical micro-level case studies of the institutional environment in which different countries (and 
regions) have achieved differential success in carrying out agricultural reforms. There are many 
unresolved issues in the theoretical and empirical literature on intellectual property rights (Salomão, 
2001). It is necessary to prevent failure on the part of regulatory frameworks to adequately address 
the  issue  of  incentives  and  failures  as  a  result  of  the  withholding  of  benefits  by  local  power 
structures. 
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3.  DECENTRALISATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
“It is essential that African leaders follow up on the commitments they have 
made  to  the  people  of  Africa,  and  genuinely  improve  governance  and 
transparency in all sectors.” 
Kofi Annan, Implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration, 2002. 
 
3.1.1.  OVERVIEW OF DECENTRALISATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE  
"Good governance" assumes a government's ability to maintain social peace, guarantee law and 
order, promote or create conditions necessary for economic growth, and ensure a minimum level of 
social security. The concept of "governance" is not new. It is as old as human civilization. Simply 
put "governance" means: the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are 
implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several contexts such as corporate 
governance,  international  governance,  national  governance  and  local  governance.  Since 
governance  is  the  process  of  decision-making  and  the  process  by  which  decisions  are 
implemented,  an  analysis  of  governance  focuses  on  the formal  and  informal  actors  involved  in 
decision-making and implementing the decisions made, and the formal and informal structures that 
have been set in place to arrive at and implement those decisions. Government is one of the actors 
in governance. Other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government that 
is  under  discussion.  In  rural  areas,  for  example,  other  actors  may  include  influential  landlords, 
associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), research 
institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions, political parties, the military etc. The situation in 
urban areas is much more complex. At the national level, in addition to the above actors, media, 
lobbyists, international donors, multinational corporations, etc. may play a role in decision-making or 
in influencing the decision-making process. 
 
Governance is considered within the framework of power, process and practice and how these 
concepts have shaped peasant access, control and the use of natural resources. Natural resource 
governance systems resulted in over-centralisation, because they were crafted in the context of 
conquest and subjugation. Over the years, State visions of appropriate management and use of 
resources have largely been extended to the African peasant sector through a centrally directed 
structure and process. However, State control over the use and management of resources among 
the peasantry was and is largely ineffectual, because the State lacks the resources and capacity to 
enforce such controls. Much of the legislation was inherited piecemeal into post-colonial times, and 
amendments to date have largely de-racialised the colonial acts and policies without democratising 
them.  
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Decentralisation  is  a  process  through  which  authority  and  responsibility  for  some  functions  are 
transferred from the central government to local governments, communities and the private sector. 
By means of this process, decentralised
12 institutions, either local offices of central government or 
local private and civil organisations (entrepreneurs, farmers, communities, associations, etc.), are 
provided with high levels of power when it comes to decision-making (Cistulli, 2002). Rondinelli 
(1981) defines decentralisation as the transfer of the authority to plan, make decisions, and manage 
public functions from a higher level of government to any individual, organisation or agency at a 
lower level. To Blair (1996) decentralisation means “reversing the concentration of administration at 
a  single  centre  and  conferring  powers  on  local  government”.  For  purposes  this  study, 
decentralisation is considered the opposite of centralisation or concentration of power and involves 
delegation  of  power  or  authority  from  the  central  government  to  the  periphery  involving  local 
communities (participation). 
 
Decentralisation  may  take  various  forms.  The  four  main  forms  are  reported  below:  (i)  Political 
decentralisation is associated with increased power of citizens and their representatives in public 
decision-making.  It  generally  involves  a  representative  political  system  based  on  local  electoral 
jurisdictions and pluralistic parties. (ii) Administrative decentralisation is the transfer of responsibility 
for planning, financing and managing certain public functions from the central government and its 
agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-
autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities. (iii) 
Fiscal  decentralisation  is  associated  with  the  authority  of  the  decentralised  units  to  make 
expenditure decisions with funds either raised locally (e.g. user charges, co-financing with users, 
property  taxes,  borrowing,  etc.)  or  transferred  from  the  central  government.  (iv)  Market 
decentralisation is the most decentralised form in as much as decision-making power is transferred 
from public to private organisations.  
 
Effective decentralisation can provide exciting opportunities for democratic change at the local level 
and can help improve national democracy as well. Through local participation and practices such as 
public meetings, citizens can participate more effectively in local decision-making, gain experience 
in democratic processes, and hold local officials responsible for their decisions. Communities can 
become more pluralistic in the absence of central political control.  A decentralised government can 
provide  space  for  people  to  participate  in  local  development.  It  can  ensure  a  more  efficient 
allocation of resources, enhance local resource mobilisation, and improve local governance. The 
implementation of democratic local governance principles offers significant opportunities for women 
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to effectively participate in decision-making on matters that determine their living conditions, and to 
undertake initiatives towards improving them. 
 
From a local community perspective, effective decentralisation concerning powers requires these 
same elements. However, when examined in detail, community-based and decentralised forms of 
management  often  lack  representation,  downward  accountability  and/or  sufficient  powers. 
Decentralisation  plays  a  special  role  in  local  democratisation,  because  local  populations  that 
participate  in  management  and  use  participatory  decision-making  can  be  a  fulcrum  for  rural 
development. A combination of locally accountable representation and discretionary powers is also 
needed. This combined condition is rarely established. Alternative local institutions are chosen even 
when democratic local bodies exist. Decentralisation is a precondition to ensure participation and is 
considered fundamental for democratisation.  
 
3.1.2.  LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION 
Participation
13, for which a case can be made on economic, political, social and cultural grounds, is 
now  considered  essential  to  the  globalisation  and  modernisation  processes.  Considered  as  a 
fundamental part of local development, it may be defined as: the capacity and the ability of the 
community to contribute to, share in and benefit from, diverse social, economic, political or other 
processes of the society. Participation in development, as an indicator of decentralisation, involves 
in the first place the national community. Participation
14 is therefore a continuum, a permanent state 
that can only be achieved through providing the means for effective involvement of people in all 
facets of the society and actively promoting this as a matter of policy and practice (Cistulli, 2002).  
 
This choice and the failure to transfer discretionary powers can undermine local democratic bodies 
and concentrate powers in the executive branch. The choices being made around natural resources 
appear  to  reflect  a  broad  resistance  of  central  governments  to  local  democratisation  and 
decentralisation  of  powers.  Participation,  as  Cistulli  (2002)  argues,  has  to  be  planned  and 
supported  by  policy  and  other  measures.  Some  areas  for  action  include:  commitment  by 
governments to the principle; a search for methodologies of effective participation for development; 
a commitment to fund and support target sectors and programmes; and commitment by the civil 
                                                       
13 Chalfant (1984) argues that participation is therefore essential to the globalisation and modernisation processes at work 
today, but the end product should not result in the homogenisation of society, national or global. If cultural change is to be 
considered an integral part of modern development, the extent, direction and pace of change must, however, be allowed 
to emerge through genuine dialogue and consultation of those concerned. 
14  A  case  for  participation  can  easily  be  made  on  several  grounds:  economic,  [resource  management;  expansion  of 
popular  economies,  etc.];  political  [involvement  of  more  sectors;  scope  for  more  equitable  power  allocation];  social 
[knowledge  and  value  systems,  interpersonal  and  group  relations];  and  cultural  [creativity,  tradition,  innovation  and 
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society organisations to efficiency, accountability and improved capability at the local level. The 
principal  targets  in  promoting  participation  in  development  in  the  framework  could  be:  the 
community sector, the private sector, and non-governmental organisational accountability.  
 
Participatory governance is increasingly emerging as a key focal area, both in its own right and also 
as a means of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – especially poverty reduction. 
Despite  the  difficulties  encountered  in  developing  the  second  Action  plan  for  the  Reduction  of 
Absolute Poverty (PARPA), it was achieved with broader stakeholder participation than before; it is 
also  equipped  with  a  better  implementation  monitoring  framework  and  has  created  increased 
awareness  within  some  parts  of  government  of  the  need  for  higher  quality  and  greater 
standardisation  in  monitoring  and  evaluation  systems.  The  national  and  provincial  Poverty 
Observatories  have  provided  an  important  space  for  civil  society  participation  in  monitoring  the 
effectiveness of the government in reducing poverty and in contributing to policy development. The 
government has developed a number of policy and legislative instruments relating to community 
involvement  in  local  governance  processes,  including  Decreto  15/2000  relating  to  the  role  of 
community authorities and the guidelines issued in 2002 on Institutions for Community Participation 
and Consultation (IPCCs). The establishment of these bodies runs the risk of being a mechanical 
process resulting in low levels of real representation of the interests and desires of the grassroots 
communities. 
 
Recent  experience  from  a  number  of  developing  countries  suggests  that  programmes  of 
decentralisation  accompanied  by  parallel  efforts  to  promote  greater  power  and  autonomy  in 
decision-making for local communities can offer genuine opportunities to improve outcomes.  From 
the perspective of central governments, the institutional dimensions of decentralisation often centre 
on  defining  which  formal  governmental  institutions  are  to  be  involved  and  establishing  an 
appropriate legal framework to define relationships between different levels of government.  
 
Central governments have not generally sought to define a role for non-governmental institutions. 
Such institutions are often perceived to be technically backward and managerially incompetent, or 
to pose a direct threat to the government through political opposition. From the perspective of rural 
people, however, the institutional situation they confront is likely to be far more complex and varied, 
comprising  a  whole  range  of  central  and  sub-national  governmental  agencies,  parastatal 
organisations, as well as the full complement of nongovernmental institutions, such as religious, 
cultural, political, social welfare and economic organisations all with their own “rules of the game” 
and their own objectives. 
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Institutional  capacity  plays  a  central  role  in  any  decentralisation  process.  Failure  of  local 
governments to take advantage of the opportunities provided by decentralisation because of a lack 
of  capacity  will  result  in  poor  outcomes.  Local  governments  and  other  institutions  that  cannot 
adequately administer and account for grants or effectively mobilise local resources will find those 
powers swiftly taken back. Decentralisation of fiscal and investment decision-making from national 
to  provincial  and  local  governments  contributes  to  more  efficient  decision-making  regarding 
investments,  and  to  more  efficient  implementation  of  projects.  Decentralisation  of  resource 
allocation and investment decisions to municipalities and communities should be accompanied by a 
clearly defined and well-disseminated system of incentives and penalties to discourage the misuse 
of funds (RSA, 2000). 
 
One of the key findings referred to by RSA (2000) is that local micro politics affect how natural 
resource policies work in practice, and particularly how the process related to the decentralisation of 
powers  occurs.  Along  with  other  southern  African  countries,  Mozambique  is  committed  to 
administrative  and  political  decentralisation,  but  this  is  taking  a  particular  form  in  practice.  The 
operation  of  local  elite  networks,  party  connections,  kin-based  linkages,  and  relations  between 
government  and  traditional  authorities  all  play  a  part  in  affecting  the  degree  to  which 
decentralisation (in its various forms) leads to benefits for the poor living in rural areas. Many rural 
areas in Mozambique remain remote and marginalised from the political and economic mainstream 
and, as a result, the standard patterns of administrative and political authority do not operate. Very 
often there are intermediaries – local elites, NGOs, donor projects and others – that have significant 
influence on the way in which resources are allocated. Thus it is at the local level where bargains 
are  made,  deals  negotiated  and  politics  practised  and  this  is  where  the  gains  or  losses  for 
livelihoods are made. With multiple and competing lines of authority, the local political context is 
key, and is often ignored in the standard models and assessments of decentralisation policies. 
 
3.1.3.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Decentralisation and the local governance process in Mozambique dates back to 1978. It began as 
part of the process of dismantling the colonial state apparatus after National Independence in 1975. 
The  Mozambican  administrative  reform  laws  replaced  the  Portuguese  colonial  administrative 
structures and constructed a new system of governance structured at the national, provincial and 
local  levels.  After  independence  Mozambique  adopted  a  system  of  centralised  administration, 
where  each  and  every  thing  was  planned  and  decided  at  the  centre  of  political  power.  The 
approach was an answer to: Meet the needs of the state; Defend/safeguard and consolidate the 
national  independence;  Achieve  planned  socio-economic  measures;  Rationally  use  the  scarce 
resources; and Consolidate a unitary state. The principles for State unity were proclaimed and all POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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administrative institutions integrated under the same command: Law 5/78 created, in 1978, the 
provincial  governments  composed  of  a  provincial  governor,  appointed  by  the  president  of  the 
Republic, and provincial directors representing each Ministry – and only in exceptional cases a set 
of ministries – which was the case when a Ministry was subdivided at the central level, but it was 
decided that the Provincial Directorate should be shared.  
 
In parallel to these there were central delegates for exclusively central-natured functions (major 
projects  conducted  at  the  central  level  or  a  service  whose  nature  was  essentially  of  a  central 
responsibility),  but  this  position  was  never  widely  utilised,  usually  substituted  by  the  provincial 
director for most representations of central services, as happens today with the provincial directors 
of Registry and Notary. The directors are appointed by their respective minister, with the provincial 
governor being consulted in the process, and are subordinate to their respective Ministry, while at 
the territorial level they are subordinate to the provincial governor, in what is a dual subordination 
system. In 1977 and 1978 a substantial reform took place when assemblies were created at all 
levels, close to both the provincial governments and other administrative units at the district and the 
city  level  (Law  no.  3/77).  These  assemblies,  although  theoretically  assigned  with  full 
decision-making powers, did not possess full authority as stated: on the one hand they existed 
under a single-party regime, meaning that primacy always rested on appointed officeholders who 
had control over resources. With the limitations of the single-party framework in force, integrating 
citizens’ representations at all levels of territorial division, they nonetheless operated in consultation 
in respect of people’s perceptions. 
 
At  the  district  and  city  level,  the  model  anticipated  the  existence  of  an  appointed  leader,  the 
chairman of the District and City Executive Council (Law no. 7/78), and members of the Executive 
Council selected by the respective assembly to supervise work areas of the administration, a model 
that is still legally in force. However, just after one year after their creation, the Executive Councils 
were transformed into the set of Directors from the various areas of administrative activity, i.e. a 
Council of appointed directors, replicating the model of the central government and the provincial 
governments. The argument then used was the difficulty of finding people among the residents in 
the districts and cities and outside the administration with the required qualifications to supervise 
the district or city services. At the local level, assemblies were created (Law no. 1/77) that elected 
their chairpersons and executive councils. These are base structures without professional executive 
apparatus, undertaking their tasks on a voluntary basis. The existing apparatus at the administrative 
posts remains the Unit for the Provision of Bureaucratic Services, which leads to talk about political 
localities and administrative localities.  
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In  1986,  the  level  of  administrative  posts  was  re-established,  their  number  increasing  to  398, 
although their functions and means available were not considerably developed. At its basis, the 
system rested on baseline organisations created at level of bairros, where the so-called dinamysing 
groups were established, in the rural areas at the level of villages constituting the locality, although 
neither of them had formal legislative support. In 1987 a national public debate on decentralisation 
and autonomy of the local government was held throughout the country and it concluded that the 
State was top-heavy at central level, and very weak at provincial and district levels.  This national 
debate  motivated  the  People's  Assembly  to  pass  Law  no.2/87  of  19  January  1987.  This  law 
authorised  or  permitted  the  Council  of  Ministers  (the  Government)  to  formulate  statutes  of 
administrative  and  financial  autonomy.  The  Cabinet  was  therefore  authorised  to  grant  such 
autonomy to bodies and institutions whose nature justified it, and which could gradually become 
financially self-sufficient.  The aim of Law no. 2/87 was twofold: Firstly, to promote greater popular 
participation  and  accountability  of  the  district  assemblies  and  their  executive  councils,  and 
secondly, to provide for close coordination between the Cabinet and provincial governments in the 
decentralisation  of  administrative  and  financial  powers  to  districts.  This  second  phase  of  local 
government reform came to an end after the adoption of the 1990 Mozambican Constitution.  
 
The  decentralisation  process  dates  back  to  the  adoption  of  the  1990  Constitution  when  the 
dismantling of provincial assemblies was announced, scheduled to take place at the moment of the 
first local elections (article 211), and State local bodies were foreseen to be composed of elected 
deliberative bodies and executive bodies appointed by the former. The end of the twentieth century 
and the beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed the onset of four movements as part of the 
political  system  consolidation:  The  gradual  implementation  of  the  municipal  model,  with  the 
establishment of 33 municipalities; The movement towards deconcentration with the consolidation 
of  provincial  governments  and  a  more  relevant  role  for  the  districts,  where  the  consultative 
committees play an important role; The acknowledgement of community authorities; The coming 
into play of communities as participants in political activity. 
 
The principles for State unity were proclaimed and all administrative institutions were integrated 
under the same command: In 1978, Law 5/78 created the provincial governments, composed of a 
provincial  governor,  appointed  by  the  president  of  the  Republic,  and  provincial  directors 
representing each ministry, and only exceptionally a set of ministries, which was the case when a 
ministry was subdivided at the central level but it was decided that the provincial directorate should 
be shared. In parallel to these there were central delegates for exclusively central-natured functions 
(big projects conducted at the central level or a service whose nature was essentially of a central 
responsibility),  but  this  position  was  never  widely  utilized,  usually  substituted  by  the  Provincial POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Director  for  most  representations  of  central  services,  as  it  happens  today  with  the  Provincial 
Directors of Registry and Notary.   
 
The Directors are appointed by their respective Minister, the Provincial Governor being consulted in 
the process, and they are subordinated to their respective Ministry, while at territorial level they are 
subordinate to the Provincial Governor, in what is a dual subordination system. In 1977 and 1978 a 
substantial  reform  took  place  when  Assemblies  were  created  at  all  levels,  close  to  both  the 
Provincial Governments and other administrative units at the District and the City level (Law no. 
3/77). These Assemblies, although theoretically assigned with full decision-making power, did not 
possess full authority as stated: on one hand, they existed under a single-party regime, and primacy 
always rested on appointed office holders, who had control over resources.  
 
At  the  district  and  city  level,  the  model  anticipated  the  existence  of  an  appointed  leader,  the 
Chairman of the District and City Executive Council (law no. 7/78), and members of the Executive 
Council selected by the respective assembly to supervise work areas of the administration, a model 
that is still legally in force. But just after one year after their creation, the Executive Councils were 
transformed into the set of Directors from the various areas of administrative activity, transformed 
into a Council of appointed Directors, replicating the model of the Central Government and the 
Provincial  Governments.  The  argument  then  used  was  the  difficulty  to  find  people  among  the 
residents in the districts and cities and externally to the administration with the required qualification 
to supervise the district or city services. 
 
In 1987 a national public debate on decentralisation and autonomy of local government was held 
throughout the country. It was concluded that the State was top-heavy at the central level, and very 
weak at provincial and district levels.  This national debate motivated the People's Assembly to 
pass Law n.2/87 on 19 January, 1987. This law authorised or permitted the Council of Ministers (the 
Government) to formulate statutes of administrative and financial autonomy. The cabinet, therefore, 
was authorised to grant such autonomy to bodies and institutions whose nature justified it, and 
which  could  gradually  become  financially  self-sufficient.  Law  no.  2/87  was  twofold.  Firstly,  it 
intended to promote greater popular participation and accountability of the district assemblies and 
their executive councils; Secondly, it intended to provide for close coordination between the cabinet 
and  provincial  governments  in  the  decentralisation  of  administrative  and  financial  powers  to 
districts. This second phase of local government reform came to an end after the adoption of the 
1990 Mozambican Constitution.  
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The decentralisation process started with the adoption of the 1990 Constitution; the termination of 
Provincial Assemblies was announced, scheduled to take place at the moment of the first local 
elections (article 211), and State local bodies were foreseen, composed by elected deliberative 
bodies and executive bodies appointed by the former. The end of the 1900s and the beginning of 
2000s witnessed the onset of four movements as part of the political system consolidation: The 
gradual implementation of the municipal model, with the establishment of 33 municipalities. Law no. 
2/1997 establishes municipalities as territorial units, with their own representative body (Municipal 
Assembly)  and  executive  organ  (Municipal  Council).  The  Municipal  Assembly  is  composed  of 
members directly elected by universal suffrage. The Municipal Council comprises the mayor and 
town  councillors.  The  president  of  the  Municipal  Council  (the  mayor)  is  elected  directly  by  the 
municipal population. The town councillors (the number of which varies depending on the size of 
the population of the municipality) are nominated by the mayor and at least half must be drawn from 
the Municipal Assembly. They are responsible for supervising the implementation of activities by the 
municipalities’ technical departments.  
 
The movement towards deconcentration lies with the consolidation of provincial governments and 
by a more relevant role of the districts, where the consultative committees play an important role, 
along with the acknowledgement of community authorities and the coming into play of communities 
as participants in political activity. Law no. 15/2000 of 20 June 2000 allows traditional authorities 
and leaders from other congregations to articulate with organs of the State on any matter that may 
arise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  that  particular  area.  Decree  15/2000  recognises  community 
authorities as interlocutors between civil society and local State organs. The decree provides for 
several  duties  to  be  carried  out  by  the  recognised  community  authorities,  including:  (i) 
disseminating  government  laws  and  policies  to  community  members;  (ii)  tax  collection;  (iii) 
registration  of  the  population;  (iv)  justice  enforcement;  and  (v)  mobilising  and  organising 
communities  for  local  development  activities.  The  community  authorities  are  entitled  to  wear 
uniforms  and  use  national  symbols.  They  also  receive  a  monetary  incentive  for  the  taxes  they 
collect.  
 
National  guidelines  for  District  Development  Plans  (adopted  in  2003)  reinforce  the  role  of  the 
districts  as  units  for  planning  and  budgeting.  The  guidelines  allow  for  the  creation  of  local 
consultative councils to act as an interface between civil society and the district authorities in the 
planning process. The existence of consultative councils extends to the municipal domain at the 
municipality, municipal district, and urban administrative post and borough levels.  
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Law no. 8/2003 – LOLE (Law of Local Organs of the State) was approved in 2003 and regulation 
became active in 2005. The Law defines the structure and organisation of local organs of the State 
and enforces the district as budgetary unity giving power to plan and define priorities. The approval 
of the LOLE in May 2003 was a small but significant step towards increasing the autonomy of 
provinces and districts. LOLE gives the provincial governor and the district administrator the power 
to merge sectoral directorates into multi-sectoral technical teams. It also makes the district a budget 
unit for the first time and thereby legitimises the district as a planning unit. These two elements 
strengthen the independence of the districts and shift some power away from the sectors towards 
the local territorial authorities. 
 
Decree  no.15/2000,  of  20  June  2000  allows  traditional  authorities  and  leaders  from  other 
congregations  to  articulate  with  Organs  of  the  State  for  any  matter  that  may  arise  within  the 
jurisdiction of that particular area. Decree 15/2000 recognizes community authorities as interlocutors 
between civil society and Local State Organs. The decree provides for several duties to be carried 
out  by  the  recognized  community  authorities,  including:  (i)  disseminating  government  laws  and 
policies to community  members; (ii) tax collection; (iii) registration of the population; (iv) justice 
enforcement; and (v) mobilizing and organizing communities for local development activities. The 
community authorities are entitled to wear uniforms and use national symbols. They also receive a 
monetary incentive for the taxes they collect.  
 
Social relations of importance to resource access go beyond the village confines, with a range of 
other institutions (local political parties, national and international NGOs, the private sector and 
religious entities) being important. Régulos have in particular derived much power and legitimacy 
from being used by agents as a first point of contact, but other actors can be equally important. On 
the other hand, the decree (Decreto 15/2000) that reinstitutes the colonial era institution of “official” 
traditional  leadership  (now  termed  “community  representatives”  and  in  operation  countrywide) 
includes a land management function as one  of the attributed powers. In several cases where 
private land applications have been made by outsiders to an area, there have been disputes as to 
whether the local land committee or the official “community representative” (or indeed a general 
meeting of community members called for the purpose) is the institution that ought to be consulted. 
These institutions can also mirror local-level power struggles; the land committee for Bajone is 
dominated by members of the local Catholic congregation, perhaps reflecting the influence of its 
donor  “partner”,  whilst  the  local  chief  (and  now  newly  elected  community  representative)  is  a 
Muslim. Not surprisingly, both assert their primary right to be consulted on land issues affecting the 
community. 
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As different worldviews and knowledge systems collide during this rapprochement, the bottom-up 
formula  of  participation  will  not  easily  marry  the  essentially  "top-down"  framework  of 
decentralisation.  It  will  lead  to  a  confrontation  of  social  actors  with  a  different  epistemology,  a 
different way of knowing – particularly when it comes to discussing natural resource management 
objectives and requirements and their devolution. The "gap" between what project documents (to 
take  but  the  most  concrete  expression  of  an  application  of  the  modern  knowledge  system  of 
"development") specify as "expected outputs, products, or results", and what has actually taken 
place, can be measured from a monitoring point of view as an indicator of sustainability – in the 
sense  that  this  gap  may  reflect  the  extent  of  local  appropriation,  adaptation,  and,  eventually, 
"ownership" and therefore institutional and social sustainability. The dichotomy that often opposes 
indigenous knowledge to modern scientific knowledge is misleading. The Land Law contains an 
article according to which the mechanisms for representation of community interests in respect of 
land use rights are fixed by law (Article 30); Decree 15/2000 and the associated regulations do not 
serve this purpose, as it is not a law but merely a decree. What remains, however, is a confused 
situation understood in different ways by different actors. If there are differences in individuals’ skills 
and  endowments  of  different  factors  of  production,  markets  should  help  in  optimising  factor 
proportions employed and thus increase overall efficiency of resource allocation.  
 
3.2.  DECENTRALISED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
All actors other than government and the military are grouped together as part of the "civil society." 
In  some  countries,  in  addition  to  the  civil  society,  organised  crime  syndicates  also  influence 
decision-making,  particularly  in  urban  areas  and  at  the  national  level.  Pioneering  efforts  at 
decentralising entrustments over use and management of resources to the peasant communities 
have largely resulted in recentralisation at the district level, where such efforts are still practised in 
the trickle-down mode. This is in part because the policy thrust seeking to empower the peasant 
communities is supply-led, and has thus been defined according to the terms and processes of 
external agents, including funders and central governments and their functionaries. 
 
Decentralised natural resource management is critical in local democratisation, because when local 
populations participate in management and use participatory decision-making, this can be a fulcrum 
for rural development. Strengthening of national capacities is vital, and local communities have to 
benefit from the existing resources. This could include capacity development of district and sectoral 
authorities  to  enable  them  to  facilitate  increased  participation  of  citizens  in  the  planning  and 
management  of  existing  natural  resources  and  to  stimulate  local  economic  development. 
Decentralisation of the local institutions being chosen to receive powers, and also the degree and 
form of power transfers, do not, however, establish conditions for the more efficient or equitable use POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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and management of natural resources. A combination of locally accountable representation and 
discretionary powers is also needed. This combined condition is rarely established. Alternative local 
institutions  are  often  chosen  even  when  democratic  local  bodies  exist.    Decentralisation  is  a 
precondition  to  ensure  participation  and  is  considered  fundamental  for  democratisation. 
Participation
15, for which a case can be made on economic, political, social and cultural grounds, is 
now  considered  essential  to  the  globalisation  and  modernisation  processes.  Considered  as  a 
fundamental part of local development, it may be defined as: the capacity and the ability of the 
community to contribute to, share in and benefit from, diverse social, economic, political or other 
processes of the society.  
 
Participation  in  development,  as  an  indicator  of  decentralisation,  involves  in  the  first  place  the 
national community. In Angola, the FAO has initiated a number of projects helping communities to map 
and  demarcate  the  boundaries  of  their  land  and  to  help  people  to  obtain  titles  and  certificates  of 
ownership. It has worked both with national staff in government offices and householders to strengthen 
decentralised land management, and has also helped the government to create a new legal framework 
for land rights. This has been coupled with projects providing direct assistance, such as seeds and tools, 
to vulnerable communities (Foley, 1997). 
 
3.2.1.  NATURAL RESOURCES AND RURAL ECONOMIES 
Natural resources play a strategic role in rural economies both as a potential source of long-term 
development and as the essential contributor to sustained food security. Many rural communities 
are  dependent  on  natural  resources  in  one  way  or  another.  Participatory  natural  resource 
management is increasingly emerging as a key focal area, both in its own right and as a means of 
achieving the MDGs, especially poverty reduction. Natural resources play a special role in local 
democratisation, because local populations rely thereon for their daily livelihoods and governments 
rely  thereon  as  a  source  of  wealth.  Allocating  power  to  local  institutions  and  strengthening 
customary authorities can also play a counter-productive role in controlling and managing local 
resources (UNDP, 2004). 
 
This research project attempts to uncover how participatory governance and decentralised Natural 
Resource Management (NRM) can be improved in rural areas and explores the implications of 
these  findings  for  rural  growth  and  poverty  alleviation  strategies  in  the  region,  specifically  in 
agricultural development, food security and local/rural development. This study provides a micro-
level  foundation  for  discussions  of  natural  resources,  as  well  as  efficiency  within  the  local 
                                                       
15 Chalfant (1984) argues that participation is therefore essential to the globalisation and modernisation processes at work 
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economies.  It  analyses  the  relationship  between  access  to  natural  resources  (including  the 
utilisation thereof) and income generation at the household level, and explores the implications of 
these  findings  for  rural  poverty  alleviation  strategies  in  Mozambique  using  data  envelopment 
analysis and econometric specifications.  
 
The study attempts to develop a framework to assess how to address natural resources strategies 
in order to support communities, organisations and (traditional) local authorities to jointly define and 
implement  local  development  based  on  existing  local  potential  and  opportunities,  particularly  in 
building the capacity of citizens to address local development. The influence of natural resources on 
their  livelihoods  and  local  development  is  examined.  Local  representative  bodies  need  to  have 
power over their resources. The strengthening of national capacities has long been recognised as 
vital if local and district populations are to benefit from possibilities that might be made available 
through the development process. This could include capacity development of local, district and 
sectoral authorities, in order to enable them to facilitate increased and improved delivery of services 
to  the  populations  they  serve.  Understanding  the  changing  approaches  to  natural  resource 
management is key when it comes to identifying appropriate strategies for managing local natural 
resources and dealing with conflicting benefits and the power to control and to make decisions. 
Emphasis is placed on natural resources as part of the population’s daily livelihoods and how this 
can really be a source of wealth. 
 
The notion that governance means maximising shareholder value derives from the neoclassical 
theory of the market economy. Many countries have chosen an institutional development strategy 
closer to local institutions and the rising collectivities. In order to lead this ambitious programme 
efficiently and measure the real stakes, these local institutions, which have till now endured many 
economic, political and social mutations, want to increasingly integrate the institutional domain of 
the  society  on  the  way  of  democracy.  This  has  been  noticeable  for  some  years  since  the 
commencement of decentralisation. The basic question is to know whether the local institutions for 
natural resource management can face the new responsibilities, because these structures have 
until now lived in the shadow of the State administrations’ thought and domination through village 
chiefs who exert a hybrid power.  
 
Local structures are the local administration representatives and sometimes activities coordinators 
of local resource management, or they are members of traditional institutions. Facing the stakes 
and directing decentralisation, emergent local institutions wish in this way to establish themselves, 
and  they  are  receptive  to  intellectual  assimilation  of  the  theoretical  and  practical  tools  for  the 
process in order to play the role of real actors in the field. Mozambique is attempting to pursue an POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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integrated development policy that will both attract investment capital and increase local income, 
finances and new structure organisation. It is imperative to have an overview of the prospective 
future  policies  as  important  tools  of  economic  growth  and  development.  The  overview  of  rural 
development  policies  is  done  to  provide  strategies  and  to  satisfy  needs,  and  to  effect  micro-
economic  and  macro-economic  changes,  equity,  efficiency  and  sustainable  use,  defining  the 
following as strategic goals: 
￿  Economic growth; 
￿  Poverty reduction; and 
￿  Sustainable use of natural resources. 
 
3.2.1.1  Natural Resources and Economic Growth 
Natural  resources  play  a  strategic  role  in  rural  economies,  as  potential  sources  of  long-term 
development, as sources of income, and as essential contributors to sustained food security and 
rural  livelihoods.  Many  rural  communities  are  dependent  on  natural  resources  in  one  way  or 
another. Increasingly participatory natural resource management is emerging as a key focal area, 
both in its own right and as a means of securing the MDGs, especially poverty reduction. Natural 
resources play a special role in local democratisation, because local populations rely on them for 
their daily livelihoods and governments rely on them as a source of wealth. Local representative 
bodies need power over the resources that affect their constituencies in order to become legitimate 
actors around which civic organisations and citizens rally for justice, sustainable livelihoods and 
economic  improvement.  Enforced  property  rights  and  security  will  also  increase  incentives  for 
natural-resources-related investment demand and thus contribute to overall economic output. In 
that way, the enforcement of property rights to natural resources will provide incentives for good 
natural resource management. Efficient mechanisms for enforcing natural resources access and 
property  rights  exchange  or  transfer  are  a  precondition  to  promote  the  productivity  of  natural 
resources,  increase  agricultural  output,  and  develop  the  use  of  natural  resources  for  credit  as 
collateral in the transaction. Well-defined natural resources rights are an indispensable basis to 
increase  taxpayers’  contributions  –  an  important  mechanism  to  increase  government  revenue 
(World Bank, 2001). 
 
According to the World Bank (2001) it is clear that natural resources are not only a basic factor of 
production – they also have a number of specific features. Against this backdrop, it has long been 
recognised  that  clarifying  property  rights  can  enhance  economic  growth  through  a  number  of 
channels:  
￿  The mean macro-economic view is that the natural resources have to be provided and used 
by government and non-governmental institutions, local community and the private sector POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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for a wide range of purposes. Enforced property rights and security will also increase 
incentives for land- related investment and thus overall economic output.  
￿  Efficient mechanisms for enforcing the natural resources access and property rights 
exchange or transfer are a precondition to promote productivity, increase agricultural output 
and to be able to use land as collateral for credit in transactions. 
￿  Well-defined land rights are an indispensable basis to increase the taxpayer base – an 
important mechanism to increase government revenue. Low-cost mechanisms for enforcing 
and exchanging property rights are a precondition for well-functioning systems to use rights 
efficiently, either on a temporary contract or long-term basis. Both types would enhance 
overall output and thus welfare. 
 
3.2.1.2  Access to Natural Resources and Poverty Reduction 
Access by the poor to natural resources (land, forests, water, fisheries, pastures, etc.), is essential 
for sustainable poverty reduction. Many rural communities are dependent on natural resources in 
one way or another.  Access and tenure security are thus crucial for economic growth and the 
efficient and rational use of natural resources.  The literature recognises that rights and ownership 
can increase indivisible investments (local or external), which will provide employment and income, 
making an important contribution to eradicating poverty. In rural areas where people depend on 
access and productive use of land, land access can help to improve nutritional status and provide 
effective  insurance  against  shocks  in  consumption.  In  rural  areas  where  household  livelihood 
depends on access and productive use of land, and where much of the wealth is held in this form, 
the formalisation of property rights to land can, if land endowments are distributed in a relatively 
egalitarian fashion, imply a considerable wealth transfer to poor households (World Bank, 2001). 
Similarly, citizen engagement in the management of natural resources will eliminate the need for 
individual owners to expend resources to defend their claims (fencing, guards, clear-cutting), thus 
saving scarce economic resources. Publicly enforced property rights would not only be less costly 
to enforce, but, to the extent that they provide greater security than private enforcement, would also 
increase incentives for related investment and thus overall economic output.  
 
3.2.1.3  Sustainable Use of Natural Resources  
NRM can and should play an important role in the infrastructure for sustainable development. In this 
context,  sustainable  development  means  development  that  effectively  incorporates  economic, 
social,  political,  conservation  and  resource  management  factors  in  decision-making  for 
development. The pivotal tension of sustainable development is between the environment and the 
pressures of human activity. It is evident that the system of recognising, controlling and mediating POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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rights,  restrictions  and  responsibilities  over  natural  resources  is  the  fulcrum  to  ensure 
decentralisation of natural resources.  
 
Decentralising natural resource management and using local decision-making powers is critical to 
improve the revenue-generating ability of citizens and local authorities. Local representative bodies 
need  power  over  the  resources  that  affect  rural  sustainable  livelihoods  in  order  to  become 
legitimate  actors  around  which  civic  organisations  and  citizens  rally  for  justice,  sustainable 
livelihoods and economic improvement. The challenge of balancing these competing tensions in 
sophisticated decision-making requires access to accurate and relevant information in a readily 
interactive  form.  In  delivering  this  objective,  information  technology,  spatial  data  infrastructures, 
multi-purpose cadastral systems and natural resources information business systems will play a 
critically important role. Unfortunately modern societies still have some way to go before they will 
have  the  combination  of  legal,  institutional,  information  technology  and  business  system 
infrastructures  required  to  support  natural  resource  management  for  sustainable  development 
(World Bank, 2001). 
 
While  it  is  immediately  obvious  that  weak  property  rights  will  reduce  households’  incentive  to 
manage the natural resources at their disposal in a sustainable manner, there are other channels 
through which land administration would affect sustainable resource management. The prevention 
of undesirable externalities through imposition of zoning regulations, an issue that has been widely 
discussed in the literature, will be impossible unless there is a basic framework of property rights 
and cadastral information that would, for example, permit identification of the areas where such 
zoning and intervention would be most appropriate (World Bank, 2001). 
 
3.3.  NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 
Evidence  points  towards  a  number  of  clear  lessons  with  respect  to  programme  design,  as 
discussed earlier. Probably the most important lesson is to increase beneficiary awareness and 
participation. Doing so would include shifting from a bureaucratic and centralised approval structure 
specifically  designed  for  land  administration  towards  a  more  integrated  vision.  These  generic 
difficulties  associated  with  natural  resources  in  general,  and  land  in  particular,  aim  to  increase 
productivity and sustainably reduce poverty, thus creating the necessity to adopt participatory and 
decentralised  policies.  Land  reforms  were  directed  towards  calming  social  unrest  and  allaying 
political pressures by peasant organisations. These measures were often initiated in response to 
political pressure (or to divert attention from other problems) rather than as part of a long-term rural 
development strategy
8. Land reforms were therefore often designed ad hoc, and bore little relation 
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had subsided. Moreover, the individuals targeted to benefit from this programme were often the 
politically most vocal and well-connected rather than those with the best ability to make productive 
use of the land, or those most deserving on poverty grounds (Rihoy, 1998). 
 
In contrast to most past discussions of redistributive land reform, this research studies in detail the 
capital  productivity  in  Southern  African  countries  (SACs)  with  the  intent  to  provide  empirical 
evidence on the implementation of land policy and management in Southern Africa, particularly in 
Mozambique. Some authors (Rihoy, 1998; Singh & Gilman, 2000) argue that many of the projects 
are still in the early stages of implementation; the data suggests that land reform was able to target 
the  poor.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  economically  successful  projects  reached  significantly  higher 
levels of poor people suggests that increased access to productive assets could be an important 
avenue  for  poverty  reduction.  Given  the  importance  of  developing  a  diverse  and  less  subsidy-
dependent  rural  sector,  a  suitably  adapted  land  reform  could  play  an  important  role  in  the 
restructuring of the rural sector.  
 
At the same time, the limited progress under the current programme suggests that much of this 
potential is, as of yet, unrealised. The evidence points towards a number of clear lessons with 
respect  to  programme  design,  as  discussed  earlier.  Probably  the  most  important  lesson  is  to 
increase beneficiary awareness and participation (Rihoy, 1998; Singh & Gilman, 2000; Spenceley, 
2002). The costs of carrying out land reform were often increased by the continued existence of 
implicit and explicit distortions, which drove land prices above the capitalised value of agricultural 
profits  and  made  it  attractive  for  land  reform  beneficiaries  to  sell  out  to  large  farmers,  thus 
contributing to reconcentration of holdings. Also, instead of aiming to create conditions that would 
improve the ability of land rental and sales markets to transfer land redistribution to more efficient 
users, thus using such markets to complement government land reform efforts, governments have 
often outlawed or severely restricted the operation of land rental (and to a lesser degree sales) 
markets (Rihoy, 1998). 
 
The  regulations  gave  rise  to  cumbersome  bureaucratic  requirements  that  stretched  available 
administrative capacity and resulted in highly centralised processes of implementation. Government 
bureaucracies at the central level – justified by the need to provide technical assistance and other 
support services to beneficiaries – proved expensive and, unable to utilise information from the 
local level, often also quite ineffective. One of the first studies to provide both a theoretical model 
and an empirical investigation of the potential impact of land reform indicates that, based on district-
level data from India, land reform can indeed have a positive impact on wages and employment. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  81
Though still accumulating, empirical evidence does support some of these conclusions (Pender et 
al., 2002). 
 
Conceptually, one would expect productivity gains to be proportional to the improvement in work 
and  investment  incentives  associated  with  the  post-reform  regime.  In  cases  where  security  of 
tenure had already been high before the reform, where cash-rent (rather than share-rent) contracts 
had prevailed, and where landlords had provided tenants with access to markets for credit, inputs 
and outputs, one would expect static efficiency gains from land reforms to be modest and the bulk 
of reform benefits to come through enhanced investment incentives (and credit access on better 
terms) associated with land ownership. As units of production that are too large will not be able to 
reap the benefits deriving from the utilisation of family labour, the net benefits would, at the very 
least, be much lower, and it is not surprising that in the large majority of cases, productivity did not 
increase and labour problems were pervasive. The only exception is where already well-established 
plantations were redistributed to the former workers, a case that is very costly and characterised by 
relatively low social benefits (Rihoy, 1998). 
 
In Ireland in the early 20th century, a large-scale "negotiated" land reform transferred 9.3 million 
acres (about half of the agricultural land available) from landowners to tenants, but this had a very 
limited impact on productivity. One reason is that land reform – which was enacted on top of earlier 
legislation – did little to alter the structure of production or increase investment incentives. Another 
issue, probably more important, is that land reform led to a worsening of access to credit, by limiting 
the ability of new landowners to mortgage land while at the same time cutting off informal credit 
they had earlier been able to obtain from the landlord. Severely restricted access to credit, together 
with insecure property rights, have also led to widespread selling of land by former land reform 
beneficiaries in Nicaragua – often at prices way below the productive value of the land (Cistulli, 
2002). 
 
This would be consistent with an interpretation of land reform as a piecemeal strategy by the rich to 
avoid the imminent threat of revolt – with backtracking as soon as the threat weakens, as modelled 
by Pender et al. (2002). Even in cases where there was a genuine commitment to break the power 
of landed elites, agrarian reforms were generally designed by urban intellectuals with little idea of 
the realities of agricultural production and a sound suspicion of the ability of small-scale cultivators 
to manage on their own, let alone to be able to increase productivity (Churchill, 1991). Due to the 
isolation and lack of access to communication technology, market and infrastructures, rural people 
often have little influence over policies and programmes that affect them.  
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It  is  well  recognised  that  severe  land  inequalities  persist  in  many  African  countries  between 
smallholder, large-scale, and State farms, and this in itself is an important topic that needs to be 
addressed as part of the quest for rural poverty reduction strategies. Most of the recent policy-
oriented work on land in Africa has focused on (a) how tenure type affects perceptions of security 
and  farm  productivity  (Bruce  &  Migot-Adholla,  1994);  (b)  the  relationship  between  alternative 
institutional  arrangements  for  transferring  land  on  rural  growth  and  equity;  (c)  differences  in 
productivity  between  large-scale  and  smallholder  farms  with  implications  for  land  redistribution 
(Binswanger  &  Deininger,  1997);  and  (d)  inequities  in  land  allocation  between  large-scale  and 
small-scale farms in parts of Africa where settler economies were prominent (Deininger, 1998). In 
the Eastern and Southern African region, much of this work treats the smallholder farm sector as a 
relatively homogeneous “unimodal” group with small but equitably distributed landholdings, which is 
placed  within  the  larger  framework  of  a  “bi-modal”  distribution  of  land  between  large-scale and 
small-scale farming sectors. 
 
Surprisingly  little  research  has  been  devoted  to  understanding  how  land  is  allocated  within  the 
smallholder farm sector, and whether this in itself requires special consideration in the development 
of rural growth strategies in Africa. Some research (e.g. Bruce & Migot-Adholla, 1994; Deininger, 
1998; Deininger & May, 1999) refer to a skewed distribution of land in many countries, and there 
has been longstanding reference to “rural differentiation” in the African development literature, but a 
clear empirical understanding of how land and other assets, as well as income, is distributed within 
the small farm sector in many African countries remains elusive. 
 
In South Africa, based on a history of dispossession of its Black population, South Africa’s rural 
sector  is  characterised  by  a  highly  bi-modal  distribution  of  livelihood  opportunities  and  a 
dependence of the rural economy on migrant remittances and government handouts. Development 
of the productive potential of the rural sector appears to be a critical pre-condition for sustainable 
poverty reduction. To create the environment for such a revival and restructuring of rural areas, the 
new government implemented, from 1994, a far-reaching programme of agricultural liberalisation.  
As  a  result  of  this  programme,  legal  barriers  to  market  entry  (both  domestically  as  well  as  for 
export) were removed and price incentives shifted towards high-value and labour-intensive crops. 
This created favourable conditions for a programme of land reform utilising market transactions 
together with a government grant, rather than expropriation, to transfer assets to the poor.  
 
In  Botswana,  Community-Based  Natural  Resource  Management  (CBNRM)  is  a  decentralised 
strategy  that  has  been  adopted  throughout  the  developing  world.  Botswana's  version  is  more 
decentralised than many and has been portrayed internationally as relatively successful. Despite its POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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international reputation for success, CBNRM has a complicated political position in Botswana. The 
policy has become a focal point for several distributional struggles. Tourism revenues associated 
with  wildlife  have  sparked  competition  between  wildlife-rich  and  wildlife-poor  districts,  wildlife 
communities  and  district  councils,  and  district  councils  and  the  national  government.  Critics  of 
CBNRM have drawn comparisons between divergent systems of rights over wildlife resources and 
diamonds. The designation of diamonds, other mineral resources and land as resources for the 
nation  played  an  important  role  in  building  political  support  for  the  new  national  government. 
Suggestions that diamond revenues should be decentralised like wildlife revenues call into question 
a  founding  principle  of  nation-building  and  challenge  the  national  government’s  main  source  of 
revenue. The politics of the situation threaten the survival of CBNRM, but also makes elimination of 
the programme politically inflammatory. Informed by fieldwork in 2004 and 2005, the paper draws 
out  the  link  between  increasing  political  competition,  rhetorical  strategies  for  national  coalition-
building, and policies affecting CBNRM (Poteete, 2007).  
 
Since  the  1970s,  Senegal's  natural  resource  potential  was  subject  to  the  effects  of  recurring 
droughts.  Many  other  factors  negatively  affected  soil  fertility  and  agricultural  productivity:  (1) 
pressures due to the increasing population; (2) low level of technology for agricultural production 
systems; (3) weak agricultural development and natural resource management and conservation 
policies; (4) poor coordination among the government departments active in the NR sector; and (5) 
limited government resources and an over-centralised, top-down decision-making process. Reports 
on the magnitude of the natural resources degradation revealed that 7.5% of the vegetation cover 
disappeared between 1980 and 1990, 82% of the fauna habitat and flora were lost between 1970 
and 1986, and salt intrusion led to extensive loss of productive land and decreased agricultural 
production by 0.2% per person per year between 1979 and 1992. To address these problems, the 
government  of  Senegal  launched  four  important  initiatives  between  1972  and  1994  to  improve 
conditions for adopting improved NRM practices in Senegal: the 1972 national regionalisation law; 
the Convention to Combat Environmental Desertification, ratified on 15 October 1994; the creation 
of a Ministry of the Environment and the Protection of Nature in June 1993; and the Forestry Code 
of April 1995. In the same period, a substantial number of NGOs (associations, GIE, women and 
youth groups, etc.) became active in the Senegalese people’s attempts to help themselves. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the application of customary law to the environment was restricted, under statute, to 
civil law and land allocation. It excluded the management of natural resources. Natural resources 
disputes at the formal legal level may only be determined according to customary law where the 
dispute is civil and both parties are African, provided also that it is consistent with general law. This 
is quite divergent from actual practice and constitutes the first level of distortion. By excluding the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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application of custom, the State has effectively denied a role for local values and priorities to inform 
resource  utilisation  and  management  and  it  has  further  trivialised  the  role  given  to  traditional 
leadership.  Additionally,  local  practices  were  criminalised  and  consequently  the  opportunity  for 
collaborative and participatory management based on dialogue and partnership is lost. Colonial 
states in Africa used a system of legal duality – one law for the European settlers and another for 
native  peoples  –  to  formally  exclude  African  people  from  civil  and  economic  society.  Where 
customary law continued to be used, its application and content was distorted to fulfil these colonial 
objectives.  
 
The second level of distortion is that customary law through its application by the courts and other 
arms of the State was brought into the formal law arena and consequently ossified. Local systems 
of management are complex and vary from locality to locality, making it impossible to generalise 
about its content and identify a set of uniformly applicable customary law rules. Yet, this is precisely 
what the formal legal system sought to do. Effectively “hijacking the development of custom by 
robbing it of its flexibility and dynamism through a process of assigning certainty and creating rules 
where none existed”. However, principles and procedures may be extracted from actual practice. It 
is important to distinguish between customary law as a State construct and customary law as a 
reflection of the actual values and practices of a community.  
 
Thirdly, customary law has in many instances been harnessed and modified by the State to control 
local people. According to Moyo (1995), for example, the use of traditional leaders intended to 
replicate customary norms of land administration. However, the presence of the chiefs in the judicial 
and administrative structure did not result in the accurate recognition and implementation of local 
customs and practice. Instead customs and tradition became a means by which the local rulers and 
family heads bargained with the colonial State for power in their communities. Thus, in areas where 
the chiefs continued to have jurisdiction, new or distorted "customs" emerged. This contributed to 
the development of two forms of customary law – the customary law of the courts and the formal 
State structures, and that of the communities. This schism is less evident in the area of resource 
management than in personal law, as the State did not recognise custom as a source of natural 
resource law. 
 
These  distortions  have  led  many  to  conclude  that  the  traditional  institutions  cannot  be 
representative and that there is little role to be played by customary law. The government itself 
came to this conclusion and focused on the creation of elected local government bodies. Although 
the reasons for this shift are complex and include the role of chiefs during the colonial era and, in 
particular,  their  collusion  with  the  colonial  regime,  it  nevertheless  demonstrates  the  lack  of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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understanding about the continued use of customary law in local natural resource management. 
Customary law has continued to play an important role simply because it reflects actual values and 
priorities. Consequently it is constantly evolving. The failure to include local knowledge and values 
has contributed to the failure of many development projects. Indeed, the recognition of local rules 
and value systems may constitute the basis for successful local natural resource management.  
 
3.3.1.  COMMUNAL NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Communal management of natural resources is used to describe a partnership whereby two or 
more  relevant  social  actors  collectively  negotiate,  agree  upon,  guarantee  and  implement  a  fair 
share of management functions, benefits and responsibilities for a particular territory, area or set of 
natural  resources.  Decentralisation  in  natural  resource  management  is  centrally  concerned  with 
community agency. Concepts such as ‘participatory development’, ‘community-based conservation’ 
and  ‘social  capital’  all  imply  that  a  collectivity  of  actors  in  place-based  relationships  has  the 
willingness and capacity to act collectively towards desired goals. Participatory institutions at the 
local  level  are  also  often  designed  with  the  additional  objective  of  capacity-building,  again 
overlooking the sources of pre-existing capacity. The success of ‘participatory’ projects is crucially 
dependent upon the collective agency of participants. While the significance of community agency 
is obvious and accepted, the sources for such agency are less clear. There is evidence that some 
project and policy interventions build community capacity, but this effect is variable across different 
communities,  and  it  is  hardly  plausible  that  the  target  communities  had  no  capacity  or  agency 
before the interventions.  
 
Communal management is considered within the framework of power, process and practice and 
how these shaped communities  access, control, and use of natural resources. Over the years, 
State visions of appropriate management and use of resources have largely been extended to the 
African communities through a centrally directed structure and process. However, State control over 
the  use  and  management  of  resources  among  the  local  entities  has  been  and  is  still  largely 
ineffectual, because the State lacks the resources and capacity to enforce such controls. There is 
consensus that decades of development effort and international cooperation have not produced the 
results  that  were  optimistically  projected  at  the  start  of  the  development  era.  All  has  not  been 
negative, as several countries may have benefited from aid; various sectors within most countries 
have taken economic and political advantage of space opened by the post-colonial processes, and 
the quality of life has improved for some. Yet slow economic growth and stagnation are still in 
evidence (Cistulli, 2002). 
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The alleviation of poverty has, in recent years, become one of the highest priorities of international 
development.  Concurrently,  the  definition  of  poverty  has  evolved  together  with  a  better 
understanding of the nature of poverty itself and its underlying determinants. Decentralisation has 
been considered by many as one of the most important strategies in public sector reform agendas 
because  in  Southern  Africa,  decentralisation  has  been  considered  as  a  strategy  that  will  bring 
service delivery closer to consumers, improve the responsiveness of the central government to 
public demands and thereby reduce poverty, improve the efficiency and quality of public services, 
and empower lower hierarchical units to feel more involved and in control.  
 
The  virtues  of  decentralisation  such  as  democracy,  popular  participation,  responsiveness, 
accountability  and  equity  have  led  to  the  belief  that  decentralisation  will  lead  to  greater 
responsiveness to the poor. Since the poor have been excluded from politics and therefore do not 
have  access  to  public  goods  and  services,  decentralisation  is  seen  as  offering  greater  political 
participation to ordinary citizens whose “voice” is more likely to increase with concomitant relevance 
and effectiveness of government’s policies and programmes, especially in poverty reduction (Crook 
& Sverrisson, 2001). The relationship between decentralisation and poverty reduction depends on 
the targeting of poverty-reducing public investment by local government units. Local government 
units  implement  the  national  poverty  reduction  policy,  narrowly  or  broadly  defined.  A  narrowly 
defined poverty policy uses transfers of income, in money or kind, to the poor. 
 
From  a  local  community  perspective,  effective  decentralisation  concerning  powers  over  natural 
resources requires these same elements. However, when examined in detail, community-based 
and decentralised forms of local natural resource management often lack representation, downward 
accountability  and/or  sufficient  powers.  Natural  resources  play  a  special  role  in  local 
democratisation, because local populations rely on them for their daily livelihoods and governments 
rely  on  them  as  a  source  of  power.  On  other  hand,  from  a  local  government  perspective, 
decentralised natural resource management and the use of participatory decision-making can be a 
fulcrum  for  rural  development.  Natural  resources  are  revenue-generating  as  opposed  to  other 
important  public  services,  such  as  infrastructure,  health  and  education.  Pioneering  efforts  at 
decentralisation  and  poverty  reduction  in  rural  areas  involving  entrustments  over  use  and 
management of resources to the local communities have largely resulted in recentralisation at the 
district level, where such efforts are still practised in the trickle-down mode. In many developing 
countries, local governments or administrative units possess the legal authority to impose taxes, but 
often  the  tax  base  is  not  sufficient  to  undertake  local  investments,  so  they  rely  heavily  on 
government transfers. The ‘poor and the unschooled’ participate much more widely in village-level POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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and  contracting  activities.  As  regards  the  ’gender  balance’,  men  are  strongly  dominant  in 
contracting but less so in other activities.  
 
Evidence in the literature argues that decentralisation
16 needs to be complemented by demand-
driven participation, conceivably championed by civil society, to ensure genuine democratisation 
and empowerment in natural resource management. The challenge facing Mozambique today is 
how  to  sustain  growth  and  reduce  poverty.  Many  important  economic  reforms  have  been 
completed, but others are needed to increase private sector skills, productivity and competitiveness, 
and create economic opportunities for all, including the poor. Infrastructure has been built to support 
service delivery and the growth of markets, but more needs to be done to integrate under-served 
areas with high growth potential. 
 
Decentralised  natural  resource  management  and  local  decision-making  can,  conversely,  be  a 
fulcrum for democratic change. Local representative bodies need powers over resources that affect 
their constituencies in order to become legitimate actors around which civil society and citizens rally 
for  justice,  sustainable  livelihoods  and  economic  improvement.  Ironically,  while  the  benefits  of 
decentralisation  stem  from  increased  popular  participation,  rather  than  supporting  new  and 
democratic  forms  of  rural  participation  and  representation,  many  decentralisations    are 
strengthening or reproducing top-down rural administration or inequitable and non-representative 
local authorities. Power over natural resources is often being devolved to non-democratic and often 
unaccountable or upwardly accountable local institutions such as chieftaincies.  
 
In  Zimbabwe,  it  was  intended  that  decentralisation  for  natural  resource  management  would  be 
through the development of CAMPFIRE. This section argues that CAMPFIRE failed to provide for 
meaningful  rights  of  participation  –  one  aspect  of  which  is  the  recognition  of  the  diversity  of 
stakeholders, their interests and value systems. CAMPFIRE is a State-driven local natural resource 
management initiative adopted in response to a legitimacy crisis of the Department of National 
Parks, which had come to be seen as little more than a police unit given their control and command 
strategies. This devolution was driven by the need to establish management systems that promoted 
natural  resource  sustainability  rather  than  from  a  concern  for  governance  systems,  human 
sustainability or the inherent rights of indigenous people to utilise a resource. Despite these origins, 
CAMPFIRE’S
17 objectives focus on the development of a participatory approach that is flexible and 
creates long-term solutions. It sought to introduce a system of group ownership, develop institutions 
                                                       
16 The decentralised entrustments are defined according to the terms and processes of external agents, including funders 
of projects and central government and their functionaries. 
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under  which  resources  could  be  managed  by  communities  for  their  own  benefit,  and  provide 
technical and financial assistance to communities to enable them to realise these objectives. The 
programme  was  a  remarkable  conservation  success.  Through  practice,  it  restored  the  belief, 
destroyed  in  the  colonial  era,  that  good  wildlife  management  could  create  new  livelihood 
opportunities. In many areas the illegal use of wildlife, as defined under general law, was reduced 
as communities derived monetary and other benefits from wildlife management. Nevertheless, it did 
not fundamentally change the nature of governance in the wildlife arena.  
 
Firstly, it failed to effectively link authority and responsibility. Communities are not involved in all 
levels of decision-making. Their role is generally restricted to determining which safari operator will 
manage the area and determining the allocation of profits. Effectively communities are little more 
than  “gatekeepers.”  In  return  for  their  conservation  efforts,  communities  are  paid  a  dividend. 
Although  community  structures  provide  some  opportunity  for  local  decision-making,  control  is 
ultimate  retained  by  the  rural  district  councils  (RDCs).  The  conflict  around  rights  to  wildlife 
demonstrates  not  only a  need  for differentiation  of  rights, but  also  the  failure  of CAMPFIRE  to 
recognise  local  values  and  priorities.  In  many  areas  community  members  express  anger  over 
hunting  rights  granted  to  outsiders  even  where  such  hunting  takes  place  under  CAMPFIRE. 
Although residents appreciate the value of hunting as a revenue source, they feel that in difficult 
times their daily survival needs to be given preference. Decision-making that neglects these values 
is not only anti-democratic, but also fails to recognise the right of prior informed consent.  
 
Secondly, CAMPFIRE did not give real rights of ownership to communities and as a consequence 
communities did not emerge as managerial and planning partners. Authority continues to lie with 
the  RDC  rather  than  with  the  actual  user  communities.  This  is  in  conflict  with  the  trend  in 
international law to place responsibility at the community level. Communities have often not been 
party  to  basic  decisions  and  consequently  many  questions  have  been  raised  around  rights  of 
entitlement  and  authority.  Rule  systems  in  CAMPFIRE  often  have  no  link  to  local  values  and 
priorities.  Failure  to  consult  at  an  adequate  level  and  with  sufficient  transparency  has  led  to 
resentment that there may be other more powerful stakeholders whose interests override those of 
weaker ones. This may also be attributed to inadequate access to information. 
 
Thirdly,  those  responsible  for  the  management  of  CAMPFIRE  at  the  local  government  level 
generally  underestimate  the  capabilities  of  communities  and  consequently  exclude  them  from 
management, thus effectively failing to provide technical assistance or to build local capacity as 
required  in  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity  (CBD)  and  other  legal  instruments. 
Decentralisation has to seek lasting solutions to these issues of local capacity by promoting the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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emergence of local leadership able to mobilise and develop local resources. Local communities 
need to be supported to network and forge linkages with other institutions and interest groups. 
Additionally, actual practice of communities needs to form the basis of capacity-building. 
 
3.3.2.  LOCAL NATURAL RESOURCE PLANNING  
Planning  processes  are  part  of  the  institutional  arrangements  of  decentralisation.  National 
governments  set  up  planning  processes  to  coordinate  between  local  and  national  development 
goals  and  to  harmonise  the  actions  of  actors  in  different  sectors,  such  as  forest  management, 
health services, road construction and policing, within the local arena. Planning in the local arena is 
needed so that local decision-makers who must allocate their funds and capacities among all of the 
social needs of their jurisdiction can do so in a systematic and balanced manner. Planning also 
helps to coordinate actions among local jurisdictions and between local, intermediate and national-
level authorities.  
 
One of the perceived advantages of decentralisation is that it is intended to improve access to 
decision-making  for  local  communities  by  bringing  planning  closer  to  the  grassroots  level. 
Empowering local communities to be involved in planning is expected to improve the opportunity for 
their demands to be met, increase their control over the decision-making and resource allocation 
process, and enhance transparency and accountability. In this regard, principles of decentralised 
planning  work  towards  ensuring  the  plurality  of  community  involvement  in  project/programme 
design and implementation through, inter alia, the strengthening of the relationship between the 
State and local communities. Decentralisation is generally assumed to facilitate redistribution and 
poverty  alleviation  since  it  brings  greater  grassroots-level  control  over  resources  and  their 
utilisation.  While  this  assumption  may  be  generally  valid,  its  applicability  under  the  conditions 
currently  prevailing  in  an  average  African  state  needs  to  be  re-examined  more  critically  as 
experience on the continent provides limited proof in support of this. In most cases, unless it is 
carefully  and  comprehensibly  handled  through,  for  example,  strong  oversight-cum-accountability 
institutions, decentralisation can, and often has, reinforced the power of local entities/communities 
and has worsened spatial inequalities – a state of affairs that has had adverse implications for 
poverty reduction itself. 
 
3.3.3.  INSTITUTIONAL SETTING IN MOZAMBIQUE 
Institutional settings  of knowledge systems  are  described  by  Usher  (1986)  as  being  "The  state 
system [deriving its legitimacy and authority from the rule of law of the nation-state] rests on a 
common property concept in which the state assumes exclusive responsibility and capability for 
managing a resource equally accessible to all citizens. The state manages for certain levels of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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abundance  on  a  technical  basis,  and  then  allocates  shares  of  this  abundance  to  users  on  an 
economic  and  political  basis.  The  system  of  knowledge  is  based  on  a  scientific  accumulation, 
organization, and interpretation of data, and management problems are resolved in a technical, a 
historical framework. This system of management is bureaucratic, which is to say, hierarchically 
organized and vertically compartmentalized. Managers become distinct from harvesters, authority 
becomes centralized and flows from the top down. The environment is reduced to conceptually 
discreet components which are managed separately. As these separate management units take on 
a life of their own, management objectives diverge and become focused on specialized objectives: 
maximizing fur production, trophy production, or recreational expenditures…The indigenous system 
[based on self-regulation] rests on communal property arrangements, in which the local harvesting 
group is responsible for management by consensus. Management and harvesting are conceptually 
and practically inseparable. Knowledge comes from the experience of every aspect of harvesting 
itself – travelling, searching, hunting, skinning, butchering and eating. It is accumulated by every 
individual, and shared intimately and constantly within the household, the family, or whatever is the 
social unit of production. It is also shared and exchanged within the larger society, and handed 
down in the form of stories from one generation to the next. In sum, these observations, like those 
of the state system’s, become coded and organised by a paradigm or a set of paradigms that 
provide a comprehensive interpretation of them” (Usher, 1986). 
 
By  way  of  the  development  agencies  and  the  complicity  of  other  partners,  the  State  system 
penetrates the indigenous system through rural and agricultural development projects. As different 
worldviews and knowledge systems collide during this rapprochement, the bottom-up formula of 
participation will not easily marry the essentially "top-down" framework of decentralisation. It will 
lead to a confrontation of social actors with a different epistemology, a different way of knowing – 
particularly when it comes to discussing natural resource management objectives and requirements 
and their devolution. The "gap" between what project documents (to take but the most concrete 
expression  of  an  application  of  the  modern  knowledge  system  of  "development")  specify  as 
"expected outputs, products, or results", and what has actually taken place, can be measured from 
a monitoring point of view as an indicator of sustainability – in the sense that this gap may reflect 
the extent of local appropriation, adaptation, and, eventually, "ownership" and therefore institutional 
and social sustainability.  A loss of livelihood options is also noted in the case of some private-
sector  development  initiatives,  particularly  those  in  the  tourism  sector  that  target  areas  of  high 
conservation value. Under the guise of providing support for alternative livelihood strategies and 
generating  local  wealth,  some  of  these  projects  in  fact  have  a  net  prejudicial  impact  on  local 
livelihoods.  Tourism  projects,  in  particular,  are  prone  to  overstating  the  extent  of  community 
agreement and participation involved in their establishment, with one operator even claiming that POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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the Quirimbas National Park is the only conservation area in the world to be proclaimed at the 
request of the local inhabitants, despite clear independent evidence of local resentment, suspicion 
and marginalisation on the part of the archipelago community (Johnstone, 2003).  
 
In  Mozambique,  the  first  phase  of  the  Agricultural  Sector  Public  Expenditure  Programme 
(PROAGRI) was set up as a five-year agreement in 1998 between a major group of donors and the 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (MADER),  based  on  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding.  The  Memorandum  committed  MADER  to  a  transformation  process  that  was  to 
involve the identification of core functions at all levels and the implementation of an institutional 
reform process and capacity-building for MADER to implement its new functions in an efficient and 
effective way. Eight separate components were designed as a platform for this programme and a 
set of “Basic Principles” was established. In addition, PROAGRI was seen as a means to introduce 
a more coherent and effective way of channelling and managing donor assistance to the sector, 
replacing  fragmented  donor-driven  projects  with  a  coherent  programme.  As  far  as  land  is 
concerned,  over  the  period  of  the  first  phase  of  PROAGRI,  the  vast  majority  of  government 
resources have been directed towards making provision for the private-sector uptake of land rights 
in rural areas, rather than on implementation of the newly introduced concepts of land delimitation 
and  formal  registration  of  community  rights.  PARPA  notes  that  the  State  has  the  obligation  to 
promote and enforce the sustainable use of natural resources, with the participation of communities 
and local government, for the benefit of the country as a whole and in order to prevent irreversible 
exploitation. The PARPA further states that agriculture and rural development play a key role in any 
strategy for poverty reduction and economic growth and it is also clear that success in this will 
depend on other sectors (such as infrastructure, telecommunications, markets, financial services, 
education and health and nutrition) that have an impact upon agricultural livelihoods in rural areas. 
The  action  plans  in  the  PARPA  are  imported  wholesale  from  the  PROAGRI.  Although  the 
implication is that “agricultural development” is in fact cross-sectoral in nature, and that appropriate 
action in a number of sectors and cross-sectoral coordination is required, the PARPA does not 
elaborate on the mechanisms by which such coordination might take place (MADER, 2003). 
 
Formal institutions  
The two main role-players in respect to the regulation of natural resource use are the National 
Directorate of Geography and Cadastre (DINAGECA) and the National Directorate of Forestry and 
Wildlife (DNFFB), both within the MADER. These national directorates are represented at provincial 
level  by  service  units  –  the  Provincial  Geographic  and  Cadastral  Services  (SPGC)  and  the 
Provincial Services for Forestry and Wildlife (SPFFB) – which also fall within the Directorates of 
Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  at  this  level.  This  is  an  important  constraint  within  the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Mozambican  administrative  system:  “dual  subordination”.  In  theory,  the  provincial  services  are 
responsible to both their line ministry (i.e. MADER) and to the provincial governor. In cases of 
disagreement it is not clear whose authority counts, and outcomes appear to depend largely on the 
personalities  and  individual  power  bases  of  those  involved  (independent-minded  provincial 
governors,  especially  those  out  of  reach  of  Maputo,  have  substantial  autonomy).  Coordination 
between the SPGC and the SPFFB is still lacking in many areas, although in some provinces there 
have  been  moves  to  implement  the  institutional  reforms  that  posit  the  amalgamation  of  these 
institutions into a single natural resource-oriented service unit. 
 
As part of a ministerial restructuring process following the 1999 elections, Fisheries was separated 
from the former Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and became a Ministry in its own right. The 
Institute for Development of Small-Scale Fisheries (IDPPE), which provides support to small-scale 
fisheries, has always kept separate from the management of semi-industrial and industrial fisheries 
and from fisheries research. The IDPPE’s focus is strongly oriented towards coastal fisheries, and 
there is effectively no formal management of inland fisheries (except on Lago Niassa). The Ministry 
of Tourism (MITUR), in respect of policy and the regulation of conservation areas, and the Ministry 
of the Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA) are also both involved in the development of 
policy that has a direct bearing on natural resource access. Both ministries have relatively weak 
provincial structures. 
 
At a district level the structure and composition of the agricultural directorates varies widely, but is 
generally characterised by a very low level of human, physical and financial resources. Very few 
districts  have  specific  representatives  from  the  provincial  land  or  forestry  and  wildlife  services, 
which tend to be concentrated in the provincial capitals. For regulatory activities, therefore, the 
provincial offices will depend upon the participation of generalist technicians based in the districts. 
Representatives  of  the  district  administrative  authorities  also  play  a  role  in  land  adjudication 
processes,  but  have  been  less  prominent  in  decision-making  in  respect  to  forest  and  wild 
resources.  Land  consultations  have  to  be  accompanied  by  a  representative  of  the  district 
administrator,  although  in  many  cases  this  role  will  be  allocated  to  the  district  directorate  of 
agriculture. At sub-district level there is even less specialist capacity and this is usually restricted to 
extension workers. Formal judicial structures extend only as far as district level and in many cases 
are  absent  even  here.  Those  that  do  exist  are  beset  with  capacity  problems;  few  judges  have 
university-level  training,  legal  texts  and  other  important  material  are  lacking,  and  corruption  is 
recognised as a major problem (CTC Consulting, 2003). It is not easy for ordinary rural citizens, 
even when they are organised through a community structure, to get access to the judicial system. 
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·  A lack of information on rights and entitlements, as a result of high levels of illiteracy and a 
lack of appropriate dissemination strategies and materials; 
·  The high costs involved, only partly alleviated by the potential to claim a “State of Poverty” 
and enjoy partial exemption from court costs; 
·  Scepticism regarding the objectivity of official institutions; 
·  The  imposition  of  administrative  resolutions  by  local  government  authorities  rather  than 
encouraging the use of judicial recourse; and, 
·  The lack of an empowered ‘community voice.’ (De Wit, 2001) 
 
It is only since the initiation of a training and support programme for the judiciary that most district 
judges have become aware of the Land Law. It will still require some time before these judges can 
respond more successfully to needs at local level. 
 
Community-level institutions 
During the colonial period, indirect rule occurred through a system of land estates (prazos), either 
granted by the crown or taken by conquest and essentially governed as fiefdoms. The colonial 
administration also co-opted traditional chiefs (régulos) as a further instrument of indirect rule; the 
chiefs became the main mechanism for levying taxes, recruiting labour and allocating land outside 
the  prazos  and  company  domains.  At  independence,  the  Liberation  Front  of  Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) abolished the regulado and replaced it with a new cell-based system of centralised 
democracy, with grupos dinamizadoros, village councils and land commissions responsible for land 
allocation (O’Laughlin, 2001). In some areas, notably in the southern provinces and the liberation 
zones of the north, this system became established with local secretarios holding substantial power 
and influence.  
 
Geographical patterns in authority can still be discerned, although these have been disrupted by 
overlapping migration patterns as people fled from conflict. In general, traditional authorities appear 
still  to  be  the  main  influential  actors  with  respect  to  natural  resource  allocation  and  control.  In 
addition to their identification with spiritual roles and mystical values, the traditional authorities are 
often used by NGOs as dispensers of aid and by companies as agents and generally have high 
stocks of social capital and influence. The extent to which traditional powers have been eroded by 
the official marginalisation of the régulos after independence varies, but there is evidence that in 
some  areas  this  process  led  to  the  development  of  open-access  systems  for  common  pool 
resources that had previously been regulated through customary norms and practices. 
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In relation to land however, the power and legitimacy of the traditional authorities seems to have 
been largely maintained. The end of the war and the consequent return of displaced populations in 
the early 1990s proved this continuing durability of traditional institutions of land allocation and 
adjudication: the re-establishment of legitimate and widely accepted landholding patterns (between 
groups and individuals that had remained in the countryside, those that had returned and those 
arriving to new areas) occurred within the framework of the customary rules of the rural populations. 
The process occurred largely without conflict and required little intervention from formal authorities. 
In times of normality, the traditional authorities in an area may only be used by local people as a 
forum for resolving disputes. In many areas access to land can be through kinship networks or 
neighbours rather than through the chieftaincies. Outsiders who come to a new area in search of 
land would traditionally be expected to ask permission from the local traditional authorities, but in 
some cases this may just consist of informing them after the fact in order for the boundaries to be 
confirmed. Customary systems of resource tenure vary across the country and between different 
ethnic groups. The sophistication of these systems appears to be linked to population density and 
competition over resources. For example, in the central provinces local leaders can describe a 
complex  set  of  rules  and  taboos,  and  the  hunting  and  harvesting  of  a  number  of  species  is 
proscribed at particular times (SLSA, 2001). 
 
Over large areas of the northern province of Niassa, on the other hand, where population density is 
extremely low, few taboos can be identified, even with respect to trees which are considered to 
facilitate communication with the ancestors. Where conflicts emerge, one section of the community 
simply breaks away and moves on and there is a reluctance to engage with either administrative or 
communal  authority.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  same  area,  the  paramount  chiefs  are  able  to 
describe and agree to the boundaries of their territories across most of the province. The lack of a 
functioning judicial system in rural areas creates further reliance upon the traditional authorities, the 
Presidentes de Localidade and the Chefes de Posto to serve as higher authorities if a criminal or 
civil matter is irresolvable at the village level. As a result, rural communities govern themselves 
more often by traditional laws or remembered vestiges of colonial law than by current State law 
(Knight, 2002). 
 
3.4.  ACCESS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS TO NATURAL RESOURCES  
Understanding the linkages between access to natural resources (size and ownership structures) 
and access to other sources of income and capital is an essential element in the policy dialogue 
about  food  security  and  poverty  reduction.  The  current  framework  of  economic  growth  and 
development includes a general trend towards the decentralisation of natural resources rights, a POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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collapse of collective structures in agriculture, and a move towards reliance on natural resources as 
the means of local community access to participation in the development process.   
 
Despite the removal of natural resource reform as an explicit part of the policy agenda, it is clear 
that the situations that led to the activation of natural resources reforms in past decades are still in 
place.  It  is  still  very  important,  therefore,  to  address  these  issues,  albeit  following  a  "market-
oriented" approach. There is discordance between contemporary macro-policy initiatives and the 
micro foundations through which they operate. A key conclusion from analysing the impacts of 
macro policy through the lens of micro-economic decision-making models is that access to various 
forms of capital is pivotal in determining household income strategies and, therefore, in determining 
the likely change in household behaviours and wellbeing when households are faced with macro-
policy changes. Mention of such a modelling exercise, which also offers empirical insights, should 
suffice to demonstrate this important revelation.  
 
Carter (1994) conducted a simulation analysis of how various strata of the Chilean peasantry would 
fare in the natural resources during a period of rapid agricultural export-led growth. The exercise 
was based on the theoretical model of household behavioural strategies developed by Carter. A key 
factor in this model, and hence in defining the differentiated behaviours of various classes of rural 
households,  is  that  households  are  stratified  according  to  resource  endowments  (or  asset 
typologies) which imply different behavioural strategies. Each stratum is differently constrained by 
its relative need for and ability to participate in size-sensitive rural factor markets.  
 
Carter (1994) conducted a simulation analysis of how various strata of the Chilean peasantry would 
fare in the natural resources during a period of rapid agricultural export-led growth. The exercise 
was based on the theoretical model of household behavioural strategies developed by Carter. A key 
factor in this model, and hence in defining the differentiated behaviours of various classes of rural 
households,  is  that  households  are  stratified  according  to  resource  endowments  (or  asset 
typologies) which imply different behavioural strategies. Each stratum is differently constrained by 
its relative need for and ability to participate in size-sensitive rural factor markets.  
 
3.4.1.  TYPOLOGY OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
The  conceptual  framework  relies  on  a  typology  of  rural  households  that  stresses  "differential 
income strategies based on access to land per adult member ...”. The typology focused on how 
different  forms  of  capital  determine  earnings  levels.    Carter  (1994)  looked  at  the  "evolution  of 
landownership structure itself ". The model and data postulate that working capital constraints (ex 
ante capital) combined with consumption credit constraints (ex post capital) lead the poor to the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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adoption  of  safety-first  strategies  entailing  the  growing  of  basic  foods  (food  security).  This  is  a 
consequence of size- sensitive access to capital. Thus, smallholders systematically opt away from 
high-profit commercial crop production, which then stifles their ability to accumulate land over time. 
Larger farms, which do not face such constraints on capital, are thus advantaged in short-term 
income distribution and in long-term capacity of land accumulation via the market.  
 
Within a similar framework, Carter (1994) reviews the issues of class basis and bias of agrarian 
growth in Paraguay. He again demonstrates the short-term effects on small farm participation and 
net employment effects which take place given a static distribution of land. More importantly, he 
draws attention to how resulting differences in economic returns across variously sized farms might 
cause a structural change in the ownership distribution of land via the operation of imperfect land 
markets that favour medium-sized to large farms. Furthermore, Bruce (1994) cautions that "... in the 
long  run,  if  a  household  is  investment-poor  [asset-constrained]  but  not  welfare-poor  [absolute 
income standard], it may lead to natural resource degradation that eventually causes the household 
to become welfare-poor ...”. In summary, it can be said that asset typologies define rural classes 
according  to  asset  portfolios,  which  tend  to  stratify  according  to  farm  size  groups.  Therefore, 
different  farm  size  groups  will  be  observed  to  use  different  behavioural  strategies  (income 
strategies). These differences will affect the outcomes of macro-economic policy decisions and, 
hence, must be recognised and taken into consideration at the point of policy design.  
 
A typology of rural households includes proletarian, semi-proletarian, peasant and capitalist family 
farms and hierarchical capitalist farms. These farms differ in particular in their capacity to increase 
access  to  natural  resource  holdings  and  financial  capital  and  to  decrease  reliance  on  off-farm 
employment for survival. The latter three forms of farming also differ significantly with regard to the 
types of labour employed on farms. The implications of this typology for participation in the natural 
resources market are striking and are discussed under natural resource markets as a means of 
access for the rural poor. 
 
The  conceptual  framework  relies  on  a  typology  of  rural  households  that  stresses  "differential 
income strategies based on access to natural resources per adult member ...” The typology focuses 
on how different forms of capital determine earnings. Carter (1994) looks at the "evolution of natural 
resources ownership structure itself ". The model and data postulate that working capital constraints 
(ex ante capital) combined with consumption credit constraints (ex post capital) lead the poor to the 
adoption of safety-first strategies entailing the growing of basic foods (food security).  This is a 
consequence of size- sensitive access to capital. Thus, smallholders systematically opt away from 
high-profit commercial crop production and this stifles their ability to accumulate natural resources POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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over time. Larger farms, which do not face such constraints on capital, are thus advantaged in 
short-term income distribution and in long-term capacity of natural resources accumulation via the 
market.  
 
Within a similar framework, Carter (1994) reviewed the issues of class basis and bias of agrarian 
growth in Paraguay. He again demonstrates the short-term effects on small farm participation and 
net  employment  effects  which  take  place  given  a  static  distribution  of  natural  resources.  More 
important, he draws attention to how resulting differences in economic returns across variously 
sized farms might cause a structural change in the ownership distribution of natural resources via 
the operation of imperfect markets that favour medium-sized to large farms.  Carter (1994) also 
argues  that,  "...  in  the  long  run,  if  a  household  is  investment-poor  [asset-constrained]  but  not 
welfare-poor [absolute income standard], it may lead to natural resource degradation that eventually 
causes the household to become welfare-poor ...”. In summary, it can be said that asset typologies 
define  rural  classes  according  to  asset  portfolios  which  tend  to  stratify  according  to  farm  size 
groups. Therefore, in this research different farm size groups will be observed to analyse different 
behavioural strategies (income strategies). These differences will affect the outcomes of macro-
economic policy decisions and, hence, must be recognised and taken into consideration at the point 
of policy design.  
 
Since the early 1980s, titling (and the registration of titles in a public registry) is regarded as the 
best way to protect ownership rights – in other words, the best form of tenure security. Titling and 
registration  is  the  highest  level  of  formalisation  of  ownership  rights  in  private  property  tenure 
systems.  Where  private  property  as  a  tenure  form  is  not  dominant,  however,  titling  has  little 
consequence or utility because holders of natural resources acquire tenure security through other 
mechanisms  (e.g.  membership  in  a  group  or  family).  This  explains  why  in  some  areas,  titling 
programmes either have little impact, unintended effects, or quickly become outdated (for example, 
title  documents  are  not  kept  up  to  date  when  property  is  transferred).  It  also  explains  the  low 
participation rates in some supply-driven titling efforts, e.g. in Honduras (Carter, 1994).  
 
He hypothesised that greater security of ownership raises farm productivity and, as a result, the 
market  value  is  higher  for  titled  land  than  for  an  identical  parcel  that  is  not  titled.  Given  the 
importance of land, there is a lot of interest in how its price is determined and how its price in turn 
influences other aspects of the economy, i.e. determination. The most commonly recognised benefit 
from the titling and registration, besides the tenure security bestowed on the property owner, is the 
use of those secure ownership rights as collateral to solicit credit. Formal lending agencies, such as 
banks, often require not only that property being used as collateral be titled, but that the title be POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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registered. In fact, the rationalisation for the cost of titling and registration programmes is that they 
put  capital  into  the  hands  of  people  with  little  wealth  and  a  low  income,  leading  to  increased 
investment  and  productivity  by  these  families.  Greater  tenure  security,  theoretically,  has  two 
impacts:  increased  agricultural  productivity  and  more  dynamic  markets.  Titling  is  expected  to 
facilitate transfers, stimulate the market and increase the supply on the market; it can thus be a 
mechanism for redistributing and making natural resources more accessible to natural resourceless 
and poor farmers. Feder, Onchan, Chalawong and Hongladarom (1988) argue that titles reduce the 
uncertainty over the entitlement of owners to maintain or transfer rights and, in turn, affect the price 
and scope of transactions.  
 
3.4.2.  GENDER AND ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES 
The position of women as a commonly marginalised group may be changing as a result of the 
messages transmitted by the Land Law, although there are community groups that contend that this 
marginalisation never existed in customary systems. In all four of the communities studied by Knight 
(2002) in Manica, community elders of both genders firmly insisted that according to local custom, 
widows had a clear right to remain on their lands after the death of their husbands. For them, the 
Land Law’s insistence that widows and unmarried women have the right to have their own land was 
merely another example of how the Land Law mirrors their own customary rules. She contends, 
however, that the Land Law is deeply affecting gender dynamics in other ways and is shifting the 
balance of power within households, particularly in relation to resource-management decisions: 
 
“Female members of the drama group in Musiyanharo reported that after learning about the land 
law, their husbands allowed them more freedom. One woman explained the changes that have 
come about as her husband has learned and understood the land law, saying, “Long back, without 
knowing this new land law, my husband was not able to give me the permission to sell any of our 
family production. But now that he knows that it is written in the land law that women have their 
rights to use the land, now I am free to decide on my production and also to sell it, and I am also 
free to do this community work” (Knight, 2002).  
 
Noticeable  shifts  are  also  occurring  in  respect  to  participation  in  community  meetings.  In  fact, 
women’s  participation  in  the  dissemination  meetings  held  by  ORAM  in  Zambézia,  which  was 
monitored over a period of two years, outstripped that of men. Knight notes that there is still much 
to be done, however, and quotes one female interviewee as saying: “When women are working, the 
men approve that the women have their own pieces of land, but when it comes to harvest time, the 
men say, “You are my own, and so whatever you are harvesting is also my own” (Knight, 2002). POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Lucas (2001) identifies two primary forms of conflict in respect to natural resources: those arising 
between local community groups and third-party interests from outside the community, and those 
occurring  between  community  members  (or  neighbouring  community  groups),  with  the  former 
identified as having a far greater negative impact on the livelihoods of the rural poor. In common 
with other studies, this research identifies the fact that many contemporary conflicts have historical 
roots that can reach back to early colonial conquests and usurpation of land rights. Where this is 
not  the  case,  the  conflict  very  often  arises  between  new  investors  seeking  to  rehabilitate  pre-
existing farms and infrastructure, many of which, in the period since independence, have been 
abandoned and subsequently occupied by local people. Other conflicts arise as a result of locally 
incompatible  land  uses,  as  evidenced  by  the  many  conflicts  in  Zambézia  province  that  occur 
between rice-growing local communities and livestock-owning investors. 
 
The traditional authorities have a predominantly greater role in the resolution of conflicts that occur 
between community members or between neighbouring groups. Very often, these institutions will 
coexist with the “community courts”, whose foundations lie in the people’s courts introduced by 
post-independence legislation. These function as a court of first instance in a local area. Cases that 
are impossible to resolve at this level can be referred to similar courts at a higher level in, for 
example, the administrative post. The “judges” are elected locally and in many cases comprise the 
local  political/administrative  functionaries  and  office  bearers  of  organisations  such  as  the 
Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM). Although the institution is largely respected and is 
recognised to play an important role, there are accusations of corruption in some areas. Similar 
comments  were  made  in  relation  to  the  traditional  dispute-resolution  processes,  but  here  there 
appears to be a higher level of acceptance that the parties to a dispute must contribute something 
to  the  chief.  Payments  are  recognised  as  “costs”  rather  than  as  inducements  for  a  favourable 
verdict. 
 
The legal incorporation of customary tenure rules into dispute-resolution processes has been a 
crucial step. Unruh (1996), who evaluated agro-forestry techniques in Nampula, noted the important 
role  served  by  the  existence  of  older  cashew  trees  in  identifying  the  legitimacy  of  claims  to 
particular pieces of land and claimed that “the widespread presence of cashew on smallholder land 
in this province allows these trees to provide evidence of land ownership, and constitute legitimate 
evidence for dispute resolution”. It furthermore appears that this incorporation is a two-way process 
and that some elements of the Land Law are now being integrated into local customary rules for 
resolving disputes: “The law has begun to be actively adopted into local conflict-solving strategies, 
both for internal conflicts and during external conflicts. In every community studied, leaders reported 
that  local  leadership  structures  have  begun  referring  to  the  land  law  when  resolving  internal POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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disputes. Furthermore, many villagers expressed variations of this statement, made by a man in 
Dororo: ‘For us to have power, we have to stick to the legal procedures!’ Such sentiments are proof 
that communities are embracing legal strategy, understanding that not only is it possible for them to 
make the jump to state-based procedures and legal process, but that it is also necessary” (Knight, 
2002). 
 
Historically, land ownership in many Yemeni communities has been associated with tribal kinship 
relations, but the socially marginal hijra population groups are not viewed as part of the kinship unit, 
and are thus not entitled to land ownership under customary rules (Carter, 1994). Participation in 
decision-making related to the affairs of the local community in general, and NRM in particular, 
depends  on  individual  and  group  relations  to  agricultural  land  ownership.  The  landless  do  not 
usually participate in the decisions concerning natural resource management. This does not mean 
that  members  of  marginal  groups  cannot  own  land  at  all,  but  that  they  can  do  so  only  on  as 
individuals,  not  as  groups.  Compared  with  rural  areas  in  Mali,  women  usually  designate  three 
female  leaders  to  represent  the  interests  of  all  women  during  meetings.  Under  certain 
circumstances, the village chief delegate’s one of his counsellors to join them in order to analyse 
together the meeting agenda, as no amendments can be made to decisions already taken. Women 
are increasingly represented within village associations and play an ever more important role in 
decision-making during general assemblies. In Ouassoulou village there are secret associations 
among widowed women called "mousso koma", one of the protective institutions of the people and 
their property, and its help is appealed to whenever a danger threatens the community: caterpillars, 
drought, epidemics, etc. In Seeno they serve, although rather discreetly, as a vehicle of expression 
for women’s opinions regarding NRM. 
 
The  matrilinear  areas  in  northern  Mozambique  present  a  picture  whereby  women  are  more 
integrated into community affairs – even though in many patrilinear areas women are dynamic and 
increasingly  important  actors  in  the  informal  market  in  the  cities  including  Maputo,  the  national 
capital.  Matrilinear  descent  is  not  the  same  as  matriarchy,  but  the  matrilocal  factor  among  the 
amakhuwa, for example, places women in a more favourable position in society than does the 
patrilocal nature of the patrilinear societies in the south and centre of the country. It is important to 
note in addition that the greater or lesser participation by women in domestic decision-making is 
also frequently conditioned by the internal hierarchy of an age group, and the consequently lower 
status of recently married women compared to the high social status conferred by motherhood of 
adult children. 
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In the matrilinear areas of Banga and Netia (in the Monapo district of Nampula province), one notes 
the  important  role  played  by  women  in  the  households,  particularly  in  the  management  of 
agricultural production with the decision-making power they hold regarding the amounts to offer 
and/or to sell, and regarding the granaries, which are linked to the responsibility women have to 
prepare food for the children throughout the year – an activity that presupposes the availability of 
basic foodstuffs. However, there is inequality between women and men even in matrilinear areas, 
for example during the rites of widowhood. Within the largely traditional role of women in Netia, the 
role of the apiyamwene of the lineage deserves to be highlighted. She is a socio-political leader of 
prominence and always by the side of the lineage chief (the humu), in her quality of "mother of 
mothers", whereby she is the symbol of the origin of the family group. As "mother of mothers", the 
apiyamwene  is  the  person  whom  other  women  of  the  lineage  consult  and  approach  with  their 
concerns. She is the intermediary through which others from the lineage, particularly its younger 
members and other women, pass their concerns on to the lineage chief, including, if applicable, 
criticisms regarding improper behaviour of the chief.  
 
Under  Mozambique’s  current  Land  Law,  land  is  owned  by  the  State,  which  issues  50-year 
renewable  leases  granting  liberal  usufruct  rights  whereby  the  holder  may  sell  and  bequeath 
improvements and access rights. In the Forestry and Wildlife Law, local communities are permitted 
to register a zone as a sacred forest and have it declared as such (thereby imposing limits on its 
use by third parties), but this is also subject to administrative discretion, this time at the level of the 
provincial governor. Authority to assign access rights and the issuance of a title depends on the 
size of the landholding. Although the actual limits vary according to land use, smallholdings are 
under the jurisdiction of provincial authorities and do not require titles, while larger holdings are 
titled and administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; and holdings exceeding 10 000 
hectares  are  in  the  domain  of  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Although  Mozambique  is  generally 
considered  a  land-abundant  country,  only  3  to  4  million  of  an  estimated  36  million  cultivable 
hectares  are  classified  as  good-quality  and  easily  accessible  to  markets.  The  more  densely 
populated  Maputo,  Gaza  and  Inhambane  provinces  have  imminent  land  constraints,  especially 
when fuel-wood collection, hunting and grazing needs are factored in. Small farmers are of the 
opinion  that  natural  resources  (especially  land)  do  not  create  added  value  and  incentives  to 
promote agricultural development (e.g. access to credit or as co-investment assets). 
 
3.4.3.  SECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS  
Natural resource tenure may be defined as the terms and conditions on which natural resources are 
held, used and transacted. Natural resources tenure reform refers to a planned change in the terms 
and conditions (e.g. adjustment of the terms of contracts between natural-resource owners and 
tenants, or the conversion of more informal tenancy into formal property rights). A fundamental goal POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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is to enhance and to secure people’s natural resources rights. This may be necessary to avoid 
arbitrary evictions and natural “resourcelessness”; it may also be an essential precondition for rights 
holders to invest in natural resources and use them sustainably. In South Africa, tenure reform is a 
component of a national natural resources reform programme, which also embraces the restitution 
of natural resources to people dispossessed by racially discriminatory laws or practices, and the 
redistribution of natural resources to the poor (World Bank, 2001). 
 
In Southern Africa, tenure reform must address a range of problems arising from settler colonisation 
and dispossession. Many of the areas referred to as communal were deliberately created to further 
colonial policies. They served as reservoirs for cheap migratory labour. Proposals for the reform of 
customary systems must accommodate livelihoods that continue to be spatially fragmented (World 
Bank, 2001). In South Africa and Namibia, a factor complicating attempts to dismantle the apartheid 
map is the complex and unstructured nature of the legislation governing the communal areas (CAs), 
much of which has yet to be repealed. The differing systems of property rights pertaining to private 
and communal natural resources are a related problem. 
 
It  is  now  recognised  that  universal  provision  of  secure  natural  resources  rights  promotes 
investment. Indeed, what is needed is that rights are transparent and that these rights can, within 
the existing physic-geographic, institutional and legal environment, be enforced in a cost-effective 
manner.  Due  to  the  importance  of  natural  resources  tenure  security,  the  community  has  to  be 
protected  by  the  State,  using  correct  legislation.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to  define  practical 
mechanisms  to  judge  the  performance  of  the  economy  and  to  define,  if  natural  resources  are 
abundant,  how  to  use  them  to  promote  growth  in  the  economy,  reduce  poverty,  promote 
investment, increase employment and increase GDP (see Stiglitz, 1993; Frisvold & Ingram, 1995; 
Harson, 1995). It is well accepted in the literature that more secure property rights could affect 
productivity by (i) improving households’ security of tenure and thus their ability (and readiness) to 
make  investments;  (ii)  providing  better  access  to  credit; and  (iii)  reducing  the  transaction costs 
associated with land transfers. Security of property can be considered as follows: 
￿  Secure long-term individual property rights are directly linked to higher demand for 
investment, and will cause individuals’ incentives in output- and productivity-associated 
natural resources use to improve.  Rural land rights studies suggest that this can increase 
not only agricultural investment but also households’ ability to engage in off-farm activities 
and thus contribute to broader rural diversification, thus making a direct contribution to the 
reduction of poverty. This can provide lessons for other countries. 
￿  A second issue relates to credit access and investment incentives. In addition to augmenting 
demand for investment, secure formal land ownership can increase the supply of investment POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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credit from formal sources, thus making an important contribution to the evolution of 
financial markets in more general terms.  
￿  Regarding transferability, written records of land ownership allow verification of the 
ownership status of land at low cost, thus reducing the scope for asymmetric information 
about land ownership and quality and making land transactions cheaper to implement. The 
reduction of transaction costs will increase “revenues”, bringing the number of efficiency-
enhancing transactions closer to the optimum and helping to establish a more viable 
financial system. The ability to transfer land between users may be of limited importance in 
the early stages of development, but only when there is little heterogeneity of skills across 
the population, and as long as non-agricultural opportunities and inter-regional migration are 
limited, or in marginal environments where no land market exists.  
 
3.5.  LAND POLICY IN MOZAMBIQUE 
In 1979, the first Land Law (Law no. 6/79 of 3
 July) was enacted, giving to the State organs, down 
to the level of the locality, the role of allocating land for habitation and agrarian uses. The traditional 
authorities did not have a role according to this law. Formally, traditional authorities did not exist. 
Under the framework established by the 1979 Land Law, a person seeking to acquire land and 
land-use rights was expected to contact the local-level-elected structures as described above, in 
order to help them identify unoccupied land, and then to contact the local representation of the 
State organ responsible for administrating land, namely the DINAGECA.  The applicant could show 
interest in acquiring land-use rights directly to the local representation of DINAGECA (normally at 
provincial level) and the DINAGECA representative would then verify in the national or provincial 
cadastral atlas whether there is a registration of occupation on the requested area. If this process is 
successfully, its ultimate result is the issuing of a land-use title.  
 
A  constitutional  debate  was  initiated  in  1990,  largely  as  a  result  of  decisions  taken  at  the  5
th 
FRELIMO  Party  Congress.  As  a  result  of  this  debate,  a  new  Constitution  was  approved  in 
November  1990;  several  important  changes  to  the  Constitution  related  to  natural  resource 
ownership and related principles of use and management. Article 35, the first article of Chapter 4 
(Economic and Social Organisation) in the Mozambican Constitution is deals with the public domain 
of  the  State  and  entrenches  the  concept  that  the  State  is  the  paramount  owner  of  the  natural 
resources occurring within its territorial limits.  
 
The Constitution recognises the obligation of the State, in the national interest, to develop the land 
of  which  it  is  the  paramount  owner  and  to  determine  the  conditions  under  which  citizens  (and 
others) may access these resources for their use and enjoyment. The Constitution is unequivocal in POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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its stipulation that land ownership is vested in the State and that no land may be sold, mortgaged, 
or otherwise encumbered or alienated. However, the same provision also stipulates that the use 
and enjoyment of land shall be the right of all the Mozambican people. The conditions under which 
citizens may enjoy such rights are the prerogative of the State, which is constitutionally obliged to 
develop specific laws governing these conditions (Negrão, 1999). 
 
The Constitution also introduces qualifications and limitations on the eventual content and nature of 
these conditions (or mechanisms of access). Firstly, it stipulates that rights of use and enjoyment 
may be granted to individual or collective persons, taking into account its social purpose. Secondly, 
there is a constitutional directive to the effect that direct users and producers must be afforded 
priority and that the laws developed by the State may not permit use and benefit rights of land to be 
used to favour situations of economic domination or privilege to the detriment of the majority of 
citizens. Most importantly, however, the 1990 Constitution obliged the State, for the first time, to 
recognise rights acquired through inheritance or occupation. It was this amendment that heralded 
the subsequent revision of the Land Law and led to the legal recognition of customary and other 
rights to land. Through this amendment, Mozambicans could finally cease to be squatters in their 
own country (Negrão, 1999). 
 
3.5.1.  POLICY FORMULATION 
The process of developing the 1995 national land policy and the main elements that emerged in this 
and the subsequent legal instruments have been well described by Negrão (1999) and Tanner 
(2002). It is important to note briefly, however, some of the elements of the process that have led to 
its being held up as a model in consultation and consensus-seeking amongst diverse groups within 
Mozambican society, and praised in particular for the space that was created during the process for 
the voice of the poor and the marginalised. Firstly, the policy development process was led by an 
Inter-Ministerial Land Commission created by statute and involving nine separate ministries and 
coordinated by a Technical Secretariat. Meetings of the Technical Secretariat were attended by 
organisations  representative  of  diverse  interest  groups:  The  Rural  Association  for  Mutual 
Assistance, the National Peasants’ Union, church-based groups, national academic institutions, and 
the private sector and land specialists. The Rural Mutual Help Organisation (ORAM) and National 
Small-Scale Farmers’ Union (UNAC) enjoyed the status of “permanent invited members” to the 
Technical  Secretariat.  This  structuring  of  the  policy  development  process  meant  that  non-
governmental  organisations  were  for  the  first  time  involved  in  legal  reforms.  Indeed,  the  1996 
National Land Conference to discuss the draft law, involving 200 participants from government, 
private sector, aid agencies, academic institutions and international and national NGOs has been POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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called “...an exercise in democratic participation hard to equal...anywhere, north or south” (Tanner, 
2002). 
 
Secondly, a broad-based campaign to raise public awareness and understanding was undertaken 
by some 200 different NGOs, churches, associations and cooperatives, and appropriate and well-
targeted  materials  were  developed  to  put  across  the  messages  of  the  campaign.  Thirdly,  the 
important implementation elements of the new law, contained within the Technical Annex, were 
subjected to an iterative process of action-learning by the piloting of some of the procedures in the 
field.  Although  the  new  law  was  espoused  as  a  Mozambican  law  made  by  Mozambicans,  it is 
questioned  whether  the  same  would  have  happened  with  political  pressure  by  donors  and 
international  technical  assistance.  The  ability  of  civil  society  to  interact  and  feed  into  policy 
formulation processes was increased by their vertical linkages (a form of social capital) with donors 
and others who were able to apply pressure so that the processes were transparent, open and 
consensual. Despite considerable work, the legal instruments have been promulgated and appear 
to  be  undergoing  a  process  of  “harmonisation”  with  other  sector  legislation.  The  regulations, 
however, were published in 2002 and it was obvious that there had been some improvements as a 
result of the more inclusive approach. The development of policy in respect to community rights 
within national reserve areas is unclear. This is an issue that has a potentially massive impact upon 
the livelihoods of many thousands of people who are resident in areas that are, or are currently 
being declared as conservation areas (Negrão, 1999). 
 
3.5.2.  NEW POLICY TOOLS AND CONCEPTS 
The  1995  Land  Policy  was  built  upon  a  set  of  principles  that  highlighted  the  need  for  greater 
protection of existing land-use rights and the establishment of an environment within which the rural 
poor could increase the benefits from the most common form of natural capital available to them: 
land. The policy was consciously designed to have a positive impact on the livelihoods of the rural 
poor. It resulted in the legal recognition of local community groups and of their land use rights, the 
incorporation of community representatives into formal institutional processes of land adjudication, 
and the establishment of legislated participatory methodologies that permitted community members 
to register their rights in the national cadastre, either as individuals or as groups of co-titleholders. 
The  Forestry  and  Wildlife  Policy  is  also  geared  towards  the  greater  involvement  of  local 
communities in the management of natural resources and ensuring that they benefit from those 
resources. There are some important similarities and equally important differences between the 
actual legislation that resulted from the adoption of these new policies. The aim of this section is to 
briefly highlight some of these issues.  
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The Land Law introduced a concept of “local communities”, which related directly to a spatial area 
within which a group of people lived and used resources. The Technical Annex introduced a legally 
prescribed methodology for the identification of the community and the related areas – a process 
that was intended to be in the hands of the particular community and to be one largely of self-
definition  (with  safeguards  such  as  obligatory  consensus  with  neighbours,  etc.).  Thus  the 
communities could be anything from a traditional unit based on membership of a clan or chieftaincy 
to a simple group of neighbours (CTC Consulting, 2003).  
 
The Forestry and Wildlife Law imports the Land Law’s definition of a “local community”, but treats 
the community as a form of public body that has a legitimate interest in resource management, 
rather than a private body (as in the Land Law) that holds actual private-use rights to a resource. It 
adds hunting as one of the areas considered as safeguarded by the local community. This is a 
positive change, since it recognises a further purpose for which customary user rights have existed. 
However, the Forestry and Wildlife Law only recognises these customary rights to forestry and 
wildlife resources for subsistence purposes.  
 
Instead of recognising more fully an inherent right to the resources (which could then not only be 
safeguarded by the community, but used by them as a natural capital asset with which they could 
negotiate),  the  law  establishes  a  licensing  framework  for  development  and  exploitation  of  such 
resources on a commercial basis. In doing so, it contains elements that put it beyond the reach of 
most of the existing national forest companies, let alone community groups that might wish to follow 
this route. In addition, the Forestry and Wildlife Law has introduced a level of confusion regarding 
the nature of the community as an entity, since it appears to be treating such groups as a form of 
public body that has a legitimate interest in resource management, rather than as a private body (as 
in  the  Land  Law)  that  holds  actual  private-use  rights  to  a  resource.  The  Regulations  to  the 
Environmental  Framework  Law  adopt  a  different  definition  of  local  community.  In  this  law  the 
community is defined as a “group of people situated in the area of influence of a proposed activity 
and that is not confined necessarily to a village or to a district”. 
 
3.5.3.  CONSULTATIONS AND REPRESENTATION 
Perhaps one of the most important aspects introduced by the new policies was that of mandatory 
consultation processes with local community groups, important largely because of the scale and 
breadth  of  application.  By  requiring  applicants  (and  government  agencies)  to  consult  with  local 
groups that were potentially affected by the request for natural resource use rights, the balance of 
power was shifted away from the State, which had previously held the prerogative of deciding upon 
the occupation and use status of resources, and towards the direct users of those resources. Both POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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the Land Law and the Forestry and Wildlife Law require these consultations, although they are 
termed  a  “renegotiation”  in  the  latter  law.  One  of  the  improvements  to  the  Regulations  for  the 
Forestry  and  Wildlife  Law  was  that  the  communities  were  also  to  be  involved  in  the  decisions 
related to the adjudication of the “simple licences”, which had not been a requirement in the earlier 
drafts. 
 
The inclusion of such a mandatory process meant that prima facie opportunities were created for 
negotiating agreements between the rights holders (local communities) and those who wished to 
gain access to resources. As such the consultations are “a critical ‘development moment’ for both 
the local population and the investor – one side gets benefits and an incentive to live peacefully with 




The Land Law recognises customary rights and gives them the force of formal legal rights, whilst 
also encouraging the growth of private sector “take-up” of land -use rights. It creates an enabling 
environment that allows local communities and investors to negotiate agreements around land-use 
rights,  with  the  State’s  role  limited  to  ensuring  that  minimum  standards  are  applied  in  these 
negotiations,  that  registration  complies  with  technical  standards,  and  that  the  taxation  system 
functions effectively. The benefits to local communities are envisaged as coming in the form of 
payments or benefits to them as a result of negotiating the third-party use of “their” natural capital. 
Conversely,  the  Forestry  and  Wildlife  Law  creates  an  enabling  environment  that  draws  local 
communities and the private sector into decision-making forums that have management powers 
over  resources.  These  resources  are  still  owned  by  the  State,  however,  which  recognises  no 
customary or inherent right to them, except in certain limited ways (e.g. the right to subsistence-
level use). Here, the benefits to local communities come from a royalty paid by the State from the 




It has been said that the two laws are essentially the same: rather than directly securing a role for 
local communities in the development and exploitation of natural resources, they create an enabling 
environment in which this can happen. This is true, but hides an important difference in approach. 
When a resource has multiple stakeholders with conflicting objectives and differential power, it is 
common  for  governments  to  work  out  co-management  arrangements.  In  this  way  they  seek  to 
strengthen local organisation, to provide technical assistance, and to mediate the overlapping and POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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conflicting claims on the resource. This allows governments to exercise a regulatory role and to 
retain control over components of the resource of direct value to the State. In Mozambique, there 
are  multiple  stakeholders  with  conflicting  objectives  in  land  as  much  as  in  forest  and  wildlife 
resources and yet it is the forest and wildlife sector that has taken the classic co-management 
approach. The land policy has elements of co-management, but these are linked to the specific 
allocation  of  use  rights in  community  areas  and  integrated  into  systems  that  permit  community 
registration of rights (Negrão, 1999). 
 
3.5.4.  PARTICIPATION IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
In addition to the mandatory consultations where user rights are to be allocated to private users, the 
new policies highlight the involvement of local communities in more general management decisions 
–  through  the  Community  Management  Councils  (COGEPs
18)  and  in  the  resolution  of  conflicts 
(specifically  mentioned  in  the  Land  Law).  Again,  there  is  a  difference  in  approach,  since  the 
decision-making powers that community groups may exercise over forest and wildlife resources 
operate within the co-management framework and have the nature of a public right to participation 
in State-mandated structures, whereas their rights to manage land resources, in terms of the Land 
Law, are recognised as private “unadulterated rights” over the land within their jurisdiction. The 
Forestry  and  Wildlife  Law  and  the  Regulations  contain  provisions  that  permit  the  delegation  of 
resource management powers over forestry resources to community groups.  
 
The nature of new rights 
Communities  have  no  right  to  register  their  rights  or  to  force  the  State  to  certify  them;  their 
registration  and  certification  is  subject  to  administrative  discretion.  Under  the  Land  Law  a 
community may only delimit their land and request its registration in the cadastral atlas if the district 
administrator approves this. Although the wording in the regulations is positive (“...at the request of 
local communities...the right of use and benefit of land acquired by occupation...can be identified 
and  registered  in  the  national  cadastral  atlas”)  and  although  there  is  nothing  in  the  law  or  the 
regulations  that  stipulates  that  the  process  is  subject  to  State  approval,  the  Technical  Annex 
introduces this requirement by including within the pro forma documentation an obligatory process 
that must be approved by the district administrator. The Technical Annex, including the pro forma 
documentation, is a legal instrument and therefore represents a legal requirement in the registration 
of  land-use  rights  acquired  through  occupation.  This  has  led  to  the  blocking  of  registration  of 
community rights, e.g. the Maputo Elephant Reserve authorities retrospectively reduced the area 
that had been delimited by a community (Nhantumbo, 2002).  
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3.6.  LAND TENURE AND RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
3.6.1.  LAND RIGHTS, TITLING AND TENURE SECURITY  
It has been argued that titling and/or registration of ownership rights to natural resources increases 
the tenure security and brings about more land productivity, because: (i) increased tenure security 
provides incentives to invest time, labour and capital in natural resources (making improvements) 
and agricultural production (buying inputs); (ii) titled natural resources can be used as collateral to 
secure credit (capital) for investment, thus making credit more abundant; and (iii) Titling facilitates 
natural resource transfers, resulting in natural resources moving into the hands of more productive 
farmers. 
 
The impact of titling and tenure security on credit availability and agricultural productivity can be 
broken down into supply and demand effects. Demand effects occur when the acquisition of a 
natural resources title increases the farmer's security and certainty that he or she will be able to 
maintain possession of the natural resources and benefit from investments that improve productive 
capacity. Improved security is hypothesised to enhance investment incentives and increase the 
demand  for  capital  and  variable  inputs  complementary  to  capital  and  thereby  raise  agricultural 
productivity (Feder et al., 1988). Supply effects result when the provision of a secure and legal 
natural resources title improves a farmer's access to cheaper and longer-term institutional credit 
because the natural resources can be pledged as collateral for loans. Output on securely owned 
(i.e. titled) parcels is consequently expected to be greater than on untitled parcels because of a 
greater use of inputs of capital and other variable production factors and potential shifts to more 
capital-intensive crops. Thus, the combined demand and supply effects, it is hypothesised, result in 
higher  farm  productivity  on  titled  natural  resources  and  also  raise  the  price  that  titled  natural 
resources can command in the natural resource market.  
 
The  rationale  provided  by  Feder  et  al.  (1988)  for  natural  resources  titling,  however,  ignores  a 
number of other factors that shape farm productivity and may affect the desired outcomes of titling 
programmes. Osborne and Trueblood (2001) argue that, in addition to ownership security, farmers' 
investment  decisions  are  affected  by  a  number  of  factors  such  as  alternative  investment 
opportunities,  accessibility  of  production  inputs,  the  farmer's  present  debt  structure  and  overall 
profitability of farming, and the availability of investment capital. These factors are dependent on 
agricultural and macro-economic policies. Moreover, the assumption that credit is available must be 
seriously  questioned.  In  an  environment  of  imperfect  capital  markets,  small  farmers'  access  to 
credit is rationed and a title to natural resources may not overcome  the obstacles to obtaining 
access to institutional credit.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  110 
 
Furthermore,  under  some  conditions,  the  provision  of  natural  resources  titles  may  work  to  the 
disadvantage of smallholders. As Carter (1994) points out: "If titled land operates as collateral then 
foreclosure and land loss is a real possibility. The threat of land loss is of course supposed to 
mitigate moral hazard problems associated with credit contracts. But in a stochastic agricultural 
environment which lacks insurance markets, the farmer faces a genuine erogenous probability of 
loss of titled and mortgaged parcels." In the case of land, under these circumstances, the impact of 
land titles on individual investment incentives and productivity is likely to be greater for wealthier 
farmers whose land size and wealth (access to other assets) leave them favourably situated with 
respect to capital and insurance markets. For smallholder farmers, the potential benefits of land 
titles may be overwhelmed by market access problems, leaving little incentive for title acquisition.  
 
While  definitive  and  conclusive  studies  on  the  long-term  effects  of  land  titling  on  the  agrarian 
structure still need to be undertaken, assessments and studies undertaken in the last decade seem 
to indicate that titling, in and of itself, does not increase credit transactions, improve production 
levels on titled land or increase the number of land transactions (Osborne & Trueblood, 2001). A 
preliminary report by Pender et al. (2002) indicates some positive differences in investment and 
credit for titled farmers over non-titled farmers. 
 
In  Angola,  one  of  the  central  problems  regarding  land  rights  is  that,  without  an  increase  in 
investment, the land that people have access to is insufficient to support them and their families. 
The solution to this is not, however, simply to give them more land. As one land rights expert has 
noted, the average Angolan family needs a minimum of about two hectares of farming land to 
sustain itself, but it is difficult to cultivate such an area without animal traction, proper irrigation and 
fertilisers. This problem becomes even more acute for female-headed households, orphans, and 
other vulnerable groups. The issue of land rights and tenure security, therefore, needs to be seen in 
a social and economic, as well as a civil and political, context. There have been reports of land-
grabbing in rural Angola and there are general concerns about the lack of transparency with which 
land is being allocated. The Ministry of Agriculture has stated that, up until 1999, more than two 
million hectares of land in the whole country had been granted to commercial farmers, but that this 
largely remains unused. Foley (1997) states that during interviews conducted for his report in the 
Bie and Huila provinces, it was reported that there had been some instances where land close to 
towns had been taken over illegally, but that there was no shortage of arable land in more isolated 
rural  areas  where  there  were  no  roads  and  that  it  was  effectively  impossible  to  farm  on  a 
commercial basis. At the moment there is little economic incentive for rural land-grabbing. However, 
given that so few people have documents proving their right to be on their own land, there is a POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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danger that this could increase if strategies to improve the rural economy are successful. The issue 
of  rural  land  rights  therefore  needs  to  be  tackled  holistically  by  increasing  people’s  security  of 
tenure at the same time as promoting economic investment in the land. One policy without the other 
will not help people; if implemented together, they could lead to a virtuous circle where greater 
tenure  security  leads  to  greater  investment,  which  in  turn  promotes  economic  and  social 
development (Foley, 1997). 
 
3.6.2.  LAND AND THE IMPACT OF MARKET IMPERFECTIONS  
The nature of land and the multiple uses to which it can be put and the complex relationships it 
generates perhaps make it one of the most difficult assets to value. For one thing, land cannot be 
moved from one point to the other. Therefore, it is not possible to move it from a land-surplus area 
to a land-deficit area in search of better prices. In and of itself, land has limited market value outside 
the specific purpose for which it is desired. Van Schalkwyk (1992), cited by Van Schalkwyk and 
Groenewald (1993), Van Schalkwyk (1995) and others, described the procedures for capitalising 
the various rewards of a farm as a basis for determining the value of the farmland. As can be 
expected, the factors that influence farm productivity will have an influence on the value of farmland 
through their impact on the achievable earnings. Thus, changes in agricultural returns, inflation and 
real interest rates, capital gains and debt acquisition are all assumed to exert some influence on the 
level of prices of agricultural land. In much the same way, factors that influence demand for, and 
supply of, land will, through their impacts on the slopes of the curves, determine the variations in 
the price of land. 
 
Land ownership provides investment incentives and, through the ability to sell, a basis for using 
land as a collateral in credit markets. The ability to formally prove ownership at low cost and, based 
on  this,  to  transact  land  in  sales markets,  will  thus  be  important  to  facilitate  the  emergence  of 
financial markets, producers’ access to formal credit, and the restructuring of bankrupt enterprises. 
However, the fact that in environments where credit markets do not work well, land sales markets 
are more likely to lead to undesirable outcomes and that, therefore, market imperfections or other 
distortions in other markets could give rise to the emergence of efficiency-reducing outcomes such 
as  speculative  purchases,  distress  sales,  and  deprivation  of  small  producers,  has  often  led 
governments to intervene in the functioning of land sales markets. 
 
The classical example for such undesirable outcomes is the case of distress sales of land, which 
arise in situations where, with limited access to markets for credit and insurance, the poor (who do 
not  have  access  to  credit  and  insurance  markets)  may  be  forced  to  sell  off  land  in  periods  of 
distress to maintain their consumption or survival in periods of shocks (e.g. bad harvests, accidents, 
etc.).  Normally  the  impact  of  such  distress  sales  is  exacerbated  by  fluctuations  in  land  prices POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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whereby the poor would have to sell at low prices during disaster (when there is little effective 
demand)  and  buy  during  normal  times  when  prices  are  high  again.  This  makes  it  difficult  or 
impossible for them to recover from those asset losses in better years (Bidinger et al. 1994 cited by 
World Bank, 2001). This possibility of transactions in the land sales market being driven by lack of 
access  to  markets  for  credit  and  insurance,  rather  than  cultivators’  productive  efficiency,  is 
illustrated by Cain (1981), comparing land transactions in Indian and Bangladeshi villages with very 
different access to risk-coping mechanisms over the 1960-80 period. In villages that had access to 
a safety net programme, the poor were able to use the land market to augment their landholdings 
by  buying  from  richer  farmers  who  sold  land  to  undertake  productivity-enhancing  investments 
(digging of wells, purchasing of pumpsets, children's education and marriages). By contrast, where 
such consumption-smoothing devices were absent, the majority of land sales market activity was 
accounted for by distress sales (World Bank, 2001). 
 
In agrarian societies, land is not only the main means of generating a livelihood but often also of 
accumulating  wealth  and  transferring  it  between  generations.  The  way  in  which  land  rights are 
assigned  therefore  determines  households’  ability  to  produce  their  subsistence  and  generate 
marketable surplus, their social and economic status (and in many cases their collective identity), 
their incentive to exert non-observable effort and make investments, and often also their ability to 
access  financial  markets  or  to  arrange  for  smoothing  of  consumption  and  income.  Given  this 
context,  markets  in  which  to  exchange  rights  to  land  can  provide  a  low-cost  means  to  effect 
transactions that would bring this factor of production to its most productive use. The institutions 
governing  the  functioning  of  land  markets  will  affect  the  transaction  cost  associated  with  such 
exchanges, the magnitude and distribution of the benefits generated by them, and the incentives for 
rational  economic  agents  to  undertake  efficiency-enhancing  transfers  and  land-improving 
investments. Furthermore, since land is one of the best collateral assets available, clearer property 
rights  and  greater  ease  of  their  exchange  are  likely  to  affect  the  emergence  and  efficiency  of 
financial markets. This implies that land markets have an essential role in the broader process of 
economic development (Bruce, 1994). 
 
Credit market imperfections would not only make it more likely for small producers to sell their land 
in periods of distress, but would also make it more difficult for those without assets to enter the land 
sales market as purchasers. The reason is that mortgaged land cannot be used as collateral for 
working capital, implying that the owner will be unable to repay a loan merely out of increased 
income from the agricultural production. In addition, the value of the ability to use unmortgaged land 
as collateral in formal credit markets will be capitalised into land prices, with the consequence that 
the equilibrium price of land at given credit costs will exceed the present discounted value of the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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income stream that can be produced from the land. The importance of the ability to sell land, as well 
as the extent to which other markets function well, increase with economic development and are 
generally  more  relevant  in  urban  than  rural  areas.  To  create  a  system  of  land  rights  that  can 
effectively respond to these challenges, Mexico has replaced wholesale prohibitions on land sales 
and rentals with a system that allows local communities to choose the type of property rights regime 
they  want  to  be  under.  Experience  shows  that  fears  according  to  which  liberalisation  of  land 
markets would lead to a wave of sales are often overblown (World Bank, 2001). 
 
Having clarified the concept of property rights in land, we turn to land sales and rental markets. To 
do  so,  we  consider  the  main  factors  affecting  participation  in  those  markets,  in  particular 
characteristics of the agricultural production process, labour supervision cost, credit access, the risk 
characteristics of an individual’s asset portfolio, and the transaction costs associated with market 
participation. These factors will affect land sales and rental markets differently; in particular, even if 
owner-operated farms are more productive than wage-labour operated ones, the sales market will 
not necessarily shift land to them. This implies that in environments where financial markets are 
imperfect, land market operation needs to be considered within a broader perspective focusing on 
access to other markets and the availability of alternative assets. We note that, in general, land 
rental markets would be less affected by these problems, because renting out does not preclude 
the landlord from utilising land as collateral to access credit, which could then be passed on to the 
tenant  in  an  interlinked  contract.  Removing  obstacles  –  often  government  regulations  or 
imperfections in other markets – that prevent smooth functioning of land rental markets, and taking 
measures that enhance potential tenants’ endowments and bargaining power, can considerably 
increase both the welfare of the poor and overall efficiency of resource allocation (Deininger & 
Olinto, 2000).  
 
The productivity advantage of small farmers who rely predominantly on family labour rather than on 
less-motivated  hired  workers  who  have  to  be  supervised  would  imply  that,  in  the  absence  of 
imperfections in other markets, a functioning land market should facilitate efficiency and equity, thus 
enhancing transfers from large to small producers or from ones with lower management skills to 
better operators. However, land sales transactions could be efficiency decreasing if, due to policy-
induced  credit  market  distortions,  large  owners’  advantage  in  accessing  credit  would  offset  the 
productivity  advantage  of  owner  operators  or  if,  due  to  the  inability  to  insure,  significant 
landholdings are not part of poor people’s optimal asset portfolio. Thus, before actions to activate 
the  land  market  are  undertaken,  careful  empirical  investigation  of  the  functioning  of  financial 
markets and insurance mechanisms, and possibly steps to improve their functioning, might be in 
order. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  114 
 
Deininger and Olinto (2000) found that even if imperfections in markets for credit and insurance 
reduce the scope for the land sales market to bring about improved land allocation through land 
transfers  from  large  to  small  producers,  such  allocation  should  –  in  a  frictionless  world  –  be 
facilitated through the land rental market. One possibility would be an interlinked contract whereby 
the landlord uses the credit access provided by land ownership to provide the tenant with working 
capital as part of the rental contract. High transaction costs – part of them related to government 
regulation – reduce the extent of land rental transactions in a number of countries. A coherent 
system of property rights that guarantees security of tenure to cultivators, facilitates access to land 
by the poor, and encourages investment to increase sustainability and productivity, is of overriding 
policy importance in two types of settings. In countries making the transition from communal to 
more individualised forms of land ownership there is need for a flexible, stepwise and decentralised 
approach that acknowledges differences in demand for tenure security based on diversity across 
regions  and  agro-climatic  conditions.  This  implies  the  need  for  a  legal  framework  that  permits 
evolution of land rights towards individualised tenure as the need emerges with commercialisation 
and  land  scarcity.  Secondly,  in  situations  where  land  tenure  arrangements  have  been  severely 
disrupted either by civil strife and war, by collectivist land reform, or by land-grabbing of influential 
individuals (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania), an approach that adjudicates among overlapping claims and 
establishes clear ownership rights to land at minimum cost is needed. 
 
Land  registration  and  titling  systems  are  often  perceived  as  an  important  element  in  a  policy 
seeking to promote tenure security and to facilitate more effective land markets. This is because 
official documentation provides better protection to an owner’s property rights, and eliminates the 
asymmetric  information  that  curtails  land  market  transactions.  However,  experience  with  titling 
programmes  has  shown  that  in  sparsely  populated  areas  the  cost  of  introducing  formal  titling 
systems may outweigh the benefits and that the administrative infrastructure needed to effectively 
implement  such  rights  was  not  available.  Similarly,  formal  documentation  is  not  crucial  where 
customary tenure systems provide sufficient security to facilitate the level of investments and land 
transactions that are relevant for the prevailing economic environment, and where credit markets 
are not yet developed to the point where collateral use is necessary (Deininger & Olinto, 2000).  
 
Past interventions have often underestimated the cost and administrative requirements of providing 
tenure security through formal title and have given little thought to the scope for alternative means 
to provide such security. Community-based approaches whereby a whole area is demarcated and 
internal administration of land rights (including provision of documentation by local authorities) is left 
to the community may in many cases provide a cheaper alternative to formal titles (Platteau, 1996). POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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However, the critical precondition for such an approach to work is that consistent implementation of 
this arrangement is feasible, that decentralised institutions are accountable and effective, and that 
the  certificates  awarded  by  such  authorities  are  legally  recognised,  entailing  a  possibility  of 
converting them into more formal titles at a later stage (Bruce, 1994). 
 
3.6.3.  EFFICIENCY AND CUSTOMARY TENURE SYSTEMS 
African land tenure is characterised by a coexistence of customary and statutory rights that need 
harmonisation. Access to land by rural people is not only essential for food production, but it also 
maintains the fabric of social relations. The effects of this have been persistent insecurity, when 
control over land was  used as a tool of social engineering. This brutal process – especially in 
Mozambique and Lesotho – coupled with the continuing centrality of the State, is an enduring issue. 
It  has  contributed  to  poverty  and  has  created  a  lack  of  understanding  of  gender  relations.  To 
resolve the land issue will need more than a technical solution. Bureaucratic thinking on land is not 
related  to  the  social-political  context,  and  debates  and  policy  initiatives  are  fragmented  (DFID, 
1999). Customary tenure systems or variations thereof are dominant in most countries of Africa. In 
indigenous areas of many African countries, the main characteristic of communal tenure is that the 
land is owned by the community rather than the individual and that market exchanges (through sale 
or  rentals)  are  normally  limited  to  the  community.  The  unsettled  nature  of  the  land  question  is 
common  across  Southern  Africa.    At  present  every  country  has  a  major  land  question.  Land 
commissions,  law  reform  and  land  reform  are  being  undertaken  throughout  the  region.  An 
extremely unsettled political situation is being created by contests for land within states, between 
states,  and  within  communities.  There  are  tenure  insecurity,  environmental  insecurity,  and 
institutional uncertainties. 
 
The challenge ahead is to create a vision in which land is considered as an integrated part of 
development, and a basic human right.  Land access is important for security, and governments 
must  provide  support  to  people  in  this  era  of  globalisation.  Should  we  not  be  talking  about  a 
regional land question? A dialogue within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is 
needed to ensure this, as in most cases, the change will depend on financial support by donors. 
Discussions  during  the  1999  workshop  of  the  UK  Government’s  Department  for  International 
Development (DFID) reaffirmed the tenacity of African customary tenure systems, and the need for 
national  policy  and  legal  frameworks  to  incorporate  them.  It  was  recognised  by  all,  including 
representatives of the World Bank and other donors, that individual land titling must no longer be 
viewed as a necessary condition for agricultural development and enhanced investment in the land. 
There are now some good examples of home-grown approaches that allow selective titling and the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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registration of customary land rights – including communal resource rights – based on genuine 
demand from land users and rural communities. 
 
There is a trend among nation states towards acknowledging the advantages of customary systems 
of tenure, and the UK, along with other donors, has recognised that individualised forms of tenure 
are not necessarily the best way to increase agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. African 
land  tenure  is  characterised  by  a  coexistence  of  customary  and  statutory  rights  that  need 
harmonization. Access to land by rural people is not only essential for food production, but it also 
maintains the fabric of social relations (DFID, 1999). The case of Ethiopia illustrates that equal 
access to land cannot necessarily be provided for all, and radical egalitarianism involves risks of 
land fragmentation, loss of rural employment and a reversion to subsistence production. Moreover, 
State ownership of land and periodic State-led redistribution programmes can create insecurity, 
undermining  incentives  to  invest.  Creation  of  non-agricultural  employment  is  central  to  poverty 
reduction, and rights to land should be located amongst rights to a wider set of entitlements to 
urban and rural livelihoods. 
 
In South Africa, Van Schalkwyk (1995) shows that the deregulation of the agricultural sector was 
actually part of an economy-wide financial sector liberalisation that began in the early 1980s to 
mitigate the macro-economic effects of the past agricultural support policies. It must be borne in 
mind that this era also witnessed the intensification of the global condemnation of the repressive 
regime  in  South  Africa  that  was  being  expressed  in  stifling  economic  sanctions  and  almost 
complete curtailment of contacts with the regime. Without a doubt, therefore, the forces that led the 
South African government to consider agricultural restructuring were multiple, coming from both 
their own policy actions and the impact of the global fight against apartheid.  
 
Another systematic study of the changing policy environment at this time by Claasen (2000), cited 
by Ajuruchukwu (2006), to analyse the situation of the group of 114 black farmers who participated 
in the land settlement scheme in the former black “homeland” of Qwaqwa in 1989. These 114 
farmers  were  mostly  selected  from  Agriqwa,  a  non-profit  government  corporation,  which  was 
founded  for  the  sole  aim  of  establishing  these  “emerging”  or  “beginning”  farmers.  The  agency 
provided financial and technical assistance to the newly settled farmers each of whom had been 
allocated between 350 and 450 hectares of farmland. Infrastructure for improved modern farming 
was  also  installed  and  farmers  received  frequent  advisory  visits  from  officials.  Value-adding 
activities seemed to be popular and profitable among emerging farmers. This experiment seemed 
to debunk the notion of the black farmer as not being responsive to economic incentives and was 
actually so steeped in tradition that he would be unable to be weaned from a subsistence mode of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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production. It was clear that these emerging farmers possessed the will and ingenuity to make a 
success of agriculture in the area. 
 
The  role  of  land  reform  in  economic  development  has  generally  been  examined  against  this 
backdrop (De Janvry, 1984). There are more empirical studies, including those undertaken by the 
World Bank, which provide cross-country evidence on this matter, the most notable being World 
Bank  (2001).  Using  cross-country  regressions,  these  studies  have  demonstrated  that  when  the 
distribution of land ownership is unequal, economic growth proceeds at a much slower pace, if at 
all. In all those countries of Southern Africa which have experienced enforced land alienation at the 
hands  of  Europeans,  the  repossession  of  alienated  land  by  African  citizens  remains  a  central 
national and agrarian objective. Land acquisition for redistribution and restitution has been given 
priority. Tenure reform in the communal areas has had to take second place to the redistribution of 
white farms. So dominant is the imperative to repossess land, that insufficient attention has been 
devoted  to  post-settlement  planning  and  support.  Thus  the  livelihoods  and  the  land  rights  of 
incoming settlers have too often remained insecure (Adams, Sibanda & Turner, 1999). 
 
In Southern Africa, tenure reform must address a range of problems arising from settler colonisation 
and dispossession. Many of the areas referred to as communal were deliberately created to further 
colonial policies. They served as reservoirs for cheap migratory labour. Proposals for the reform of 
customary  systems  must  accommodate  livelihoods  that  continue  to  be  spatially  fragmented.  In 
South Africa and Namibia, a factor complicating attempts to dismantle the apartheid map is the 
complex and unstructured nature of the legislation governing the communal areas (CAs), much of 
which has yet to be repealed. The differing systems of property rights pertaining to private and 
communal land are a related problem (Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997). 
 
Sjaastad and Bromley (1997) stressed that under conditions of low population density when payoffs 
from land-related investments are limited; the investment disincentives associated with communal 
tenure are likely to be low as people will not tend to invest under either system of tenure. With 
increasing  scarcity  of  land,  many  communal  tenure  systems  recognise  property  rights  to  land 
improvements such as trees or compensate for improvements made upon redistribution of land, 
thus  attenuating  tenure-related  investment-disincentives  (Sjaastad  &  Bromley,  1997).  It  is  also 
pointed out that, while communal systems prohibit land transactions with outsiders, rental and often 
even sale within the community (and possibly beyond) is normally allowed, providing scope for 
efficiency-enhancing transfers. In this sense supposedly backward communal tenure arrangements 
provide greater flexibility and scope for efficiency-enhancing transfers than many of the closed “joint 
stock companies” founded in Eastern European countries where members can neither physically POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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identify  their  share  nor  decide  on  its  temporary  or  permanent  alienation  to  other  producers. 
Moreover, they are often quite dynamic and evolve over time. World Bank research has greatly 
contributed to this revised attitude (e.g. Migot-Adholla, Hazell, Blarel & Place, 1993; Bruce & Migot-
Adholla, 1994).  
 
Land access and security of property rights systems are normally limited to the private sector. This 
limitation may reduce investment incentives. To facilitate economic growth and prevent the static 
and dynamic efficiency land losses, studies and frameworks have to be carried out to recognise the 
multiple  land  functions.  While  systems  prohibit  land  transactions,  communities  will  permanently 
continue practising traditional land use, and investment opportunities in the communal areas will be 
low. In other ways the system does provide flexibility and scope for efficiency-enhancing transfers. 
It is now recognised that universal provision of secure land rights promotes investment. Zimbabwe 
and other countries in the region operate on a dual legal system in which the received Roman 
Dutch law operates side by side with customary law. The two legal regimes also determine the 
tenure regimes that exist in Zimbabwe and the SADC countries. Under customary tenure, active 
occupation and usage of the land is the main evidence of ownership or an existing interest in the 
land. Under this tenure regime, access to land is contingent upon tribal or community membership 
controlled by the chief, and this allows for varying degrees of access to the fundamental resource 
by women. Under the customary tenure, women have secondary access through marriage or such 
other relations with the male members of the community and this access can be denied once the 
relations are no longer smooth – e.g. in the case of divorce or the death of the spouse. 
 
Foley (1997) states that Angola gained independence from Portugal in November 1975, prompting 
a massive exodus of Portuguese settlers. Thousands of plantations were abandoned, and were 
promptly “nationalised” by the new government.  According to Foley (1997), “All natural resources 
existing in the soil and subsoil, in internal and territorial waters, on the continental shelf and in the 
exclusive economic area, shall be the property of the state, which shall determine under what terms 
they are used, developed and exploited … Land, which is by origin the property of the state, may be 
transferred  to  individuals  or  corporate  bodies,  with  a  view  to  rational  and  full  use  thereof,  in 
accordance  with  the  law  …  The  state  shall  respect  and  protect  people's  property,  whether 
individuals  or  corporate  bodies,  and  the  property  and  ownership  of  land  by  peasants,  without 
prejudice to the possibility of expropriation in the public interest, in accordance with the law … Any 
nationalization or confiscation carried out under the appropriate law shall be considered valid and 
irreversible  for  all  legal  purposes,  without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  specific  legislation  on 
reprivatization.”  
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The Land Law 1992 (Law no. 21-C/92) based itself on the former colonial cadastral record, which 
has not been updated since independence, and tried to restore some order to rural land relations. 
There was little public debate, however, and it was approved without much scrutiny. The country 
was still at war and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Party of Labour (MPLA) 
retained a monopoly of power in the areas that it controlled. Angola’s legislature was still unelected 
and civil society practically non-existent at the time. The law’s preamble stated that local community 
land  rights  would  be  protected,  and  recognised  some  different  forms  of  tenure.  However,  it 
remained heavily based on the old ideals of state central planning principles, requiring, for example, 
that land conceded by the government must be “put to effective use”, and retaining the right to 
subject production to the “requirements of national development”. The attempt to make security of 
land tenure dependent on land use was based on a general hostility towards both the concept of 
private ownership and the social and economic position of rural smallholder producers – a hostility 
shared by many of Africa’s post-colonial governments. Similar provisions, which attempt to boost 
agricultural production through coercion, can be found in the early land laws of a number of other 
African countries. The law also failed to include customary land rights in rural areas, or the rights of 
those living in informal settlements in urban and peri-urban zones, and was unclear about the legal 
status of communal land. Urban land issues were also almost completely ignored, despite huge 
population drift to the cities. One observer concluded that the law “was not rooted in any formal, 
written policies that might have explained the priorities to be promoted through land use, tenure or 
transactions … it was not so much a land law as a set of regulations for access and titles” (Foley, 
1997). 
 
3.6.4.  TENURE REFORM IN THE COMMUNAL AREAS 
Opinions differ regarding the relative merits of indigenous customary tenure systems and those 
based on Western concepts involving the registration of individual ownership. In the 1980s, the 
policy debate on the individualisation of tenure focused on economic development. In the 1990s, 
the  focus  turned  to  the  sustainable  use  of  land  resources.  Both  these  arguments  tend  to 
underestimate the importance of customary land tenure systems, which are an integral part of the 
social,  political  and  economic  framework.  Above  all,  they  overlook  the  unintended  effects  of 
undermining land tenure systems that protect poor and vulnerable members. They also tend to 
disregard the empirical evidence that traditional tenure systems can be flexible and responsive to 
changing  economic  circumstances.  Individualisation  has  occurred  autonomously  with  population 
pressure and commercialisation (Migot-Adholla et al., 1993). 
  
There are undoubtedly “tenure hotspots” where, if the rights of the more vulnerable members of 
society are to be protected, change must not be allowed to take place in a legal and administrative POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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vacuum. Rihoy (1998) describes how, in Zimbabwe, competing and ineffective attempts by both 
government  and  NGOs,  frustrated  by  weak  local  administration  and  disingenuous  central 
government  interventions,  have  failed  to  resolve  land  tenure  problems  in  the  absence  of 
constitutional and legal principles governing land in the Community Associations (Cas). Studies in 
South Africa demonstrate the increasing breakdown of customary management arrangements and 
the often dysfunctional mixture of old and new institutions and practices.  
 
People are often uncertain about the nature of their rights and confused about the extent to which 
these are affected by institutions and laws. Tribal commonage is passing to open access, and rights 
to homestead plots and fields are becoming increasingly insecure. Tenure insecurity is most acute 
among those using land to generate income, especially women. Profit-making from agriculture and 
small business activity in the CAs are not clear rights. As soon as informal land markets become 
accepted,  people  with  allocation  authority  –  usually  men  with  connections  to  those  in  power  – 
emerge as squatter patrons or warlords (Schuh & Norton, 1991).  
 
In  countries  where  policy  and  legal  frameworks  still  discriminate,  it  would  be  desirable  to  work 
towards  recognition  of  such  tenure  arrangements;  in  the  context  of  a  national  land  policy 
framework, much time has been spent discussing legal changes in the absence of mechanisms of 
implementation.    The  Mozambican  administrative  reform  laws  replaced  the  Portuguese  colonial 
administrative structures and constructed a new system of governance structured at the national, 
provincial  and  local  levels.  After  independence  Mozambique  adopted  a  system  of  centralised 
administration,  where  each  and  every  thing  was  planned  and  decided  at  the  centre  of  political 
power.  The  approach  was  intended  to  be  an  answer  that  would  meet  the  needs  of  the  state, 
defend/safeguard  and  consolidate  the  national  independence,  achieve  planned  socio-economic 
measures, use the scarce resources rationally, and consolidate a unitary state. After more than five 
years of public debate and technical assistance, the Mozambique Assembly of Republic adopted a 
new land law on 31 July 1997. There have been some significant differences as compared to the 
1975 land law in that: 
￿  Local communities must be consulted prior to approving a concession request within their 
territory, and local communities should participate in the resolution of land conflicts involving 
private interests; 
￿  It defines the mechanisms for representation and for the exercise of the local communities 
with regard to the right of land use and benefit, and it recognises the customary (non-
written) forms of evidence in the resolution of land disputes between second and third 
parties; and 
￿  It creates possibilities for co-titling of land for women and men. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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The transformation from subsistence- to market-oriented production has created dramatic changes 
in the socio-economic relations of the resource users in community areas of Mozambique. Tique 
(2000)  noted  that  those  changes  in  the  use  of  natural  resources,  including  land  and  forest 
resources,  reflect  the  overall  ongoing  challenges  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy,  towards  a 
reallocation of productive resources from the traditional channels to the open market. Resource 
degradation can in turn contribute to poverty and food insecurity.  
 
 
3.6.5.  TENURE SECURITY AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN AGRICULTURE 
Land is not only a basic factor of production, it also has a number of specific features such as 
indivisibility, lack of mobility, and lumpiness, which distinguish it from other factors. Against this 
backdrop, it has long been recognised that clarifying property rights to land can enhance economic 
growth through a number of channels: (i) Both measurement of land parcels and the enforcement of 
property rights to land are clear public goods. Maps as well as a cadastre and associated land 
records can, once established, be used by government institutions and the private sector for a wide 
range of purposes. Their public availability will prevent wasteful spending and duplication by these 
actors. Similarly, public enforcement of property rights to land will eliminate the need for individual 
land owners to expend resource to defend their claims (fencing, guards, clear-cutting), thus saving 
scarce economic resources; (ii) Publicly enforced property rights would not only be less costly to 
enforce, but, to the extent that they provide greater security than private enforcement, also increase 
incentives for land-related investment and thus overall economic output.; (iii) Low-cost mechanisms 
for enforcing and exchanging property rights to land are a precondition for well-functioning markets 
to exchanges land rights, either on a temporary (rental) or a permanent (sales) basis. Both types of 
exchange would enhance overall output and thus welfare.  
 
Understanding the linkages between access to land (size and ownership structures) and access to 
other  sources  of  income  and  capital  is  an  essential  element  in  the  policy  dialogue  about  food 
security  and  poverty  reduction.  The  current  framework  of  economic  growth  and  development 
includes  a  general  trend  towards  the  privatisation  of  land  rights  and  a  collapse  of  collective 
structures in agriculture, as well as a move towards reliance on land markets as the means of 
peasant  access  to  participation  in  the  development  process.  A  typology  of  rural  households  is 
defined, including proletarian, semi-proletarian, peasant and capitalist family farms and hierarchical 
capitalist farms. These farms differ in particular in their capacity to increase access to landholdings 
and financial capital and decrease reliance on off-farm employment for survival. The latter three 
forms of farming differ significantly also with regard to the types of labour employed on their farms.  
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The problem with policy models, according to Carter (1994), is that they "... generally abstract from 
these  features  [market  failures,  transactions  costs,  etc.]  and  postulate  instead  the  existence  of 
perfect markets with exceptions such as surplus labour, price regulation ...”. This statement is made 
in the context of showing how consideration of micro-economic features, such as whether or not a 
household  is  a  net  buyer  or  net  seller  of  a  farm  commodity,  matters  for  the  distribution  of  the 
benefits and costs of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Increasing attention has 
since the early 1980s been given to land titling as a means of increasing tenure security. The titling 
of land (and the registration of titles in a public registry) is considered by many to be the best way to 
protect ownership rights to land – in other words, the best form of tenure security. Land titling and 
registration  is  the  highest  level  of  formalisation  of  ownership  rights  in  private  property  tenure 
systems. Where private property as a tenure form is not dominant, however, land titling has little 
consequence or utility because landholders acquire tenure security through other mechanisms (e.g. 
membership of a group or family). This explains why in some areas titling programmes either have 
little impact or unintended effects, or quickly become outdated (for example, title documents are not 
kept up to date when property is transferred). It also explains the low participation rates in some 
supply-driven titling efforts, e.g. in Honduras.  
 
Greater tenure security, theoretically, has two impacts: increased agricultural productivity and more 
dynamic land markets. Titling is expected to facilitate land transfers, stimulate the land market and 
increase the supply of land on the market; thus, it can be a mechanism for redistributing land and 
making land more accessible to landless and land-poor farmers. Feder et al. (1988) argued that 
land titles reduce uncertainty over the entitlement of owners to maintain or transfer land rights and, 
in turn, affect the price and scope of land transactions. The funding of an effective system of land 
rights management is a precondition for securing the land rights of poorer citizens, both in the CAs 
and on private land. While communities can be expected to allocate their own resources for this 
purpose, government should ensure that adequate measures are in place to protect people from 
exploitation by elites. At the outset, when systems are being established, funds also have to be 
found for public information, the training of officials, community facilitation, dispute resolution, etc. 
(Adams et al., 1999). 
 
3.6.6.  POLICY DISTORTIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
The impact of policy distortions in the agricultural sector can be appreciated from the fact that, 
instead of specialisation in the labour-intensive production of high-value crops and agro-exportable 
products that one would expect given the country’s natural endowment, South Africa’s agricultural 
sector focus on crops (e.g. wheat) is not in line with its comparative advantage and has very low 
potential for employment generation. In the relatively small homeland areas, millions of poor relied POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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on scarce natural resources to complement remittances and pensions from “outside” as part of a 
survival strategy. On white commercial farms, by contrast, abundant natural resources were used 
by a small number of the “privileged” to produce increasing surpluses. There is agreement that, 
even though these policies allowed the country to achieve self-sufficiency in food and create a 
highly technified agricultural sector, the costs – in social as well as economic terms – of doing so 
have been very high (Deininger, 1998). 
 
To reverse this trend and establish a more diverse rural structure, a liberalisation programme was 
initiated to (i) further reform the input and output marketing system; (ii) reduce concentration in the 
agro-processing sector; (iii) restructure the system of rural financial intermediation; (iv) revise land 
subdivision  legislation  and  other  legal  acts  that  had  been  established  with  the  express  goal  of 
discriminating against the black population; and (v) upgrade agricultural support services and invest 
in an improved physical and social infrastructure in the former homelands. These measures set in 
motion a serious decline in the profitability of “traditional” crops, an increase in productivity due to a 
shift to higher value production, and a dramatic increase in the number of indebted farms (Bruce, 
1994). In South Africa, following a number of earlier legal interventions with similar goals, the Native 
Lands Act of 1912 prohibited the establishment of new farming operations, sharecropping or cash 
rentals by blacks outside of the reserves, which made up only 7.7% of the country’s area. Inside the 
reserves, an artificial form of “traditional” tenure with maximum holding sizes and restrictions on 
land transactions was imposed, giving considerable power to collaborative local chiefs. Subsequent 
policies  of  “black  spot  removal”  transferred  the  majority  of  black  farmers  who  had  legitimately 
owned land outside the reserves into 5 homelands or bantustans where tenure restrictions, high 
population density, and lack of capital and market access made commercial agriculture virtually 
impossible (Bruce, 1994). 
 
Labour laws that discriminated against blacks in favour of White workers, and generous capital 
subsidies  to  White  farmers,  contributed  to  successive  evictions  of  large  parts  of  the  Black 
population from White farms, where they had been employed as labour tenants and farm workers 
(Binswanger & Deininger, 1997). While the Native Lands Act was repealed in 1993, the momentous 
task  of  a  comprehensive  reversal  of  the  other  policies  and  their  consequences  was  left  to  the 
government  that  entered  power  following  the  1994  elections.  In  attempting  to  do  so,  this 
government  had  to  contend  not  only  with  the  extremely  unequal  land  distribution  (the  average 
amount held per person was 1.3 hectares by Blacks compared to 1 570 hectares by Whites). This 
was  exacerbated  by  the  lack  of  any  local  government  structure,  widespread  absence  of 
administrative capacity, and the legacy of misdirected agricultural policies, which included subsidies POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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to  capital  and  fertiliser,  public  sector  marketing  monopolies,  and  a  legislative  environment  that 
undermined the operation of factor markets. 
 
The sustainable livelihoods framework put forward by Cramer and Pontara (1997) helps analyse the 
strengths of particular systems of land tenure, and of their evolution. The framework is useful when 
considering options for change and their likely impact on people’s asset status. Their access to 
capital assets, including finance, land, natural resources and social capital, determines how and 
how far livelihoods can be enhanced. Where financial resources are lacking, social capital can 
provide the basis for a range of livelihood opportunities, including customary access to land and 
natural resources and opportunities for the poor to sell their labour.  For those relying largely on 
local rural resources for their livelihood, a secure place to live, free from threat of eviction, with 
access to productive land and natural resources are essential for rural livelihoods in the region. 
These elements are broadly located in the customary land tenure categories: “the holding” and “the 
commons”. 
 
The case for government intervention undoubtedly varies greatly throughout Southern Africa. The 
extent to which rural people are able informally to adjust tenure to suit their livelihood purposes is 
likely to depend on the extent to which land rights have been disrupted by past interventions and by 
enforced overcrowding under colonial and apartheid regimes. In parts of South Africa, the “informal” 
situation on the ground is getting out of hand and effective reform is urgently needed. On the other 
hand, in rural Lesotho where there are more modest expectations about official systems and the 
rule of law, all kinds of arrangements are made and informal tenure systems are not a significant 
constraint on rural livelihoods, though they are on urban and peri-urban ones. There is a need for 
more information on how people in the Southern African region are “muddling through” and how 
functional or dysfunctional each situation is (Cramer & Pontara, 1997). 
 
According to Tique (2000) those changes in the use of natural resources, including land and forest 
resources,  reflect  the  overall  ongoing  challenges  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy,  towards  a 
reallocation  of  productive  resources  from  the  traditional  channels  to  the  open  market.  It  is 
hypothesised that when community institutions are more meaningfully integrated into decentralised 
rural development initiatives, the net benefits outweigh the net costs, provided that their role is 
formalised to the appropriate extent, clarified, and endorsed by all stakeholders involved. As a new 
institution these consultations are beset with myriad problems. In some cases they do not take 
place at all or they may perform in a perfunctory manner. Local elites may manipulate the process. 
Local  administrative  structures  may  not  provide  supportive  guidance.    By  tradition,  the  local 
authorities are considered the “lords of the land”, according to a legitimacy that is related to the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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symbolic  power  flowing  from  the  diverse  traditional  norms  of  each  region.  Their  control  of  rice 
plantations, for example, provides customary institutions with new forms of customary leadership.  
 
This is so much so that the traditional loan principle is increasingly regarded as a risk, due to the 
fact that after a few years the borrowers claim rights of inheritance, invoking national legislation, by 
which all land belongs to the state, and calling into question the rights of the lender. Experience has 
pointed to an increased role of certain traditional community institutions, particularly those involved 




3.7.  SUMMARY OF POLICY ISSUES 
The  policy  framework  for  natural  resource  management  changed  dramatically  in  the  last  two 
decades. “Governance” moved to the centre of development debates in the 1980s. By the mid-
1990s  environmental  governance  and  sustainable  development  had  become  key  concepts 
influencing environmental management. Devolution and participation emerged as important issues 
in development and environmental thinking. This coincided with increasing concern by governments 
and non-governmental actors about the success of natural resource management, and resulted in a 
global trend to participatory approaches. 
 
The concept of governance, like development, is both a political and a technical term. This conflates 
the normative and prescriptive with the descriptive and analytical, and consequently refers to both 
an  end  state  and  a  process.  Governance  may  be  conceptualised  in  many  ways  –  including 
structural constructions, dynamic approaches and objective-driven strategies. Alternatively, and as 
in the approach taken here, governance may be thought of as the relationship between civil society 
and the state, and thus fundamentally different from the concept of government. It covers the whole 
range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing.  
 
Defining the relationship between the State and civil society and their respective roles has become 
a core issue in development theory; participation, accountability, local institutions, local practices, 
indigenous  knowledge,  policy,  gender  equity,  tenure  and  fair  and  equitable  decision-making 
processes became key focuses. This shift from centralist development strategies to locally driven 
development  has  been  complemented  by  a  corresponding  shift  in  the  rights  and  obligations  of 
various  parties.  Participation  may  take  many  forms.  It  occurs  along  a  continuum  from  active 
consultation  to  complete  transfer  of  authority  and  responsibility  to  stakeholders.  Devolution, 
decentralisation or deconcentration may promote participation because they focus on creating lower POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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levels  of  decision-making.  Decentralisation  can  be  defined
19  as  “any  act  in  which  a  central 
government formally concedes power to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political and 
territorial hierarchy. It involves the creation of a realm of autonomy in which a variety of lower-level 
actors  can  exercise  some  autonomy.  It  is  fundamentally  different  from  deconcentration. 
Deconcentration  occurs  when  powers  are  devolved  to  appointees  of  central  government”.  The 
increasing downward linkages of governments towards sub-national government may be a strategy 
to reassert control and is not necessarily driven by a concern for rights. 
 
Natural resources play a strategic role in rural economies both as a potential source of long-term 
development and as the essential contributor to sustained food security. Many rural communities 
are dependent on natural resources in one way or another. Understanding the linkages between 
access to natural resources (size and ownership structures) and access to other sources of income 
and capital is an essential element in the policy dialogue about food security and poverty reduction. 
Farmers feel that natural resources (especially land) do not create added value and incentives to 
promote agriculture development (e.g. access to credit or as co-investment assets). The economic 
implication is that rural income continues to fall and poverty is increasing. In general, the correlation 
between availability, accessibility and utility of natural resources is controversial, and in many cases 
it is affected by political regimes, excessive centralisation, and bureaucracies. 
 
Natural resources tenure may be defined as the terms and conditions on which natural resources 
are held, used and transacted. Natural resources tenure reform refers to a planned change in the 
terms and conditions (e.g. adjustment of the terms of contracts between natural-resource owners 
and tenants, or the conversion of more informal tenancy into formal property rights). From local 
community  perspective,  effective  decentralisation  concerning  powers  requires  these  same 
elements.  However,  when  examined  in  detail,  community-based  and  decentralised  forms  of 
management often lack representation, downward accountability and/or sufficient powers.  
 
Many African processes of devolution have not been taken to their logical conclusion, so that local 
grassroots interests are able to fully exert themselves. The key problem seems to be that these 
initiatives  were  not  about  devolution,  but  were  instead  a  means  to  achieve  other  objectives 
including  conservation,  legitimacy  and  more  effective  government.  However,  given  the  rhetoric 
about  devolution  and  empowerment  that  has  accompanied  these  initiatives,  communities  have 
been sent mixed messages about their rights vis-à-vis traditional interests and state interests, which 
has created a level of expectation and discontentment. It is clear from the experience of all these 
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initiatives  that  their  future  (and  their  success)  lies  in  addressing  these  expectations  and  thus 
redefining governance relations. 
 
The right to public participation, as developed in these agreements, is significantly different from the 
established legal concept of public participation, which was based primarily on a right to object to 
decisions, but offered no role in decision-making. This approach was reactive and was based on 
indirect  representation.  The  emerging  right  of  participation  is  proactive  in  that  it  creates 
opportunities for individuals and groups to participate in the formulation of management strategies 
and the implementation thereof. Participation, as a legal concept, has evolved in the context of an 
environmental management framework that recognises the importance of effective representation, 
the inclusion of the full diversity of stakeholders and the recognition of their value and knowledge 
systems,  the  linkage  between  authority  and  responsibility,  capacity-building,  accountability  and 
transparent  administrative  procedures  including  access  to  information  and  due  process. 
Recognised stakeholders include women, indigenous people, workers and trade unions, farmers, 
youth and children, as well as business and the scientific community. There is also recognition of 
the rights of local communities and indigenous people. 
 
The recognition of customary law seems to be important, because at the level of local communities 
it is evident that traditional leaders and practices do assert themselves and that many of these 
reflect sound resource utilisation controls and practices. Yet these are not incorporated into land-
use considerations or management plans, except at ad hoc informal levels. The creation of village 
assemblies and the new roles of the chiefs seem to offer some opportunity for local approaches to 
resource management to be formally included in planning. However, this potential is constrained 
because the value basis, i.e. customary law, on which this approach is developed, is not legally 
recognised. Village assembly initiatives will need to fall firmly within the boundaries of national law, 
which defines rights of access, management and use. For these institutions to play a meaningful 
and empowered role in natural resource management, the ambit for decision-making needs to be 
broadened. One approach suggests that national law should facilitate rather than prescribe. This 
would allow institutions to define rules for management that are locally appropriate.  
 
Mechanisms  and  systems  of  participation  need  to  be  creatively  considered  if  the  initiatives 
discussed here are to be improved and to acknowledge local rights. The emerging international 
regime  identifies  some  key  issues.  The  starting  point  of  many  multilateral  environmental 
agreements  is  that  the  full  diversity  of  interests  related  to  resource  management  must  be 
acknowledged  –  systems  for  acknowledging  these  and  for  mediating  and  negotiating  between 
different perspectives need to be created. This suggests that the recognition of customary law and POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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values  might  offer  opportunities  for  more  effective  participation.  In  conclusion,  the  process  of 
developing appropriate structures for local conservation must be seen as just that – a process. The 
challenge facing conservation initiatives is to move beyond a focus on benefits to finding a place 
within the broader “culture” of humanity. Humanity is at the end of the day not just about having 
food in one’s stomach, but rather recognising the totality of what makes us human – it is about 
development, governance, health, integrity and human dignity. Conservation efforts need to start 
bringing all these aspects together. 
 
Finally, despite a lack of evidence of productivity effects, there is evidence of a significant impact of 
decentralised and participatory policies in development. This could reflect the capitalised value of 
the costs of acquiring a land title, as well as perceived implications of title for tenure security and 
access to credit. Land reform measures for communal land should underpin the adaptability and 
responsiveness of existing customary systems and should not constrain local coping strategies; the 
measures should be flexible and gradualist with regard to the role of traditional authorities. The 
focus for land administration reform should be defined, paying special attention to the legal status 
and economic activities of women and the poor, who are often disproportionately dependent on the 
commons. Land reform is a time-consuming process requiring thorough public consultation and 
careful preparation. Long-term budgetary commitment is needed from governments and (political 
sensitivities permitting) from donors.  
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4.  ECONOMIC THEORY OF EFFICIENCY 
“There  is  considerable  agreement  with  the  notion  that  effective  economic 
development strategy depends critically on promoting productivity and output growth 
in the agricultural sector, particularly among small-scale producers”. 
Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) 
 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Following  the  work  of  Debreu  (1951),  Farrell  (1957)  and  Färe,  Grosskopf  and  Lovell  (1985), 
technical efficiency is defined as the proportional rescaling of inputs or outputs that would bring the 
firm to the production frontier. The methodology presented is rooted in the seminal article by Farrell 
(1957).  In  this  analysis  it  is  hypothesised  that  the  special  characteristics  of  the  farm  economy 
influence a country’s social and political environment, and therefore the political processes that 
determine key policies. If this hypothesis is correct, it provides a strong justification for focusing 
specifically on agricultural and agrarian policies. 
 
Efficiency  is  a  measure  of  a  unit’s  ability  to  produce  outputs  from  a  given  set  of  inputs.  The 
efficiency of a Decision-Making Unit (DMU) is always relative to the other units in the set being 
analysed, so the efficiency score is always a relative measure. A unit’s efficiency is related to its 
radial distance from the efficient or efficiency frontier. It is the ratio of the distance from the origin to 
the inefficient unit, over the distance from the origin to the composite unit on the efficient frontier. 
The efficiency frontier represents “best performance” and is made up of the units in the data set that 
are most efficient in transforming their inputs into outputs. The units that determine the frontier are 
classified as being 100% efficient. Any unit not on the frontier has an efficiency rating of less than 
100%. Empirical production functions, empirical production envelopes and envelopment surfaces 
are all terms analogous to efficient frontier (Banxia, 1993). 
 
The  analysis  of  economic  efficiency  complements  Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP)  studies  by 
providing performance measures for evaluating production activities (Lovell, 1993) and by helping 
to identify the determinants of inefficiency, all of which are useful in guiding extension activities, 
research  and  technical  support  (Tupy,  Freitas  &  Esteves,  2003).  In  the  context  of  national 
agricultural  production,  studies  of  economic  efficiency  can  also  shed  light  on  the  speed  and 
geographic spread of agricultural modernisation and productivity growth. For example, efficiency 
analysis can tell us if UFs with the largest TFP indices are also the most efficient, or if temporary 
disequilibria  caused  by  the  adoption  of  new  technologies  (Schultz,  1964)  has  influenced  the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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efficiency  levels,  or  if  areas  of  low-productivity  agriculture  produce  efficiently  given  factor 
endowments and relative prices (Schultz, 1964).  
 
The deterministic approach was initiated by Aigner and Chu (1968), who estimated a Cobb-Douglas 
production frontier through linear and quadratic programming techniques. Radial measures focus 
on the maximum feasible equiproportionate reduction in all variable inputs, or the maximum feasible 
equiproportionate expansion of all outputs. The measure is defined as one minus the maximum 
equiproportionate reduction in all inputs that still allows continued production of given outputs. In 
some  circumstances  it  is  desirable  to  convert  the  Debreu  measure  to  equiproportionate  output 
expansion with given inputs; the conversion is straightforward (Lovell, 1993). Thus the analysis of 
technical efficiency can have an output-augmenting orientation or an input-conserving orientation. 
The allocative, or price, component refers to the ability to combine inputs and outputs in optimal 
proportions in light of prevailing prices (Lovell, 1993). 
 
A total of 30 studies from 14 different countries were examined. The country that received most 
attention was India, and rice was the most studied agricultural product. The average Technical 
Efficiency (TE) index from all the studies reviewed is 72%. The few studies reporting allocative and 
economic efficiency show an average of 68% and 43%, respectively. These results suggest that 
given  existing  technology,  there  was  considerable  room  to  increase  agricultural  output  without 
additional inputs. Several of the studies reviewed have sought to explain farm-level variation in TE. 
The variables most frequently used for this purpose have been farmer education and experience, 
contacts with extension, access to credit, and farm size. With the exception of farm size, the results 
reveal that these variables tend to have a positive and statistically significant impact on TE. Thus, 
considerable  effort  has  been  devoted  to  measuring  efficiency  in  developing  country  agriculture 
using a wide range of frontier models. Despite all this work, the extent to which efficiency measures 
are sensitive to the choice of methodology remains uncertain (Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 1993). 
 
There is evidence that farm consolidation could improve family incomes in rural areas. Thus, both 
cash family income and imputed family income (including the value of farm products from own 
production  consumed  in  the  household)  increase  with  the  amount  of  land  cultivated  by  the 
household. Households with land enjoy higher incomes than rural households without land. Larger 
individual farms produce higher incomes and achieve higher levels of family welfare than smaller 
farms. This finding has naturally led to the conclusion that consolidation of individual farms (within 
the range of up to about 100 hectares) is a desirable process and has produced certain policy 
recommendations relating to land markets as a medium for farm size adjustment.  
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Donner  (cited  by  Bruce  &  Migot-Adholla,  1994:2)  questioned  the  appropriateness  of  customary 
tenure  systems  for  an  agriculture  that  is  capitalising  and  adopting  new  technology  to  increase 
productivity.  Harrison  (1987)  argued  that  because  customary  systems  are  deeply  embedded  in 
cultural and political systems and generally offer members of particular social group overlapping 
multiple rights of land use, they tend to exclude non-members of the group from transactions in 
land. Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) emphasised that there is considerable agreement with the 
notion that effective economic development strategy depends critically on promoting productivity 
and output growth in the agricultural sector, particularly among small-scale producers. Empirical 
evidence  suggests  that small  farmers  are  desirable  not  only  because  they  provide  a  source  of 
reducing unemployment, but also because they provide a more equitable distribution of income, as 
well as an effective demand structure for other sectors of the economy.  
 
The post-World War II land reform distributed land of most large estates to the rural population, 
creating agriculture of smallholders. The fragmented farm structure produced by this reform did not 
undergo  significant  adjustment  during  later  regimes  due  to  a  lack  of  land  markets.  Although 
transactions in agricultural land were never prohibited, various administrative restrictions and high 
legal costs prevented the development of functioning land markets in the decades after World War 
II. This situation, combined with the acknowledged inefficiency of agriculture, beg the questions of 
farm fragmentation and consolidation. 
 
In the 1960s the “poor but efficient hypothesis”, advanced by Schultz (1964), generated a great deal 
of empirical work designed to test the allocative or price efficiency of peasant farmers. In the early 
1970s, Schultz published two important papers developing a dual profit function model to measure 
both allocative and technical efficiency. Meanwhile, a separate body of efficiency literature evolved 
based on a seminal paper written by Farrell in 1957. Farrell’s original work has given rise to a host 
of related models known collectively as frontier methodology. The distance function D(x, y, T, a) is 
of special interest in the measurement of production efficiency and productivity. The analysis of 
economic efficiency has typically cantered on the TE, AE and Scale Efficiency (SE) of production 
decisions (e.g. Färe et al., 1994). 
 
Evidence of a total of 30 studies from 14 different countries was examined by Bravo-Ureta and 
Pinheiro (1993), and the average TE index from all the studies reviewed was 72%. The few studies 
reporting allocative and economic efficiency show an average of 68% and 43%, respectively. The 
results suggest that there is considerable room to increase agricultural output without additional 
inputs and given existing technology. 
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4.2.  CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
4.2.1.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
About  fifty  years  ago,  Michael  Farrell  (1957)  introduced  a  methodology  to  measure  Economic 
Efficiency (EE), Technical Efficiency (TE) and Allocative Efficiency (AE). In this methodology, EE is 
equal to the product of TE and AE, which defines the ability to produce a predetermined quantity of 
output at minimum cost for a given level of technology. According to Farrell (1957), TE is associated 
with the ability to produce on the frontier isoquant, while AE refers to the ability to produce at a 
given level of output using the cost-minimising inputs ratio (Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 1997). 
 
Debreu (1951) introduced another measure of technical efficiency. His measure is a radial measure 
of technical efficiency. Radial measures focus on the maximum feasible equiproportionate reduction 
in  all  variable  inputs,  or  the  maximum  feasible  equiproportionate  expansion  of  all  outputs.  The 
measure is defined as one minus the maximum equiproportionate reduction in all inputs that still 
allows continued production of given outputs. A score of unity indicates technical efficiency because 
no equiproportionate input reduction is feasible, and a score less than unity indicates the severity of 
technical  inefficiency.  In  some  circumstances  it  is  desirable  to  convert  the  Debreu  measure  to 
equiproportionate  output  expansion  with  given  inputs;  the  conversion  is  straightforward  (Lovell, 
1993). Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can be either input oriented or output oriented. In the 
input-oriented  case,  the  DEA  method  defines  the  frontier  by  seeking  the  maximum  possible 
proportional reduction in input usage, with output levels held constant. In the output-oriented case, 
the DEA method seeks the maximum proportional increase in output production, with input levels 
held fixed. The two measures provide the same technical efficiency scores when a Constant Return 
to  Scale  (CRS)  technology  applies,  but  are  unequal  when  Variable  Returns  to  Scale  (VRS)  is 
assumed. Hence the choice of orientation is not a major issue in the present case. It appears to be 
fair to assume that, in agriculture, one usually attempts to maximise output from a given set of 
inputs, rather than the converse. 
Figure 4.1: DEA output-oriented model  
 
A is technically inefficient since it is located on the 
interior of the production isoquant for output level yo; 
that is, the same output could have been achieved 
with fewer inputs (X1 and X2), given the best practice 
frontier. Point B is technically efficient since it on the 
isoquant  for  output  yo;  however,  this  point  is  not 
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point,  like  point  B´.  Since  point  B´  is  both  technically  efficient  and  allocatively  efficient,  it  is 
economically efficient. 
 
Koopmans  (1951)  provided  a  formal  definition  of  technical  efficiency:  a  producer  is  technically 
efficient if an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one other output or an increase 
in at least one input, and if a reduction in any input requires an increase in at least one other input 
or a reduction in at least one output. Thus a technically efficient producer could produce the same 
outputs with less of at least one input, or could use the same inputs to produce more of at least one 
output (Lovell, 1993). Koopman’s definition of technical efficiency is a relative notion – relative to 
best-observed practice in the reference set to comparison group. According to Farrell (1957), TE is 
associated  with  the  ability  to  produce  on  the  frontier  isoquant,  while  AE  refers  to  the  ability  to 
produce at a given level of output using the cost-minimising inputs ratio (Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 
1997). Thus a technically inefficient producer could produce the same outputs with less of at least 
one input, or could use the same inputs to produce more of at least one output (Lovell, 1993).  
 
The  latter,  “purely”  technical,  or  physical,  component  refers  to  the  ability  to  avoid  waste  by 
producing as much output as input usage allows, or by using as little input as output production 
allows. Thus the analysis of technical efficiency can have an output-augmenting orientation or an 
input-conserving orientation. The allocative, or price, component refers to the ability to combine 
inputs and outputs in optimal proportions in light of prevailing prices (Lovell, 1993). The role that 
agriculture should play in economic development has been recognised for years. The adoption of 
new technologies designed to enhance farm output and income has received particular attention as 
a means to accelerate economic development (Schultz, 1964; Kuznets, 1966; Hayami & Ruttan, 
1985). However, output growth is not only determined by technological innovations but also by the 
efficiency with which available technologies are used. The potential importance of efficiency as a 
means of fostering production has yielded a substantial number of studies focusing on agriculture 
(Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 1993).  
 
Lovell  (1993)  examined  the  technical,  allocative  and  economic  efficiency  for  a  sample  of  220 
farmers  located  in  four  irrigated  cropping  districts  in  Southern  Africa.  Separate  Cobb-Douglas 
probabilistic  production  frontiers  were  estimated  for  each  district.  The  average  TE,  EE  and  AE 
measures reported were 84%, 70% and 53% respectively. Based on these measures the author 
concluded that technical inefficiency associated with qualitative variables caused a 40-50% loss in 
farm profits, while the loss in profits due to allocative inefficiency was only around two percent. 
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4.2.2.  FRONTIER FUNCTION METHODOLOGY 
Farrell  (1957)  extended  the  work  initiated  by  Koopmans  and  Debreu  by  noting  that  production 
efficiency has a second component reflection: the ability of producers to select the “right” technically 
efficient  input-output  vector  in  light  of  prevailing  input  and  output  prices  The  piece-wise-linear 
convex  hull  approach  to  frontier  estimation  was  initially  proposed  by  Farrell  in  1957,  but  was 
considered by only a few authors in the two decades following Farrell’s paper.  
 
The original frontier function model introduced by Farrell (Färe et al., 1994) uses the efficient unit 
isoquant to measure economic efficiency, and to decompose this measure into TE and AE. In this 
model, TE is defined as the firm’s ability to produce maximum output given a set of inputs and 
technology.  Stated  differently,  technical  inefficiency  reflects  the  failure  of  attaining  the  highest 
possible  level  of  output  given  inputs  and  technology.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  TE  from 
technological  change,  where  the  latter  reflects  an  upward  shift  of  the  production  function  or  a 
downward  shift  of  the  unit  isoquant.  AE  (or  price  efficiency)  measures  the  firm’s  success  in 
choosing the optimal input proportions, i.e., where the ratio of marginal products for each pair of 
inputs is equal to the ratio of their market prices. In Farrell’s framework, EE is a measure of overall 
performance and is equal to TE times AE (i.e. EE = TE X AE).  
 
The large number of frontier models that have been developed based on Farrell’s work can be 
classified  into  two  basic  types:  parametric  and  non-parametric.  Parametric  frontiers  rely  on  a 
specific  functional  form,  while  non-parametric  frontiers  do  not.  Another  important  distinction  is 
between deterministic and stochastic frontiers. The deterministic model assumes that any deviation 
from the frontier is due to inefficiency, while the stochastic approach allows for statistical noise. The 
deterministic parametric approach was initiated by Aigner and Chu (1968), who estimated a Cobb-
Douglas production frontier through linear and quadratic programming techniques. This procedure 
was further developed by Lovell (1993), who introduced the probabilistic frontier production model. 
Lovell  estimated  a  series  of  frontier  production  functions  dropping  at  each  stage  the  extreme 
observations.  
 
Another class of deterministic parametric models is the statistical production frontier proposed by 
Jeffrey,  Schupp  and  Taylor  (1997),  in  which  technical  efficiency  is  measured  by  a  one-sided 
disturbance  term.  When  explicit  assumptions  for  the  distribution  of  the  disturbance  term  are 
introduced,  the  frontier  is  estimated  by  the  maximum  likelihood  method.  If  no  assumptions  are 
made concerning the distribution of the error term, the frontier can be estimated by the Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) method, which entails neutrally shifting the frontier upwards (i.e. 
the intercept only) until no positive error term remains. The stochastic frontier production model POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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incorporates a composed error structure with a two-sided symmetric and a one-sided component 
(Aigner, Lovell & Schmidt, 1977; Lovell, 1993). The one-sided component reflects inefficiency, while 
the two-sided error captures the random effects outside the control of the production unit, including 
measurement errors and other statistical noise typical of empirical relationships.  
 
The estimation of a stochastic frontier function can be accomplished in two ways. Firstly, if no 
explicit  distribution  for  the  efficiency  component  is  made,  then  the  production  frontier  can  be 
estimated  by  a  stochastic  version  of  COLS.  If  an  explicit  distribution  is  assumed,  such  as 
exponential,  half-normal  or  gamma,  then  the  frontier  is  estimated  by  Maximum  Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE). According to Greene (1980), MLE makes use of the specific distributions of the 
disturbance term and are thus more efficient than COLS. The initial inability to calculate individual 
firm efficiency measures from the stochastic frontier model was overcome by the work of Lovell 
(1993). 
 
More  recent  developments  in  frontier  methodology  include  multi-equation  models  based  on 
production, cost or profit function specifications. Other recent extensions of the stochastic frontier 
approach are models that take advantage of panel data structures (Battese & Coelli, 1995). A major 
advantage  of  panel  data  models  is  that  there  is  no  longer  need  to  assume  that  inefficiency  is 
independent of the regressors. In addition, these models do not restrict the efficiency term to follow 
a specific distribution for the inefficiency term while making these restrictions testable propositions.  
Radial measures focus on the maximum feasible equiproportionate reduction in all variable inputs, 
or the maximum feasible equiproportionate expansion of all outputs. The measure is defined as one 
minus the maximum equiproportionate reduction in all inputs that still allows continued production of 
given  outputs.  In  some  circumstances  it  is  desirable  to  convert  the  Debreu  measure  to 
equiproportionate  output  expansion  with  given  inputs;  the  conversion  is  straightforward  (Lovell, 
1993). Thus the analysis of technical efficiency can have an output-augmenting orientation or an 
input-conserving orientation. The allocative, or price, component refers to the ability to combine 
inputs and outputs in optimal proportions in light of prevailing prices (Lovell, 1993). 
 
Shephard's (1970) distance functions have guided much of the development in productivity analysis 
and efficiency analysis. Färe et al. (1985) have shown how the Farrell efficiency indexes are closely 
related to Shephard's distance functions. In a multi-input multi-output framework, Shephard defines 
two  distance  functions:  an  input  distance  function  that  rescales  all  inputs  toward  the  frontier 
technology, and an output distance function that rescales all outputs toward the frontier. However, 
in some situations, this attainability assumption may not be satisfied, especially if some inputs or 
outputs are not essential. This can greatly limit the empirical usefulness of the methodology. To POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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illustrate, consider Chalfant and Gallant's (1998) investigation into productivity growth and efficiency 
in industrialised countries. Using Shephard's output distance function, the authors were unable to 
report empirical estimates of technical change and SE for Ireland because the associated data did 
not  satisfy  the  attainability  assumption.  This  suggests  a  need  to  extend  Shephard's  distance 
functions.  Shephard’s  distance  functions  have  been  generalised  in  a  number  of  ways.  Graph 
measures of production efficiency have been developed by Färe et al. (1985). For example, they 
defined  a  “Farrell  graph  technical  efficiency  index”  that  rescales  both  inputs  and  outputs 
equiproportionally.  
 
Other  extensions  of  Farrell  technical  efficiency  include  a  “generalised  Farrell  graph”  measure 
proposed by Färe et al. (1985), non-radial efficiency measures discussed by Färe et al. (1985), a 
“Farrell  proportional  distance”  measure  defined  by  Briec  (1997),  and  the  shortage  and  benefit 
functions developed by Chalfant and Gallant (1998). Briec’s (1997) “Farrell proportional distance” 
function and Luenberger’s (1992) shortage function are the same: they both allow the rescaling of 
inputs  and  outputs  in  any  particular  direction.  As  such,  they  provide  a  broad  generalisation  of 
Shephard’s distance functions. They include as special cases most measures of technical efficiency 
found in the literature (Briec cited by Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 1993). 
 
Thus  it  appears  desirable  to  rescale  inputs  and  outputs  in  a  more  flexible  way  than  done  in 
Shephard’s distance functions. The Luenberger-Briec approach provides a general framework for 
doing so. However, it does not provide clear guidance for choosing the rescaling direction for inputs 
and  outputs  in  efficiency  analysis.  Also,  while  the  Farrell  efficiency  measures  can  be  easily 
interpreted in terms of average cost, such interpretation is not straightforward as in the Luenberger-
Briec approach. This is somewhat unfortunate, since average cost is a basic concept found in all 
production economics textbooks and commonly used in empirical economic analysis. This suggests 
considering a rescaling scheme for inputs and outputs that extends Shephard’s distance functions 
while retaining the intuitive average cost interpretation of the Farrell indexes. 
 
The generalised Shephard's distance function considers the simultaneous rescaling of both inputs 
and outputs. The direction of rescaling depends on a single parameter that can vary between 0 and 
1. As special cases, the parameter taking the value 0 (1) implies only input (output) rescaling. Thus, 
the generalised distance function nests as special cases both Shephard’s input and output distance 
functions.  It  applies  without  Shephard's  attainability  assumption,  thus  widening  the  range  of 
applications of distance functions in economic analysis. This proposed approach also resolves the 
current dilemma concerning which Shephard's distance function (i.e. the input distance function, or 
the output distance function) to use when the technology departs from constant returns to scale. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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4.2.3.  DETERMINISTIC PRODUCTION FRONTIERS 
4.2.3.1 Parametric Frontiers 
The primary parametric approach is the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) (Aigner et al., 1977; 
Lovell, 1993). The large number of frontier models that have been developed based on Farrell’s 
work can be classified into two basic types: parametric and non-parametric. Parametric frontiers 
rely on a specific functional form while non-parametric frontiers do not. Another important distinction 
is  between  deterministic  and  stochastic  frontiers.  The  deterministic  model  assumes  that  any 
deviation from the frontier is due to inefficiency, while the stochastic approach allows for statistical 
noise.  The  deterministic  parametric  approach  was  initiated  by  Aigner  and  Chu  (1968),  who 
estimated  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  frontier  through  linear  and  quadratic  programming 
techniques.    De  Meza  and  Gould  (1992)  measured  technical  efficiency  through  a  deterministic 
Cobb-Douglas production frontier obtained by linear programming. A major objective of the study 
was to analyse the roles of information and modernisation in the production process of 40 cotton 
farms  in  Tanzania.  Using  correlation  analysis,  De  Meza  and  Gould  (1992)  found  that  technical 
efficiency had a high positive association with both general modernisation and information. 
 
De Meza and Gould (1992) investigated technical efficiency for a sample of 37 Tanzanian cotton 
farmers.  A  Cobb-Douglas  production  frontier,  derived  by  linear  programming,  yielded  a  66% 
average level of technical efficiency. These results led the authors to conclude that, in contrast with 
the “poor but efficient” hypothesis advanced by Schultz (1964), production in traditional agriculture 
suffered  from  significant  inefficiencies.  Lusigi  and  Thirtle  (1997)  used  the  COLS  procedure  to 
estimate  a  deterministic  Cobb-Douglas  production  frontier  model  to  investigate  efficiency  in 
Nepalese agriculture. A model where the dependent variable was the total value of rice, maize, 
millet and wheat production yielded an average technical efficiency level of 80%. Separate frontiers 
were  estimated  for  rice  and  maize,  which  revealed  average  efficiency  levels  of  84%  and  67%, 
respectively. Based on the efficiency measures obtained from the equation for all crops, correlation 
analysis showed that nutritional levels, income and education were significantly related to TE, while 
no relationship was found for farming experience. The study suggested that technical efficiency 
gains  could  be  attained  through  extension  and  education,  and  that  the  introduction  of  new 
technologies has been a key element in raising productivity in Nepalese agriculture. 
 
Shapiro  and  Muller  (1977)  measured  technical  efficiency  through  a  deterministic  Cobb-Douglas 
production frontier obtained by linear programming. A major objective of this study was to analyse 
the roles of information and modernisation in the production process of 40 cotton farms in Tanzania. 
Using  correlation  analysis,  the  authors  found  that  technical  efficiency  had  a  high  positive 
association with both general modernisation and information. Shapiro (1983) investigated technical POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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efficiency for a sample of 37 Tanzanian cotton farmers. A Cobb-Douglas production frontier, derived 
by linear programming, yielded a 66% average level of technical efficiency. These results led the 
author to conclude that, in contrast with the “poor but efficient” hypothesis advanced by Schultz 
(1965), production in traditional agriculture suffered significant inefficiencies.  
 
Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) examined the technical, allocative and economic efficiency of a sample of 
220 farmers located in four irrigated cropping districts of the Pakistani Punjab. Separate Cobb-
Douglas probabilistic production frontiers were estimated for each district. Taylor, Drummond and 
Gomes (1986) formulated a Cobb-Douglas deterministic frontier production function to analyze the 
impact of a World Bank sponsored credit program on allocative and technical efficiencies for a 
sample of Brazilian farmers. The production frontier was estimated using both COLS and maximum 
likelihood (statistical frontier) assuming that, in the latter case, the non-negative farm effects had a 
gamma distribution. Estimates of technical efficiency for farms participating in the credit programme 
versus  non-participants  revealed  no  major  differences  between  the  two  groups,  Moreover, 
participants exhibited allocative efficiencies slightly lower than the rest. Hence, these results imply 
that this credit programme was not successful in improving farm-level efficiency. 
 
To summarise, the parametric studies, five of which relied on the Cobb-Douglas functional form, as 
reported by Lusigi and Thirtle (1997), found efficiency measures ranging from 27% to 63% with an 
average of 43%. The results revealed that, although there was no significant difference in output 
efficiency across farm size groups, informational efficiency was very low for the small farms. The 
results suggest that marked improvements could be attained by the diffusion of information about 
the standard crop-production technology. The parametric studies, five of which relied on the Cobb-
Douglas functional form, reported efficiency measures ranging from 17% to 84% with an average of 
63%. The average allocative and economic efficiency for the two studies in this group reporting 
these measures as 68% and 32%, respectively.  
 
4.2.3.2 Non-Parametric Frontiers 
The only application found in literature of a non-parametric frontier methodology to farm data from a 
developing country is the study by Ray (1985), who used linear programming to measure efficiency 
for a sample of 63 West Bengal farms. The efficiency measures were decomposed into output or 
technical efficiency, and into informational efficiency. The latter was defined as the ratio between 
optimal  output  given  the  existing  technology  and  optimal  output  when  additional  technology 
information is available. Univariate and multivariate statistical tests were conducted to compare the 
performance of three farm groups classified according to size.  
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The results revealed that although there was no significant difference in output efficiency across 
farm size groups, informational efficiency was very low for the small farms. The author suggested 
that marked improvements could be achieved by the diffusion of information about the standard 
crop-production  technology.  The  nonparametric  approach  known  as  DEA  was  developed  by 
Charnes et al. (1978). There have been a few studies comparing the parametric and nonparametric 
approaches. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are well known. The SFA allows 
one to obtain parameter values and statistical significance levels, and separate random noise from 
efficiency levels. However, SFA is criticised sometimes for requiring an arbitrary specification of the 
functional form and efficiency distribution (Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 1993). 
 
4.2.4.  CROSS-SECTIONAL FRONTIERS 
Several of the efficiency studies performed using stochastic methodologies have focused on Indian 
agriculture, a subject that has captured the attention of economists for a long time. The earliest 
stochastic frontier function study using Indian data appears to be the one by Kalirajan (1981).   This 
author explored TE in paddy production for a random sample of farms located in the state of Tamil 
Nadu by estimating, using maximum likelihood, a Cobb-Douglas production frontier. A second-step 
analysis  showed  that  management  practices  and  contacts  with  local  extension  agents  had  a 
significantly positive impact on technical efficiency.  Huang and Bagi (1984) examined the TE of a 
sample of 151 farms in the Punjab and Haryana states of India, based on a translog production 
frontier estimated via maximum likelihood. The study showed an average TE level close to 90%, 
while the performance of small vs. large farms was almost equal. 
 
Kalirajan and Shand (1985) estimated a Cobb-Douglas production frontier by maximum likelihood 
for a random sample of 91 paddy farmers from the Coimbatore district in the Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu. In a second-step analysis, where farm-level TE was the dependent variable, these authors 
found that the level of schooling was not statistically significant in explaining differences between 
maximum  and  actual  yields.  However,  the  farmers’  non-formal  education,  defined  as  their 
understanding of current technology, had a significantly positive role on productivity (Chavas & Cox, 
1999). 
 
4.3.  ANALYTICAL PROGRAMMING MODEL  
4.3.1.  DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS - DEA 
The deterministic approach was initiated by Aigner and Chu (1968), who estimated a Cobb-Douglas 
production  frontier  through  linear  and  quadratic  programming  techniques.  The  method  received 
wide attention only after the publication of the paper by Charnes et al. (1978). DEA involves the use 
of linear programming methods to construct a non-parametric piece-wise surface (or frontier) over POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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the data. Efficiency measures are then calculated relative to this surface. The piece-wise linear 
convex  hull  approach  to  frontier  estimation  was  initially  proposed  by  Farrell  in  1957,  but  was 
considered by only a few authors in the two decades following Farrell’s paper. The deterministic 
approach to the measurement of efficiency, i.e. DEA, defines a frontier envelopment surface for all 
sample observations following a mathematical programming model.  
 
DEA is a method of constructing production frontiers without specifying the production technology 
proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). The efficiency of a DMU is measured relative to all other units, 
with the simple restriction that all of them are on or below the efficient frontier. More specifically, it is 
a linear programming methodology that uses data on outputs and inputs to construct complete 
linear  production  surfaces.  The  frontier  surface  is  obtained  by  a  series  of  linear  programming 
problems, one for each observation (DMU) in the sample (Rao & Coelli, 1999). The measure of the 
inefficiency of each DMU is given by the distance between each point and the production frontier. In 
the present study, an input-oriented DEA was used to define the frontier based on the maximum 
possible proportional reduction in input usage, holding output levels constant for each observation.  
 
In this research, DEA was chosen as the analysis technique for a number of reasons, including the 
fact that: (i) There is no restriction on the types of variables that can be included in the analysis; (ii) 
When using DEA the variables can be measured in different units; and (iii) DEA measures technical 
efficiency,  defined  as  the  successful  implementation  of  a  production  plan,  and  therefore  any 
deviations from the plan are noticeable. A linear programme is solved for each unit to determine its 
relative technical efficiency.  
Jeffrey et al. (1997) state that the DEA procedure is also useful because it allows a comparison of 
units  without  assuming  that  the  most  efficient unit  is  producing  at  its  full  potential.  While  other 
methods  of  estimating  technical  efficiency  exist,  such  as  using  regression  analysis  to  estimate 
technical efficiencies given generalised frontier production functions, DEA does not constrain units 
to  produce  along  an  estimated  production  function  of  a  particular  functional  form,  nor  does  it 
constrain the analysis to one measure of output. 
 
The heart of the analysis lies in finding the "best" virtual producer for each real producer. If the 
virtual producer does better than the original producer by either making more output with the same 
input or making the same output with less input, then the original producer is inefficient. Some of 
the subtleties of DEA are introduced in the various ways that producers A and B can be scaled up 
or down and combined. DEA represents a promising methodology for efficiency measurement that 
can estimate a single relative performance metric (relative efficiency) for entities that have multiple 
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Efficiency concepts are commonly used to describe the performance of production units. There are 
two  reasons  to  measure  the  efficiency  of  natural  resources  using  DEA.  First  of  all,  efficiency 
estimates are success indicators – performance measures whereby production units are evaluated. 
Secondly,  it  is  only  by  measuring  efficiency  and  separating  their  effects  on  production  that 
hypotheses concerning the sources of efficiency or productivity differentials can be explored.  
 
According to Sexton (1986) DEA is useful in situations where (a) there are multiple outputs and 
multiple inputs, and (b) there is no objective way to determine the efficiency of a family based upon 
a single efficiency index formula. In such cases, more than one family may be technically efficient 
while producing different amounts of products and using different input levels. Sexton (1986) states 
that DEA measures the efficiency of a family or organisation as the “ratio of its total weighted output 
to its total weighted input”. Families have considerable flexibility in determining the weights to be 
used in evaluating their efficiencies, allowing families to use different combinations of inputs to 
produce different combinations of outputs according to their preferred weights.  
 
4.3.2.  THEORETICAL MODELLING APPROACH  
The objective function of the linear programming formulation for determining technical efficiency for 
a family using DEA is expressed as a fractional objective function where family k maximises the 
utility  of  natural  resources,  its  technical  efficiency  hk,  the  ratio  of  total  weighted  output  by  total 
weighted  input.  The  method  adopted  (DEA)  assumes  that  the  inputs  and  outputs  have  been 
correctly identified. Usually, as the number of inputs and outputs increase, more DMUs tend to get 
an  efficiency  rating  of  1  as  they  become  too  specialised to  be  evaluated  with  respect  to  other 
families.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  are  too  few  inputs  and  outputs,  more  DMUs  tend  to  be 
comparable.  Sexton  (1986)  argues  that  DEA  is  an  appropriate  method  for  analysing  technical 
efficiency and is expressed as: 
 
This is a fractional objective function where family k maximises its technical efficiency h, the ratio of 
total weighted output divided by total weighted input. The term u,~ represents the output weights for 
output r and family k, and  Y,~ denotes output r produced by family k. Xi~ >0 is the amount of input i 
used by family k, and v,~is the family weight placed on input i by family k. The family chooses the 
weights u,~ and v,~ subject to a constraint that no other family j will have a technical efficiency 
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The selected weights cannot be negative; thus: 
 
The fractional linear program is transformed into an ordinary linear program so that the objective 




Unit  k  maximises  its  weighted  output  subject  to  the  above  constraints:  (2)  that  other  families’  
weighted outputs are not greater than their weighted inputs, (3) that unit k’s total weighted inputs 
sum to 1, and (4)-(5) that individual input weights are greater than or equal to zero. Weights are 
determined  by  the  individual  units.  With  the  DEA  technical  efficiency  method,  the  unit  is  not 
penalised for diversifying its operation or specialising in the production of a certain output. Likewise, 
the unit is not penalised if it decides to use an alternate set of inputs. The efficiency of a DMU is 
simply the ratio of the inputs to the outputs, and is constrained by qualitative influences.  
 
4.3.3.  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
The potential importance of efficiency as a means of fostering production has yielded a substantial 
number of studies focusing on agriculture (Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 1993). The results suggest that 
there  is  considerable  room  to  increase  agricultural  output,  given  existing  technology,  without 
additional  inputs.  Variables  related  to  quality  were  also  used  to  identify  factors  influencing 
agricultural inefficiency.  Public policies (P) include the nature of the state and the power of interest 
groups, or of attitudes and ideologies, to influences policy outcomes.   
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Various  theories  and  models,  denoted  by  lower-case  Greek  letters,  explore  the  relationships 
between the variables.  The models include static economic models (e), accumulation models (a), 
behavioural  theories  (b),  and  political  decision  models  (p).  Models  of  political  economy  differ 
according  to  the  variables  (both  endogenous  and  exogenous)  included  and  the  behavioural 
assumptions employed. 
 
Figure 4.2: Factor Allocation Model  
In Figure 4.2, Utility Value (UV) represents the 
outcome segment resulting from the efficiency 
level of resource allocation. Quantity Used (QU) 
represents  the  level  of  resources  used  in 
productive  activities.  Segment  SS’  represents 
the supply side – the total resources available.  
D1D1’ and D2D2’ represent the level of demand.  
A  represents  the  efficient  level  of  resource 
allocation,  while  B  and  C  represent  inefficient 
levels  of  resource  allocation.  If  the  level  of 
demand increases as a result of an increment 
in  the  level  of  investment  (business 
opportunities) the curve D1D1’ moves in an ascendant direction.  
 
Policy outcomes (X), which include variables such as the allocation of rights of different groups, 
state  organisations,  and  public  expenditure  patterns,  influence  economic  outcomes  (Y).  Policy 
outcomes are considered to be institutional factors related to governance, participation, local power 
and authorities (local governments), and grassroots organisations and structures (civil society and 
local communities) that are the real agents of local governance (www.eldis.org/static/doc9693.htm). 
 
4.3.4.  RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL 
Following  similar  studies,  Bruce  (1994)  describes  the  research  methodology  using  descriptive, 
theoretical,  philosophical  and  analytical  models,  based  on  economic  principles.    Based  on  that 
reference, resource allocation is modelled assuming that resources are limited (supply) and that 
there  are  qualitative  influences  of  institutional  and  political  nature  that  affects  the  utility  of  the 
resources. Demand will only be effective if the DMUs maximise the utility of the allocated resources 
(equilibrium point K). 
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Exogenous influences arise from restrictions related to policy aspects, and institutional aspects also 
influence the allocation of resources, e.g. participation of the local community in the management of 
local resources (consultation processes). This approach is based more on maximisation of the utility 
of resources. This framework follows Bingxin et al. (2002) who hypothesised that African countries 
are  poorer  not  because  of  cultural  or  geographic  factors,  but  mostly  because  of  less  sound 
institutions and development policies that affect production. 
 
Agricultural production is characterised by heterogeneity, seasonality and spatial dispersion, large 
variations  in  weather  and  prices  caused  by  policy  influences,  and  well-known  informational 
asymmetries, as well as limitations to the application of purely economic theories. Institutions and 
policies, as well as customary and traditional influences and informational asymmetries have major 
consequences in the markets. Identification of sources and effects is essential to the institution of 
public and private policies designed to improve performance.  
 
Figure 4.3: Resource Allocation Model 
The  governance  theory  of  efficiency 
was  developed  due  to  limitations  of 
the  traditional  economic  theory  of 
supply  and  demand,  and  the 
capitalism  analytical  framework,  in 
contrast  to  the  inexistence  of  a 
framework  that  supports  the  social 
dimension  of  development  (socialism 
approach),  and  this  could  be  why 
capitalism  has  dominated  the 
economic  theories  while  socialism 
collapsed  due  to  a  lack  of  economic 
and analytical frameworks.  
 
Under  the  resource  allocation  model  of  utility  maximisation,  it  is  recognised  that  the  economic 
optimal point (A) captured by pure economic estimations does not necessarily satisfy the social 
optimal point (C), due to qualitative influences, e.g. governance, policies and institutions. The level 
of utility portrayed by A uses less resources, while the social optimum C uses more resources. It is 
assumed that efficiency will be determined by both economic and social equilibrium (K). 
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Specialisations  of  different  DMUs  with  different  potentialities  and  of  different  agro-ecological 
situations are also considered. Governance aspects are discussed in the sense that in a market 
economy, the economic theory of demand and supply defines the optimum as the equilibrium point, 
while  descriptive  theoretical  models,  where  market  solutions  are  not  applied,  are  influenced  by 
qualitative  variables  like  policy  outcomes  (X),  which  include  variables  such  as  the  allocation  of 
rights  of  different  groups,  state  organisations,  and  public  expenditure  patterns  that  influence 
economic  outcomes  (Q),  (such  as  flows  and  prices  of  outputs).  Accumulation  alters  material 
conditions  (M)  –  the  quantity  and  composition  of  the  capital  stock  and  the  labour  force,  the 
distribution of wealth, and the technology of agricultural production. External variables also emanate 
from nature or from other countries, and include shocks (S), technology options (T), ideas (I), and 
opportunities for trade, borrowing, and alliances with other countries (F).
20 
 
This is consistent with Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) who emphasised that there is considerable 
agreement  with  the  notion  that  effective  economic  development  strategy  depends  critically  on 
promoting  productivity  (efficiency)  and  output  growth  with  existing  technology.  The  presence  of 
shortfalls in efficiency means that output can be increased without requiring additional conventional 
inputs  and  without  the  need  for  new  technology.  This  suggests  that  these  factors  should  be 
considered in determining the causes of agricultural productivity performance. 
 
It  is  important  is  to  consider  the  design  of  these  institutional  mechanisms  and  what  they  were 
expected to achieve. Governance framework does not mean advocating strong states or centralism, 
but in a market economy, it means having the state intervene on behalf of the poor (regulatory and 
sound  policies)  and  allowing  them  to  participate  actively  in  local  development  (producing  and 
accessing services). This will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public interventions by the 
central government, who are distant from the point where needs are felt and service delivery is 
needed.  
 
4.4.  EMPIRICAL POLICY EVIDENCES 
Mozambique is still highly agrarian, with more than 80% of the labour force employed in agriculture. 
However,  despite  its  large  share  in  employment,  agriculture  contributes  less  than  30%  to  the 
country’s gross value added. Agricultural productivity is thus far below the average for the economy, 
and policymakers continue to focus on ways of improving productivity and the efficiency of capital. 
Low  productivity  is  a  general  feature  of  the  inherited  agriculture  in  former  socialist  countries  in 
Africa. This feature is commonly attributed to the weaknesses of the collective form of organisation 
                                                       
20  Each  of  the  symbols  represents  a  multidimensional  vector  of  similar  variables.    For  example,  T  refers  to  many 
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that was dominant in most of the region in the past era. Yet Southern Africa countries are unique 
among transition countries in this respect: Agriculture was not subjected to sweeping collectivisation 
– such as in Eastern Europe and China – after World War II, and individual farms have consistently 
controlled about 80% of agricultural land in this country. Low agricultural productivity is thus low 
productivity of individual farms, not collectives or cooperatives.  
 
Between 60 and 80 percent of cultivated land in all the provinces is concentrated in units ranging 
between 0.2 and one hectare. This suggests that there is considerable room to increase agricultural 
output without additional inputs and given existing technology. The results of efficiency literature 
based on frontier methodology are generally consistent with the notion that human capital plays an 
important  role  in  farm  productivity  in  developing  countries;  consequently,  public  investments 
designed to enhance human capital can be expected to generate additional output even in the 
absence of new technologies. The fact that significant increases in output could be achieved by 
making better use of available inputs and technology does not mean that research designed to 
generate new technology should be overlooked. Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) noted that the 
evidence  presented  in  their  paper  suggests  that  there  is  much  room  for  improving  economic 
efficiency, using a domestic best practice standard, and that the magnitude of the input market 
distortions is in some cases quite severe. 
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5.  ESTIMATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the estimation measurements and analysis and adopts a two-step approach. 
The  first  step  is  to  estimate  technical  efficiency  using  the  non-parametric  Data  Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). In the second step, in order to determine the factors affecting efficiency, regression 
estimations are measured. Variables are segregated to measure the influence in overall efficiency. 
The major methodological advantage of this procedure is that it enables the comparison of two 
different production technologies, rather than an analysis of a single production frontier derived from 
all  families,  as  was  the  case  with  most  previous  research.  While  general  empirical  results  are 
provided rather than a precise family-level quantification of economies of scope, the results provide 
an application to production, as well as to other influences such as agro-ecological factors and 
human capacity, which most probably affects the governmental policies.  
 
 
5.2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DEA MODEL 
In the case of a process with a single input and a single output, productivity is the ratio of the unit’s 
outputs  to  its  inputs.  DEA  does  not  measure  productivity;  it  measures  the  efficiency  of  the 
production  process.  Productivity  is  a  function  of  production  technology,  the  efficiency  of  the 
production process and the production environment. DEA maximises the output adopted when it is 
the goal to maximise the output from a fixed number of inputs. The concept of technical efficiency 
relates  to  the  question  of  whether  a  firm  uses  the  best  available  technology  in  its  production 
process. Assume that the firm is observed using inputs-outputs (TE ε [0, 1]). Following the work of 
Debreu  (1951),  Farrell  (1957),  Farrell  and  Fieldhouse  (1962)  and  Färe  et  al.  (1985),  Technical 
Efficiency (TE) has been defined as the proportional rescaling of inputs or outputs that would bring 
the firm to the production frontier. This suggests using the generalised distance function as an index 
of  technical  efficiency.  Besides  TE  and  Allocative  Efficiency  (AE),  Scale  Efficiency  (SE)  is  a 
determinant of Economic Efficiency (EE). The SE
21 of the firm can be motivated from free entry and 
exit conditions in the industry, and its implications for long-run equilibrium (Baumol et al., quoted by 
Chavas & Cox, 1999). It is closely linked with zero profit, which is a necessary condition for long-run 
equilibrium under free entry and exit. Long-run equilibrium is typically defined as a situation where 
there is no incentive for entry or exit into the industry. Clearly, under free entry, any positive profit 
provides an incentive for firms to enter the industry. Thus, in the absence of barriers to entry or exit, 
there is no incentive for entry or exit in the industry only if firm profit is zero (Chavas & Cox, 1999). 
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5.2.1.  MODELING EFFICIENCY APPROACH 
The  measurement  of  productivity  and  efficiency  has  been  a  topic  of  considerable  interest  in 
economics. Much research has focused on the analysis of TE, AE and SE of production activities 
(e.g. Debreu, 1951; Färe et al., 1985), and the analysis of technological progress and productivity. 
Farrell’s (1957) efficiency indexes have been commonly used in empirical research on production 
efficiency for two reasons: they can easily be combined into an overall efficiency index, and they 
have an intuitive interpretation in terms of cost ratios or average cost ratios.  
 
It is well known that in many countries land prices exceed the capitalised value of farm profits 
(Binswanger, Deininger & Feder, 1995).  This is not surprising in peri-urban areas, where land has 
many alternative uses.  Yet the phenomenon is prevalent even far from cities, because, in addition 
to the profit stream available from farming, land provides other services to the owners, and these 
are  capitalised  into  land  prices.    Where  insurance  markets  are  imperfect  (because  of  the 
combination of covariance and moral hazard problems), land provides value as collateral.  Land 
provides additional services, serving as an inflation hedge, a tax shelter (due to the preferential 
treatment of agriculture in income and property tax systems), and collateral to obtain access to 
subsidised credit. Consequently, many researchers and policymakers have focused their attention 
on the impact that the adoption of new technology can have on increasing farm productivity and 
income (Schultz, 1964; Kuznets, 1966). Over the past two decades at least, major technological 
gains  stemming  from  the  green  revolution  seem  to  have  largely  been  introduced  across  the 
developing  world.  However,  in  Africa  and  particularly  in  Southern  Africa,  the  population  is  still 
affected by chronic food insecurity. This suggests that attention to productivity gains arising from a 
more efficient use of existing technology is justified (Bravo-Ureta & Pinheiro, 1993).  
 
The  presence  of  shortfalls  in  efficiency  means  that  output  can  be  increased  without  requiring 
additional conventional inputs and without the need for new technology. Empirical measurements of 
efficiency are needed in order to determine the magnitude of the gains that could be obtained by 
improving  performance  in  agricultural  production  with  the  given  technology.  Lovell,  Richardson, 
Travers  and  Wood  (1994)  argue  that  technically,  economies  of scope  occur  when  the  costs  of 
producing a specific output vector Y jointly are lower than the costs of producing the same output 
vector separately under the restriction of orthogonal nonnegative output vectors (Yi): 
 
Diseconomies of scope occur when that inequality is reversed. In the case of production, the output 
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(YF). Economies of scope exist when the inequality holds and the separate production of outputs 
comes at a higher cost than joint production – consociation: 
 
If this applies to production, an integrated market solution with only one firm is favourable to an 
institutional  arrangement  wherein  the  infrastructure  manager  is  institutionally  separated  from 
production units. Furthermore, the estimation technique compares two different production frontiers 
of separated and integrated family units rather than analysing one frontier derived from all families, 
as was done in most previous work, and thus incorporates different production technologies. By 
modelling a production technology as an input distance function, one can investigate how much the 
input vector can be proportionally reduced while holding the output vector fixed. Assuming that the 
technology satisfies the standard properties listed in Färe and Primont (1995), the input distance 
function can be defined as: 
 
Where, the input set L(y) represents the set of all input vectors x that can produce the output vector 
y.  The  function  is  non-decreasing,  positively  linearly  homogeneous  and  concave  in  x,  and 
increasing in y (Lovell et al., 1994). From x  ε L(y) follows DI(x, y) ≥ 1.  A value equal to unity 
identifies the respective firm as being fully efficient and located on the frontier of the input set. 
Values greater than unity belong to input sets within the frontier, indicating inefficient firms. 
 
5.2.2.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The data was collected using a structured survey of 192 farms (corporate and private farms), based 
on the data of a rural household survey conducted by the Agriculture National Directorate between 
1996 and 2005, selected by random sampling and covering 20 districts in ten different provinces 
subdivided into 3 macro regions: South, Central and North. A panel model was constructed for two 
time periods to control for unobserved heterogeneity and also to investigate inter-temporal changes. 
The first period of the inter-temporal dataset used is from the Economic and Social Plan (PES) 
2005 – 2009. In addition, based on that dataset information, the following panel data is forecast on 
for the second period 2010 – 2015. For each individual variable, an incremental level is assumed 
year  by  year.  Because  the  survey  covers  samples  of  the  Mozambique  population,  the  figures 
derived are only estimates of efficiency levels in the whole population, based on information derived 
from the INE (National Statistics Institute).  
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Mozambique  is  one  of  the  poorest  countries  in  the  world.  More  than  80%  of  the  population  is 
concentrated in rural areas, and an even higher proportion depends on agriculture for survival.  
Agriculture  contributes  around  30%  of  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP),  with  most  production 
coming  from  the  family  sector,  which  covers  more  than  3  million  families.  For  this  reason, 
agriculture and rural development must be a priority in the strategy for poverty reduction and broad-
based  growth.    The  principal  objective  of  rural  development  is  to  increase  income-generating 
opportunities, especially for the family sector. The generation of income depends on agronomic 
advances  to  raise  productivity,  but  also,  and  fundamentally,  on  access  to  and  management  of 
natural  resources.  Table  5.1  below  provides  descriptive  statistics  (means)  of  individual 
characteristics. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of Statistics 
Poverty     Economic Growth     Population    
           
Mean  0.39306  Mean  0.102  Mean  19766123 
Standard Error  0.025194  Standard Error  0.007376  Standard Error  547625.3 
Median  0.384419  Median  0.096947  Median  19684523 
Standard Deviation  0.087274  Standard Deviation  0.025552  Standard Deviation  1897030 
Sample Variance  0.007617  Sample Variance  0.000653  Sample Variance  3.6E+12 
Range  0.266599  Range  0.073926  Range  5788923 
Minimum  0.273401  Minimum  0.074  Minimum  17000000 
Maximum  0.54  Maximum  0.147926  Maximum  22788923 
Source: Author, based on PARPA projections 
 
Table 5.1 analyses the individual influence of the variables and the relationships between them 
based on PARPA projections. Econometric analysis aids in identifying the determinants, given the 
actual poverty rate of 54%, which is expected to be around 27.3% by the year 2015 (GoM, 2005). 
These estimates are subject to sampling error, which will vary with the size of the sample (larger 
samples produce lower sampling variability). From the characteristics we can deduce that: 
·  At 95% confidence, economic growth and population are both possible determinants and 
consequences of efficiency. There is roughly a more than 90% chance that economic 
growth is a determinate factor, while with the population variable, the true value for the 
whole population is unpredictable. On average the expected level of economic growth 
considered is roughly 10% during the period of the estimate.  
·  The survey targeted the answers to its questions to be 95% accurate with a 10% error 
margin. With the interactions of population and economic growth – given unpredictability – POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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the institutional feature is needed for sound functioning and for protection against external 
shocks not considered in this model (e.g. the effects of HIV, disasters and other external 
factors).  
 
5.2.3.  PRODUCTION ESTIMATIONS 
The  192  surveyed  farm  units  (corporate,  cooperative  and  private  farms)  were  aggregated  per 
province  and  analysed  comparatively  to  geographic  influences  (agro-ecological  conditions)  on 
production and productivity as evidence for efficiency analysis. With the aggregation of family units, 
the  cumulative  data  on  farm  units  per  province  revealed  that  between  60  and  80  percent  of 
production  is  concentrated  in  Northern  Mozambique,  which  has  comparative  advantages  (more 
production in a smaller cultivated area). This could be reflected in (a) the higher technical efficiency 
of both partnerships and family farms with implications for provincial production, and (b) the fact that 
the difference in technical efficiency is especially important in production. These results suggest 
that there is considerable room to increase agricultural output given existing technology, without 
additional inputs. Table 5.2 summarises the combined production, productivity and area cultivated 
per province of the surveyed farms.  
 






Maize  Cassava  Beans  Peanut  Average 
‘000 
Ton 
%    %  ‘000 
Ton 
%  ‘000 
Ton 




Niassa  20  59  6  11  2  4  3  4  3  1,30  1,81 
C. Delgado  22  194  19  70  14  7  6  24  19  1,27  1,64 
Nampula  19  170  17  205  41  33  29  64  50  0,97  1,21 
Zambézia  20  147  14  153  30  8  7  8  6  0,76  1,35 
Tete  17  131  13  1  -  2  1  1  1  0,70  1,83 
Manica  15  91  9  2  -  1  1  1  1  0,89  2,13 
Sofala  17  97  9  18  4  5  5  4  3  0,64  2,17 
Inhambane  18  67  7  32  6  34  30  14  11  0,21  2,56 
Gaza  22  43  4  11  2  14  12  6  5  0,26  2,28 
Maputo  22  20  2  1  -  5  4  1  1  0,16  2,01 
TOTAL  192  1019  100  504  100  113  100  127  100  0,72  1,82 
Source: Author, based on survey data 
 
Compared  to  evidence  from  the  literature  (MADER,  2004),  in  Mozambique  food  insecurity  is 
reportedly  increasing  in  many  rural  areas,  with  low  and  declining  yields  of  food  crops.  The POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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productivity advantage of small farmers who rely predominantly on family labour rather than on 
less-motivated  hired  workers  who  have  to  be  supervised  would  imply  that,  in  the  absence  of 
imperfections in other markets, this should facilitate efficiency and equity. Despite these findings, 
the  analysis  to  date  is  not  sufficient  to  make  a  judgment  concerning  the  impact  on  efficiency 
measures. 
 
5.3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF EFFICIENCY 
5.3.1.  FARM UNIT EFFICIENCY ESTIMATES 
The study examined the technical, allocative and economic efficiency for a sample of 10 provinces 
of Mozambique. For a sample of 192 farmers, using a translog stochastic production frontier – using 
the same technology that Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) and Bravo-Ureta and Evenson (1994) 
used to estimate a Cobb-Douglas total value product frontier to analyse – the study found that the 
average EE, TE and AE for the sample were 11.6%, 83.0% and 13.7%, respectively. Table 5.3 
revels the results from the Data Envelopment Analysis Program (DEAP) Version 2.1 (for detailed 
estimations, see Annexure 3). 
 
Table 5.3: Farm unit efficiency 
Units  TE  AE  EE 
Mean  0.830  0.137  0.116 
Variable 
(Average) 
Original Value  Slack Movement  Projected 
Movement 
output 1  (Production Value)  95.000  0.000  103.057 
input   1  (Hours)         79.000  -59.866  19.134 
input   2 ( Labour)          56.000  0.000  56.000 
input   3 (Area)           41.000  -12.057  28.943 
input   4  (Wage)           4.000  0.000  4.000 
Note: TE = technical efficiency 
          AE = allocative efficiency = EE/TE 
          EE = Economic efficiency (Cost Efficiency) 
Source: DEAP calculations (detailed in Annexure 3) 
 
Based on DEA estimations of the 192 observations undertaken, it was also found that the results of 
technical efficiency show an estimated average of 83.0% for the sample of unit farmers, with a low 
of 58.8% and a high of 100%. Input-specific AE indicated that farmers were inefficient with respect 
to all inputs.  The estimates indicate that the differences in technical efficiency between farm units, 
on  the  other  hand,  are  smaller  than  would  be  expected  based  on  theories  that  explain  the 
“optimality of the family farm” because of transaction costs in labour contracting. The question that POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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emerges locally is: What can be done to increase efficiency? There is evidence that qualitative 
factors could influence family incomes in rural areas. Thus, both cash family income and imputed 
family  income  (including  the  value  of  farm  products  from  own  production  consumed  in  the 
household) increase with the farming system and the amount of land cultivated by the household.   
 
The mean allocative and economic efficiency indices are respectively 13.7% and 11.6% for the 
DEA  parametric  approach  in  constant  returns  to  scale  (CRS).  Thus  the  results  estimated  both 
reveal considerable inefficiencies in production. The analysis of the role of various firm-specific 
factors in productive efficiency suggests that farm size has strong negative effects on efficiency 
levels. Similarly, based on that result, by operating at the efficient frontier the sample producers 
would be able to reduce their production area depending upon the method and returns to scale 
considered.  The stochastic frontier production function model reveals that the quantity of time used 
and the quantity of area cultivated are direct factors affecting the output efficiency, while the number 
of labourers used and the salary paid are insignificant factors given the fact that the farms use a 
family labour force. On the basis of the findings, the study suggests that in order to increase the 
level  of  the  projected  output  keeping  all  other  variables  constant,  attention  should  be  paid  to 
establishing an environment conducive to the creation of means to reduce the negative effect. This 
negative effect could be the result of misuse of the allocated area or inappropriate use of existing 
conditions (natural resources). 
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  Technical 
Allocative 




b    No
a  %
b    No
a  %
b 
≥0;≤10  0  0.00%    96  50.00%    123  64.06% 
>10;≤20  0  0.00%    72  37.50%    51  26.56% 
>20;≤30  0  0.00%    11  5.73%    8  4.17% 
>30;≤40  0  0.00%    5  2.60%    4  2.08% 
>40;≤50  0  0.00%    2  1.04%    1  0.52% 
>50;≤60  3  1.56%    1  0.52%    1  0.52% 
>60;≤70  13  6.77%    2  1.04%    1  0.52% 
>70;≤80  55  28.65%    0  0.00%    0  0.00% 
>80;≤90  75  39.06%    2  1.04%    2  1.04% 
>90;≤100  46  23.96%    1  0.52%    1  0.52% 
TOTAL  192  100.00%    192  100.00%    192  100.00% 
Mean (%)  19.2  -    19.20  -    19.20  - 
Minimum (%)   0  -    -  -    -  - 
Maximum (%)  75      96.00      123.00   
a The number of farms.             
b The percentage (rounded) of total farms.         
Source: Author, based on survey data 
 
The results derived from Table 5.4 indicate that technical efficiency (TE – CRSTE) indices range 
from 0 to 75 percent for the farms in the sample, with an average of 19.2%. This means that if the 
average farmer in the sample were to achieve the TE level of his/her most efficient counterpart, 
then the average farmer could realise a 50.5% cost savings (i.e. 1 − [19.2/75])
22. The combined 
effect  of  technical  factors  shows  that  the  average  economic  efficiency  level  for  this  sample  is 
19.2%, with a low of 0.52% and a high of 64.06%. These figures indicate that if the average farmer 
in the sample were to achieve the EE level of his/her most efficient counterpart, then the average 
farmer could experience a cost saving of 84.39% (i.e. 1 − [19.2/123]). In sum, it is evident from 
these results that SE could be improved substantially.  
 
Figure  5.1  summarises  the  frequency  distribution  of  TE,  EA  and  EE  efficiency  analysis  of  192 
farmers. It is denoted that while there were more farms in the 0.6-1.0 category, a significant number 
of farmers had very low allocative efficiencies – in the 0.6–0.10 range. Of the five farmers, there 
were only four with EE. 
                                                       
22 Average farm cost saving calculated as = 1-(mean/variation), where variation could be maximum or minimal. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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TE 0 0 0 0 0 3 13 55 75 46
AE 96 72 11 5 2 1 2 0 2 1
EE 123 51 8 4 1 1 1 0 2 1
≥0;≤10 >10;≤20 >20;≤30 >30;≤40 >40;≤50 >50;≤60 >60;≤70 >70;≤80 >80;≤90 >90;≤100
 
Source: Author, based on survey data 
 
Figure 5.1 presents the stochastic frontier production and production function model used to predict 
the farm-level technical, allocative and economic efficiencies respectively. The predicted technical 
efficiency and economic efficiency are the basis for estimating the allocative efficiency of the farms. 
Estimated results, however, show that farms in the study area are technically efficient (TE) given 
the value obtained from the analysis, meaning that farmers are producing the maximum physical 
relationship between outputs and inputs. 
 
In contrast, the analysis reveals an inefficiency measure disaggregated into EE and AE, meaning 
that TE appears to be more significant than AE as a source of gain in EE, which means that the 
farms are maximising production and incurring a high level of costs. The policy implication of these 
findings points to the fact that the farms in the study area are inefficient in allocating their resources 
considering their scope of operation and the limited resources, which cyclically will have an impact 
on the level of production. 
 
5.3.2.  AGGREGATED RESULTS PER PROVINCE 
The  TE  and  SE  scores  are  both  equally  good  predictors  of  economic  efficiency,  and  are  also 
correlated with each other. As a combination of desegregated farm-unit data per province shows, at 
least  4  provinces  (Niassa,  Zambézia,  Manica  and  Maputo)  that  have  high  technical  efficiency POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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scores tend to also have high allocative efficiency scores. Therefore, these provinces, which are not 
known for their enthusiasm for reform, have relatively high technical and allocative efficiency scores 
(recall that the data being analysed is for corporate use and for cooperatives and private farms or 
plots).    Table  5.4  provides  a  summary  of  estimates  and  an  aggregated  data  analysis  of  the 
efficiency measures in Mozambique. 
 
TE per province ranges from 0.202 to 1.00 (CRSTE), with an average of 0.60. Inputs could on 
average be reduced by 40% if all operations were to produce along the production frontier. About 
40% of the observations are technically efficient, and 60% of the observations exhibit technical 
efficiency measures greater than 0.80. At variable returns to scale, TE ranges from 0.78 to 1.00, 
with  an  average  of  0.933.  Approximately  90%  of  the  observations  exhibit  efficiency  measures 
greater than 0.80. Four observations are technically efficient. Scale efficiency (SE) varies from 0.25 
to 1.00, with an average of 0.62. Over 80% of observations exhibit scale measures less than 0.95.  
The production frontier results indicate that on average, 62.9% of the farms are technically more 
efficient. These findings are consistent with the results shown in Table 5.5, where on average the 
frequency distribution range is between 60% and 75%. 
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Table 5.5: DEA estimates by province  
Provinces  Code         Number of 
Farms 
Surveyed 
              Technical Efficiency  Scale 
Efficiency         Crste           Vrste 
Niassa        1 
Cabo Delgado     2 
Nampula     3 
Zambézia        4 
Tete          5 
Manica        6 
Sofala        7 
Inhambane        8 
Gaza         9 
Maputo       10 













































Average  0.603  0.933  0.629 
Cod:    crste = Constant Returns of Scale  
       vrste = Variable Returns of Scale 
      scale = Scale Efficiency = crste/vrste 
Source: Author, based on survey data 
 
5.3.3.  GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY  
In  general,  the  efficiency  distribution  shows  that  the  major  concentrations  of  farm  units  are 
operating at 80-85% level of efficiency. The analysis supports the hypothesis that family farms and 
partnerships  (mostly  working  with  family  labour)  have  an  advantage  in  agricultural  production 
because of lower labour transaction costs.  As demonstrated in Table 5.5, TE measures range from 
0.202 to 1.00 (CRSTE), with an average of 0.60. Inputs could on average be reduced by 40% if all 
operations  were  to  produce  along  the  production  frontier.  About  40%  of  the  observations  are 
technically efficient, and 60% of the observations exhibit technical efficiency measures greater than 
0.80. 
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Figure 5.2: Geographic distribution of efficiency analysis 
In general, the results show 
that significant increases in 
output  could  be  achieved 
by  making  better  use  of 
available  inputs  and 
technology, which does not 
mean  that  research 
designed  to  generate  new 




Similar conclusions were drawn by Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) who noted that there is much 
room  for  improving  economic  efficiency,  using  a  domestic  best  practice  standard,  and  that  the 
magnitude  of  the  input  market  distortions  is  in  some  cases  quite  severe.  However,  land  sales 
transactions could be efficiency decreased if, due to policy-induced credit market distortions, large 
owners’ advantage in accessing credit would offset the productivity advantage of owner operators 
or if, due to the inability to insure, significant landholdings are not part of poor people’s optimal 
asset portfolio.  
 
Qualitative  variables  have  a  considerable  influence  on  efficiency.   The  theoretical  and  practical 
foundation of traditional authority is generally of a symbolic religious nature, and is given legitimacy 
only by the communities themselves (often finally endorsed through bodies such as councils of 
elders). They are thus “grassroots institutions” that in effect have to negotiate their power day-by-
day, and therefore embody a degree of flexibility that may be extremely useful for the efficient 
management of natural resources. This statement was also demonstrated by Lundin (1998) who 
argues  that:  "[In  Mozambique]  a  certain  measure  of  integration  at  some  sectoral  levels  exists 
already, for example in the case of agricultural extension, health, and the work of the NGOs. But it 
is  diluted  in  the  personal  attitudes  of  people  and  the  attitude  of  the  established  power  holders 
present in the different zones of the country. There exists no formalization of this integration in laws, 



















ETRC EFRV EEPOLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  159 
5.3.4.  GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF SCALE EFFICIENCY 
The findings based on the observations reveal that on average, production in the provinces is 0.60 
technically efficient. Thus, the same quantity of resources may be utilised with 40% less cost if all 
operators  were  to  produce  on  the  minimum  cost  frontier  under  constant  returns  to  scale.  This 
conclusion suggests that the economic theory of the commons is an important strand of thinking 
about efficient use of natural resources. It is conventionally indicated that common property rights 
are  inconsistent  with  efficient  utilisation  of  natural  resources  in  the  absence  of  some  form  of 
government intervention, and that given the impediments to effective intervention, private property 
rights are a better bet.  
 
Under the output-oriented approach, which conditions the scale properties on the input vector, it is 
found that decreasing returns to scale, on average, indicate a too-large input vector for the majority 
of the firms. Furthermore, considering that scale inefficiency is due to decreasing returns to scale, a 
significant but small negative correlation between scale inefficiency and economies of scope can be 
shown  (average  farmer  cost  saving  of  50%).  Therefore,  on  average,  a  possible  bias  of  the 
estimated  scope  economies  of  the  integrated  units/families  only  applies  as  a  downward  bias, 
affecting  the  economies  of  scope  negatively,  if  at  all.  Firms  have  considerable  flexibility  in 
determining the weights to be used in evaluating their efficiencies, allowing firms to use different 
combinations of inputs to produce different combinations of outputs according to their preferred 
weights; therefore, more than one firm can be technically efficient.  Scale differences among the 
integrated firms and ”virtually” integrated firms, and possible related differences in returns to scale, 
do not cause an upward bias in the economies of scope estimations. The returns to scale of the 
integrated firms are estimated by using the SE method.   
 
The analysis shows that on average, all the northern provinces of Mozambique have considerably 
higher scale economies in crop production. Efficiency is even higher because of agro-ecological 
conditions associated with higher scale efficiency. Farm associations (partnerships) have turned out 
to be the most efficient production organisations, because they combine the advantages of low 
transaction costs with family labour and low hired labour input with optimal scale economies. The 
results of the efficiency literature based on frontier methodology are generally consistent with the 
notion  that  human  capital  plays  an  important  role  in  farm  productivity  in  developing  countries; 
consequently, public investments designed to enhance human capital can be expected to generate 
additional output even in the absence of new technologies. Traditional authority is an institution that 
is legitimised in community settings, in the sphere of a community civil society of an agricultural 
base. In the event of this instrument of legitimisation being transferred from a civil to a state level, 
this authority would lose its intrinsic assets and would probably become frozen in time. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Figure 5.3: Geographic influences of scale: Analysis per province 
Since the estimations of the average 
technical efficiency of each province 
reveal  the  dynamics  of  the 
restructuring  changes,  technical 
efficiency  exhibits  the  poorest 
performance,  either  because 
individual  farmers  were  more  likely 
to leave the poorer performing farms 
or  simply  because  they  went 
bankrupt.  It  was  found  that  the 
average  efficiency  of  the  provinces  increased  due  to  forced  institutional  change  and  social 
incentives  (organisational  restructuring,  participation  and  inclusiveness).  Most  provinces  lack 
mechanisms to minimise risks due to price variability, thus discouraging investment in agriculture 
associated with a lack of infrastructure and agricultural services. In all the provinces investigated, 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  land  market  is  a  determinant  when  it  comes  to  improving  farm 
productivity.  
 
As Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) noted, there is considerable agreement with the notion that 
effective economic development strategy depends critically on promoting productivity and output 
growth  in  the  agricultural  sector,  particularly  among  small-scale  producers.  Empirical  evidence 
suggests  that  small  farmers  are  desirable  not  only  because  they  provide  a  means  of  reducing 
unemployment, but also because they provide a more equitable distribution of income, as well as 
an  effective  demand  structure  for  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  The  presence  of  shortfalls  in 
efficiency means that output can be increased without requiring additional conventional inputs and 
without the need for new technology. If this is the case, the empirical measures of efficiency are 
necessary in order to determine the magnitude of the gains that could be obtained by improving 
performance in agricultural production with the given technology. The next section investigates the 
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5.4.  FACTORS AFFECTING EFFICIENCY  
5.4.1.  ECONOMETRIC MODELING 
It is recognised that governance influences access to and management of natural resources in 
Mozambique. Fieldwork has shown that the significance of the hypothesis is constrained by the fact 
that in the specific rural areas under review, the presence of the state has historically been limited 
in the past two decades. The decentralisation approach changed the paradigm, and positive effects 
are emerging at local level as a result of government restructuring. The extent to which the greater 
role  played  by  traditional  structures  has  been  determined  by  market  failures  is  very  difficult  to 
disentangle  in  causal  relationships,  and  thus  it  would  make  more  sense  to  speak  of  selected 
"institutional  failures".  To  delve  deeper  into  this  matter,  one  can  follow  what  is  known  in  the 
literature  as  “second-step”  estimation  (Bravo-Ureta  &  Pinheiro  1993)  by  using  econometric 
specification. 
 
This  section  presents  the  Maximum  Likelihood  Estimation  (MLE)  of  the  production  function 
parameters  based  on  econometric  specifications.  The  regression  coefficients  are  the  average 
amount by which the dependent increases when the independent increases by one unit and other 
independents  remain  constant.    MLE  has  been  used  in  past  technical  efficiency  studies  (as 
prescribed by Sexton, 1986), and is used here.  A censored two-limit tobit model (as discussed in 
Greene, 1993), with limits of 0 to 1 on the dependent technical efficiency variable, is also used.  
Measures of technical efficiency are used in a regression analysis to estimate those factors that are 
most important in determining a firm’s technical efficiency. Measures of technical efficiency are 
used in a regression analysis to estimate those factors that are most important in determining a 
firm’s  technical  efficiency.  Equation  (1)  presents  the  regression  equation  that  estimates  the 
relationship  between  exogenous  variables  and  technical  efficiency,  formulated  by  a  general 
conceptual model where family efficiency (FE) rate is given by:  
 
FE = f (EF, IF, SF, PF)          (1) 
 
FE represents the technical efficiency score, and F(δ) indicates the operator. Following Rupasingha 
and Goetz (2003), variables hypothesised to affect technical efficiency include a vector of economic 
factors  EF,  individual-level  factors  IF,  social  factors  SF,  and  “political”  factors  PF.    These  are 
estimated in the model below by alternatively using levels and rates of change in family poverty 
rates as dependent variables. The econometric model is summarised as: 
FE=Ώ (W) + Xβ + εi.             (2) 
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Where:  
FE denotes an nx1 vector of the dependent variable, X represents an nxk matrix containing the 
determinants of efficiency (EF, SF, PF, IF), and W is spatial weights, as explained above. Scalar ρ 
is  a  spatial  autoregressive  parameter  and  β  denotes  the  k  parameters  to  be  estimated  for  the 
explanatory  variables.  The  other  specification  is  the  spatial  error  model  (Rupasingha  &  Goetz, 
2003).  If  the  error  term,  ui,  is  found  to  be  non-spherical,  it  is  decomposed  into  a  pure  noise 
component, vi, and an efficiency component, ui. The expression of technical efficiency relies on the 
value of the unobservable ui, which must be predicted.  
 
These  predictions  are  obtained  by  deriving  the  expectation  of  the  appropriate  function  of  ui 
conditional on the observed value of vi - ui (Jondrow, Lovell, Materov & Schmidt, 1982; Battese & 
Coelli, 1988; Battese & Coelli, 1992). Assumptions must be made about the shape of the efficiency 
score distribution. The most commonly used distributions have been the half-normal (Aigner et al., 
1977)  and  truncated  normal,  although  the  gamma  distribution  has  also  been  recommended 
(Greene, 1980). For panel data models, there have been a few different proposals about how to 
model inefficiency patterns over time. This study uses the exponential time model proposed by 
Battese and Coelli (1995). The essential idea behind the stochastic frontier model is that εi is a 
“composed” error term (Aigner et al., 1977). This term can be written as: 
 
εi = Vi – Ui              (3) 
 
where v is a two-sided (-∞ < v < ∞) normally distributed random error (v;N[0, σv
2]) that captures the 
stochastic  effects  outside  the  farmer’s  control  (e.g.  weather,  natural  disasters,  and  luck), 
measurement  errors,  and  other  statistical  noise.  The  term  u  is  a  one-sided  (u  ≥  0)  efficiency 
component that captures the technical inefficiency of the farmer. In other words, u measures the 
shortfall in output Y from its maximum value given by the stochastic frontier f(Xi; β) + v. This one-
sided term can follow such distributions as half-normal, exponential, and gamma (Aigner et al., 
1977; Greene, 1980). 
 
It is considered an efficient unit as a vector of a multiple regression equation, which is used to 
account for (predict) the variance in an interval dependent, based on linear combinations of internal 
dichotomous, and dummy independent variables. Multiple regression can establish that a set of 
independent variables explains a proportion of the variance in a dependent variable at a significant 
level  (significance  test  of  the  coefficient  of  determination  R
2),  and  can  establish  the  relative 
predictive importance of the independent variables (comparing beta weights). In power terms it can POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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be  added  as  independent  variables  to  explore  curvilinear  effects.  Given  the  estimate  of  the 
production  function  and  the  efficiency  component  ui,  the  observed  output  of  farm  i,  yi,  can  be 
filtered for noise by subtracting the efficiency component from the technically efficient output, f(xi;ß): 
 
y = yi - vi = f(xi;ß) – εi.           (4)  
Since the Cobb-Douglas production function was found to be an appropriate representation of the 
technology, the optimal input use ratios of a cost-minimising farm are independent of output. This 
property can be used to calculate the technically efficient input set by substituting y for output in the 
factor demand equations, x*(y,w), and using shadow prices derived from the observed input ratios. 
The dual cost function is then used to derive the economically efficient input set (with observed 
prices, rather than shadow prices). 
 
Cross-product terms can be added as independent variables to explore interaction effects. One can 
test the significance of difference between two R
2's to determine whether adding an independent 
variable to the model helps significantly. Using hierarchical regression, one can see how variance in 
the dependent variable can be explained by one or a set of new independent variables, over and 
above that explained by an earlier set. Of course, the estimates (β coefficients and constant) can be 
used to construct a prediction equation and generate predicted scores on a variable for further 
analysis.  
 
Multiple regression shares all the assumptions of correlation: linearity of relationships, the same 
level of relationship throughout the range of the independent variable ("homoscedasticity"), interval 
or near-interval data, and data whose range is not truncated. In addition, it is important that the 
model  being  tested  is  correctly  specified.  The  exclusion  of  important  causal  variables  or  the 
inclusion  of  extraneous  variables  can  markedly  change  the  beta  weights  and  hence  the 
interpretation of the importance of the independent variables.  
 
5.4.2.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
Following the Rupasingha and Goetz (2003) formulation of a general conceptual model on family 
efficiency rate, the econometrical multiple regression model is given as: 
Ei = β0 + βiXi + εi.             (5) 
The parameter β denotes the k parameters to be estimated for the explanatory variables, where β0 
is the level of the poverty determined by other factor not considered in the model, and the term εi is 
the  error  specification  of  the  model.  The  β's  are  the  regression  coefficients,  representing  the 
amount the dependent variable Ei changes when the independent changes. β0 is the constant, 
where the regression line intercepts the y axis, representing the level at which the dependent Ei will POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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be when all the independent variables are 0. The standardised version of the β coefficients is the 
beta weights, and the ratio of the beta coefficients is the ratio of the relative predictive power of the 
independent variables. Associated with multiple regression is R
2, which is the percent of variance in 
the dependent variable, explained collectively by all of the independent variables. The empirical 
model of analysis based in econometric analysis can be formalised in the following equation: 
Ei= ß0 +β1X1+…+ β6X6 + β4D1 +…+ βnDn+ εi.      (6) 
Specified as: 
Ei= ß0 +β1Econg + β2InternalResources + β3Pop + β4GoodGov + β5ExtResources + β6CapB + 
β7Years + β8UNDP + β9 UNCDF + β10DBS + εi.       (7) 
Where:  
Ei = Dependent variable denotes an nx1 vector of the dependent variable – Production efficiency;  
X1  = Economic growth  (EconG) –  a positive and significant sign on the EconG  estimate would 
provide evidence that it is an effective input in increasing efficiency; 
X2 = Internal resources (state budget), with a positive influence in terms of government investment 
in different sectoral areas (e.g. agricultural infrastructures); 
X3 = Population growth (Pop) – the variable POP is hypothesised to have a positive influence on 
efficiency; 
X4 = Good governance – the role of institutions and local authorities; 
X5 = External resources (multilateral loan) – it is hypothesised to have a positive impact with an 
unexpected impact in the long run;  
X6 = Capacity-building – it is hypothesised to have a positive impact on efficiency; 
X7 = Years – it is hypothesised to have a positive impact on a farm’s technical efficiency due to 
learning from past experiences, meaning that the technology is transferred; 
X8 = UNDP contribution – it is hypothesised to have a positive impact on efficiency; 
X9 = UNCDF contribution – it is hypothesised to have a positive impact on efficiency; 
X10 = Direct budget support – it is hypothesised to have a positive impact on efficiency; 
εi = Error term. 
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5.4.3.  DEFINITION OF VARIABLES OF THE MODEL 
The determinant factors of the model estimated are explained in the table below: 
Table 5.6: Determinant factors of the model 
Variables  Description 
·  Economic Growth  Economic  growth  is  the  increase  in  the  value  of  goods  and 
services produced by an economy. It is conventionally measured 
as the percentage rate of increase in real gross domestic product, 
or GDP. Growth is usually calculated in real terms. 
·  State Budget Allocation 
(Internal Resources) 
The  state  budget  optimises  the  required  level  of  investment  to 
maximise the expected utility stream. The composition of the state 
budget  is  the  local  revenues  and  other  contributions.  Budget 
generally refers to a list of all planned expenses and revenues. 
·  Demography                       
(Population) 
Demographic factors are directly correlated with poverty-reduction 
targets. Demographic analysis can relate to whole societies or to 
groups defined by criteria such as education, nationality, religion 
and  ethnicity.  It  includes  the  study  of  the  size,  structure  and 
distribution of populations, and how populations change over time 
due to births, deaths, migration and ageing.  
·  Bilateral Support (G-19) 
(External Resources) 
Aid is inversely correlated, meaning that while the aid contribution 
increases, the level of poverty is reduced. Bilateral support is the 
allocation,  within  a  system,  of  available  resources  amongst  the 
various functions that need to be performed. 
·  Multilateral Support 
(UNDP + UNCDF) 
UNDP + UNCDF support is inversely related to poverty, meaning 
that  while  the  aid  contribution  increases,  the  level  of  poverty  is 
reduced.  The  UN  support  aims  to  promote  decentralisation  and 
local  development,  including  capacity-building  and  infrastructure 
(Local Development Fund). 
 
The quantitative data analysis was selected from the PARPA budget allocation (2006- 2009). All 
indicative data from 2010 – 2015 was predicted by the annual expected increase rate (1+i)
n. It is 
hypothesised  that  the  level  of  population  (demographic  trends)  will  increase  proportionally  on 
average at 2.7% per year. 
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Dummy  variables  are  considered
23:  Qualitative  data  was  selected  from  governance  trends  and 
expectations. The table below describes the qualitative variables. 
Table 5.7: Description of qualitative variables 
Variables    Description   
·  Good Governance: The 
role of institutions  
Yes = 1 and Opposite =0, assuming that by 2010 a high level of 
institutional  influence  will  be  achieved,  including  autonomy  and 
local  empowerment.  It  is  hypothesised  that  governance  aspects 
(policies and institutions) will have different technical efficiencies. 
The  influence  of  institutions  is  defined  as  a  representative  and 
inclusive  system  established  to  strengthen  the  process 
of government,  ensuring  accountability,  transparency,  advocacy, 
participatory decision-making and the direct interaction of citizen 
groups with government. Good governance can thus be seen as 
the  achievement  of  greater  efficiency,  representation, 
accountability and transparency. 
·  Capacity-Building  Yes  =  1  and  Opposite  =0,  assuming  that  capacity-building 
influences service delivery at local level. Capacity-building means 
the ability of institutions to satisfy the group’s needs and demands, 
and  the  variable  is  considered  critical  in  achieving  more  rapid 
economic development and improving standards of living at local 
level. 
·  Budget Support (Aid)  Yes = 1 and Opposite =0, assuming that a considerable portion of 
the  budget  is  assumed  to  come  from  international  development 
partners (G-19), channelled via the central government. While aid 
increases there is a positive influence on economic growth. It is 
hypothesised  that  donor  funds  are  employed  in  government 
systems  and  sector-wide  approaches.  This  should  be  used  in 
combination  with  set  performance  targets  on  the  part  of  budget 
holders. 
 
Estimating  the  level  of  inefficiency  attributable  to  firm-level  failures  in  terms  of  organising  and 
optimally utilising available inputs provides important implications for firms themselves to address 
internal weaknesses before they opt for solutions from external bodies. 
                                                       
23 Dummy variables are a way of adding the values of a nominal or ordinal variable to a regression equation. (e.g. Yes = 
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5.4.4.   ESTIMATIVE OF THE REGRESSION 
This  involves  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  and  Maximum  Likelihood  (ML)  Estimation  of  the 
production function parameters. The OLS function provides estimates of the “average” production 
function, while the MLE model yields estimates of the stochastic production frontier. The similarities 
of the slope parameters across equations confirm that the frontier function represents a neutral 
upward shift of the average production function. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Bravo-Ureta  and  Rieger  (1990)  and  Bravo-Ureta  and  Evenson  (1994).  Moreover,  all  parameter 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level for the two models. Table 5.8 below presents 
the results of the OLS and maximum-likelihood two-limit tobit estimations. 
 
Table 5.8: Parameter estimations 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) AND MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (ML) PARAMETER ESTIMATES 




   MLE               
Estimates 
Standard Error 
Intercept  -3.40556125  0.062564116     -3.55655445  0.061684545 
X1  -2.87884054  0.076153413     -2.40545812  0.065856545 
X 2  2.41E-06  7.54E-08     2.11E-06  6.58565E-08 
X3  2.52E-07  4.22E-09     3.15E-07  3.68785E-09 
X 4  -2.69E-05  8.67E-06     -2.29E-05  7.38745E-05 
X 5  -7.43E-06  1.84E-07     -7.15E-06  1.39385E-07 
X 6  -0.00725178  0.000172446     -0.00787868  0.000146542 
X 7  -0.12526788  0.001453887     -0.25260217  0.001487025 
X 8  -1.39E-07  4.79E-08     -1.09E-07  5.14543E-08 
X 9  -9.11E-06  1.56E-07     -9.97E-06  1.66543E-07 
X 10  0.010335259  0.000286038     0.03006529  0.000238215 
Function coefficient  0.77                     -                           0.78                         -    
F-Statistic model  6.22                     -                               -                           -    
Adjusted R²                0.71                      -                               -                           -    
λ                    -                        -                          0.975                         -    
σ²                    -                               -                         0.517                         -    
                     -                            (0.221)                        -    
Log likelihood                    -                       -                         34.36                         -   
The level of coefficient determination (R
2), adjusted to 71.0%, shows a highly significant interaction 
effect, the same as for any other variable. The ratio of the standard error of u (σu) to the standard 
error of v (σv), known as lambda (λ), is 0.97. Based on λ, the derive gamma (γ) measures the effect 
of technical inefficiency in the variation of observed output (γ = λ² / [1 + λ²]. The estimated value of γ 
is 0.49, which means that 49% of the total variation in farm output is due to technical inefficiency.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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The function coefficient measures the proportional change in output when all inputs included in the 
model  are  changed  in  the  same  proportion.  The  function  coefficient  for  both  the  OLS  and  ML 
estimates is approximately 0.78, which indicates that returns to size are decreasing. Restricted 
least squares regression was used to formally test the null hypothesis of constant returns to size. 
The computed F statistic is 6.22, which exceeds the critical F value of 4.02 at the 5% level of 
significance. Consequently, the null hypothesis of constant returns to size was rejected. A number 
of  factors  or  characteristics  could  be  cited  as  possible  causes  for  efficiency  variation  among 
different firms. In our case, some of the firms were exporting their products to the external market 
while  others  were  not.  The  possible  hypothesis  that  could  emerge  from  this  condition  is  that 
enterprises operating in a more efficient way were able to export their products to the international 
market. The other possibility could be related to size. Large firms may enjoy relatively higher scale 
economies and operate more efficiently than otherwise.   
 
The results indicate that: 
·  Variable X1 (economic growth) and variable X5 (external resources – aid support) are important 
determinants of an individual’s production efficiency.  
o  The donor support will still be critical to achieve MDGs, meaning that the country will 
require  that  donors  fulfil  their  pledges  to  take  steps  towards  increasing  their  official 
development  assistance  at  least  by  0.5%  per  year.  The  same  is  the  case  with 
multilateral contributions. The effects are largely stated in terms of influence in local 
development  through  institutional  and  human  resources  capacity  for  planning, 
implementing, monitoring and evaluating at the district level.  
o  The decreased share of public resources allocated to agriculture is often explained by 
the  poor  image  of  the  sector.  It  is  perceived  as  stagnating,  mainly  constituted  by 
subsistence  farmers  and  not  offering  good  opportunities  for  dynamic  business.  A 
considerable share of public resources is also often spent on subsidies of private goods 
(e.g. agricultural commodities, private investment) to the detriment of public goods.  
o  The level of investment (US $46.662 million) expected from multilaterals is reflecting a 
great impact at local level. The investment per capita by 2015 is expected to be US $1.7 
per habitant, converted into infrastructures and capacity-building at the local level.  
·  Variable X2 (internal resources) is inversely related to poverty reduction, meaning that the level 
of increase is not sufficient to support poverty-reduction strategies.  
o  The result suggests that the government should be more engaged in terms of creating a 
suitable fiscal environment in view of collecting more revenues. District finances are one 
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o  The study showed that increasing public goods is likely to promote economic growth 
directly (as factors of production) and indirectly (through its positive effect on private 
investment).  Government  budget  cuts  made  in  the  wake  of  structural  adjustment 
programmes have affected agriculture more than other sectors. The share of agriculture 
in government budgets declined from around 5% in 1990/91 to 3.5% in 2004/5.  
o  This  gravely  affected  public  investment  in  agriculture  and  the  capacity  of  public 
institutions.  Political unrest and armed conflict have strongly affected agriculture in a 
number  of  provinces  by  preventing  farmers  from  producing,  displacing  populations, 
destroying infrastructure and littering the countryside with mines.   
 
Interpreting ß for dummy variables (qualitative): Dummy variables and their interpretation under 
alternative forms of coding are discussed below.  
·  Variable X4 (good governance, institutions) reveals a direct impact on poverty alleviation. 
The result is consistent with the idea that decentralisation and local governance are critical 
to promote local development.  
o  The role of institutions and governance in creating an attractive climate for private-
sector  development,  including  anti-corruption  programmes  and  the  institutional 
reforms  needed  to  generate  private  investment  and  job  creation,  are  critical  in 
poverty reduction.  
o  Poor  governance  and  weak  institutional  capacity  have  resulted  in  poor  policies 
incapable  of  addressing  the  challenges  of  agriculture  and  rural  development. 
Malfunctioning and inefficient markets (frail private sector, high transport costs, weak 
information systems, poor regulatory framework) are also a factor.   
o  The flow of aid to agriculture and rural development has declined in the last 4 years 
after PROAGRI I. Current flows are insignificant compared to identified needs; more 
resources are allocated to food aid than to agriculture and rural development aid, 
while analysis suggests that investing in agriculture would reduce the need to resort 
to food aid in the future. As a result, capital and productivity per agricultural worker 
are lower in Mozambique than in any other region of the world. 
·  Variable X10 (direct budget support): While poverty is reduced each year, the impact of DBS 
will increase the output to 0.0103, meaning that the variable will have a negative impact 
considering the human and institutional capacity.  
o  The estimation suggests a major impact of projects in local development. Donors 
should  continue  to  provide  project  financing.  In  addition,  to  increase  alignment, 
strengthen country capacity and reduce costs, donors should strive to increase – POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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where appropriate – the resources they provide for budget support and sector-wide 
approaches.  
o  Both  donors  and  governments  should  take  concrete  steps  to  adjust  staff  and 
management incentives to motivate and be consistent with the use of harmonisation, 
alignment, and managing for results, involving all partners – donors, countries and 
civil society organisations (CSOs) – that should together explore ways to increase 
the constructive engagement of CSOs at all stages of the harmonisation, alignment, 
and managing-for-results agendas. 
 
5.4.5.  MODEL SIMULATION 
Goodness of fit of these estimates is most easily assessed by means of simulation. The basic 
principle behind the simulations is to make random draws from the uniform distribution in which the 
random values are converted to simulated durations, via the inverted survivor functions. This has 
been applied by Aassve, Burgess, Chesher and Propper (2002). Fortunately, simulating a system of 
simultaneous hazards is quite similar to the case of single equation models with repeated spells, or 
any fully sequential model, such as the competing risk model.  
 










Building years UNDP UNCDF DBS
2004 54.000% 0.0750            22,373.45           17,000,000.00          0 19,733.40            0 0 32861000.00 3000.00 1
2005 50.760% 0.0770            23,551.00           17,459,000.00          0 20,772.00            0 1 33,518,220.00      4300.00 1
2006 47.714% 0.0740            26,665.00           17,930,393.00          0 25,863.00            0 2 34,188,584.40      4,515.00               1
2007 44.852% 0.0799           31,194.00           18,414,513.61          0 28,128.00            0 3 34,872,356.09      4,740.75               1
2008 42.160% 0.0863           34,331.00           18,911,705.48          0 28,980.00            1 4 35,569,803.21      4,977.79               1
2009 39.631% 0.0932           39,141.00           19,422,321.53          0 29,983.00            1 5 36,281,199.27      5,226.68               0
2010 37.253% 0.1007           41,098.05           19,946,724.21          1 31,482.15            1 6 37,006,823.26      5,488.01               0
2011 35.018% 0.1087           43,152.95           20,485,285.76          1 33,056.26            1 7 37,746,959.72      5,762.41               0
2012 32.917% 0.1174           45,310.60           21,038,388.48          1 34,709.07            1 8 38,501,898.92      6,050.53               0
2013 30.942% 0.1268           47,576.13           21,606,424.97          1 36,444.52            1 9 39,271,936.90      6,353.06               0
2014 29.085% 0.1370           49,954.94           22,189,798.44          1 38,266.75            1 10 40,057,375.64      6,670.71               0
2015 27.340% 0.1479           52,452.68           22,788,923.00          1 40,180.09            1 11 40,658,236.27      7,004.25               0
b0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10
-537.1% -3.405561              -0.425856       0.126231            5.731869                  -0.000027          -0.298577            -0.007252         -1.377947        -5.650507             -0.063829             -                    
Variables (2015) -3.4056                  0.1479            52,452.6835       22,788,922.9976      1.0000               40,180.0876        1.0000              11.0000            ############# 7,004.2469           -                    
Parameters Coefficients (2.878841)       0.0000024          0.0000003                (0.0000269)        (0.0000074)          (0.0072518)      (0.1252679)      (0.0000001)          (0.0000091)          0.0103353        





Despite the fact that the principle remains the same, simulating a system will necessarily involve a 
higher level of complexity. Some lessons can be learned from the simulation: 
·  Economic growth and state budget: Table 5.9 shows that by 2015 the expected level of 
output can be reached at 27% (considering the target of 50%). Economic growth increases at a 
minimal level of 8% per year. The challenge is to achieve the level of 14% by 2015. The level of 
economic growth has an impact in terms of local capacity of investment, meaning that the state POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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budget (internal resources) should increase by more than 5% per year. The simulation shows a 
major impact when internal resources increase at a level of 10% per year. 
·  Aid (budget support): Donor contribution still plays a critical role in poverty alleviation. The 
expected minimal level to satisfy the need of an annual poverty decrease of 6% should be 
roughly 5% per year. More domestic and foreign investments associated with economic growth 
should encourage development partners to increase budget support. However, many analysts 
believe that had an investment in agricultural development, equal to the volume of resources 
used during emergencies, been made during normal years, it would have had a positive impact 
on the economy, which would have rendered food aid unnecessary. 
·  Multilateral  contribution:  A  positive  and  significant  dependence  in  the  dependent  variable 
(poverty  rate)  indicates  that  the  UNDP’s  and  UNCDF’s  influence  is  still  critical.  UNDP  and 
UNCDF  investment  should  be  situated  at  the  minimal  level  of  2%  (in  terms  of  technical 
assistance and capacity-building) and 5% (in terms of capital investment) respectively.  
 
5.4.6.  PREDICTION OF DIFFERENCE SCENARIOS 
The question associated with prediction is: “What will happen if the variables changed at a faster or 
slower pace, and what are the consequences?” In general it is noted that addressing the constraints 
and exploiting opportunities for agriculture and rural development will require considerable public 
support, in terms of both additional resources and policy reforms. In the prediction, a number of 
variables are analysed: (i) Donor support, (ii) Level of investment – internal support, (iii) capacity-
building, and (iv) governance aspects. 
 
a)  Donor budget support: Tapping this potential will depend on the ability of central and local 
governments to create the right conditions for farmers to take the initiative and invest and trust 
in the functioning of markets that will remunerate their efforts fairly. The results of this study 
show that the machinery-intensive nature of corporate districts may have limited capacity for 
harmonising, aligning donor support to the national budget, and managing for results. In that 
sense: (i) Donor support should be reflected in development,  meaning that funds must be used 
as agreed and that priorities in the poverty strategies must be adhered to; (ii) Governments 
must offer assurances that they will transfer capacity and resources and pursue sound financial 
management so that donors are not “writing a blank cheque for economic mismanagement”; (iii) 
Farming  technology  may  be  inappropriate,  given  the  current  low  cost  of  labour  relative  to 
machinery  and  fuel.  Given  the  proper  institutional  reforms  to  allow  for  more  factor  mobility, 
private plot farming over time might evolve into large-scale, capital-intensive agriculture. 
b)  Internal resources: Generating income to support the level of investment is critical. The issue 
of public investment will be increasingly important also in the case of agricultural development in 
infrastructure,  plant  and  livestock  breeding,  and  in  native  crops  suited  to  local  conditions. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  172 
Climatic changes and droughts affecting Mozambique are some expected constraints that might 
influence  the  allocation  of  internal  resources.  There  are  also  many  cases  of  failure  of 
cooperation in the management of common resources, leading to an anarchical regime in the 
scramble for these resources. With the erosion of the local commons – decimation of forests 
and grazing lands, silting and increasing toxicity of rivers and ponds, depletion of aquifers and 
soil erosion and desertification – life for the rural poor in many parts of the world has become 
more insecure and impoverished in ways that are not captured in the usual poverty estimates 
based  on  private  consumer  expenditure  data.  Research  becomes  more  important  for 
agriculture,  and  as  issues  of  patent-protected  pricing  and  appropriateness  of  commercially 
developed technology to the agro-climatic and economic environment become salient, one will 
need more theoretically informed empirical analysis of the various trade-offs involved case by 
case. 
c)  Capacity-building – Social capital: This variable has the potential to influence the utilisation of 
natural  resources.  It  is  clear  from  the  analysis  conducted  that  there  are  considerable 
opportunities  for  expanding  the  utilisation  of  natural  resources  (e.g.  land  under  cultivation, 
increasing yields through better management of water and soil resources, and use of improved 
technology).  An  oft-quoted  statistic  of  Mozambican  agriculture  is  that  private  plot  farming 
provides more than 50% of the value of all agricultural production in Mozambique, while using 
less  than  10%  of  all  available  arable  land.  The  Mozambican  government  has  only  recently 
started to publish data on peasant and family farming. This reflects a bias of the Mozambican 
government towards large-scale, machinery-intensive farming. 
d)  Governance aspects (institutions and policies): Examining the implications of policies and 
regulations in more detail would be of importance, as removing unjustified interventions is likely 
to go a long way towards improving resource allocation in agricultural systems characterised by 
an efficiency-reducing transfer of land from small to large producers. With the emphasis on 
livelihood resources and outcomes, as well as institutional processes, multiple entry points for 
development  interventions  are  suggested  by  the  framework.  These  range  from  more 
conventional options focused on supporting access to particular livelihood resources to allow for 
the more effective pursuit of particular livelihood strategies (or combinations), to more complex 
alternatives arising from the social analysis of “messy” institutional arrangements. Rather than 
focusing  solely  on  conventional  interventions  (transfer  of  technologies,  skills,  etc.),  the 
sustainable livelihoods approach emphasises getting the institutional and organisational setting 
right, with emphasis on both formal and informal mechanisms. Such an approach will hopefully 
improve the effectiveness of conventional interventions while extending the range of options 
across livelihood strategies. 
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5.5.  DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE  
5.5.1.  TRENDS OF QUANTITATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE ESTIMATIONS  
According  to  the  study,  since  the  returns  to  scale  are  not  significantly  different  from  one,  the 
increase in output that could be expected from using the same amount of inputs would be the 
same. Furthermore, according to the allocative efficiency estimates, for the same output target, 
costs could be reduced (from DEA results). The results suggest different patterns of relationships 
that could relate as much to the nature of the variables as to policy effects manifested by the 
presence of the dummies. For instance, the results suggest that real interest on debt and real farm 
debt, which had a negative relationship in the previous estimate, consistent with economic theory, 
turned  out  to  relate  positively  to  real  farmland  prices  in  the  presence  of  the  annual  dummies. 
However, this positive relationship was shown not to be statistically significant. 
 
Both parametric and non-parametric calculations support this conclusion. It should be emphasised 
that the efficiency differences within regions are considerably smaller than the literature typically 
assumes, and it has been predicted that the difference will decline further during transition. While 
further research is required to provide a conclusive answer, the current analysis suggests that the 
main reason for the pre-reform inefficiency of the collective farms was the socialised economic 
environment, rather than the intrinsic problems of large-scale farming.  
 
Figure 5.4: Variables with a long-term effect 
In  general,  it  is  found  that 
unless  the  variable  population 
and internal resources have an 
inverse  relationship,  all 
variables  considered  are 
statistically  significant  in  the 
output. It should be noted that 
the data used in this study was 
available  only  for  corporate 
farms.  Results  tend  to  be  in 
favour of financial decentralisation in the accomplishment of efficient allocations regarding different 
local  preferences  concerning  local  public  goods  and  services.  If  each  local  government  can 
establish the taxes and the package of benefits in favour of citizens from the local community, 
efficiency and social wellbeing could be maximised. 
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The largest distortion affecting input use is probably Mozambican farmers’ inability to secure credit 
to replace their labour-saving machinery with labour-intensive machinery (due to the poor financial 
performance of the agricultural sector and the credit market). This means that farmers often find 
that they perform better by implementing the old machinery-intensive agricultural practices rather 
than  responding  to  market  incentives,  which  would  require  the  emphasis  of  labour-intensive 
practices. All inputs were found to contribute to low allocative efficiency, reflecting markets that 
function poorly. The main source of allocative efficiency was the large cost share of oil products. 
The large cost share of fuel implies that Mozambican farmers purchased more than the efficient 
proportion of fuel compared to other inputs.  
 
This study estimated a stochastic and deterministic production frontier and used non-parametric 
techniques to  calculate  the  technical  and  scale  efficiency  of  family  farms,  partnerships  and  the 
large-scale successor organisations (LSOs) of the collective farms (CFs). The results indicate that 
LSOs display lower levels of technical efficiency than partnerships and family farms. Although this 
confirms the theory that family farms and partnerships deal better than LSO’s with the agency-
managerial problems that arise as a result of the difficult metering of effort in agricultural production, 
the difference in technical efficiency is small and declining over time. Moreover, family farms are 
scale  inefficient  compared  to  both  partnerships  and  LSOs,  because  they  are  still  too  small  to 
exhaust  all  scale  economies.    Farms  organised  as  partnerships  are  superior  to  all  other 
organisational forms regardless of the measuring technique used. 
 
The  study  provides  an  alternative  analytical  approach  based  on  non-measurable  variables 
(qualitative measurements), using contingent valuation survey data proposed by Harson (1995). 
Examining the utility theoretical foundations of the models, it was found that qualitative variables 
substantively influence the level of efficiency related to natural resource management and ultimately 
its impact on the agricultural sector. In terms of the knowledge systems’ institutional settings, it was 
found that the role of institutions and governance in creating an attractive climate for private-sector 
development,  including  anti-corruption  programmes  and  the  institutional  reforms  needed  to 
generate private investment and job creation, is critical in poverty reduction. It was found that poor 
governance and weak institutional capacity have resulted in poor policies incapable of addressing 
the challenges of agriculture and rural development.  
 
The State system (deriving its legitimacy and authority from the rule of law of the nation-state) rests 
on a common property concept in which the state assumes exclusive responsibility and capability 
for managing a resource equally accessible to all citizens. The state manages for certain levels of 
abundance  on  a  technical  basis,  and  then  allocates  shares  of  this  abundance  to  users  on  an POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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economic and political basis. The system of knowledge is based on the scientific accumulation, 
organisation and interpretation of data, and management problems are resolved in a technical, a-
historical framework. This system of management is bureaucratic, which is to say, hierarchically 
organised and vertically compartmentalised. The physical closeness of traditional authorities to their 
“constituency” allows for the application of a set of rules and norms that will rarely be out of touch 
with the ecological reality and the management and conservation requirements of the resources in 
their  territory.  The  role  of  the  customary  leadership  as  regards  responsibilities  outside  of  the 
conventional traditional sphere is thus undefined, due to this overlap and the gap in the existing 
laws. The big chiefs should understand the importance of the role of the traditional authorities, and 
in order to collaborate with them, it is necessary to better understand and know who is the authority 
at local level.  
  
The social capital of communities in Mozambique, mainly in rural ones, is a capital that originates, 
grows and develops in a productive system exogenous to the laws of the modern state. When the 
state  is  absent,  or  is  kept  out,  it  is  this  capital  that  sustains  the  system  of  production  and 
reproduction of social groups, and of the communities. It circulates in a stock exchange of social 
contacts and rests on group loyalties based on kinship, ethnicity and religion, or, to a lesser extent, 
political affiliation. The exercising of power by traditional chiefs attending to their personal interests 
and the interests of the community is based on the process by which (hereditary) political power is 
constantly  legitimised  through  actions  and  practices  that  satisfy  community  interests,  which  the 
community reattribute in turn with a counter-provision of services. 
 
In  lineage-based  hierarchical  societies,  mechanisms  for  redistribution  are  an  expression  of  the 
moral obligations of the senior members of the community who are responsible for ensuring social 
and  spiritual  reproduction,  as  well  as  its  junior  members,  responsible  for  ensuring  economic 
welfare.  They  are  essentially  networks  of  mutual  support  and  solidarity,  as  well  as  clientelistic 
relations among kinship groups of unequal social status, nested in historical power relations and 
priority rights for some lineages, which are largely the consequence of who occupied the land first. 
The descendants of the first to settle and cultivate the land will claim superior social status, as will 
those who are members of a lineage who came to dominate others by battle and conquest.  
 
5.5.2.  THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNANCE POLICIES                        
In practice, sector programmes have been slow to adopt government systems. However, there are 
cases where funds are largely disbursed via government systems. In order to overcome central, 
provincial  and  district  government  capacity,  broad  coalitions  that  bring  together  a  diversity  of 
interest  groups  from  different  sectors  of  society  and  government  could  provide  an  effective POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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institutional forum for the promotion of democratic decentralisation. Such coalitions are needed to 
counterbalance the centralising tendencies of national governments, and as such might serve as 
important political allies for the long-term development of a real, democratic decentralisation. 
 
Leadership  structures  must  be  assessed  and  informed  by  local  settlement  histories,  which 
contribute to determine institutional inclusion and exclusion. Cross-country comparisons, although 
in  a  context  of  adherence  to  different  legal  systems,  will  still  be  of  use,  to  the  extent  that  the 
recording  and  endorsement  of  local  organising  practices  is  based  upon  certain  "cultural  traits" 
common to agricultural and merchant societies. In relation to these traits, among the myths to be 
dismantled is that the customary authority structures they produce are gender-biased, atavistic, 
opaque, unaccountable, unchecked and necessarily "undemocratic": when applying the "modern" 
criteria of "good governance" to traditional structures, most of them fare surprisingly well – rather, 
their roles are tied to different mechanisms for participation, social inclusion and decision-making on 
Natural Resource Management (NRM). 
 
The new framework maintains the unitary system of government, but it places the responsibility for 
the  delivery  of  public  services  primarily  at  the  district  level.  At  the  same  time,  the  authority  of 
provinces is limited to the implementation of essential inter-district functions such as the provision of 
specialised  education  and  training,  control  of  communicable  diseases,  spatial  planning,  and 
environmental control. The new fiscal arrangements afford provincial and district governments more 
certainty in the availability of transferred resources and more discretion over their use. For example, 
the  lack  of  a  coherent  sectoral  policy  /  strategy  makes  it  difficult  to  monitor  progress  in 
decentralisation, notably in relation to the implementation of the Action Plan for the Reduction of 
Absolute Poverty (PARPA) and the transformations envisaged within the Public Sector Reform, 
whose strategy document clearly mentions an increasing role of local governments in the execution 
of policy and programmes. 
 
The  process  of  decentralisation  has  highlighted  the  fundamental  dilemma  of  upholding  the 
government's dual role as promoter of change and insurer of stability and consensus. Creating 
conditions in the public sector that promote a culture of continuous improvement, foster innovation 
and  capitalise  on  individual  and  team  performance  is  in  itself  an  ongoing  challenge  for 
governments.  However,  governments  are  also  required  to  constantly  maintain  stability  while 
stimulating change and innovation.  
 
It is often the most appropriate level for effective government intervention to meet a variety of public 
welfare  needs  and  to  stimulate  economic  efficiency.  It  also  serves  as  a  vehicle  to  permit  such POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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variation in the mix of government-delivered services as is necessary to respond to local needs and 
diversity. Local government is therefore central to the establishment and maintenance of responsive 
government and the sustaining of the democratic state. 
 
Through local participation and practices such as public meetings, citizens can participate more 
effectively  in  local  decision-making,  gain  experience  in  democratic  processes,  and  hold  local 
officials responsible for their decisions. It may give greater voice and representation to citizens, 
stress local ownership as an effective instrument of implementation, and bring greater grassroots-
level  control  over  resources  and  their  utilisation.  It  is  important  to  realise  that,  no  matter  how 
"parallel" the two institutional setups and the different production systems they govern may seem at 
first  glance,  some  sort  of  informal  articulation  and  communication  normally  exists  between  the 
traditional and modern sphere, often on land matters. With the probable exception of land conflict 
resolution, for which decision-making is more focused and ultimately usually lies with only one key 
authority,  at  all  echelons  there  is  a  multiplicity  of  decision-making  levels  that  frame  traditional 
institutions. The involvement of traditional community leaders brings natural resource claims and 
conflicts closer to illiterate persons, who rarely dispose of the many resources necessary to bring to 
bear  their  civil  rights  over  livelihood  assets  through  formal  government  channels  and  do  not 
understand all the rules and regulations, and the rights and duties that come with them. 
 
They may not have any such rights under national statute law, which does not recognise traditional 
usufruct. The village is not usually recognised as a legal entity, yet it is at this level that we find the 
traditional institutions that could sustain genuinely community-based natural resource management. 
As  different  worldviews  and  knowledge  systems  will  run,  or  flow,  into  each  other  under 
decentralisation  and  devolution,  the  dichotomy  that  often  opposes  "indigenous  knowledge"  to 
"modern  science"  is  misleading,  and  the  participatory  evaluation  of  both  would  appear  a 
fundamental  starting  point  when  analysing  the  dynamics  of  adopting  new  technologies,  or  new 
management and decision-making procedures. Arguably, community participation must take into 
account the norms upheld by traditional leaders, which implies that "win-win" scenarios are usually 
rare at any level and that some trade-offs are unavoidable.  
 
The mode of "ownership" will be reflected in local interpretations of, and expectations from, the 
decentralisation process, which should be explored, as they may augur well or not, so that early 
"remedies" can be sought. Since for the time being it remains the most visible manifestation of 
decentralisation  at  the  village  level,  local  perceptions  are  much  related  to  the  process  of 
restructuring administrative territories as geographical units. Information is provided below on why 
traditional leaders should be involved in the decentralisation and restructuring process. The extent POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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to which this may be happening anyhow (by default) is part of the research hypothesis that guided 
the  fieldwork,  which  has  not  been  found  to  be  relevant  in  all  countries.  This  leads  to  the 
configuration of local property relations and differentiated rules of access to land and other natural 
resources, in turn leading to the subordination and poverty of certain groups.  
 
The devolution of powers of natural resource management to local groups has been complicated by 
a parallel process through which the government has been reinstituting the institution of “indirect 
rule” through “community representatives”. This legislation was not submitted to Parliament, but 
was  issued  as  a  decree  from  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The  decree  essentially  reappoints  the 
traditional chiefs as legally recognised representatives of community groups, although it mentions 
that these representatives can also be the Bairro or village secretaries or other leaders “legitimised 
as such by their respective communities”. The decree and the associated regulations contain no 
clear procedures for how this choice of representatives is to be made, except for the provision that 
where a community has “legitimised” both a traditional authority and a “civic” leader (such as a 
Bairro secretary), it is the community that decides who has precedence. Research conducted in 
Zambézia in 2001 revealed that the implementation of the decree was understood rather differently 
by the local authorities who stated that they were “calling all the chiefs in the area to reinstate them” 
(SLSA, 2001). 
 
5.5.3.  SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES                        
In the case of Mozambique, Hanlon (1998) writes that: "Traditional leaders clearly retain power and 
influence  in  many  areas,  and  marriage  and  inheritance  are  often  covered  by  customary  law. 
Practices vary widely throughout Mozambique, but in many areas women are discriminated against 
in terms of land and [other] inherited property. There was a strong move at the time of the end of 
the war in 1992 to pay more attention to traditional leaders and the land commission draft [of the 
new  land  law]  specifically  recognized  ‘customary  systems’.  This  was  criticized  at  the  land 
conference as supporting discriminatory and backwards systems. The Council of Ministers withdrew 
these  references  and  substituted  [them  with]  the  concept  of  ‘local  community’.  This  still  leaves 
space for customary law where it retains a recognized role, but does not enshrine it in law.” 
 
From the point of view of this objective, traditional leadership, based on regional-ethnic criteria, and 
the creation of chasms between national institutions and institutions of local power, could endanger 
the fostering of this citizenship. In addition to being a natural space (that can be characterised 
through agro-ecological data), a territorial area is a social product, and it is necessary to specify 
which  is  the  traditional  unit  of  social  organisation  for  agricultural  production,  as  this  will  have 
repercussions for the management of managing food security and rural development. Genuinely POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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participatory planning should take into account not only important local conceptions of poverty and 
wellbeing, but also those of "space" and spatial organisation. 
 
Traditional authorities in Mozambique have always been present in their communities of origin, 
acting often "undercover" in community life. If anything has contributed to the reinforcement of their 
role, one could point to the fact that the state has not yet managed to provide services to the rural 
areas, schools, hospitals, law and order, and so on. However, even if the state will be able to 
eventually  fulfil  the  role  of  facilitating  development  and  market  mechanisms  to  structure 
commercialisation, it is likely that traditional authority will persist in its capacity of community leader. 
It is an important part of the cultural universe of Africans; the structuring of the personality of an 
individual is in a certain way related to this authority. Thus, it is more likely that the role of traditional 
authority will be rearranged within the social dynamics of community life, with greater, the same, 
minor, or even without contact to the modern state. 
 
NRM and village development committees have become ubiquitous, but their social legitimacy must 
be analysed, as must the way in which their including traditional authority would modify decision-
making mechanisms (and the interface with local government). This inclusion can take place in 
direct or in less direct ways, but should always be accompanied by the provision of flexibility in 
institutional arrangements that can be revised. Committees should not be newly created, but, if 
possible, existing institutions used, and, if necessary, adapted: in many areas a point of "saturation" 
with "artificial" committee structures has been reached (some call it "committee-mania") oblivious to 
farmers’ time constraints. Within the time constraints of development agencies there is a need to 
promote more thorough work on feasibility analyses and longer term investigations, which can also 
take place alongside project activities. 
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6.  POLICY & INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
6.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Mozambique became an independent state in 1975 after an armed struggle waged against the 
Portuguese colonial state that lasted over 10 years. The legacy left to Mozambique at the time was 
characterised  by  extreme  underdevelopment  of  most  rural  areas  and  an  externally  focused 
economy that was dominated by the provision of transport routes, tourism services and migrant 
labour to neighbouring countries in the region. The Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) 
sought to sweep away this legacy by taking command of the economy, setting production quotas for 
all sectors, and running the former colonial farms and plantations as large-scale state enterprises.  
The  ensuing  period,  between  1977  and  1987,  was  an  “intense  but  brief”  phase  of  building  a 
centrally planned economy. As a result of the relative brevity of this period, the rural economy 
remained pretty much in its pre-independence state. Although drastic changes took place in the 
ownership of land (with state farms replacing colonial plantations and settler farms), the conditions 
under which most of the rural population operated remained the same, particularly in relation to the 
relative  importance  to  their  livelihoods  of  off-farm  incomes  and  subsistence  production  (Wuyt, 
2001). 
 
6.2.  RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN CONTEXT 
The legal and policy framework regarding natural resources is still evolving and presents good 
opportunities for strengthening community rights. However, there are some areas of concern; some 
important policy instruments still need to be put in place and the application of these policies and 
regulations  has  major  shortcomings,  in  terms  of  both  of  capacity  and  commitment.  Ongoing 
decentralisation  processes  and  devolution  of  rights  and  responsibilities  to  local  communities  is 
revealing the tensions in Mozambique where land and natural resource policy mixes the powerful 
role of the state with the need to strengthen community rights. Devolution of rights policy is being 
driven more by informal “pilot” and ad hoc approaches than through central-level processes, and in 
fact there are pressures to move in the opposite direction, where powerful interests are involved 
(World Bank, 2003). 
 
The approach taken during the era of central planning, which treated the rural population as a 
homogenous  group  of  subsistence  producers  operating  outside  of  the  cash  economy,  failed  to 
capture the complexity of rural peoples’ livelihoods. Remittances from migrant, seasonal and casual 
labour occupied (and continue to do so) a significant part of the livelihoods of many of the rural 
population, albeit to different extents in different parts of the country. The model of a homogenous 
peasantry  remains  dominant,  however,  in  the  post  central-planning  phase  of  reform  and POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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reconstruction, though it now comprises a mass of “smallholder producers” rather than “subsistence 
producers”. The existence of this homogenous peasantry is largely a fiction; on the contrary, the 
picture is highly heterogeneous. Livelihoods are constructed from various survival strategies and 
diverse forms of “income-gathering” (Tanner, 1996). The difficulty of analysing rural livelihoods, and 
understanding the characteristics of the rural poor and the mechanisms that may be needed to 
improve their conditions, lie precisely in this complexity. 
 
Evidence  from  estimations  shows  how  most  rural  livelihoods  in  Mozambique,  while  highly 
dependent on access to natural resources, are not constructed on the “narrow” use of land for 
cultivation.  It  examines  the  extent  to  which  new  natural  resource  policies  in  Mozambique  have 
taken cognisance of this diversity, and looks at some of the initial evidence of the impact of these 
policies. It advances the proposition that some of the initial gains made from policy developments in 
the land sector, which were cognisant of livelihood diversity amongst the rural poor in Mozambique, 
may now be being rolled back by more narrowly constructed policy narratives in respect of the 
forms of access and rights frameworks of other natural resources and other sector legislation. 
 
6.2.1.  THE VULNERABILITY CONTEXT OF RURAL LIVELIHOODS 
Major changes have occurred in the context in which rural livelihoods have been constructed in 
Mozambique over the past 20 years, many of which have enhanced the vulnerability of the majority 
of the rural population. These changes have impacted upon the natural, physical and social capital 
that  is  available  to  the  rural  poor.  They  include  the  widespread  destruction  of  the  war,  the 
introduction  of  economic  structural  adjustment  policies,  the  advent  of  market  forces  and  a 
liberalised economy at the end of the war, the increasing onset of a severe HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
prolonged periods of drought, and more recently, devastating floods and climatic events. 
 
Smallholder farmers face a range of hazards that pose a threat to their productivity and farm-based 
livelihood strategies. These hazards include declining soil fertility through the practice of slash-and-
burn agriculture. According to MADER (2002), there are significant threats to crops and livestock 
from diseases, insect infestations, weeds and storage pests. Cattle and goats were decimated by 
the war, and as populations recover, there are concerns about the capacity of veterinary support 
services. External shocks such as global commodity price volatility and the continuing shrinkage in 
migrant labour opportunities in South Africa have the potential to significantly reduce rural incomes. 
Other threats include floods and droughts. The areas most vulnerable to drought are those in the 
central  and  southern  parts  of  the  country  (Maputo,  Gaza,  Inhambane,  Northern  Manica  and 
Southern Tete). It is estimated that around 60% of the country has a higher than 30% probability of 
the occurrence of drought. Flood risk affects over 1.7 million hectares at an altitude of less than 20 POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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meters above sea level and within 10 kilometres from the principal hydro-basins. The areas most at 
risk of flooding are those around the Zambezi, Pungue and Buzi rivers, and, to a lesser extent, 
those surrounding the Limpopo and Incomati (MADER, 2002). 
 
Mozambique’s  agricultural  sector  has  suffered  from  several  changes  in  direction  since 
independence, as well as the massive disruption from the war. At the end of the war, the severe 
lack of basic services and rural infrastructure was a binding constraint on agricultural growth. Many 
rural areas with large populations and considerable agricultural potential continue today to have 
extremely  difficult  access  to  the  national  road  network.  The  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
review of the implementation of the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) in 
2003 stated that the “nationwide coverage of transitable highways is still fragile, however, which has 
discouraged private-sector investment and slowed the development of rural markets for agricultural 
inputs and products” (IMF, 2003). 
 
Rural  trading  is  therefore  beset  with  problems  of  transport  availability,  at  costs  that  make 
Mozambican  trading  comparatively  disadvantaged.  A  number  of  studies  have  identified  market 
access and prices as the most important determinants for agricultural production. Physical capital in 
the form of the network of small stores (cantinas) that existed during the colonial period has been 
decimated – these used to offer the option of bartering agricultural produce for consumer goods and 
agricultural  inputs,  and  provided  an  important  bulking-up  function.  They  may  also  have  offered 
small-scale production or consumption credit to local people. Now, many farmers have to travel 
long distances to local markets where their bargaining position is weak. 
 
Since the mid-1990s state farmland was distributed to private enterprises and, to a much lesser 
extent, smallholders. Many of the state-operated farms near to the major population centres were 
occupied during the war by displaced people, often with the permission and encouragement of the 
authorities. These landholdings have been returned to the now-privatised companies that formerly 
operated  them  or  to  new  entrants  to  the  scene,  leading  to  the  loss  of  land,  trees  and  other 
resources that had formed a major part of rural people’s wartime livelihood strategies. Many of the 
companies  have  little  capital  and  investment  potential,  however,  and  the  landholdings  in  many 
cases are being held for speculative rather than productive reasons. 
 
HIV prevalence rates were estimated at 12.2% in 2000, with the highest rates in the central region 
(INE, 2002). The impact over the coming years is likely to increase the vulnerability levels of many 
households, as families are affected by illness. Some families are likely to lose land, or to get much 
less benefit from the land than was assumed. The burden of care for family members who fall ill will POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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largely  be  placed  upon  female  members  of  the  household,  who  are  also  predominantly  those 
involved in agricultural production. Family savings will be consumed and assets sold to help pay for 
medical expenses. Farmland utilisation is likely to decline as the inputs become unaffordable and 
the household labour supply is reduced (Drimie, 2002). Land rights of women may also become 
increasingly  insecure  under  patriarchal  customary  tenure  systems  (which  predominate  in 
Mozambique, despite their nominal unconstitutionality in this respect); widows may be required to 
return to their own families and lose the land that they had access to whilst married. It is noticeable 
that the higher rates of infection also coincide with those areas where there is most competition for 
land; the major international transport corridors and the peri-urban areas (ibid). In addition, AIDS 
has already begun to affect the people working within land and natural resource administrations and 
related institutions, as well as those involved in the supply of essential goods and services or those 
that provide markets. The implications for institutional capacity to carry out functions will be several: 
impacts in terms of productivity, on finances and on human resources (Drimie, 2002). 
 
6.2.2.  PUBLIC POLICY AND NATURAL RESOURCES  
Public policy has long appreciated that access to shared or “common” natural resources is crucial to 
local livelihood strategies. Many of the rural poor depend directly on shared natural resources, yet 
they  often  live  in  ecologically  marginal  areas  and  have  limited  and  insecure  rights  to  natural 
resources. A recurrent question in the rural development debate has been: How are poverty, local 
governance and access to natural resources linked and what are the policy implications of these 
linkages?  A  principal  conclusion  has  been  that  decentralised  natural  resource  management 
regimes will enhance both sustainability and equitable access to natural resources by the poor. 
 
Through local participation and practices such as public meetings, citizens can participate more 
effectively  in  local  decision-making,  gain  experience  in  democratic  processes,  and  hold  local 
officials responsible for their decisions. In short, local development can emerge. Participation, for 
which a case can be made on economic, political, social and cultural grounds, is now considered 
essential  to  the  globalisation  and  modernisation  processes.  It  may  give  greater  voice  and 
representation to citizens, stress local ownership as an effective instrument of implementation, and 
bring greater grassroots-level control over resources and their utilisation. 
 
It is important to realise that, no matter how "parallel" the two institutional setups and the different 
production systems they govern may seem at first glance, some sort of informal articulation and 
communication normally exists between the traditional and modern sphere, often on land matters. 
With the probable exception of land-conflict resolution, for which decision-making is more focused 
and  ultimately  usually  lies  with  only  one  key  authority,  at  all  echelons  there  is  a  multiplicity  of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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decision-making levels that frame traditional institutions. The involvement of traditional community 
leaders brings natural resource claims and conflicts closer to illiterate persons, who rarely dispose 
of the many resources necessary to bring to bear their civil rights over livelihood assets through 
formal government channels and do not understand all the rules and regulations, and the rights and 
duties that come with them. 
 
They may not have any such rights under national statute law, which does not recognise traditional 
usufruct. The village is not usually recognised as a legal entity, yet it is at this level that we find the 
traditional institutions that could sustain genuinely community-based natural resource management 
(NRM). As different worldviews and knowledge systems will run, or flow, into each other under 
decentralisation  and  devolution,  the  dichotomy  that  often  opposes  "indigenous  knowledge"  to 
"modern  science"  is  misleading,  and  the  participatory  evaluation  of  both  would  appear  a 
fundamental  starting  point  when  analysing  the  dynamics  of  adopting  new  technologies,  or  new 
management and decision-making procedures. Arguably, community participation must take into 
account the norms upheld by traditional leaders, which implies that "win-win" scenarios are usually 
rare at any level and that some tradeoffs are unavoidable. 
 
NRM and village development committees have become ubiquitous, but their social legitimacy must 
be analysed, as must the way in which their inclusion of traditional authority would modify decision-
making mechanisms (and the interface with local government). This inclusion can take place in 
direct or in less-direct ways, but should always be accompanied by the provision of flexibility in 
institutional arrangements that can be revised. Committees should not be newly created, but, if 
possible, existing institutions used, and, if necessary, adapted: in many areas a point of "saturation" 
with "artificial" committee structures has been reached (some call it "committee-mania") oblivious to 
farmers’ time constraints. Within the time constraints of development agencies there is a need to 
promote more thorough work on feasibility analyses and longer term investigation, which can also 
take place alongside project activities (MADER, 2004). 
 
The mode of "ownership" will be reflected in local interpretations of, and expectations from, the 
decentralisation process, which should be explored, as they may augur well or not, so that early 
"remedies" can be sought. Since for the time being it remains the most visible manifestation of 
decentralisation at village level, local perceptions are much related to the process of restructuring 
administrative territories as geographical units. Information is provided below on why traditional 
leaders should be involved in the decentralisation and restructuring process. The extent to which 
this  may  be  happening  anyhow  (by  default)  is  part  of  the  research  hypothesis  that  guided  the 
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Empirical evidence from MADER (2004) shows that a variety of different locations suggests that 
rural households do indeed engage in multiple activities and rely on diversified income portfolios. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, a range of 30-50% reliance on non-farm income sources is common; but it may 
reach  80-90%  in  Southern  Africa.  In  South  Asia,  on  average,  roughly  60%  of  rural  household 
income is from non-farm sources; however, this proportion varies widely between, for example, 
landless households and those with access to land for farming. In sub-Saharan Africa, reliance on 
agriculture tends to diminish continuously as income level rises, i.e. the more diverse the income 
portfolio the better-off is the rural household. Elsewhere, a common pattern is for the very poor and 
the comparatively well-off to have the most diverse livelihoods, while the middle ranges of income 
display less diversity. 
 
It is widely agreed that an ability to diversify is beneficial for households at or below the poverty line. 
Having  alternatives  for  income  generation  can  make  the  difference  between  minimally  viable 
livelihoods  and  destitution.  However,  diversification  does  not  have  an  equalising  effect  on  rural 
incomes overall. Better-off families are typically able to diversify in more favourable labour markets 
than poor rural families. Total income and the share of income derived from non-farm sources are 
often positively correlated. Different income sources may have strongly differing impacts on rural 
inequality. For example, unequal land ownership may mean that a policy focus on crop income 
favours the rich above the poor; however, greater access to non-farm wage income would have the 
reverse effect. The conventional wisdom for many years has been that rising output and incomes in 
agriculture itself are the catalyst for diverse non-farm activities in rural areas. However, in sub-
Saharan Africa this has rarely been the case, since most household-level diversification is not just 
non-farm but non-rural in character.  
 
6.2.3.  NATURAL RESOURCE AND LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
Mozambique is essentially an agriculture-based economy. The war resulted in increased pressure 
on land near major towns of the coastal zones and safe rural areas, but out-migration to areas of 
origin has since occurred. With improvements to rural security and the tertiary road network has 
come increasing clearance of land for cultivation. Of the total area cultivated, it is estimated that 
about 90% is under production systems of the so-called “family sector”. The remainder is used by 
other  agents:  agribusiness  firms  (particularly  sugar,  tea  and  cotton)  state/private  joint  ventures, 
cooperatives and private individual farmers. Most agriculture is rain-fed, and in the southern and 
central provinces of Mozambique rain falls erratically and most of it only during a short period of the 
year. 
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The use of natural resources in livelihood strategies is not limited to agriculture and the full-time 
cultivation of land, i.e. the low level of land that is cultivated paints a false picture of the actual area 
that  is  important  to  the  rural  poor.  Other  natural  resources  are  collected,  processed  and/or 
marketed by many families, either as a predominant activity or as part of a diversified portfolio of 
livelihood strategies designed to spread and minimise specific risks. These include resources such 
as bush meat, honey, clay, roots and tubers, medicinal plants, building materials, thatching grass, 
firewood,  and  the  production  of  charcoal  and  salt.  Forests,  in  particular,  provide  a  range  of 
resources central  to  people’s livelihoods.  The  majority  of  the  population  remains  in settlements 
dispersed  widely  throughout  the  country’s  forests.  This  is  in  marked  contrast  to  other  African 
countries,  where  colonial  policy  had  been  to  relocate  people  from  the  forests  to  roadside 
communities. The effect in Mozambique is that a much higher percentage of the population lives in 
isolated forest communities that are directly dependent on access to surrounding forest resources 
and the health of forest ecosystems for survival. Mozambicans rely on woody biomass, for example, 
for nearly 85% of their total energy consumption (IMF, 2003). 
 
6.3.  DECENTRALISED MANAGEMENT AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS 
Mozambique  possesses  extensive  natural  resources  and  a  rich  biodiversity.  Agro-climatic 
conditions allow a variety of crops and multiple land-use systems. Its significant river basins provide 
great potential for improvement to land productivity, through large irrigation and drainage systems. 
The resources are inadequately used, rural income continues to fall, and poverty is increasing. In 
recent years, rapid population growth and declining food production have affected Southern Africa. 
Food security, life expectation and immune systems have been declining, thus rapidly increasing 
the rate of infant mortality. The rural standard of living has been deteriorating year by year. Net 
incomes and livelihoods have been taken away, leading to the adoption of informal systems and 
subsistence  agriculture.  Why?  Does  Decentralised  Natural  Resource  Management  have  the 
potential  to  meet  the  objective  of  empowerment  of  the  poorest  in  all  contexts?  Under  what 
conditions will it work?  
 
In theory, decentralisation should improve resource allocation, efficiency, accountability and equity, 
by linking the costs and benefits of local public services more closely. This coincides with a general 
consensus  among  natural  resource  practitioners  that  centralised  management  has  often  failed 
National governments sometimes have legal authority over vast forest areas that they are unable to 
control. Integrated rural development projects often failed, because they were top-down projects 
that did not take local people’s needs or desires into account. 
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Decentralisation, community rights and sustainable use of natural resources are some of the key 
motifs that organise the development discourse of our times. Local boards functioned as units of 
governance for rural areas with a variety of tasks assigned to them, including, in some provinces, 
the management of land and soil improvement. The genealogy of natural resource management 
paradigms is far more complex than that for decentralised governance. For one, the chronologies of 
management  and/or  regulatory  initiatives  of  different  resources  such  as  forests  and  soil  do  not 
correspond. Secondly, one of the domains for this study – watersheds – includes within it a set of 
different resources (such as land and water, but also sometimes forests and grasses) that need to 
be studied separately. The concept of institutions in many good-governance debates has mostly 
stopped at the level of sub-national authorities (local governments), and rarely does the concept 
extend  sufficiently  to  civil  society  and  grassroots  organisations  and  structures  that  are  the  real 
agents of local governance. In many cases, institutional development has sought to be linked to 
popular  participation  through  local government  structures,  community  development  programmes 
and district planning, before these links are explored. It is important to consider the design of these 
institutional mechanisms and what they were expected to achieve (IMF, 2003). 
 
6.3.1.  RURAL GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 
Good governance does not mean advocating strong states or centralism, but in a market economy 
it means having the state intervene on behalf of the poor (regulatory) and allowing the poor to have 
a voice (devolution). This will lead to enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of public interventions 
by the central government, which is distant from the point where needs are felt and service delivery 
is needed. Local governments know the needs and desires of their constituents better than national 
governments, while at the same time it is easier for constituents to hold local leaders accountable. 
Decentralisation  should  also  promote  democracy  by  “bringing  the  state  closer  to  the  people,” 
increasing  local  participation  and  building  social  capital.  The  goals  of  decentralisation  largely 
coincide with the needs of effective natural resource management. Local people are more likely to 
accurately identify and prioritise their environmental problems.  
 
The key issues in rural development relate to the judicious use and management of the resource 
base on which the rural people depend for their livelihoods. This is to ensure that while present 
economic activities draw dividends from the natural resource base, they do not draw down on the 
natural capital (i.e. the ecosystem goods and services) so that future generations will continue to 
depend on it. As found by Negrão (2002) rural governance plays a vital role in ensuring this. The 
rural  poor will  remain poor  unless  they  are  able  to  produce  surplus  and  sell  it under  the most 
favourable market conditions, or to divert their surplus labour to economic activities that are not 
based on primary resources. Good rural governance should be able to provide services such as POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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timely  market  information  for  producers  to  benefit  from  market  changes,  as  well  as  open  up 
opportunities for a broader based rural economy to diversify livelihood strategies.  
 
The role of rural governance in providing these services remains important, particularly to rural 
communities  that  are  both  physically  and  economically  isolated.  Lack  of  informal  and  formal 
education restricts the capacity of rural people to take advantage of alternative job opportunities. 
The incidence of chronic ill-health due to poor accessibility to and affordability of health services 
and its effect on reducing rural labour productivity has been grossly underestimated (Flores, 2001). 
Recent  experience  from  a  number  of  developing  countries  suggests  that  programmes  of 
decentralisation  accompanied  by  parallel  efforts  to  promote  greater  power  and  autonomy  in 
decision-making  for  local  communities  can  offer  genuine  opportunities  to  improve  outcomes. 
Decisions about the management of natural resources should be delegated to the local authorities – 
a downstream approach.  From the perspective of central governments, the institutional dimensions 
of  decentralisation  often  centre  on  defining  which  formal  governmental  institutions  are  to  be 
involved, and establishing an appropriate legal framework to define relationships between different 
levels of government.  
 
Central governments have not generally sought to define a role for non-governmental institutions. 
Such institutions are often perceived to be technically backward and managerially incompetent, or 
to pose a direct threat to the government through political opposition. From the perspective of rural 
people, however, the institutional situation they confront is likely to be far more complex and varied, 
comprising  a  whole  range  of  central  and  sub-national  governmental  agencies,  parastatal 
organisations, as well as the full complement of non-governmental institutions, such as religious, 
cultural, political, social welfare and economic organisations, all with their own “rules of the game” 
and individual objectives. Institutional capacity plays a central role in any decentralisation process 
(IMF,  2003).  Failure  of  local  governments  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities  provided  by 
decentralisation because of a lack of capacity will result in poor outcomes. Local governments and 
other institutions that cannot adequately administer and account for grants or effectively mobilise 
local resources will find those powers swiftly taken back. Decentralisation of fiscal and investment 
decision-making  from  national  to  provincial  and  local  governments  contributes  to  more  efficient 
decision-making  regarding  investments,  and  to  more  efficient  implementation  of  projects. 
Decentralisation of resource allocation and investment decisions to municipalities and communities 
should  be  accompanied  by  a  clearly  defined  and  well-disseminated  system  of  incentives  and 
penalties to discourage the misuse of funds (RSA, 2000) 
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6.3.2.  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
Under decentralisation reforms, in a sense that all actors are involved at local levels in inclusive 
structures, power is transferred from central government to institutions and actors at lower levels of 
political and /or administrative authority. The rationale behind decentralisation is that these reforms 
foster increased efficiency and equity in development activities. By virtue of their proximity to the 
people they serve, democratic local institutions are likely to have access to better information about 
local conditions and a better understanding of local needs and aspirations, and to be more easily 
held accountable by local populations. Decentralisation does not mean transferring and centralising 
the decision-making process at local level – it implies moving decision-making closer to the people 
and  requires  that  citizens  have  a  voice  and  exit  options  for  local  governance  (political 
decentralisation). In addition, the local governments that are elected should be allowed home rule in 
fiscal, regulatory and administrative matters (fiscal and administrative decentralisation). All of these 
elements  must  be  in  place  to  ensure  effective  decision-making  at  the  local  level.  The  holistic 
approach ensures that all pieces of the puzzle fit together - i.e. the desired balance in autonomy 
and accountability is achieved while providing incentives for cost efficiency. This balance might not 
be achieved under piecemeal reform. 
 
The  choice  of  institutional  setup  for  supporting  Decentralised  Natural  Resource  Management 
(DNRM) should be guided by the administrative systems that national governments have decided to 
put in place for different natural resources. In situations where jurisdiction over a natural resource is 
poorly  defined  and  a  general  devolution  process  is  already  being  implemented,  or  when  the 
resource  is  already  under  local  government  jurisdiction,  the  appropriate  institutional  choice  for 
support is likely to be  devolution. Conversely, if the natural resource is under the domain of a 
politically  strong  line  ministry,  devolution  might  be  politically  infeasible,  which  leaves 
deconcentration/delegation as the most realistic model for actual promotion of DNRM.  
 
Moreover, deconcentration/delegation need not be the final result. It could rather be considered a 
(pragmatic) first step towards devolution of natural resource management. Whether the legitimate 
interests  of,  say,  pastoralists  and  indigenous  peoples,  who  are  local  minorities  or  traditionally 
roam/move through large areas, are served better through devolution or deconcentration/delegation 
of natural resources is an open question, since both models are primarily based on geographically 
defined rather than interest-defined communities. Whichever institutional setup is chosen, special 
provisions  will  probably  be  needed  to  accommodate  the  interests  of  minorities,  seasonal  and 
occasional resource users, as well as public authorities with direct or indirect stakes in the natural 
resource. 
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With  regard  to  the  knowledge  systems’  institutional  settings,  it  was  found  that  institutions  and 
governance policies have a role in creating an attractive climate for private-sector development, 
including institutional reforms needed to generate an enabling environment for local development. It 
was  found  that  poor  governance  and  weak  institutional  capacity  have  resulted  in  poor  policies 
incapable of addressing the challenges of agriculture and rural development, with a major impact in 
terms  of  malfunctioning  and  inefficient  markets  (frail  private  sector,  high  transport  costs,  weak 
information systems, poor regulatory framework).   
 
6.3.3.  DECENTRALISATION INITIATIVES WITH REGARD TO NATURAL RESOURCES 
The decentralisation of natural resource management and the use of local decision-making powers 
are considered critical in improving the revenue-generation capacity of citizens and local authorities. 
Local representative bodies need powers over the resources that affect their sustainable livelihoods 
and economic improvement. Natural resources play a strategic role in rural economies both as a 
potential  source  of  long-term  development  and  as  the  essential  contributor  to  sustained  food 
security. Many rural communities are dependent on natural resources in one way or another.   
 
The devolution of powers of natural resource management to local groups has been complicated by 
a parallel process through which the government has been reinstituting the institution of “indirect 
rule” through “community representatives”. This legislation was not submitted to Parliament, but 
was  issued  as  a  decree  from  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The  decree  essentially  reappoints  the 
traditional chiefs as legally recognised representatives of community groups, although it mentions 
that these representatives can also be the Bairro or village secretaries or other leaders “legitimized 
as such by their respective communities” (IMF, 2003). In the decree and the associated regulations 
there are no clear procedures for how this choice of representative is to be made, except for the 
provision that where a community has “legitimised” both a traditional authority and a “civic” leader 
(such  as  a  Bairro  secretary),  it  is  the  community  that  decides  who  has  precedence.  Research 
conducted in Zambézia in 2001 revealed that the implementation of the decree was understood 
rather differently by the local authorities who stated that they were “calling all the chiefs in the area 
to reinstate them”. 
 
The Land Law contains an article that states that the mechanisms for representation of community 
interests in respect of land-use rights are fixed by law (Article 30); the decree 15/2000 and the 
associated  regulations  therefore  cannot  serve  this  purpose,  since  it  is  not  a  law  but  merely  a 
decree. What remains is a confused situation understood in different ways by different actors. The 
theoretical  and  practical  foundation  of  traditional  authority  is  generally  of  a  symbolic-religious 
nature, and is given legitimacy only by the communities themselves (often finally endorsed through POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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bodies such as the Council of Elders). They are thus "grassroots institutions" that in effect have to 
negotiate  their  power  day-by-day,  and  therefore  embody  a  degree  of  flexibility  that  may  be 
extremely useful for the efficient management of natural resources. The physical closeness to their 
"constituency" allows for the application of a set of rules and norms that will rarely be out of touch 
with the ecological reality and the management and conservation requirements of the resources in 
their territory. In West Africa, for example, in the case of negotiating and managing transmigrant 
cattle corridors, this flexibility is vital if ecological degradation and social conflict are to be avoided. It 
may also ensure that cultural rights are respected within the complex ethnic mosaic of most rural 
societies in Africa, including matrilinear and patrilinear groups. 
 
In  Mozambique,  traditional  chiefs  act  as  mediators  between  a  given  ethnic  group  and  its 
environment, and their relationship to the land is determined by the location of the burial places of 
the ancestors of a given lineage (or tribe). Traditional community leaders are the symbol of an 
intimate alliance with their territory. The primary function of such traditional authorities is to ensure 
peace and harmony in the rural communities within their territory. Thus, a "bad" chief or sheikh 
would be someone not able to ensure this, for example during celebrations when people consume 
alcohol and fights may break out. The main tasks of traditional authorities revolve around mediating 
in land-conflict resolution and regulating access to land. Solutions are normally reached among the 
parties involved, often with the mediation of the respective local lineage chief(s) or sheikh. It is only 
when the latter are unable to reach a verdict acceptable to everyone that the traditional chief or the 
grand  sheikh  (sheikh  daman)  is  approached.  He  or  she  is  acknowledged  to  have  ultimate 
knowledge of the customary geographical boundaries, and will reach a decision in consultation with 
his  or  her  counsellors  (Tanner,  1996).  In  performing  these  services,  traditional  leaders  have 
obligations and duties without any rights. There is no reward for the work they carry out for the 
institutions  of  the  government,  for  organisations  or  companies,  which  occupy  their  time  to  the 
detriment of their fields. 
 
In Mozambique, making land claims before the traditional authorities usually takes the form of oral 
testimony by credible witnesses, and state institutions in charge of land administration are rarely 
approached for conflict resolution, unless one of the parties derives the legitimacy to substantiate 
their claim from modern legislation rather than customary rights and thus stands to gain from their 
involvement. There is in fact a broad (and not necessarily consistent) repertoire of norms and laws 
that  the  shrewder  and  better-informed  individuals  can  draw  upon  and  interpret  to  their  own 
advantage. The resolution of land conflict, therefore, becomes somewhat unpredictable, and the 
involvement of traditional authorities does not a priori guarantee that outcomes favour the aggrieved 
party.  Rather,  results  are  determined  by  a  dialectic  relationship  between  traditional  norms  and POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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individual behaviour, and may be strongly influenced by political considerations. In Mozambique, 
the  vital  role  of  customary  institutions  in  supervising  access  to  land,  particularly  amidst  recent 
waves  of  thousands  of  people  returning  after  1992  with  the  end  of  the  civil  war,  has  been 
documented (Tanner, 1996). 
 
With regard to traditional leadership, the unification of Yemen in 1990 has brought together two very 
diverse sets of government policies. In the Republic of Yemen’s administrative and local power 
structures it is the sheikhs who at village and sub-district level represent both the local population 
and the state. The government administration is only represented by the district chief, two levels 
higher  up,  who  exerts  authority  by  confirming  or  rejecting  the  choices  made  at  the  local  level 
according to customary rules (Mundy, 1995). Traditional leadership includes sheikhs, akels (wise 
men), amins (religious authorities who organise the collection of the zakat Islamic tax), religious 
leaders (hijra or sada), and, related to water management, mukaddams or almudawels (for details, 
see Othman & Messer, 1999). Although households are directly involved in NRM, traditional leaders 
assist  them  in  solving  community-level  problems  related  to  land  disputes,  the  distribution  of 
irrigation water, and the practices of the traditional hema rangeland management and conservation 
system. The influence of such leadership is increasingly re-emerging in Southern Yemen. 
 
Land conflict is not usually inspired by the intent of appropriation, and the notion of private property 
of land is almost unknown. Given the mode of settlement and the numerous marriage ties, non-
autochtonous population groups are not considered “strangers” and enjoy equal rights and duties. 
The Domain and Land Tenure Code CDF) states that land on which customary tenure rights are 
applied has no property value and belongs to the domain of the state, and that the application of 
customary tenure rights is confirmed, as long as the state does not require the land on which these 
are applied. The code affirms that "customary chiefs, who regulate land use on the part of families 
and individuals according to custom, may in no case use their functions to claim other rights over 
the soil other than those resulting from their personal use, in conformity with custom" (Tanner, 
1996). 
 
Throughout the country the political-administrative figure of the political party secretary persists, a 
post that was created after independence in order to carry out party political tasks at local level, but 
also  to  replace  the  traditional  chief  in  his  role  as  a  link  between  the  population  and  the  state 
administration.  At  community  level,  only  the  chiefs  and  not  the  political  secretaries  have  the 
legitimacy to see to traditional matters. Furthermore, in the perception of rural communities, many 
administrative  matters  also  fall  within  the  domain  of  the  traditional  chiefs  because  of  their 
symbolism, such as in the case of land and of conflicts without bloodshed. Throughout the country POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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there persists a coincidence or overlapping between the political secretary and various levels of 
traditional authority in terms of geographical space and political-administrative functions, which are: 
mobilising the population to take part in local development activities; solving minor social disputes 
that arise in "their" areas; notifying and channelling to the competent institutions any problems they 
cannot solve and those outside their sphere of competence; passing on guidelines from the local 
administration to "their" population; involving the population in agricultural production; mobilising the 
population  for  sanitation  work;  opening  landfills  and  building  latrines;  supporting  vaccination 
campaigns; collecting taxes (also a task of régulos); and meeting with the population to listen to 
problems (Tanner, 1996). 
 
The  role  of  the  customary  leadership  as  regards  responsibilities  outside  of  the  conventional 
traditional sphere is thus undefined, due to this overlap and the gap in the existing laws (Lundin & 
Alfane,  1999):  “The  big  chiefs  should  understand  [the  importance]  of  the  role  of  the  traditional 
authorities... to collaborate with them... it is necessary to better understand and know who is the 
authority at local level”. When it comes to a comparative study based mainly on fieldwork in Yemen, 
Mali  and  Mozambique,  the  question  to  ask  is:  Is  there  anything  amongst  these  very  different 
countries  that  can  be  meaningfully  compared  at  all,  and,  in  the  affirmative,  for  what  use?  The 
metaphor used in methodological discussions is often that of “comparing apples and oranges” – or 
can we go to scale, and compare them as “fruit”? This researcher argues the latter, namely that if 
the issues are placed in a context of current policy challenges for rural development, we must not 
shy away from such complex concerns. Rather than the unit of analysis and timeframe, what needs 
to be modified and relaxed is the intent of such a normative output: it cannot pretend to do more 
than give clues and insights, directions for consideration, reflection on the part of policymakers, and 
further action-research for validation and consolidation, for made-to-measure solutions.  
 
6.3.4.  CONSULTATIONS AND PARTICIPATION IN NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
One  of  the  most  important  aspects  introduced  by  the  new  policies  was  that  of  mandatory 
consultation  processes  with  local  community  groups.  These  are  now  necessary  in  every  single 
application  for  natural  resource  rights  in  rural  areas.  The  consultation  process  is  an  important 
opportunity for the establishment of a potential long-term partnership between a local community 
and private-sector investors in rural areas and is of primary importance in reducing the potential for 
later conflict. As a new institution these consultations are beset with myriad problems. In some 
cases they are not taking place at all, or they may be performed in a perfunctory manner. Local 
elites  may  manipulate  the  process.  Local  administrative  structures  may  not  provide  supportive 
guidance. Structural problems exist, such as the inclusion of a mandatory financial “incentive” for 
the  community  group  and  the  lack  of  a  system  for  capturing  the  terms  of  agreements  and POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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monitoring compliance. Further research conducted in Zambézia revealed a high awareness on the 
part of communities of the requirement that they be consulted on new applications for private land-
use  rights  within  their  areas.  However,  they  registered  complaints  regarding  the  quality  of 
consultations that have taken place to date and record that in some instances there are other “local 
structures” that are consulted in their name (Bila & Nhantumbo, 2002). 
 
Even  where  local  administrative  structures  may  take  a  more  neutral  role  in  respect  to  the 
consultations, there is very little acceptance of the need to provide community groups with support 
and information that would assist them in making informed choices in the negotiations. Very rarely, 
if at all, do Provincial Geographic and Cadastral Services (SPGC) representatives who attend the 
consultations come equipped with maps and registers that show the extent of actual and pending 
private landholdings in a community area, and it is in fact rare for even the district administrations to 
have access to this kind of information. Innovative and progressive solutions are not advanced by 
local  state  structures,  which  are  often  looking  for  quick-fix  solutions  rather  than  long-term 
agreements  that  they  will  then  be  required  to  monitor.  Thus,  as  a  report  from  Cabo  Delgado 
province states: “In reality, the new law has not turned out quite as well as planned. While it does 
defend community land rights, it has not produced the close relationships between investors and 
rural communities that its designers envisioned. Instead of contracts spelling out ongoing financial 
relationships between investors and communities, the practice of one-off (compensation) payments 
continues, leaving community members with a short-term flush of cash and long-term loss of their 
lands”.  There  is  also  very  minimal  recording  of  the  nature  and  elements  of  any  longer-term 
agreements  that  may  be  being  made,  making  the  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  these  an 
extremely unlikely scenario in the future. 
 
Bila and Nhantumbo (2002) point out that community consultations in the forestry sector are more 
complex in comparison with those regarding land resources, largely as a result of issues of scale. 
Forest  concessions  can  cover  hundreds  of  thousands  of  hectares  distributed  across  district 
boundaries and covering various administrative posts and dozens of villages. They further note that 
given  the  apparent  complexity  and  variety  of  stakeholders  and  interests  involved  in  such  large 
areas, it would be expected that the consultations would raise a range of issues and expectations. 
However, “the consultation reports of those [concessions] already approved appear very simple and 
are not clear on the methodology used nor the principles used in the [consultations]” and it would 
seem that “the consultations were merely done to obtain a ‘rubber-stamp’ [from the community]” 
(Bila & Nhantumbo, 2002). 
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There  is  in  fact  little  experience  of  consultations  in  forestry  applications,  given  the  fairly  recent 
enactment of the regulations and the fact that most of the existing applications were in fact already 
authorised (despite their nominal illegality). However, concession agreements may proceed without 
operators taking on any meaningful obligations vis-à-vis the affected communities: “Other villagers 
lament that community leaders have negotiated away their forests in exchange for gifts such as a 
bicycle or food. Concessionaires admit that they often arrive in areas to begin harvesting and find 
villagers who have heard nothing of the concession. When problems arise after operations begin, 
such as the inadvertent destruction of crops as a result of tree felling, communities apparently find it 
impossible to speak with people at a level within the company who can make reparations. An oft-
stated view is that the consultation processes act as a powerful disincentive to investment in rural 
areas,  but  it  appears  to  be  rarely  the  case  that  a  community  will  reject  an  application  during 
consultation. Most community groups in fact welcome the potential presence of a new local actor 
with resources and social capital that they do not possess, perceiving this to be a positive impact 
upon local development. 
 
6.3.5.  LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY CONSULTATION 
There is also anecdotal evidence that suggests that the intensive targeting of community groups by 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society campaigns, coupled with the comparative 
lack of a state-driven process of disseminating information, has created a situation in which the 
local  populations’  awareness  of  the  regulatory  framework  is  in  fact  greater  than  that  of  local 
administrative  structures  –  also  at  a  district  level.  This  is  equally  true  within  the  forest  sector. 
Conclusions  from  the  consultation  process  carried  out  also  identified  similar  obstacles:  (1) 
Government agents did not have access to the laws, or the capacity to disseminate information to 
local community groups; (2) Laws had not been translated into local languages; (3) NGOs involved 
in dissemination did not always understand the concepts and principles in the law; and (4) High 
levels of illiteracy were an obstacle to dissemination (Tanner, 1996). 
 
One  of  the  most  important  aspects  introduced  by  the  new  policies  was  that  of  mandatory 
consultation  processes  with  local  community  groups.  These  are  now  necessary  in  every  single 
application  for  natural  resource  rights  in  rural  areas.  The  consultation  process  is  an  important 
opportunity for the establishment of a potential long-term partnership between a local community 
and private-sector investors in rural areas and is of primary importance in reducing the potential for 
later conflict. Further research conducted in Zambézia revealed a high awareness on the part of 
communities of the requirement that they be consulted on new applications for private land-use 
rights within their areas. However, they registered complaints regarding the quality of consultations 
that have taken place to date and record that in some instances there are other “local structures” POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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that are consulted in their name. After the initial land delimitation exercises undertaken in 1999 as 
part of the piloting processes of the Technical Annex, the level of government finance, resources 
and involvement in this area of implementing the new policies has been extremely limited. Most 
land delimitations since this time have in fact been undertaken through off-budget donor-supported 
exercises that have been implemented by various NGOs, with government participation occurring 
as a reimbursed service to these groups. 
 
Indeed,  although  there  was  apparently  considerable  support  for  the  resource  and  funding 
requirements that would be needed to implement and test the new poverty-focused elements of the 
law (not least through PROAGRI) it soon became apparent that the government considered these 
to be of secondary importance and embarked instead upon a drive to attract outside investment and 
to  facilitate  the  allocation  of  private  land-use  rights.  Pro  forma  expenditure  plans  may  include 
allocations for information dissemination and delimitation, but actual expenditure has been minimal 
over the last few years. This has been characterised as “a tendency within the more conventional 
thinking  of  PROAGRI  towards  a  dualist  view  of  ‘family’  sector  (community)  land  use  and  new, 
private sector land needs” (DFID, 1999). 
 
Despite limited government funding for the proactive delimitation of community land, a considerable 
number of delimitations has been completed in various parts of the country, largely through the 
support of NGOs. Information on and monitoring of the implementation of these delimitations has 
been fragmented and partial, notwithstanding the recent DFID-funded appraisal of the land sector, 
which  included  a  specific  review  of  completed  delimitations  throughout  the  country  (CTC 
Consulting, 2003). This review stated that the total of delimited areas now stands at 162; 59 of 
these  have  been  issued  with  certificates  and  24  have  a  full  land  title,  implying  that  they  were 
demarcated rather than delimited. One of the gaps left by the dissolution of the Inter-Ministerial 
Land Commission is a central collection point for the monitoring of the implementation of this aspect 
of  the  new  law,  a  gap  that  has  not  been  filled  by  the  National  Department  of  Geography  and 
Cadastre, which is still battling to provide the country with an efficient and transparent register on 
private landholdings. 
 
In the mid-1990s, the policymakers were keen to highlight the flexibility of the land law and technical 
annex: that the community (as an entity that can register land-use rights) need not necessarily be a 
group  that  pays  allegiance  to  a  traditional  paramount  chief  (régulo)  and  that  the  boundaries  of 
delimited areas need not follow old “traditional” boundaries from the colonial period, nor present-day 
administrative  divisions.  The  “community”  can  choose  its  own  name,  define  its  membership 
according  to  broad  and  flexible  guidelines,  and  appoint  its  own  representatives,  free  of  any POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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stipulations in the law. The challenge of “how to (legally) recognise a group without converting it into 
something  else”  seems  to  have  been  an  important  consideration  in  the  framing  of  the  law.  In 
implementation,  however,  it  appears  that  the  vast  majority  of  delimitations  that  have  been 
completed are being defined along the lines of the old colonial-era regedorias or are defining and 
refining the zones of influence of traditional chiefs and authorities at various levels (Tanner, 1996). 
The  issue  of  scale  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  important  considerations  in  relation  to  the 
effectiveness of delimitation exercises and their actual and potential impact upon livelihoods. In 
general, common property management regimes are predisposed for success when the group of 
users is small and the resources not too extensive. Reasons for this include the low cost of the 
intra-group enforcement of rules, extra-group exclusion, easy detection of problems and infractions, 
better coordination and participation in decision-making. The Mucombwe case had a small group, 
containing  a  population  of  over  600  people,  and  the  area  that  was  delimited  covered  3,000 
hectares. In contrast, some of the delimitations completed in Zambézia have covered very large 
areas of land with considerable populations. Again, this appears to be as a result of the enduring 
nature of the concept of regulados and regedorias. The “entry point” used by the Rural Mutual Help 
Organisation (ORAM) for the delimitation exercises in Zambézia, for example, has tended to be 
through the locality (State) structures and the “recognised” traditional authorities, many of which are 
identified through the use of old colonial-era registers or maps (Norfolk, Nhantumbo & Pereira, 
2003). Well-entrenched notions of administrative and traditional boundaries tend to be the dominant 
defining characteristics of the “community groups”, despite a policy framework that would allow for a 
much wider range of potential associations. 
 
The  extent  to  which  the  process  of  delimiting  community  land  forms  part  of  a  “joined-up” 
implementation approach, which has as an objective the integration of the poor in the social and 
economic development of an area, has also been of concern. Many delimitation processes to date 
have been criticised for having been undertaken in isolation and without a clear vision of how the 
exercise  would  form  part  of  further,  obviously  necessary,  processes  of  local  planning  and 
development. To a certain extent this situation has come about as a result of two main drivers: (i) 
An objective articulated by some NGOs that considered the defensive implementation of the law as 
necessary  in  order  to  secure  and  protect  land  rights  from  outside  encroachment;  and  (ii)  A 
programmatic imperative on the part of some NGOs to deliver on targets set as a result of donor 
agreements. 
 
6.4.  THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES  
Local authorities play a critical role in development. They are composed of different systems and 
segments,  and  define  the  drivers  of  development.  By  looking  at  how  agents,  institutions  and POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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structures  shape  and  are  shaped  by  one  another,  it  becomes  possible  to  engage  with  political 
interests  and  power  relations  and  to  come  to  terms  with  how  political  choices  and  demands 
influence policy outcomes and institutional incentives, rules and patterns. The aim is not merely to 
do routine stakeholder analysis, but to come to an understanding of the processes through which 
interests  are  mediated,  decisions  made  and  resources  allocated.  This  concept  also  offers  and 
requires a longer-term perspective rather than solely a focus on short-term poverty reduction. It 
facilitates  a  more  fundamental  impact  on  patterns  and  directions  of  change.  It  also  holds  the 
potential to sensitise, work with local preoccupations, systematise the timing for initiatives, build 
synergy between pro-poor policies and a broader growth/development/modernisation agenda, and 
engage with wider groups of opinion. 
 
6.4.1.  THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE  
Development literature and concepts are good at identifying what needs to be done to improve the 
lives of the poor in developing countries, but they are not always clear about how to make this 
happen  most  effectively.  The  Drivers  of  Change  (DoC)  approach,  developed  by  the  UK 
Government’s Department for Inernational Development (DFID)
24, is a concept to identify, describe 
and  to  better  understand  the  interaction  between  them  (agents,  institutions  and  structures). 
Typically,  development  agenda  has  sought  to  bring  about  change  through  technically  sound 
programmes, supported in-country by individual champions of reform or change. Increasingly, the 
importance  of  understanding  the  underlying  political  systems  and  the  mechanics  of  pro-poor 
change has been acknowledged. In particular the role of institutions – both formal and informal – 
and underlying structural features is being recognised.  
 
The core point of the DoC approach is that local situations and local history should be the point of 
departure for development and policy change in any given society that has distinguished between 
structures, institutions and agents as drivers of continuity and change:  
(i)  Agents  are  actors,  individuals  and  organisations  that  pursue  particular  sets  of 
interests. Agents refers to individuals and organisations pursuing particular interests, 
including  the  political  elite,  civil  servants,  political  parties,  local  government,  the 
judiciary, the military, faith groups, trade unions, civil society groups, the media, the 
private sector, academics, and donors. 
(ii)  Institutions are frameworks of rules governing the behaviour of agents (i.e. markets, 
cultural  patterns,  legal  and  administrative  frameworks,  and  norms).  Institutions 
include  the  rules  governing  the  behaviour  of  agents,  such  as  political  and  public 
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administration  processes.  They  include  the  informal  as  well  as  formal  rules. 
Institutions are more susceptible than structural features to change in the medium 
term.   
(iii)  Structures refer to the relationships and dynamics underlying the economic, social 
and political fabric of the country and its resource endowments as reflected in the 
distribution of assets, economic processes, social relations, ingrained political legacy 
and form of government. Structural features includes the history of state formation, 
natural and human resources, economic and social structures, demographic change, 
regional  influences  and  integration,  globalisation,  trade  and  investment,  and 
urbanisation. These are deeply embedded and often slow to change.  
 
6.4.2.  ANTHROPOLOGIC AND SOCIOLOGIC PERSPECTIVES 
Scholars of anthropology and sociology have been creative in interpreting political movements and 
in offering conceptualisations for their understanding (Lundin & Alfane, 1999). Local governance 
has  also  followed  from  the  same  process.  Revitalised  local  institutions  have  asserted  the 
supremacy of civilian authority. The process has reinforced the recognition of the traditional system 
as a means of empower local authorities and has allowed people to come together and discuss 
diverse  local  problems  within  the  forums  that  have  drawn  upon  and  strengthened  their  local 
institutions.  Local government units are working in partnership with these traditional structures to 
support the development aspirations articulated by area residents. Working within their traditional 
norms  and  institutions  enables  people  to  understand  and  readily  come  to  terms  with  change. 
Having  the  support  of  technically  qualified  personnel  facilitates  the  capacity-  and  knowledge-
building required for dealing competently with the new tasks of modernisation and development. 
The resulting blend of capacity and legitimacy enables people to participate fully in development 
enterprises, deriving the best possible results in the process. The example of some districts of 
Mozambique  illustrates  how  traditional  institutions  can  be  strengthened  and  redirected  toward 
activities concerned with autonomous self-development and how such constructive engagements 
can be promoted by governments and by non-governmental organisations (Tanner, 1996). 
 
Traditional authorities are informal and local institutions in a given territory. Traditional institutions 
are  important  to  people  in  many  parts  of  the  developing  world  and  especially,  though  not 
exclusively,  among  indigenous  peoples.  Traditional  institutions  such  as  indigenous  cooperation 
groups, councils of elders, and customary laws and mediators are important for resolving disputes, 
enforcing widely agreed standards of behaviour, and uniting people within bonds of community 
solidarity  and  mutual  assistance.  As  such,  they  embody  important  forms  of  social  capital, 
representing forums wherein local communities can unite together and act collectively. Traditional POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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authority includes those who hold local traditional power – the traditional chiefs, the lesser lineage 
chiefs,  the  chiefs  of  social  groups,  those  who  hold  spiritual  power,  the  traditional  doctors,  the 
herbalists, those who know the essential skills for the basic physical survival of the community, 
those who know and can work with the mechanisms of social control, and those who control cultural 
transmission. These powers, skills or tasks can, and usually do, overlap in the person of more than 
one individual (Lundin, 1998). 
 
However, traditional institutions are rarely included within plans of development that are formulated 
for the most part in national capitals. Planners have mostly disregarded the potential for collective 
action that inheres within these institutions, partly because of ignorance and partly also because 
development, which is seen as “modernisation”, is often regarded as antithetical to tradition in any 
form. On their own part, too, leaders of traditional institutions have been reluctant to adapt to new 
concerns. The incursion of modern activities and forms of governance is often seen as challenging 
the prerogatives of these institutions. It is exceptional, thus, to find traditional institutions taking an 
active  role  in  regional  development  activities.  It  is  even  more  unusual  to  see  such  institutions 
working closely in cooperation with technical personnel of government agencies.  
 
Traditional leadership as part of the above-mentioned systems, in its form before external interference, 
operated on the principle of community participation, consultation, consensus, and an acceptable level of 
transparency through the village council or open tribal consultative meetings. These principles are not too 
different from the ones which modern democracies prescribe as essential for democracy! It might serve a 
purpose, therefore, if African countries that are striving to achieve good governance could look with 
renewed focus to the role of traditional leaders, and pay specific attention to the similarities between the 
principles of traditional governance and the aspirations of new democracies the world over (Venson, 
1995:2). 
 
In South Africa, traditional authorities also provide a challenge for new rural councils. The African 
National Congress (ANC) originally took the position that traditional authorities would undermine 
democracy and that this illegitimate institution should be phased out. This position changed as the 
ANC realised that traditional authorities have a strong pull on their constituents – it is estimated that 
traditional authorities have jurisdiction over 18 million people or 40% of the population (Botha, 1994, 
cited  by  Galvin,  1999).  Traditional  authorities  vary  in  their  level  of  local  acceptance  among 
provinces and within provinces, depending on the extent to which they were used by the apartheid 
regime and whether they were ever a part of the local culture. In KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape 
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new  local  government  structures  is  uncertain.  Although  the  White  Paper  has  confirmed  the  ex 
officio status of councils, it is not clear what will really happen (Galvin, 1999). 
 
In Mozambique, the Portuguese colonial administration defined land boundaries and territories for 
their own intents and purposes; at that time many traditional chiefs lost authority over “their” own 
population, while other chiefs gained power over a population over which they had no traditional 
rights. Many of the chiefs became associated with, or new ones were appointed by, the colonial 
regime  under  what  was  in  effect  indirect  rule  to  undertake  a  number  of  jobs  and  functions. 
According to the six-year research project by the Ministry of State Administration (MAE), "(...) after a 
generation this task [of acting as middlemen] came, in the collective unconscious, to form part of 
the  very  nature  of  being  a  traditional  chief,  even  though  this  is  not  the  case"  (MAE,  1996  – 
parenthesis  added).  The  FRELIMO  government  of  post-independence  Mozambique  opted  for  a 
policy  of  exclusion  of  traditional  authorities  from  power,  replacing  them  with  party  secretaries, 
accountable directly to the party leaders in national government. There exists, however, evidence 
that customary institutions were never de facto completely or always without real influence in the 
rural areas, although details on their position and relationships within the social structure are rather 
locality specific (Messer, 1998).  
 
Before  and  during  the  17  years  of  civil  war  that  ravaged  the  country,  the  armed  Mozambican 
National  Resistance  (RENAMO)  took  advantage  of  the  FRELIMO  stance  toward  traditional 
authorities to win them for their cause, collaborating closely with them. Therefore, the degree of 
local  legitimacy  of  traditional  authorities  varies  tremendously,  and  reflects  the  history  of  their 
interaction  with  the  Portuguese  colonial  regime,  and  the  FRELIMO  government  and  RENAMO 
opposition after independence. Colonial territorial divisions that used to be ruled by the traditional 
authorities  were  replaced  by  new  territorial  divisions  with  new  rulers.  In  the  first  two  years  of 
independence,  the  new  local-level  authorities
  who  replaced  traditional  authorities  were  the 
Dynamising Groups (GDs). GDs were popularly elected officials at workplaces in urban and rural 
neighbourhoods. They also existed at the level of circle, village, locality, and district (Hanlon, 1984). 
The formation of GDs constituted a step forward in the construction of rural democratic governance
 
in  relation  to  the  colonial  past.  Contrary  to  the  traditional  authorities,  these  new  officials  were 
elected  directly  by  the  people  they  ruled,  and  their  composition  was  more  inclusive  and  less 
dependent  on  racial,  tribal,  gender  and  age  conditions.  For  instance,  both  black  and  white 
Mozambicans could become members of GDs. A person from one ethnic-linguistic background, 
man or woman, young or old, could integrate GDs in another location, if the electorate had found 
that he/she was best in that position. This was an important departure from colonial times when, POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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under the rule of the traditional authorities, women and the youth were often excluded from the 
decision-making process (Tanner, 1996). 
 
The institution and the role of traditional authorities have changed over time (in some areas from 
the pre-colonial time up until now). As what we find today is the result of past actions, we must go 
back and examine the history of each particular area of the country if we want to understand the 
current dynamics in relation to traditional authorities. For example, where there are disputes of 
power today among traditional authorities, we may be in a position of understanding the origins of 
the dispute with respect to the history of that area. Moreover, the “terminology” related to traditional 
authority varies countrywide and it has changed with the history. This is also a critical aspect to take 
into account while seeking ways of better understanding the issue of traditional authorities. The 
anthropologist  Lundin  (1998)  argued  that  members  of  “African  communities”  in  Mozambique 
perceive the institution of traditional authority “as the true and real representative institution of the 
territoriality”. The role to be played by traditional authorities in the society she characterised is seen 
as “culturally diverse”. This position is that “the meaning and function of ‘traditional authority’ has 
been  transformed  many  times  over  with  changes  in  the  larger  political  contexts  in  which  local 
institutions  have  existed”.  As  consequence  of  that,  an  understanding  of  the  issue  of  traditional 
authorities can only be achieved through a close examination “of its variegated and contentious 
history”, taking into account “local contexts” and “using terminology with greater geographical and 
historical precision”.  
 
6.4.3.  LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS  
The role of customary institutions in supervising access to land, particularly amidst recent waves of 
return migration, has been observed. Under the new land law, passed by parliament in September 
1997, individuals or communities can acquire land rights through occupancy and use of a piece of 
land for a period of at least ten years, or by occupying land according to “customary norms and 
practices”, provided these are not contrary to the constitution. However, “the nature and capacity of 
community-based land management institutions is an issue, as is the question of the articulation 
between customary and formal state authority, at locality and district level” (Quan, 1999). Great 
care is needed to achieve an appropriate balance of respect for traditional authorities and their role 
in  representing  the  interests  of  local  communities,  while  still  aiming  to  redress  grievances  that 
emerge from these same institutions.  For example, in the case of projects promoting individual land 
titling for women in patrilinear societies – without doubt a laudable and often crucial development 
objective in itself – if the project were to end or go awry, these women may no longer be able to 
claim support from their communities, which they would have had under the traditional mode of 
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In  the  two  northern  communities  of  Netia  and  Banga,  in  the  Nampula  and  Tete  provinces 
respectively, the families depend primarily on subsistence agriculture, sale of agricultural products 
(cotton, potatoes) and beer-brewing for food and income. In the southern villages (Massoane and 
Djavanhane in the Maputo and Gaza provinces, respectively) with less and more irregular rainfall, 
and  in  close  proximity  to  South  Africa,  families  depend  more  on  remittances,  off-farm  labour, 
livestock and common property resources, such as wild fruits and the sale of firewood, as well as 
subsistence agriculture. Massoane has particularly severe food security problems largely explained 
by the invasion of elephants in the crop fields. The level of consumption varies greatly within and 
between the four villages. The annual consumption per adult equivalent has been documented as 
US $108 in Djavanhane, US $ 79 in Banga, US $ 72 in Netia and US $ 45 in Massoane (Tanner, 
1996). By consumption quartile, the values range from US $175 for the richest households to US 
$21 for the poorest. The main sources of income for the poorest households are remittances and 
working for others (ganho ganho), as well as the sale of forest products. The poor also reduce 
consumption and seek assistance from relatives and through forms of mutual assistance.  
 
Data  on  participation  in  local  institutions  and  their  perceived  importance  to  households,  as 
presented by Lundin and Alfane (1999), show that the most important local institution, particularly 
for women, is the church, followed by traditional authorities and political parties. In terms of informal 
traditional institutions, Mozambican rural society is replete with different types of local arrangements 
between people of relatively lower and higher economic status. There are many different forms of 
mutual assistance based on social norms of reciprocity. Local institutions have survived a long 
history of repression and civil strife in Mozambique and are now being revitalised under a more 
liberalised regime, and in the absence in rural areas of formal economic and social institutions. 
Local agricultural institutions are relatively ineffective in helping the landless (nearly 36% of the 
sample)  and  marginal  farmers  (30%  of  the  sample)  to  break  out  of  poverty.  Sharecropping  is 
typically practised on unfavourable terms that do not allow the sharecropper to accumulate and 
escape day-to-day survival. This is an instance where local institutions (village dairies) provide a 
means for the poor to take advantage of increased demand for milk resulting from higher incomes 
among the urban and landed rural population since economic reforms initiated in the early 1990s. 
Participation by the poor, especially in dry areas, is nevertheless constrained by limited access to 
fodder to feed their animals. 
 
The government-supported “fair price” shops provide basic foods at subsidised prices under various 
targeting schemes, and are a vital means of covering food deficits for the poor. There are also 
many informal arrangements between the poor and better-off households that enable the poor to 
survive despite extremely precarious livelihoods and low wage rates. These arrangements, rooted POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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in mutual dependency and social norms, include giving domestic work to the poor, making loans of 
cash or food, advancing wages to trusted labourers, providing meals and tea to farm workers, and 
assisting in emergencies (Quan, 1999).  
 
With regard to household participation in local institutions and arrangements with socio-economic 
wellbeing, using local classifications of poverty and wealth, it was found that in general, there are 
few barriers to participation in these institutions, and the poor and women are well represented. An 
exception may be political parties that appeal to the richer families, mainly men (Tanner, 1996). 
Even the fees required for church membership do not appear to present a significant barrier to 
participation of the poor because of options for contributing free labour instead of food or cash. In a 
multivariate  analysis,  higher  levels  of  consumption  were  significantly  correlated  with  land  area 
farmed and literacy of the head of the household, but not with participation in local institutions. 
Further exploration of these institutions in the next section, however, shows their importance for 
social cohesion, food security, and village mobilisation for collective action. All three communities 
have established community enterprises to log and market from their common property resources. 
In economic terms, the enterprises have not prospered as a result of inadequate technology and 
low efficiency, and the few decent jobs created have not been sufficient to reduce out-migration 
from the region. Nevertheless, these enterprises continue to be a vital part of community life. Profits 
are invested in highly valued public goods, roads, water, rural electrification, and cultural-religious 
traditions and fiestas, thus supporting “the continuity of the traditions and political and civic-religious 
structures of the indigenous culture” (Quan, 1999). 
 
6.4.4.  THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES 
Since the Peace Accord in 1992, political events in Mozambique have called into question which 
type of policies to adopt vis-à-vis traditional authorities. Under economic liberalisation policies, the 
latter will be conceded more latitude as the state continues to withdraw many of its former support 
structures from rural areas; furthermore, decentralisation may provide a new window of opportunity 
for “bottom-up” sustainable development. Laws 5/78, 6/78 and 7/78, of 22 April 1978, replaced the 
colonial administrative structure and introduced a system of governance resting on three levels: 
national, provincial and local (cities and districts). By 1983 it was publicly and officially recognised 
that the administrative system was excessively centralised (Guambe 1998). Thus, in 1987, further 
steps towards decentralisation were taken, and on 13 September 1994 Law 3/94 established the 
Local Government Reform Programme of municipal administration. This programme, encoded in 
the  lei  dos  municípios,  includes  the  principle  of  “respect  for,  and  collaboration  with,  traditional 
authorities”, which was kept expressly minimal and loose, to allow for flexibility to adapt to the 
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The theoretical and practical foundation of traditional authority is of a symbolic-religious nature, and 
is ultimately given legitimacy only by the communities themselves (endorsed through councils of 
elders). They are thus “grassroots institutions” that in effect have to negotiate their power day-by-
day, and therefore embody a degree of flexibility that may be extremely useful for the efficient 
management of natural resources. The physical closeness to their “constituency” allows for the 
application of a set of rules and norms that will rarely be out of touch with the ecological reality and 
the management and conservation requirements of the natural resources in their territory. In West 
Africa, experience with the “gestion des terroirs” approach has shown that, for example in the case 
of  managing  and  negotiating  transmigrants’  cattle  corridors,  this  flexibility  is  vital  if  ecological 
degradation and social conflict are to be avoided. It may also ensure that cultural rights and local 
self-determination  are  respected  within  the  complex  ethnic  mosaic  of  Mozambican  society, 
including, for example, matrilinear and patrilinear groups (Quan, 1999). 
 
Traditional chiefs have legitimacy, on religious and lineage grounds, as mediators between a given 
ethnic group and its environment. The primary function of traditional authorities is to ensure peace 
and harmony in the rural communities within their territory (território). Thus, a “bad” chief would be 
someone not able to ensure this, for example during celebrations when people consume alcohol 
and fights break out. Mediating in land-conflict resolution and regulating access to land are thus the 
main  tasks  of  traditional  authorities.  Most  of  the  time  solutions  are  reached  among  the  parties 
involved, often with the mediation of the respective local lineage chief(s). Only when the latter are 
unable to reach a verdict acceptable to everyone is the traditional chief approached. He or she is 
acknowledged  to  have  ultimate  knowledge  of  the  customary  geographical  boundaries,  and  will 
reach a decision in consultation with his or her counsellors (Bourdieu 1977).  
 
State  institutions  charged  with  land  administration  are  rarely  approached  for  conflict  resolution 
(Mucussete, 1996), unless one of the parties stands to gain from their involvement, as when they 
derive legitimacy to substantiate their claim from modern legislation rather than customary rights. 
There is in fact a broad (and not necessarily consistent) repertoire of norms and laws that the more 
shrewd individuals can draw upon and interpret to their own advantage. The resolution of land 
conflicts,  therefore,  becomes  somewhat  unpredictable,  and  the  involvement  of  the  traditional 
authorities does not guarantee that outcomes favour the poor. Rather, results are determined by a 
dialectic  relationship  between  traditional  norms  and  individual  behaviour,  and  may  be  strongly 
influenced by political considerations. Switching legal arena to influence the outcome of disputes is 
an opportunity that is more difficult to seize for the poor than it is for better-off and informed rural 
households (Quan, 1999). 
 POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  206 
In practice, the actions of party secretaries and traditional authorities continue to coincide, and 
include, amongst others, the task of teaching agricultural production techniques. In many areas 
(e.g.  Banga  and  Djavula)  the  former  have  disappeared  altogether.  Traditional  authorities  also 
contribute significantly to the maintenance of social capital, for example by mediating accusations of 
witchcraft (in northern Mozambique: ufiti) and other similar conflicts. Such accusations are frequent 
and occur from the bottom to the top of the social hierarchy, from the poor to the rich. This implies 
that individual accumulation of wealth takes place within the texture of both vertical and horizontal 
solidarity bonds in a given community. Therefore, as a result of witchcraft accusations, the accused 
will be exhorted by the traditional authority or some other form thereof (e.g. a local tribunal), to allow 
for some redistribution of their economic wealth, either through the networks of mutual assistance 
(ayuda mutua), or, more indirectly, by paying for healthcare, school fees, funerals, marriages, etc. 
This type of “transfer” is also sought in relations with the state. For example, a widow in Banga 
(Tsangano district, Tete province) in charge of five children solicited the help of the local chief 
(nyakwawa)  to  approach  the  local  administrator  (chefe  do  posto)  to  be  exempted  from  paying 
school fees. The administrator rejected her case with the justification that her children were young 
and healthy, and therefore they could open up fields (machambas) and cultivate them to pay for the 
fees. This example shows that for the most marginalised segments of rural society, traditional chiefs 
remain an important “interface” with local government officials to enlist certain types of services and 
support (Lundin & Alfane, 1999).   
 
In  lineage-based  hierarchical  societies,  mechanisms  for  redistribution  are  an  expression  of  the 
moral obligations of the more senior members of the community who are in charge of ensuring 
social  and  spiritual  reproduction,  as  well  as  its  more  junior  members  in  charge  of  ensuring 
economic welfare through adequate levels of agricultural production and trade. These mechanisms 
are essentially networks of mutual support and solidarity, as well as clientelistic relations among 
kinship groups of unequal social status. The historical power relations and priority rights of some 
lineages are largely the consequence of who occupied the land first; the descendants of the first to 
settle and open up fields will claim superior social status, as will those who are members of a 
lineage that came to dominate others through battle and conquest. Dominance and privileges of 
one  particular  lineage and  clan,  therefore,  have  their  roots  in  the  ancestral  domain,  legitimised 
through  religious  ideology  and  ritual  by  means  of  the  symbolic  capital  embodied  in  traditional 
authorities  (Bourdieu,  1977).  This  leads  to  the  configuration  of  local  property  relations  and 
differentiated  rules  of  access  to  land  and  other  natural  resources,  in  turn  leading  to  the 
subordination and poverty of certain clans. 
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6.4.5.  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE ORGANS AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
There are a variety of actors at the local level that pursue the same agenda as traditional leaders. 
These are structures such as the consultative councils, women’s groups, youth groups, etc. While 
often  targeting  the  same  group  of  people,  it  is  rare  to  find  these  structures  in  constant 
communication with one another in the new dispensation. Traditional leaders were going about their 
daily functions just as they had done in the past; however, their practices often affronted the post-
1994  constitutional  ethos.  After  the  2007  floods  for  example,  the  government  recognised  that 
traditional authorities played an important role. The way in which traditional authorities are seen by 
the  government  and  other  organisations  working  at  local  level  has  undergone  a  small  positive 
change.  In  many  administrative  posts,  traditional  authorities  are  now  invited  to  attend  monthly 
meetings  where  they  are  encouraged  to  report  to  the  head  of  administration  on  problems  and 
progress in their area of jurisdiction. The problem they report most frequently is hunger.  
 
There is concern among many people that the institution of traditional leadership is so inherently 
undemocratic that it simply does not have a place in an open democratic society. In support of this 
view, those against traditional leadership point to the hereditary nature of traditional leadership, the 
lack  of  representation  of  youth  and  women,  as  well  as  the  unconstitutionality  of  some  of  the 
practices and sentences in the traditional court. Indeed, there is a great deal to take issue with in 
the institution of traditional leadership. As we have seen from the Mokopane case, some of the 
procedural aspects can be faulted for unjustifiably infringing on the rights of the disputants. Yet 
there seems to be more positive than negative aspects about the chief’s court, and criticism levelled 
against the traditional court should therefore be balanced against the need not to disregard the 
immense contribution that the institution makes to governance. This kind of reasoning should inform 
the approach to the democratisation of the institution of traditional leadership, and efforts to bring it 
in line with the constitution (Bourdieu, 1977). 
 
A disturbing factor is that many traditional leaders see their authority as diminishing. For example, 
some  traditional  leaders  have  stated  that  young  members  of  traditional  communities  do  not 
recognise traditional leaders. As one traditional leader put it: “There cannot be control, because 
these days we have ‘setshaba ka gare ga setshaba’ (a community within another community).” He 
cited the example of people who are aligned to civics and prefer civic leaders to traditional leaders. 
Many traditional leaders state that they are frustrated because they are powerless when it comes to 
ruling people who stay within the area of their jurisdiction. For instance, if one member of that 
community comes to the traditional leader and lays a complaint against another, the traditional 
leader cannot do anything more than request such a person to come to his office. Should this 
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overcome by a legal provision making it an offence to refuse to attend when called by a traditional 
leader. This could be restricted to issues of immediate concern to traditional leaders, so that when 
approached by individual members of the community, he/she will be able to give informed advice, 
take appropriate steps and/or refer the individual member to the relevant place for assistance. It is 
crucial for traditional leaders to be reasonably informed, as members of the community frequently 
approach them for advice. 
 
For instance, traditional leaders are aware that corporal punishment is no longer permissible, but 
are at a loss as to how to deal with cases that in the past would have been dealt with through 
corporal punishment. As another example, traditional leaders are conscious of the fact they are no 
longer at liberty to order the resettlement of any person from the community when they do not 
comply with the community’s mores and regulations. Traditional leaders express this as the doom 
visited upon communities by “ditokelo” (rights). While this uncertainty among traditional leaders is 
understandable in many respects, it appears to be founded on many misconceptions, as well as the 
actions  of  opportunistic  individuals  in  communities  who  hold  traditional  leaders  to  ransom.  For 
instance, a shebeen (liquor-selling establishment) owner who sells liquor throughout the night and 
plays loud music within a residential area is for all intents and purposes breaking the law. Firstly, 
the  illegal  sale  of  liquor  by  such  a  person  constitutes  an  offence,  and  secondly,  if  licensed, 
remaining open throughout the night and playing loud music in all likelihood constitutes a violation 
of the licence conditions. 
 
The community, therefore, has a right to act against such a person. A traditional leader becomes an 
embodiment of the community; members of the community affected by a problem will therefore 
approach the traditional leader to seek relief. Unfortunately, the shebeen owner in this example may 
wave the constitution at the traditional leader and say that he/she has the right to earn a living.  
Comfortingly, after an inexplicable de facto marginalisation of traditional leaders, there seems to be 
a  growing  willingness  to  accommodate  them  (Bourdieu,  1977).  This  willingness  is  matched  by 
eagerness  on  the  part  of  traditional  leaders  to  be  fully  integrated  into  the  current  order.  The 
appropriate question to ask in dealing with traditional leadership is: How do we integrate them into 
“the mainstream” as opposed to “should we integrate them?” (Negrão, 2002). Traditional leaders 
are at the centre of development in rural areas and then the role of traditional leadership cannot be 
ignored. This is a role they have always played, as demonstrated by traditional leaders facilitating 
the building and maintenance of schools and clinics within their respective traditional authorities and 
representing the local communities. This representation should provide the necessary checks and 
balances to deal with suspicions that some traditional leaders and their courts are biased. Such 
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Equally so, traditional leaders have a responsibility to perform safety and security duties, as well as 
the administration of justice. Both structures are based at the local level of government and are 
relatively accessible. At the same time, both are represented at provincial and national government 
levels.  Traditional  leaders  and  local  municipalities,  therefore,  stand  to  contribute  significantly  to 
crime prevention. It is with the above in mind that it is recommended that local municipalities, in 
close consultation with traditional leaders – if not working together on the project as equal partners 
–  should  develop  a  comprehensive  crime-prevention  strategy  in  line  with  the  provisions  of  the 
national  and  provincial  crime-prevention  strategies.  The  obvious  advantage  of  such  a  locally 
engineered  crime-prevention  strategy  is  that  it  will  be  relevant  to  local  needs  and  priorities. 
Furthermore, the proximity of local municipalities and traditional leaders to traditional communities 
puts them in a good position to understand the socio-economic dimensions that may be contributing 
to  crime  in  that  particular  locality.  While  other  role  players,  such  as  the  provincial  department 
responsible  for  safety  and  security,  remain  important,  their  role  should  be  to  facilitate  and/or 
complement initiatives and programmes led by municipalities and traditional leaders. 
 
It is clear that traditional leadership as an institution will remain part of the post-1994 dispensation. 
It is also evident, from this monograph, that traditional leaders have not been integrated into the 
major crime-prevention policies of the country. For their mere indispensability, there is a need to 
reconcile the political and the institutional decentralisation process with public-sector management 
reform. The role and importance of civil servants at sub-national levels of government must be 
considered. A general observation may be made in this regard (Bourdieu, 1977): Decentralisation of 
the  public  service  (administrative  decentralisation)  should  take  place  in  concert  with  political 
decentralisation.  The  absence  of  decentralisation,  or  only  partial  decentralisation  of  the  public 
service,  may  compromise  the  links  between  that  public  service  and  its  corresponding  political 
structures on the same horizon or tier of government (Quan, 1999). This may result, for example, in 
a public service that is only incompletely accountable to the political authorities on that tier; or it may 
require the corresponding political authorities to bear a level of responsibility for the performance of 
the  public  service  that  is  inconsistent  with  the  actual  authority  and  control  that  these  political 
authorities enjoy.  A  permutation  of  this  consideration  exists  in  South  Africa,  in which  provincial 
public  servants  are  formally  in  the  employ  of  a  single  national  public  service,  and  in  which 
remuneration levels and employment conditions are negotiated between public service unions and 
the  central  government.  This  has  compromised  the  ability  of  provinces  to  manage  their  large 
workforces, or to take into account specific regional conditions (Bourdieu, 1977).  
 
It appears that the role of kings in land administration was more visible after a conquest of a certain 
territory or at the period of organisation and reorganisation of the kingdom. In such cases, it was the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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king who divided his kingdom into chieftaincies ruled by his relatives. In this way, the king allocated 
and distributed land rights to his relatives who would also allocate and distribute land rights to other 
people under their jurisdiction in name of the king (Quan, 1999). The king also intervened in cases 
of land disputes involving his kingdoms’ chieftaincies and those chieftaincies of other neighbouring 
kingdoms, because all land of the kingdom belonged to him. Although continuing allocating and 
distributing land for their subjects, traditional authorities had lost much of their power deriving from 
customary  law  and  practices,  because  their  decisions  regarding  land  could  be  revoked  by  the 
colonial administration. If a certain area of land under the jurisdiction of a traditional authority figure 
was required to be allocated to Portuguese interests, the traditional authority’s opposition to the 
granting of that land could be disrespected (Sachs & Welch, 1990).  
 
Policymakers  in  Mozambique  realise  the  importance  of  making  decentralisation,  and  the 
implementation  of  the  new  land  law,  as  participatory  and  transparent  as  possible,  creating  an 
enabling environment to tap social capital for local development efforts. “(...) Land policy issues 
raise fundamental questions of rural governance, and the law itself requires further legislation to 
clarify  exactly  how  rural  communities  can  hold  land,  women's  land  rights,  and  the  roles  of  the 
various  forms  of  customary  authority  in  Mozambique”  (Quan,  1999).  Following  the  MAE  (1996) 
research project, the government is currently giving more thought to what the articulation between 
traditional authorities and the state could look like. For the time being, no legislation exists that 
addresses this important issue directly, and the only law (2/97) mentioning traditional authority at all 
pertains to urban settings.  
 
6.4.6.  REVITALISING TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
In many countries, traditional leaders also continue to play a critical role in controlling access to 
land. This is obviously of central concern to the majority of Africans who still rely directly on their 
land  for  survival,  as  well  as  to  many  urban  Africans  who  continue  to  maintain  roots  in  rural 
communities, in part by retaining access to a piece of land – the closest many have to an insurance 
policy or pension plan. Management of the continent’s land resources has long been a controversial 
topic. On the one hand, many economists have called for massive and immediate privatisation of 
ownership  in  order  to  rationalise  investment  in  agriculture.  Others  argue  that  traditional  tenure 
systems, usually managed by local chiefs, may be better aligned with African cultural and social 
norms, and more protective of the most vulnerable in rural communities. A number of studies have 
suggested that even where privatisation has been introduced, many communities have, to varying 
degrees,  ignored  or  circumvented  modern  tenure  systems  and  continued  to  rely  on  traditional 
tenure norms. 
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An effective meld between traditional institutions and technical agencies of the government was 
achieved in the project implemented in the Cordillera Administrative Region of the Philippines that 
had ancestral land demarcation and regional development as its objectives. Traditional institutions 
had remained alive in this region, enabling people to cope with centuries of exploitation at the 
hands  of  a  distant  and  unsympathetic  state  (Quan,  1999).  After  the  laws  of  the  country  were 
amended and indigenous people were given rights of self-determination over all natural resources 
within their ancestral domains, the same traditional institutions were called upon to enforce these 
rights. It is not easy to forge such understandings and working arrangements between traditional 
institutions and government agencies (O’Laughlin, 2001).  
 
Working with traditional institutions, each community team gathered documentary proof on land 
ownership. While  results  differ  from  place  to place,  on  the  whole  these  initiatives  have  worked 
everywhere  to  improve  the  functional  interplay  between  national  law  and  local  custom. 
Considerable  gains  have  been  reported  from  various  project  locations.  Communities  within  the 
municipalities  have  started  implementing  their  resource  management  plans  and  are  mobilising 
external support for undertaking projects that have been identified (Quan, 1999). Alternative models 
of development have emerged as people of different origins have asserted their separate visions for 
the future. Several communities have influenced the government to grant permits for micro-scale 
instead  of  large-scale  mining,  and  for  micro-hydroelectric  and  irrigation  projects  within  their 
ancestral  domain  area.  They  have  also  proposed  tramlines  for  transportation  in  place  of  road 
construction through fragile forests. They are planning to institute a programme of education and 
training that allows such concerns to be addressed amongst themselves and with a larger group of 
area residents (O’Laughlin, 2001). 
 
There are several reasons why traditional authorities remained marginalised despite evidence that 
they were operating in other parts of the country. Firstly, in some areas of Mozambique, especially 
in urban and urban-like settings but also in rural areas, there were structures elected from 1975 
onwards  (secretaries  of  the  village,  ward/bairro  or  circle)  that  worked  with  the  people  after 
independence and during the war. Some of these elected structures enjoyed the sympathy of the 
local populations. Another example of changing customary law and practices comes from cotton-
cultivation areas of Northern Mozambique. In these areas, patrilineal systems of land tenure were 
imposed and enforced by colonialists and traditional authorities, to people governed by a matrilineal 
land  tenure  system  (O’Laughlin,  2001).  The  majority  of  traditional  authorities  were  appointed 
according to hereditary laws of succession, but they were also dependent on confirmation by the 
colonial government. With regard to heads of groups of villages, they were also appointed following 
customary laws of succession, but depended on the approval of the colonial administrators for their POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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coronation. This means that a traditional authority appointed according to the customary law of 
succession  could  not  be  coroneted  by  the  Portuguese  if  they  judged  him  not  capable  of 
representing their interests. In the course of their duties, traditional authorities had to meet all the 
demands of the colonialists to maintain their positions. These demands included the collection of 
taxes and the recruitment of their subjects for forced labour (O’Laughlin, 2001). 
 
Such  action  was  likely  to  bring  social  tensions  and  endanger  the  government’s  support.  Even 
without  formal  status,  in  some  areas  traditional  authorities  were  disputing  power  with  elected 
structures.
 The government might have been seeking a strategic solution that it hoped might not 
worsen the current situation. The Land Law (Law no. 19/97) was drafted after a long period of 
consultation  and  debate  (Tanner,  2002).
  It  recognised  the  allocation  and  distribution  of  land 
according  to  customary  systems  of  land  tenure  available  in  the  country.  As  under  customary 
systems of land tenure, land allocation and distribution is effected by the lineage heads. The land 
law of 1997 evidently recognised the role of traditional authorities, particularly lineage heads, in 
land-allocation issues. In fact, what the land law of 1997 did was to formalise what was happening 
in  practice on  the  ground.  As  argued  in  Chapter  3,  in  many  rural  areas  the  heads  of lineages 
continued  distributing  land  under  their  control  to  members  of  their  families.  All  the  roles  of  the 
traditional authorities on land, which are covered by the customary systems and are not against the 
constitution, were recognised by the Land Law of 1997.  
 
However,  the  Land  Law  did  not  exclude  post-independence  authorities  from  land  allocation. 
According to the Land Law and its regulations (Decree no. 66/98) the formal way of land allocation 
is as follows: A person seeking to acquire land in the rural area contacts theSPGC or the district 
representation and then registers that intention (Tanner, 2002). The SPGC will verify within the 
Cadastre Atlas whether there is a record of occupation in the area in question. If there is no such 
record, the process will proceed and a formal application will be opened, depending on the local 
context of the area where land is being requested, under the formal process. Traditional leaders 
deal with matters relating to every aspect of life within the traditional community. It is this elasticity 
that puts traditional leaders in a position to interact with every state department, as well as NGOs 
and  community-based  organisations  (CBOs).  This  is  a  potential  role  identified  by  Decree  no. 
15/2000. 
 
This Decree introduced the concept of the community authorities (autoridades comunitárias), which 
it defines as traditional chiefs, secretaries of ward (bairro) or village, and other leaders legitimised 
as such by respective local communities.
 The introduction of this concept allows the government to 
recognise  traditional  authorities  while  at  the  same  time  maintaining  the  post-independence POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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structures.  As  already  stated,  beyond  traditional  authorities  there  are  ward  (bairro)  and  village 
secretaries elected during the 1970s and later who continue to exist and to work (Tanner, 2002). 
The framework of this Decree is highly influenced by Lundin’s (1998) approach. In respect of the 
means of legitimising the traditional authorities, the regulations of Decree no. 15/2000 state that it 
will  be  done  according  to  “the  rules  of  the  specific  community”.
  The  government  gave  to  the 
community the freedom to decide on this according to local custom and practices. With regard to 
the hierarchy between community authorities, the regulations point out that if in a community a 
traditional chief and a bairro
 or village secretary are legitimised, it will be the respective community 
defining the level of hierarchy between them.
 It is one of them who will represent the community 
before  the  government.
  However,  the  regulations  do  not  clarify  how  the  community  will  define 
hierarchies. Decree no. 15/2000 provides a set of rights that community authorities on duty will 
enjoy: i) To be recognised and respected as representatives of the respective local communities; ii) 
To be able to use symbols of the Republic; iii) To participate in official ceremonies locally organised 
by state administrative authorities; and iv) To wear a uniform or personal badge. 
 
Under Decree no. 15/2000, areas of articulation of local state organs and community authorities 
include land use.  Its regulations set fourteen main duties of traditional chiefs and secretaries of 
villages or bairros. However, it is silent on defining the precise roles of traditional authorities on land 
allocation and distribution. Even regarding duties that were indicated, there is an overlap between 
what traditional authorities will do and what community authorities will perform. This overlapping 
and lack of clarity is leading to confusion. In respect of land, who will have the role of allocating land 
– traditional authorities or elected structures? For example, if an individual migrates to a certain 
territory where there are recognised traditional authorities and elected structures, who may he/she 
approach  to  acquire  land?  Shall  he/she  go  to  traditional  authorities  or  elected  structures?  The 
Decree and its regulations did not make these issues clear. It is still too early to analyse whether 
there has been change in land-distribution procedures in the community as a result of the formal 
recognition  of  traditional  authorities,  because  that  recognition  took  place  only  two  years  ago 
(Tanner, 2002). The heads of the lineages continue distributing land that they control as in colonial 
and  pre-colonial  periods.  However,  control  of  land  allocation  for  outsiders  at  the  time  of  doing 
fieldwork for this study was still in the hands of the post-independence local-level authorities.  
 
6.5.  THE NEW RURAL DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM 
The modernisation paradigm, which for many decades dominated agricultural practices, policies 
and science, is gradually being replaced by a rural development paradigm. The emerging rural 
development paradigm calls for, amongst other things, a new approach to policymaking, steering 
and control – in other words, for a new approach to rural governance. The need for new forms of POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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rural  governance  is  embedded  in  current  political  and  scientific  debates  on  shifts  in  multilevel 
governance that occur in a variety of socio-economic domains.  
 
The notion of endogenous development, as suggested by Bassand, Brugger, Bryden, Friedman 
and Stuckey (1986), has been put forward in opposition to traditional understanding, or in other 
words the ‘modernist’ notion of development – this defines the new inclusive rural development 
paradigm.  Endogenous  development  is  understood  as  the  hypothesis  that  improvements  in  the 
socio-economic wellbeing of disadvantaged areas can best be brought about by recognising and 
animating  the  collective  resources  of  the  territory  itself.  According  to  Brugger  (1986)  “the  new 
meaning of development, that is, qualitative and structural indicators, and not just quantitative and 
monetary measures, are used as criteria… [and] cultural, social, political, and ecological values as 
well as social costs and long term effects are combined” for endogenous development (cited in 
Bassand et al., 1986:39). 
 
This concept as a development approach was created as an alternative to the practice of central 
authorities in designing interventions that deal with sectors of social and economic life in isolation 
from each other and/or which assume that socio-economic problems can be solved by standard 
measures, regardless of location or culture. Here the emphasis has been very much upon what 
areas can do for them, and support and assistance has been geared towards the enablement of 
local economic growth  (OECD 1996/2).  According to Lowe, Ray, Ward, Wood and Woodward 
(1998) the basic characteristics of the endogenous model of rural development are as follows: (i) 
Key principle – the specific resources of an area (natural, human and cultural) hold the key to its 
sustainable development; (ii) Dynamic force – local initiative and enterprise; (iii) Function of rural 
areas  –  diverse  service  economies;  and  (iv)  Major  rural  development  problems  –  the  limited 
capacity of areas and social groups to participate in economic and development activity. 
 
 
6.5.1.  THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS 
Understanding  institutional  processes  allows  for  the  identification  of  restrictions/barriers  and 
opportunities  (or  “gateways”)  to  sustainable  livelihoods.  Since  formal  and  informal  institutions 
(ranging  from  tenure  regimes  and  labour-sharing  systems,  to  market  networks  or  credit 
arrangements)  mediate  access  to  livelihood  resources  and  in  turn  affect  the  composition  of 
portfolios of livelihood strategies, an understanding of institutions and organisations is therefore key 
to designing interventions that improve sustainable livelihood outcomes. Most previous approaches 
to looking at rural livelihoods have only cursorily asked these questions (Tanner, 2002). In part, this 
has  been  a  disciplinary  bias  whereby  economic  analysis  has  concentrated  on  exploring  the 
quantitative relationships between measurable variables. For example, the agricultural economics POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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and related literature has many examples of detailed analysis of the relationships between, for 
instance, economic assets, indicators of agricultural intensification, and poverty levels. This remains 
important, and is a significant component of work on sustainable livelihoods. 
 
The “new rural paradigm” requires a change in the policy infrastructure conception and efficient 
implementation mechanisms, and a movement away from the traditional hierarchical administrative 
structures  and  institutional  arrangements.  Designing  rural  development  policy  for  different 
communities  involves  pooling  the  knowledge  held  by  multiple  actors  and  increasing  the  use  of 
partnerships  between  the  public,  private  and  voluntary  sectors.  There  is  a  focus  on  local 
specificities  as  a  means  of  generating  new  competitive  advantages,  such  as  amenities 
(environmental or cultural) or local products (traditional), as well as more attention to quasi-public 
goods  or  “framework  conditions”  that  support  enterprise  indirectly.  It  requires  coordination  to 
encourage  the  various  institutional  and  managerial  systems  that  formulate  and  implement  rural 
policy to work together, and political commitment to overcome sectoral tendencies. Integrated rural 
policies work – the place-based approach helps foster local level public-private partnerships and 
integrate new stakeholders and resources (Tanner, 2002). These initiatives are developing a culture 
of cross-sectoral cooperation within central and local governments and thus more coherent policy 
initiatives.  More  importantly,  there  is  recognition  that  a  place-based  approach  requires  more 
bottom-up as opposed to top-down initiatives. This produces new ways of coordinating vertically 
across levels of government, and a better use of local knowledge. 
 
6.5.2.  PLANNING FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS 
Planning and implementing a sustainable livelihoods approach is therefore necessarily iterative and 
dynamic.  A  simple  framework,  such  as  the  one  presented  here,  combined  with  the  integrative 
analysis  derived  from  participatory  field-level  analysis,  may  help  in  this  challenging  process  by 
highlighting  key  issues,  questions  and  contradictions,  as  well  as  pointing  towards  areas  where 
actions  may  proceed  and  common  goals  can  be  achieved.  Planning  for  what  combination  of 
interventions is most appropriate in a particular site presents some major challenges. For a start, 
defining  what  a  sustainable  livelihood  is  in  a  particular  context  is  always  open  to  debate.  As 
discussed earlier, the sustainable livelihood definition encompasses a range of different criteria, 
some  of  which  may  conflict.  “Sustainable  livelihoods”  is  thus  a  normative  concept  made  up  of 
multiple and sometimes contested elements. Negotiating what is a sustainable livelihood among the 
variety of stakeholders must therefore be a first task in any intervention process.  
 
Negotiations, for instance, may have to take place over the focus for intervention. Should this be at 
the area level, or focused on particular villages or households or on identified target groups or POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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individuals? The framework can be used for analysis at different scales and, in turn, it may highlight 
some key dilemmas and trade-offs. For example, when focused at an area level, different priorities 
may emerge than when focused on targeted groups, individuals or sectors. Since there is also such 
a  range  of  intervention  options  possible,  and  trade-offs  between  these  are  always  evident, 
negotiation and discussion must continue throughout any intervention process. It also requires the 
active  participation  of  all  different  interested  parties  in  the processes of  defining meanings  and 
objectives,  analysing  linkages  and  trade-offs,  identifying  options  and  choices  and,  ultimately, 
deciding what to do.  
 
In the case of rural development, there is heavy dependence on the primary resource base as a 
source of rural livelihoods, and it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future in most developing 
countries. Whether rural economic activities are agriculture, forestry or fishery based, increasing 
pressure to produce more using less land, water, forest and biodiversity resources raises concerns 
that human economic activities may not be sustained in the long term when the natural resource 
base is being eroded. Capability, equity and sustainability are the fundamental means and ends to 
sustainable livelihoods (Tanner, 2002). Capability is the ability to perform certain basic functions, to 
cope with stresses and shocks, and to find and make use of livelihood opportunities. Equity is more 
equal  distribution  of  assets,  capabilities  and  opportunities,  and  an  end  to  discrimination. 
Sustainability is the ability to maintain and improve livelihoods while maintaining or enhancing the 
assets on which livelihoods depend.  
 
Planning  for  future  livelihoods  implies  placing value  on  the  future.  However,  the  future  is  often 
undervalued due to discounting, lack of democratic representation of future generations, and an 
inability to predict future trends (e.g. population, technology, social change). Enhancing livelihood 
intensity  is  possible.  There  is  now  better  understanding  of  complex,  diverse  and  risk-prone 
agriculture  that  can  be  enhanced  by  diversification  with  interlinking  enterprises.  Degraded 
resources have been proven to present immense livelihood potential for the poor, and they are 
protected by their low value to others.  
 
Many small-scale economic opportunities other than farming can be generated locally, and this can 
result in a synergy of recirculation of income. Optimising this synergy of recirculation should be a 
central  priority.  Net  sustainable  livelihoods  is  a  measure  of  the  number  of  environmentally  and 
socially  sustainable  livelihoods  that  provide  an  adequate  living  in  a  context,  less  their  negative 
effect on the benefits and sustainability of the totality of other livelihoods elsewhere. This does not 
require a precise measure of “how much”, but rather that relative values, weightings or trends can 
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6.5.3.  TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Rural  development  is  understood  to  be  multidimensional,  encompassing  improved  provision  of 
services, enhanced opportunities for income generation and local economic development, improved 
physical  infrastructure,  social  cohesion  and  physical  security  within  rural  communities,  active 
representation  in  local  political  processes,  and  effective  provision  for  the  vulnerable.  Rural 
development  in  this  context  is  thus  much  broader  than  poverty  alleviation  through  social 
programmes and transfers (Pender, 1996). The concept places emphasis on facilitating change in 
rural environments to enable poor people to earn more, invest in themselves and their communities, 
contribute  toward  maintenance  of  the  infrastructure  key  to  their  livelihoods;  in  short,  to  identify 
opportunities and to act on them. A successful strategy will thus make people less poor, rather than 
more comfortable in their poverty. Integration has been a goal of rural development programmes for 
many decades. Most of these failed to achieve the desired synergy, because they failed to design a 
mechanism  for  integration.  Rural  development  is  difficult  to  integrate,  because  it  cuts  across 
traditional sectors and involves all levels of government.  
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The figure above reflects what can be considered an integrated rural development system, where 
the  vision  is  both  sectoral  and  territorial,  with  the  involvement  of  the  three  key  actors:  Local 
government,  civil  society,  and  private  sector  (small  and  medium  enterprises).  An  effective 
mechanism for integration will specify what happens at the various levels, who does what, and how 
the integration will be accomplished (Pender, 1996). 
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There is a dire need to resuscitate the rural economies and advance the cause of rural areas as 
potential engines of economic growth that would contribute towards their own development and the 
broad  national  development  agenda.  A  strategy  to  achieve  growth  must  be  founded  on  an 
understanding of how rural areas grow. Although the specific processes vary over time and space, 
the general dynamics are understood in terms of sources of growth and linkages that spread and 
multiply the initial impulse. Growth in agriculture, tourism, forestry and other primary activities that 
bring  incremental  earnings  into  rural  areas  generates  additional  incomes  through  linkages  in 
expenditure and employment. 
 
6.5.4.  SUPPORTING LOCAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
Developing strong representative rural institutions is now widely recognised as being one of the 
central  pillars  without  which  rural  economic  development  cannot  take  place.  A  key  governance 
challenge is to build the political will and institutional capacity to promote sustainable livelihoods 
and this requires a particular focus on developing practical linkages to translate national policies, 
laws and regulations into action at the local level. Support for local institutions to strengthen their 
ability to deliver services (government) and to make claims on entitlements (citizens) is an area on 
which there needs to be considerable focus in the years ahead. This study has shown how local 
politics have a far greater impact in practice than the design of decentralisation policies at national 
level and therefore much greater attention should be paid to the issue of building and strengthening 
the social and political capital of the rural poor than at present (Pender, 1996). 
 
If  decentralisation  and  devolution  are  to  be  effective  in  promoting  sustainable  resource 
management, there have to be effective management institutions in place at the level to which 
authority has been transferred. These institutions need to be genuinely representative, transparent 
and  accountable  to  the  constituencies  they  represent.  A  critical  component  of  the 
decentralisation/devolution  process  is  ensuring  that  these  local-level  institutions  are  effectively 
empowered through an appropriate legal framework. A prerequisite to the successful functioning of 
such institutions is a clear and commonly understood definition of the membership of the group that 
such institutions represent. Whilst this is a policy issue that has not been dealt with clearly and 
consistently  by  the  new  policies  to  date,  it  is  also  an  implementation  issue  that  has  been  little 
considered. Some of the examples covered in this paper indicate that in several cases, despite an 
effective  legislative  framework,  implementation  has  been  undermined  by  lack  of  a  coherent 
strategy. 
 
There is also a clear and related need for more and broader investments in human capital that cut 
across  classes  and  gender  and  support  transformative  processes  within  community-level POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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institutions. As Bingen (2000) points out, “...human capital investments offer the promise of enabling 
people to liberate themselves from the ‘ties that exclude’...”. Research findings quoted here reveal 
that investments in human capital can provide women and other marginalised groups in a society 
the opportunity not only to build and strengthen their other assets, such as social capital, but also to 
use them as a means of enhancing their livelihood strategies. The process of modifying informal 
institutions in this way can be slow, and often conflict-ridden. Its success in practice often depends 
on access to an effective legal system and the existence of supportive community-oriented service 
organisations and resources.  
 
6.6.  FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Mozambique is still highly agrarian, with more than 80% of the labour force employed in agriculture. 
However,  despite  its  large  share  in  employment,  agriculture  contributes  less  than  30%  to  the 
country’s gross value added. Agricultural productivity is thus far below the average for the economy, 
and policymakers continue to focus on ways of improving productivity and the efficiency of capital. 
Low  productivity  is  a  general  feature  of  the  inherited  agriculture  in  former  socialist  countries  in 
Africa. This feature is commonly attributed to the weaknesses of the collective form of organisation 
that was dominant in most of the region in the past era. Agriculture was not subjected to sweeping 
collectivisation after World War II, and individual farms have consistently controlled about 80% of 
agricultural land in this country. Low agricultural productivity is thus low productivity of individual 
farms,  not  collectives  or  cooperatives.  Agriculture  continues  to  have  a  major  share  in  the  rural 
economy and is extremely important for the incomes of rural households: both farmers and wage 
earners. Since the reforms there has been a shift in the cropping pattern away from food crops and 
towards cash crops. This is likely to adversely impact the food consumption of the poor – especially 
those who receive payments in kind for farm labour or as sharecroppers. In order to prevent this it is 
very important that the availability of food grains through the fair-price shop system be maintained 
and improved. 
 
Informal groups such as savings groups, labour groups, cattle-rearing groups, women’s groups and 
youth groups are important and play a significant role for the landless and poor. These can be used 
as a basis for addressing a range of social and economic development needs. The participation of 
women in the membership and management of different institutions is extremely limited and needs 
to be substantially improved. In general, greater and more active participation by all members in the 
institutions  needs  to  be  encouraged.  With  the  reforms,  the  economic  environment  has  become 
considerably more challenging and competitive for many local institutions and organisations. At the 
same time the management of the institutions is purely local, resting heavily on individuals who 
have no specialised training. There is a great need to plan, develop and conduct good training POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  220 
programmes for the management and staff of these institutions in order to improve their knowledge 
and skills in running their organisations in a competitive market economy. 
 
Although  the  case  of  Mozambique  is  instructive  with  respect  to  the  inclusion  of  traditional 
institutions in decentralisation policy, it would seem too early to allow for a qualified assessment of 
this  hypothesis.  The  integration  of  traditional  structures  into  decentralised  rural  development 
initiatives  has  until  present  only  been  observed  on  a  relatively  minor  scale,  and  this  only  fairly 
recently. By taking local development plans and regional policies as a starting point, an assessment 
of the benefits and costs of such an articulation will depend on the objectives to be achieved. No 
generalisation can be extrapolated from the present research findings as such, but locality-specific 
examples  have  been  given  to  illustrate  which  points  of  the  state-civil  society  interface  need  to 
typically be investigated.  
 
The management of land resources and legal arrangements concerning land tenure have been 
matters of heated dispute among Mozambican policymakers and external agencies over the past 
decade.  From an economic perspective the central issue of the land debate concerns the best 
strategy for promoting the intensification of agriculture, focusing on the expansion of more capital-
intensive forms of land use aimed at production for the market rather than for subsistence.  Within 
this overall theme, a major point of contention concerns the respective roles of commercial medium-
scale and large-scale farming that is highly market oriented, and small-scale “family” farming that 
has been, at least in the past, less capital-intensive and more concerned with meeting subsistence 
needs. The social dimension of the debate arises from concerns about poverty alleviation and the 
distribution of the gains from agricultural change.  Mozambique remains a relatively rural country, 
and a large majority of the poor depend upon small-scale agriculture for their livelihood.  Thus, for 
many commentators, it has been critical that new institutional arrangements affecting land tenure 
should protect or enhance the existing rights of poor households that rely upon access to communal 
land to meet their subsistence needs (Pender, 1996). 
 
Accepting the importance of sustaining and promoting small-scale agriculture as a core element in 
programmes for poverty alleviation and economic development, there is still considerable scope for 
differences in emphasis in the design of appropriate land policies.   The role of shifting agriculture is 
central.    There  is  no  doubt  that  small  farmers  will  respond  to  opportunities  to  enhance  their 
incomes, provided that the risks associated with climatic variability can be managed.  However, 
some  observers  believe  that  existing  arrangements  for  land  tenure  combined  with  shifting 
agriculture hinder and thus slow down the adoption of more capital- and input-intensive forms of 
small farming, either by limiting the access of small farmers to sources of finance or by diffusing POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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incentives to invest in improving or sustaining soil fertility (Tanner, 2002).  It is not enough to protect 
the interests of some vulnerable groups if the arrangements limit the capacity of many farmers to 
accumulate capital and adopt new methods of production. As Mozambique is a relatively land-
abundant country, the predominant forms of agricultural production are land-intensive with heavy 
reliance on shifting crop production and extensive livestock grazing.  While elements of this pattern 
of land use will persist for several decades, achieving sustained growth in agricultural incomes must 
depend  upon  the  intensification  of  land  use  relying  upon  the  application  of  more  human  and 
physical capital combined with higher levels of material inputs – seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, etc.  
The transfer of skills and resources required for the successful adoption of improved agricultural 
technologies is a part of the story.  However, the accumulation of land-related stocks of capital such 
as on- and off-farm infrastructure for managing water resources, improving soil fertility, storing and 
processing crops, and extending access to markets will be the critical challenge.  Land policies 
must provide appropriate incentives to promote the transition away from land-extensive modes of 
agricultural production. 
 
6.6.1.  LAND ISSUES IN MOZAMBIQUE 
The generic difficulties associated with land reform were, in past reform efforts, often exacerbated 
by implementation-related issues. Instead of aiming to increase productivity and sustainably reduce 
poverty, many past land reforms were directed towards calming social unrest and allaying political 
pressures by peasant organisations. They were often initiated in response to political pressure (or 
to  divert  attention  from  other  problems)  rather  than  as  part  of  a  long-term  rural  development 
strategy. As a consequence, land reforms were often designed ad hoc and bore little relation to 
actual  needs  on  the  ground,  and  commitment  to  them  faltered  once  social  emergencies  had 
subsided.  Moreover,  the  individuals  targeted  to  benefit  from  these  programmes  were  often  the 
politically  most  vocal  and  well-connected  rather  than  the  ones  with  the  best  ability  to  make 
productive use of the land, or the most deserving on poverty grounds. 
 
The  sensitivity  and  complexity  of  tenure  issues  and  concentration  on  land  redistribution  have 
caused some governments in the region to neglect tenure reform.  Land tenure reform must be built 
on a thorough understanding of the livelihood strategies of those intended to benefit. It should not 
be  assumed  that  the  inadequacies  of  tenure  laws  and/or  administrative  support  constrain 
livelihoods  in  practice.    Tenure  reform  measures  for  communal  land  should  underpin  the 
adaptability  and  responsiveness  of  existing  customary  systems  and  not  constrain  local  coping 
strategies.  Land tenure reform policy should be flexible and gradualist with regard to the role of 
traditional  authorities.    As  far  as  possible,  responsibility  for  land  rights  management  should  be 
devolved to the rights holders.  Land tenure reform must pay special attention to the legal status POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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and economic activities of women and the poor, who are often disproportionately dependent on the 
commons.  Despite  the  complexities,  tenure  reform  to  sustain  their  access  to  the  commons  is 
essential.   
 
Land tenure reform is a time-consuming process requiring thorough public consultation and careful 
preparation. The necessary institutional development is likely to take decades. Long-term budgetary 
commitment  is  needed  from  governments  and  (political  sensitivities  permitting)  from  donors. 
External support is likely to be conditional upon appropriate constitutional and legal frameworks.  To 
keep it in context, policy to reform land tenure must be developed alongside policies, resources and 
financial incentives to help the building of more sustainable livelihoods, including non-land-based 
activities.  Interventions may have to focus on the more densely settled areas and be phased to 
give priority to situations that are a direct threat to livelihoods or political stability. 
In contrast to most past discussions of redistributed land reform, this research provides empirical 
evidence  of  the  actual  implementation  of  land  policy  and  administration  in  Southern  Africa, 
particularly  in  Mozambique.  Although  many  of  the  projects  are  still  in  the  early  stages  of 
implementation, the data suggest that land reform was able to target the poor. Moreover, the fact 
that economically successful projects reached significantly higher levels of poor people suggests 
that increased access to productive assets could be an important avenue for poverty reduction. 
Given the importance of developing a diverse and less subsidy-dependent rural sector, suitably 
adapted land reform could play an important role in the restructuring of the rural sector. 
 
This has not only eliminated an important opportunity for landless individuals to acquire farming 
experience, but has also resulted in the need to develop complex regulations to implement land 
reform.  These  regulations  gave  rise  to  cumbersome  bureaucratic  requirements  that  stretched 
available administrative capacity and resulted in highly centralised processes of implementation. 
Government  bureaucracies  at  the  central  level  –  justified  by  the  need  to  provide  technical 
assistance and other support services to beneficiaries – proved expensive and, unable to utilise 
information from the local level, often also quite ineffective. One of the first studies to provide both a 
theoretical model and an empirical investigation of the potential impact of land reform indicates that, 
based on district-level data from India, land reform can indeed have a positive impact on wages and 
employment.  Though  still  accumulating,  empirical  evidence  does  support  some  of  these 
conclusions (Pender, 1996). 
 
Conceptually, one would expect productivity gains to be proportional to the improvement in work 
and  investment  incentives  associated  with  the  post-reform  regime.  In  cases  where  security  of 
tenure had already been high before the reform, where cash-rent (rather than share-rent) contracts POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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had prevailed, and where landlords had provided tenants with access to markets for credit, inputs, 
and outputs, one would expect static efficiency gains from land reforms to be modest and the bulk 
of reform benefits to come through enhanced investment incentives (and credit access on better 
terms) associated with land ownership. As units of production that are too large will not be able to 
reap the benefits deriving from the utilisation of family labour, the net benefits would, at the very 
least, be much lower, and it is not surprising that in the large majority of cases, productivity did not 
increase and labour problems were pervasive. The only exception is where already well-established 
plantations were redistributed to the former workers, a case that is very costly and characterised by 
relatively low social benefits. 
 
This would be consistent with an interpretation of land reform as a piecemeal strategy by the rich to 
avoid the imminent threat of revolt. Even where there was a genuine commitment to breaking the 
power of landed elites, agrarian reforms were generally designed by urban intellectuals with little 
idea of the realities of agricultural production and a sound suspicion of the ability of small-scale 
cultivators to manage on their own.  As a result of the isolation and lack of access to communication 
technology, market and infrastructures, rural people often have little influence over policies and 
programmes that affect them.  Polices and programmes have had little effect in rural areas when it 
comes  to  introducing  changes  in  livelihoods,  increasing  local  income,  and  providing  alternative 
subsistence methods. 
Local authorities should be concerned about the sustainable development of their communities. 
Tourism may play a greater or lesser part, according to the area’s location, resources and market 
circumstances, as well as the general desires and aspirations of the community. In summary, the 
main  recommendations  are  that  local  authorities  should:  (i)  Prepare  (where  applicable)  and 
integrate participatory tourism development agenda into district planning, with income generation 
being the most important motive for participation by local communities; (ii) Develop and maintain 
permanent  partnerships  (community-private-sector  partnerships).  Local  control  appears  to  be  a 
necessary  component  for  creating  and  maintaining  the  link  between  conservation  and  tourism. 
Ownership rights and those enterprises, including tour operators and local service providers who 
understand  the  realities  of  the  marketplace  and  of  running  a  viable  business,  are  involved  in 
planning  sustainable  development;  (iv)  Support  the  sustainable  use  of  resources  and  initiate 
environmental actions on different levels to conserve the environment while tourism is developing. 
 
6.6.2.  ACCESS TO LAND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Understanding the linkages between access to land (size and ownership structures) and access to 
other  sources  of  income  and  capital  is  an  essential  element  in  the  policy  dialogue  about  food 
security  and  poverty  reduction.  The  current  framework  of  economic  growth  and  development POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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includes  a  general  trend  towards  the  privatisation  of  land  rights  and  a  collapse  of  collective 
structures  in  agriculture,  as  well  as  a  move  towards  reliance  on  land  markets  as  a  means  of 
peasant access to participation in the development process. Despite the removal of land reform as 
an explicit part of the policy agenda, it is clear that the situations that led to the activation of land 
reforms in past decades are still in place. It is still very important, therefore, for these issues to be 
addressed, albeit following a “market-oriented” approach (Shearer, Lastarria-Cornhiel & Mesbah, 
1991).  
 
There  is  discordance  between  contemporary  macro-policy  initiatives  and  the  micro  foundations 
through which they operate. A key conclusion from analysing the impacts of macro policy through 
the lens of micro-economic decision-making models is that access to various forms of capital is 
pivotal in determining household income strategies and, therefore, in determining the likely change 
in household behaviours and wellbeing when faced with macro-policy changes. Mention of two such 
modelling exercises, which also offer empirical insights, should suffice to demonstrate this important 
revelation. A key factor in this model, and hence in defining the differentiated behaviours of various 
classes of rural households, is that households are stratified according to resource endowments (or 
asset  typologies),  which  imply  different  behavioural  strategies.  Each  stratum  is  differently 
constrained by its relative need for and ability to participate in size-sensitive rural factor markets. A 
typology  of  rural  households  is  defined,  including  proletarian,  semi-proletarian,  peasant  and 
capitalist  family  farms  and  hierarchical  capitalist  farms.  These  farms  differ  in  particular  in  their 
capacity to increase access to landholdings and financial capital and decrease reliance on off-farm 
employment for survival. The latter three forms of farming differ significantly also with regard to the 
types of labour employed on the farms. The implications of this typology for participation in the land 
market are striking and are discussed under “Land markets as a means of access for the rural poor” 
(Pender, 1996). 
 
Their  conceptual  framework  relies  on  a  typology  of  rural  households  that  stresses  differential 
income  strategies  based  on  access  to  land  per  adult  member.  Their  typology  focused  on  how 
different forms of capital determine earnings level. Their model and data postulate that working 
capital constraints (ex ante capital) combined with consumption credit constraints (ex post capital) 
lead the poor to the adoption of safety-first strategies entailing the growing of basic foods (food 
security).  This  is  a  consequence  of  size-  sensitive  access  to  capital.  Thus,  smallholders 
systematically opt away from high-profit commercial crop production, which then stifles their ability 
to accumulate land over time. Larger farms, which do not face such constraints on capital, are thus 
advantaged in short-term income distribution and in long-term capacity of land accumulation via the 
market.  More  importantly,  he  draws  attention  to  how  resulting  differences  in  economic  returns POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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across variously sized farms might cause a structural change in the ownership distribution of land 
via the operation of imperfect land markets that favour medium-sized to large farms.  
 
·  A significant part of the demand for commercial farming focuses on the extensive grazing of 
cattle  and  other  livestock.    There  seems  to  be  substantial  pressure  on  existing  range 
grassland resources in at least two provinces – Tete and Manica – at present, and this 
situation is likely to get considerably worse during the next decade.  While there should be 
no  difficulty  in  accommodating  demand  for  grazing  on  permanent  pasture  and  in  mixed 
farming,  the  development  of  extensive  range  grazing  should  be  discouraged  in  most 
provinces.  The exceptions could be those that have ample underutilised range grazing such 
as Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Sofala and Zambézia. 
·  There is very little information on existing stocking rates and land-use patterns set in the 
context of accessibility and infrastructure provision.  A study referred to by Pender (1996) 
regarding  land  use  in  the  Manica  district  (the  largest  district  in  the  Manica  province  by 
population)  carried  out  by  Cruzeiro  do  Sul  shows  the  critical  importance  of  transport 
infrastructure.  Within zones of moderate to good soil quality, existing smallholder agriculture 
is concentrated in areas close to the major transport corridors.  The same is true for land 
licensed for commercial farming, even to the extent of licences being acquired in areas with 
poorer  land  but  better access  by  road.    While  the  Manica  province  faces  a  prospect  of 
considerable  land  pressure  in  future,  there  are  significant  areas  of  land  categorised  as 
having moderate to good soil quality that are not currently farmed, either because they are 
unattractive  for  small  farmers  and/or  as  a  consequence  of  difficulty  of  access.    This 
reinforces the standard economic point that the management of land resources is as much 
about the development of infrastructure – in particular roads – as it is about legal aspects of 
land rights and policies.  This dimension has been neglected in recent debates both inside 
and outside Mozambique. 
 
The titling of land (and the registration of titles in a public registry) is considered to be the best way 
to protect ownership rights to land, in other words, the best form of tenure security. Land titling and 
registration  is  the  highest  level  of  formalisation  of  ownership  rights  in  private  property  tenure 
systems. Where private property as a tenure form is not dominant, however, land titling has little 
consequence  or  utility,  because  landholders  acquire  tenure  security  through  other  mechanisms 
(e.g. membership of a group or family). This explains why titling programmes in some areas have 
little impact, or unintended effects, or quickly become outdated (for example, title documents are 
not kept up to date when property is transferred). It also explains the low participation rates in some 
supply-driven titling efforts, e.g. Honduras (Negrão, 1992).  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Greater tenure security, theoretically, has two impacts: increased agricultural productivity and more 
dynamic land markets. Titling is expected to facilitate land transfers, stimulate the land market and 
increase the supply of land on the market; thus, it can be a mechanism for redistributing land and 
making land more accessible to landless and land-poor farmers. Land titles reduce the uncertainty 
over the entitlement of owners to maintain or transfer land rights and, in turn, affect the price and 
scope  of  land  transactions.  They  hypothesise  that  greater  security  of  ownership  raises  farm 
productivity and, as a result, the market value of land is higher for titled land than for an identical 
parcel that is not titled. The most commonly recognised benefit from the titling and registration of 
land,  besides  the  tenure  security  bestowed  on  the  property  owner,  is  the  use  of  those  secure 
ownership rights as collateral to solicit credit. Formal lending agencies, such as banks, often require 
not only that property being used as collateral be titled, but that the title be registered. In fact, the 
rationalisation for the cost of titling and registration programmes is that they put capital into the 
hands  of  people  with  little  wealth  and  a  low  income,  leading  to  increased  investment  and 
productivity by these families. 
 
There is one important qualification to these conclusions.  The fact that there is ample under- or 
unutilised land available for the expansion of commercial and small-scale agriculture leaves open 
the question of who has rights over the use of that land.  Recent estimates (e.g. Negrão, 1992) 
suggest  that  land  concessions  over  about  28,000  sq.  km  were  awarded  up  until  1990.    Land 
concessions to private companies and farmers since then amount to a further 5,000 sq km.  How 
far this overlaps with the area of cultivated or cultivable land is not known.  Still, it is clear that 
agricultural expansion will involve the transfer from current use to new uses of large areas of land 
that has already been conceded to individuals, companies and institutions.  Thus, it is critical that 
the  legal  framework  should  permit  such  transfers  to  take  place  in  a  reliable,  transparent  and 
efficient manner.  
 
6.6.3.  IMPACT ON CREDIT AND INVESTMENT 
In  Mozambique,  under  these  circumstances,  the  impact  of  land  titles  on  individual  investment 
incentives and productivity is likely to be greater for wealthier farmers whose land size and wealth 
(access  to  other  assets)  leave  them  favourably  situated  with  respect  to  capital  and  insurance 
markets. For smallholder farmers, potential benefits of land titles may be overwhelmed by market-
access problems, leaving little incentive for title acquisition. While definitive and conclusive studies 
on  the  long-term  effects  of  land  titling  on  the  agrarian  structure  still  need  to  be  undertaken, 
assessments and studies undertaken in the last decade seem to indicate that titling, in and of itself, 
does  not  increase  credit  transactions,  improve  production  levels  on  titled  land  or  increase  the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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number of land transactions. There are some positive differences in investment and credit for titled 
farmers  over  non-titled  farmers.  The  fact  that  their  results  are  inconsistent  means  that  more 
attention  is needed  to  evaluating  their  data,  as  well  as  their  competing  methodologies  and  the 
differences between the two regions in Mozambique (Negrão, 1992).  
 
MADER (2004) states that credit market imperfections can thus offset small farmers’ supervision 
cost advantage. For the case of the Nampula province, for example, yields for virtually all crops are 
lower  for  poor  (small)  farmers  and  higher  for  rich  (large)  farmers,  thus  turning  the  farm-size 
productivity relationship upside down. Furthermore, the informal “land market” leads to land transfer 
from poor and labour-abundant smallholders, to rich and relatively labour-scarce households. The 
reason is that capital market imperfections, combined with reasonably functioning land and labour 
markets and a technology that is not supervision intensive, make it more attractive for small credit-
constrained households to rent out land and work for a wage than to engage in owner-cultivation 
without capital inputs. By contrast, in panel data from the Manica province an inverse farm-size-
productivity  relationship  was  observed  even  though  a  positive  presence  of  correlation  between 
yields and cash inflows from non-agricultural employment suggests the presence of capital market 
imperfections.  
 
Furthermore, informal lenders have only limited scope to diversify covariate risks, and they typically 
do not provide much long-term credit. Interest rates on informal loans are thus high. Therefore, both 
the limited availability of credit and the high cost of borrowing credit would prevent those who do not 
have  accumulated  savings  from  acquiring  land.  Even  if  imperfections  in  markets  for  credit  and 
insurance  reduce  the  scope  for  the  land  sales  market  to  bring  about  improved  land  allocation 
through land transfers from large to small producers, such allocation should – in a frictionless world 
– be facilitated through the land rental market (Carter, 1994). One possibility would be an interlinked 
contract whereby the landlord uses the credit access provided by land ownership to provide the 
tenant with working capital as part of the rental contract. High transaction costs – part of them 
related to government regulation – reduce the extent of land rental transactions in a number of 
countries (Stanfield, 1985).  
 
The impact of titling and tenure security on credit availability and agricultural productivity can be 
broken down into supply and demand effects. Demand effects occur when the acquisition of a land 
title increases the farmer’s security and certainty that he or she will be able to maintain possession 
of the land and benefit from investments that improve its productive capacity. Increased security is 
hypothesised to enhance investment incentives and increase the demand for capital and variable 
inputs complementary to capital and, thereby, raise agricultural productivity.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Stanfield (1985) argues that, in addition to ownership security, farmers’ investment decisions are 
affected  by  a  number  of  factors  such  as  alternative  investment  opportunities,  accessibility  of 
production inputs, the farmer’s present debt structure and overall profitability of farming, and the 
availability of investment capital. These factors are dependent on agricultural and macro-economic 
policies.  Moreover,  the  assumption  that  credit  is  available  must  be  seriously  questioned.  In  an 
environment of imperfect capital markets, small farmers’ access to credit is rationed and a title to 
land may not overcome the obstacles to obtaining access to institutional credit.  Furthermore, under 
some  conditions,  the  provision  of land  titles  may  work  to the  disadvantage  of smallholders.  As 
Carter (1994) points out: “If titled land operates as collateral ... then foreclosure and land loss is a 
real possibility. The threat of land loss is of course supposed to mitigate moral hazard problems 
associated with credit contracts. But in a stochastic agricultural environment which lacks insurance 
markets, the farmer faces a genuine erogenous probability of loss of titled and mortgaged parcels.” 
Finally, despite a lack of evidence of productivity effects, there is evidence of a significant impact of 
titling on the market price of land, which could reflect the capitalised value of the costs of acquiring 
a land title, as well as perceived implications of title for tenure security and access to credit.  
 
A key reason for land markets’ transfer from large to small producers to be rarely observed is that it 
is very difficult for small farmers to access markets for credit and insurance (Carter, 1994). On the 
other hand, credit market imperfections that increase the shadow price of credit for small producers 
would  reduce  small  farmers’  competitiveness  in  the  land  sales  market  and  at  the  same  time 
outweigh the supervision cost advantage they enjoy (Negrão, 1992). Asymmetric information and 
moral  hazard  lead  generally  to  quantity  rationing  in  credit  markets.  Formal  credit  markets  can 
overcome the problem of asymmetric information by utilising a collateral requirement. However, the 
costs of and political impediments to foreclosure on smallholders land are often quite significant. 
This  is  part  of  the  generally  high  transaction  costs  associated  with  providing  credit  to  small 
producers. In informal credit markets, close familiarity and social control is used to select promising 
clients or projects.  
 
6.6.4.  EFFICIENCY LOSSES ASSOCIATED WITH CUSTOMARY TENURE SYSTEMS 
The efficiency losses associated with customary tenure systems may for a number of reasons be 
more modest than generally assumed. Firstly, in the large majority of communal tenure systems, 
arable land (in contrast to pasture and forest or fishing grounds) is cultivated by individuals who 
may even enjoy inheritable rights. This implies that the static (and maybe even dynamic) efficiency 
losses  possibly  associated  with  communal  tenure  may  be  quite  limited.  Secondly,  communal 
resource ownership is often maintained because it either provides public goods or allows owners to 
take advantage of synergies that would be difficult to provide under fully individualised cultivation. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Land access and security of property rights systems are normally limited to the private sector. This 
limitation may reduce investment incentives. To facilitate economic growth and prevent static and 
dynamic efficiency land losses, studies and frameworks have to be carried out to recognise the 
multiple  land  functions.  While  systems  prohibit  land  transactions,  communities  will  permanently 
continue practising traditional land use, and investment opportunities in the communal areas will be 
low. In other ways the system does provide flexibility and scope for efficiency-enhancing transfers. 
It is now recognised that the universal provision of secure land rights promotes investment.  
 
Evidence is mixed regarding the gains and losses to agriculture of household-level diversification 
strategies; negative effects are associated with the withdrawal of critical labour inputs from  the 
family farm, while positive effects include the alleviation of credit constraints and a reduction in the 
risk of innovation. Poor migrants from remote areas are less likely to reinvest urban earnings in 
agriculture, while better-off migrants from nearby or high-potential areas are more likely to do so. 
Where on-farm diversification occurs, it can generate many of the same beneficial effects on off-
farm  diversification.  What  is  needed  is  that  rights  are  transparent  and  can,  within  the  existing 
physic-geographic, institutional and legal environment, be enforced in a cost-effective manner. In 
terms of importance of land tenure security, the community has to be protected by the state, using 
correct legislation, but it is necessary to define practical mechanisms to look at the performance of 
the economy.  Also, if land is abundant, it is also necessary to define its use to best stimulate 
growth in the economy, reduce poverty, promote investment and employment, and increase GDP. 
 
Supply effects result when the provision of a secure and legal land title improves a farmer’s access 
to cheaper and longer-term institutional credit, because the land can be pledged as collateral for 
loans. Output on securely owned (i.e. titled) parcels is consequently expected to be greater than on 
untitled parcels because of a greater use of inputs of capital and other variable production factors 
and potential shifts to more capital-intensive corps. Thus, the combined demand and supply effects, 
it is hypothesised, result in higher farm productivity on titled land and also raise the price that titled 
land can command in the land market. The rationale provided by Feder et al. (1988) for land titling, 
however, ignores a number of other factors that shape farm productivity and may bring about the 
desired outcomes of titling programmes.  
 
Land  tenure  may  be  defined  as  the  terms  and  conditions  on  which  land  is  held,  used  and 
transacted. Land tenure reform refers to a planned change in the terms and conditions (e.g. the 
adjustment of the terms of contracts between land owners and tenants, or the conversion of more 
informal  tenancy  into  formal  property  rights).  A  fundamental  goal  is  to  enhance  and  to  secure 
people’s land rights. This may be necessary to avoid arbitrary evictions and landlessness; it may POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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also be essential if rights-holders are to invest in the land and to use it sustainably. In South Africa, 
tenure  reform  is  a  component  of  a  national  land  reform  programme  that  also  embraces  the 
restitution of land to people dispossessed by racially discriminatory laws or practices, and land 
redistribution to the poor. One of the greatest challenges is to secure the switch from antipathy to 
supportiveness in the relations between public administration at local levels and private, non-farm, 
productive activity in rural areas.  
 
6.7.  DEVELOPMENT POLICY PRIORITIES 
There is wide scope within existing rural development policies for support to beneficial forms of 
diversification. Such action does not mean increasing the role of the state in particular economic 
sub-sectors,  nor  does  it  mean  manipulating  prices  and  costs  in  order  to  achieve  specified 
outcomes. Rather it is about improving the institutional context of private decision-making by, for 
example, reducing risk, increasing mobility, minimising barriers to entry (e.g. licensing regulations), 
and ensuring fairness and transparency in the conduct of public agencies. It is also about facilitating 
the poor to improve their assets, and to make use of those assets to best effect.  The appropriate 
mix of policies is highly context-specific, but some general principles are likely to hold:  
·  Human capital: The significance of education, both formal academic education and workplace 
skills,  for  improving  livelihood  prospects  is  established  by  a  great  number  of  studies,  and 
poverty is closely associated with low levels of education and lack of skills. There is little doubt 
that  rural  education  is  under  stress  in  many  countries.  The  demands  made  on  educational 
systems  by  rising  populations  are  one  important  factor,  the  cost  of  updating  educational 
materials another. Parental contributions to the upkeep of schools are increasing, with inevitable 
implications for differential access that excludes those unable to meet such contributions. This 
makes innovative approaches to educational delivery at village level a priority in the future.  
·  Enabling environments for grassroots initiatives: Even after nearly two decades of market 
liberalisation,  it  is  a  mistake  to  assume  that  an  environment  that  facilitates  small-scale 
enterprise  is  now  in  place.  The  local-level  policy  context  often  remains  inimical  to  self-
employment and start-up business. Local enterprise often arises “outside” the regulations, i.e. 
as an unrecognised informal sector activity, and depends on paying off local officials to allow 
continued  operation.  Any  business  wishing  to  register  formally  therefore  faces  widespread 
reluctance to dismantling regulations, or speeding up the processing of applications. It is in this 
sense  that  reform  (in  terms  of  efficiency,  effectiveness,  transparency  and  fairness  of  state 
operations), although proceeding at different speeds in different countries, is still in its early 
stages.  
·  Decentralising natural resource management: The choice of institutional setup for supporting 
decentralised natural resource management (DNRM) should be guided by the administrative POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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systems that national governments have decided to put in place for different natural resources. 
In  situations  where  jurisdiction  over  a  natural  resource  is  poorly  defined  and  a  general 
devolution process is already being implemented, or where the resource is already under local 
government jurisdiction, the appropriate institutional choice for support is likely to be devolution. 
Conversely,  if  the  natural  resource  is  under  the  domain  of  a  politically  strong  line  ministry, 
devolution might be politically infeasible, which leaves deconcentration/delegation as the most 
realistic model for actual promotion of DNRM. Moreover, deconcentration/delegation need not 
be the final result. It could rather be considered a (pragmatic) first step towards devolution of 
natural  resource  management.  Whether  the  legitimate  interests  of,  say,  pastoralists  and 
indigenous  peoples,  who  are  local  minorities  or  who  traditionally  roam/move  through  large 
areas, are served better through devolution or deconcentration/delegation of natural resources 
is  an  open  question,  since  both  models  are  primarily  based  on  geographically  rather  than 
interest-defined  communities.  Whichever  institutional  setup  is  chosen,  special  provisions  will 
probably  be  needed  to  accommodate  the  interests  of  minorities,  seasonal  and  occasional 
resource users, as well as public authorities with direct or indirect stakes in the natural resource.  
·  Providing economic incentives and ownership at community level: Economic incentives for 
people to protect and invest in a particular natural resource are closely associated with their 
enforceable rights, as well as the terms of trade prevailing for resulting product flows. Owners 
and proprietors have the strongest incentives to invest in and maintain a resource, because 
they hold the right of excluding others from capturing the benefits of their investments. This 
incentive is even stronger if owners and proprietors can pass on these rights to their heirs. 
Claimants hold stronger investment incentives than authorised and unauthorised users, but the 
propensity  of  these  three  categories  to  invest  in  the  resource  is  likely  to  be  rather  small, 
because their use of it depends on the goodwill of others (owners or proprietors). Community 
control over a substantive portion of the values generated by managing the resource also forms 
a crucial part of the economic incentives established through NRM. Accordingly, these should 
not  be  undermined  by  undue  restrictions  on  trade  or  excessive  taxation  of  NRM  products. 
Payments to communities from society at large for environmental services accruing from NRM 
(watershed maintenance, coastline protection, maintenance of biodiversity, etc.) could also form 
a  relevant  part  of  the  economic  incentive  structure,  especially  in  cases  where  national  and 
international environmental concerns result in tight limitations of product extraction 
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7.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, concern has been expressed over rising agricultural and food prices. The world 
market prices for major food commodities such as grains and vegetable oils have risen sharply to 
historic highs of more than 60% above levels just 2 years ago. Many factors have contributed to the 
run-up in food commodity prices. Some factors reflect trends of slower growth in production and 
more rapid growth in demand that have contributed to a tightening of world balances of grains and 
oilseeds  over  the  last  decade.  Other  factors  that  have  added  to  global  food  commodity  price 
inflation include the declining value of the US dollar, rising energy prices, increasing agricultural 
costs  of  production,  growing  foreign  exchange  holdings  by  major  food-importing  countries,  and 
policies adopted recently by some exporting and importing countries to mitigate their own food price 
inflation (Trostle, 2008). 
 
International pricing is not the only factor that affects the stability of the agricultural sector and rural 
livelihoods.  Natural  disasters,  deteriorating  weather  conditions  (climate  changes),  institutional 
constraints and inefficient use of resources are important elements effecting rural livelihoods and 
determining productive output. This research discusses these factors and illustrates how they have 
contributed to the deterioration of rural livelihoods and food crises. Low agricultural productivity 
associated with institutional and policy frameworks have pushed food prices beyond the reach of a 
significant number of the rural poor. The livelihoods of rural people with no or very limited access to 
natural resources are vulnerable, because they have difficulty in obtaining food, accumulating other 
assets, and recuperating after natural or market shocks or misfortunes.  
 
This thesis is developed as a framework to examine how agricultural and governance policies affect 
local development and how effectively natural resource governance strategies can be addressed to 
support communities, organisations and local authorities (traditional) to jointly define and implement 
local  development  based  on  existing  local  potential  and  opportunities.  On  the  basis  of  a 
comprehensive literature review, it was found that the governance of natural resources has played 
an important role in past and present configurations of the rural economy of Mozambique.  Despite 
the implementation of governance reforms and agricultural restructuring over the past 10 years, no 
recent institutional and rural development  model of natural resource management has explicitly 
considered  these  new  issues.  Access  by  the  poor  to  natural  resources  (land,  forests,  water, 
fisheries, pastures, etc.) is essential for sustainable poverty reduction.  
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7.2.  SUMMARY  
The role that agriculture should play in economic development has been recognised for years. The 
adoption of new technologies designed to enhance farm output and income has received particular 
attention as a means to accelerate economic development. However, output growth is not only 
determined  by  technological  innovations,  but  also  by  the  efficiency  with  which  available 
technologies are used in the absence of inefficiency factors. After decades of research, institutional 
analysis  has  become  a  prominent  area  of  development.    The  combination  of  policies  and 
institutions seems to bring a new analytical direction to non-market-oriented analysis, where the 
traditional analytical framework (demand and supply) seems to have limitations.   
 
This study attempts to uncover how participatory governance and decentralised natural resource 
management  (NRM)  can  be  improved  in  rural  areas,  and  it  explores  the  implications  of  these 
findings for rural growth and poverty-alleviation strategies in the region, specifically in agricultural 
development,  food  security  and  local/rural  development.  It  analyses  the  relationship  between 
access to natural resources (including its utilisation) and income generation at household level, and 
explores the implications of these findings for rural poverty-alleviation strategies in Mozambique 
using data envelopment analysis and econometric specifications. 
 
The country of Mozambique, with its sufficient natural resources, possesses large tracts of arable 
land with a wide diversity of agro-ecologic conditions, but hunger and misery affects more than half 
of  the  population,  with  a  major  incidence  thereof  in  rural  areas  that  has  left  the  majority 
malnourished. This study provides an alternative analytical approach based on non-measurable 
variables (qualitative measurements). Examining the utility theoretic foundations of the models, it 
was found that qualitative variables have a substantial influence on the level of efficiency related to 
natural resource management and ultimately the impact thereof on the agricultural sector. Over the 
years,  state  visions  of  the  appropriate  management  and  use  of  resources  have  largely  been 
extended  to  the  rural  sector  through  a  centrally  directed  structure  and  process  (for  example, 
according to the land law, the domain to authorise 100,000 hectares of land falls under the Minister 
of Agriculture in Mozambique). However, state control over the use and management of resources 
amongst the peasantry was and is largely ineffectual, because on one hand the state lacks the 
resources (human, technical and financial) and capacity to enforce such controls, and on the other 
hand because the policy thrust seeking to empower the peasant communities is supply-led and thus 
defined according to the terms and processes of external agents, including funders and central 
governments.  
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Findings  based  on  the  observations  reveal,  on  average,  that  provinces  were  0.60  technically 
efficient. Thus, the same quantity of resources may be utilised with 40% less cost if all operators 
produce on the minimum cost frontier under constant returns to scale. This conclusion suggests 
that  the  economic  theory  of  commons  is  an  important  strand  of  thinking  about  efficient  use  of 
natural resources.   It is conventionally indicated that common property rights are inconsistent with 
efficient utilisation of natural resources in the absence of some form of government intervention, 
and that given the impediments to effective intervention, private property rights are a better bet.  
This  challenges  the  validity  of  this  proposition  for  some  types  of  property,  and  results  in  the 
conclusion  that  communal  management  may  be  socially  wealth-enhancing  for  properties  with 
certain characteristics of public goods. The presence of shortfalls in efficiency means that output 
can be increased without requiring additional conventional inputs and without the need for new 
technology. If this is the case, empirical measures of efficiency are necessary in order to determine 
the  magnitude  of  the  gains  that  could  be  obtained  by  improving  performance  in  agricultural 
production with given technology.   
 
This  suggests  that  attention  to  productivity  gains  arising  from  more  efficient  use  of  existing 
technology  is  justified.  These  results  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  with  decentralisation,  power 
transferred from the central/state government to the local-level government enables the rural poor 
to: a) Share in decision-making that affects their daily lives; b) Evaluate the outcome of their own 
decisions;  c)  Minimise  the  chances  of  misunderstanding;  d)  Understand  the  difficulties  and 
complexities of administration, planning and management; e) Accept responsibility for failure; and f) 
Develop a sense of belonging and commitment to civil society.  
 
The  study  found  that  concentrations  of  families’  exploration  are  between  0.2  and  1.0  hectares, 
mostly in rural areas. Technical efficiency (TE) measures ranged from 0.202 to 1.00 (CRSTE), with 
an average of 0.60. Inputs could on average be reduced by 40% if all operations could be produced 
along the production frontier. About 40% of the observations were technically efficient, and 60% of 
the observations exhibited technical efficiency measures greater than 0.80. At variable returns to 
scale,  TE  ranged  from  0.78  to  1.00,  with  an  average  of  0.933.  Approximately  90%  of  the 
observations exhibited allocative efficiency measures greater than 0.80. Four observations were 
technically efficient. Scale efficiency (SE) varied from 0.25 to 1.00, with an average of 0.62. Over 
80% of observations exhibited scale measures less than 0.95. These results are consistent with the 
fact that significant increases in output could be obtained by making better use of available inputs 
and technology. However, this does not mean that research designed to generate new technology 
should be overlooked. As Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro (1993) noted, the evidence presented suggests 
that there is much room for improving economic efficiency, using a domestic best practice standard, POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Israel Jacob Massuanganhe                                                                                                             PhD Thesis – 2008 
  235 
and that the magnitude of the input market distortions are in some cases quite severe. However, 
land  sales  transactions  could  be  efficiency  decreasing  if,  due  to  policy-induced  credit  market 
distortions, large owners’ advantage in accessing credit would offset the productivity advantage of 
owner-operators or if, due to the inability to insure, significant landholdings are not part of poor 
people’s optimal asset portfolio.  
 
In agricultural analysis particularly, more factors influencing efficiency are qualitative, and mostly 
related to institutions, politics and policies. This suggests that these factors should be considered in 
determining the causes of agricultural productivity performance. Variables related to quality were 
also used to identify factors influencing agricultural inefficiency.  Exogenous influences arise from 
restrictions  related  to  policy  aspects  (government  side),  but  institutional  aspects  also  influence 
allocation  of  resources,  e.g.  participation  of  the  local  community  in  the  management  of  local 
resources  (consultation  processes).  Policy  outcomes  are  considered  to  be  institutional  factors 
related  to  governance,  participation,  local  power  and  authorities  (local  governments),  and 
grassroots  organisations  and  structures  (civil  society  and  local  communities)  that  are  the  real 
agents of local governance. There is considerable influence of qualitative variables in efficiency.  
The theoretical and practical foundation of traditional authority is generally of a symbolic religious 
nature, and is given legitimacy only by the communities themselves (often finally endorsed through 
bodies such as councils of elders).  
 
One of the key findings of the study is that local micro politics affect how natural resource policies 
work in practice, and particularly how the process related to the decentralisation of powers occurs. 
Leadership  structures  must  be  assessed  and  informed  by  local  settlement  histories,  which 
contribute to determining institutional inclusion and exclusion. Empowering authorities that are not 
held downwardly accountable to local populations can imperil the long-term wellbeing expected 
from more accountable local management. It can imperil democracy by taking resources away from 
emerging  democratic  structures  while  strengthening  and  helping  to  entrench  the  very  non-
democratic  institutions  that  democratic  reforms  aim  to  replace.  Successful  decentralisation 
programmes must take advantage of, support and work with democratic reforms.  
 
Governance is considered within the framework of power, process and practice and how these 
shaped peasant access, control and use of natural resources in Mozambique. Natural resource 
governance systems resulted in over-centralisation, because they were crafted in the context of 
conquest and subjugation. Over the years, state visions of appropriate management and use of 
resources have largely been extended to the peasant sector through a centrally directed structure 
and  process.  However,  state  control  over  the  use  and  management  of  resources  among  the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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peasantry was and is largely ineffectual, because the state lacks the resources and capacity to 
enforce such controls. Much of the legislation was inherited piecemeal into post-colonial times, and 
amendments to date have largely de-racialised the colonial acts and policies without democratising 
them.  
 
They are thus “grassroots institutions” that in effect have to negotiate their power day-by-day, and 
therefore embody a degree of flexibility that may be extremely useful for the efficient management 
of natural resources. There exists no formalisation of this integration in laws, decrees, or sectoral 
directives. As far as such formalisation is concerned, any potential step to be taken in this direction 
should be carefully considered beforehand. Traditional authority is an institution that is legitimised in 
community settings, in the sphere of a community civil society of an agricultural base. In the event 
that this instrument of legitimisation is transferred from a civil to a state level, this authority would 
lose its intrinsic assets and would probably become frozen in time. 
 
Decentralising natural resource management (NRM) can give local governments allocative powers 
over lucrative opportunities, both of which can help build local government legitimacy. In general, 
resource allocation and institutional mechanisms for its management seems to be the limitation. It is 
hypothesised that by improving institutions, citizens’ and communities’ capacity to address local 
governance and decision-making through prominent decentralised natural resource management 
policies, they could participate more effectively in local development, gain experience in democratic 
processes,  and  hold  local  officials  responsible  for  their  decisions.  Pioneering  efforts  at 
decentralising  entrustments  over  the  use  and  management  of  resources  to  the  peasant 
communities have largely resulted in recentralisation at district level, where such efforts are still 
practised in the trickle-down mode. This is in part because the policy thrust seeking to empower the 
peasant  communities  is  supply-led,  and  thus  defined  according  to  the  terms  and  processes  of 
external agents, including funders and central governments and their functionaries. 
 
 
7.3.  CONCLUSIONS  
Mozambique is highly agrarian, with more than 80% of the labour force employed in agriculture. 
However,  despite  its  large  share  in  employment,  agriculture  contributes  less  than  30%  to  the 
country’s gross value added. Agricultural productivity is thus far below the average for the economy, 
and policymakers continue to focus on ways of improving productivity and the efficiency of capital. 
Mozambique has a large extension of land and a rich diversity of natural resources. Resources are 
inadequately used, rural incomes continue to drop, and poverty is increasing. The rural standard of 
living has been deteriorating year by year. Over the years, state visions of appropriate agriculture POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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development  have  largely  been  extended  to  the  peasant  sector  through  a  centrally  directed 
structure and process.  
 
The role that agriculture should play in economic development has been recognised for years. With 
agriculture being a subject very close to the cultural setting and largely sensitive to the changes in 
society, flexible informal institutions are more effective in agriculture. The livelihoods of rural people 
with no or very limited access to natural resources are vulnerable, because they have difficulty in 
obtaining  food,  accumulating  other  assets,  and  recuperating  after  natural  or  market  shocks  or 
misfortunes. It is not possible to discuss food prices without mentioning the agricultural structure, 
production systems, rural development, and access by the poor to natural resources (land, forests, 
water,  fisheries,  pastures,  etc.),  which  are  essential  for  sustainable  poverty  reduction.  In 
Mozambique, major changes have occurred in the context within which rural livelihoods have been 
constructed  in  Mozambique  over  the  past  20  years  –  many  of  which  have  increased  the 
vulnerability of the majority of the rural population. These changes have impacted upon the natural, 
physical and social capital that is available to the rural poor.  
 
The concept of governance, like development, is both a political and a technical term. This conflates 
the normative and prescriptive with the descriptive and analytical, and consequently refers to both 
an  end  state  and  a  process.  Governance  may  be  conceptualised  in  many  ways  –  including 
structural constructions, dynamic approaches, and objective-driven strategies. Alternatively, and as 
in the approach taken here, governance may be thought of as the relationship between civil society 
and the state, and thus fundamentally different from the concept of government. It covers the whole 
range of institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing.  
 
The policy framework for natural resource management has changed dramatically in the past two 
decades. “Governance” moved to the centre of development debates in the 1980s. By the mid-
1990s,  environmental  governance  and  sustainable  development  had  become  key  concepts 
influencing environmental management. Devolution and participation emerged as important issues 
in development and environmental thinking. This coincided with increasing concern by governments 
and non-governmental actors about the success of natural resource management, and resulted in a 
global trend towards participatory approaches. Defining the relationship between the state and civil 
society and their respective roles has become a core issue in development theory. Participation, 
accountability,  local  institutions,  local  practices,  indigenous  knowledge,  policy,  gender  equity, 
tenure,  and  fair  and  equitable  decision-making  processes  became  key  focuses.  This  shift  from 
centralist  development  strategies  to  locally  driven  development  has  been  complemented  by  a 
corresponding shift in the rights and obligations of various parties. Participation may take many POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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forms. It occurs along a continuum from active consultation to complete transfer of authority and 
responsibility  to  stakeholders.  Devolution,  decentralisation  or  deconcentration  may  promote 
participation, because they focus on creating lower levels of decision-making. Decentralisation can 
be  defined  as  “any  act  in  which  a  central  government  formally  concedes  power  to  actors  and 
institutions at lower levels in a political and territorial hierarchy. It involves the creation of a realm of 
autonomy in which a variety of lower-level actors can exercise some autonomy. It is fundamentally 
different from deconcentration. Deconcentration occurs when powers are devolved to appointees of 
central  government”.  The  increasing  downward  linkages  of  governments  towards  sub-national 
government may be a strategy to reassert control and is not necessarily driven by a concern for 
rights. 
 
In many African countries, processes of devolution have not been taken to their logical conclusion, 
so that local grassroots interests may be able to fully exert themselves. The key problem seems to 
be that these initiatives were not about devolution, but were instead a means to achieve other 
objectives including conservation, legitimacy, and more effective government. However, given the 
rhetoric  about  devolution  and  empowerment  that  has  accompanied  these  initiatives,  the 
communities have been sent mixed messages their rights vis-à-vis traditional interests and state 
interests, and as a result certain levels of expectation and discontentment have been created. It is 
clear  from  the  experience  of  all  these  initiatives  that  their  future  (and  their  success)  lies  in 
addressing these expectations and thus redefining governance relations. 
 
The right to public participation, as developed in these agreements, is significantly different from the 
established legal concept of public participation, which was based primarily on a right to object to 
decisions, but offered no role in decision-making. This approach was reactive and was based on 
indirect  representation.  The  emerging  right  of  participation  is  proactive  in  that  it  creates 
opportunities for individuals and groups to participate in the formulation of management strategies 
and the implementation thereof. Participation, as a legal concept, has evolved in the context of an 
environmental management framework that recognises the importance of effective representation, 
the inclusion of the full diversity of stakeholders, and the recognition of their value and knowledge 
systems,  the  linkage  between  authority  and  responsibility,  capacity-building,  accountability  and 
transparent  administrative  procedures,  including  access  to  information  and  due  process. 
Recognised stakeholders include women, indigenous people, workers and trade unions, farmers, 
the youth and children, as well as business and the scientific community. There is also recognition 
of the rights of local communities and indigenous people. 
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The recognition of customary law seems to be important, because at the level of local communities 
it is evident that traditional leaders and practices do assert themselves and that many of these 
reflect sound resource utilisation controls and practices. Yet these are not incorporated into land-
use considerations or management plans, except at ad hoc informal levels. The creation of village 
assemblies and the new roles of the chiefs seem to offer some opportunity for local approaches to 
resource management to be formally included in planning. However, this potential is constrained 
because the value basis, that is customary law, on which this approach is developed, is not legally 
recognised. Village assembly initiatives will need to fall firmly within the boundaries of national law, 
which defines rights of access, management and use. For these institutions to play a meaningful 
and empowered role in natural resource management, the ambit for decision-making needs to be 
broadened. One approach suggests that national law should facilitate rather than prescribe. This 
would allow institutions to define rules for management that are locally appropriate.  
 
The  “new  rural  paradigm”  emphasises  the  adoption  of  specialised  districts,  meaning  the 
maximisation of the potential and productive comparative/competitive advantages – the one district 
and one product approach. Each district should, based on local potential, identify its productive 
value  chain  based  on  local  resources  in  a  participatory  and  inclusive  manner.  This  requires  a 
change  in  the  policy  infrastructure  conception  and  efficient  implementation  mechanisms,  and  a 
movement away from the traditional hierarchical administrative structures.  It requires coordination 
to encourage the various institutional and managerial systems that formulate and implement rural 
policy to work together, and a political commitment to overcoming sectoral tendencies. Integrated 
rural  policies  do  work,  and  the  place-based  approach  helps  to  foster  local-level  public-private 
partnerships  and  integrate  new  stakeholders  and  resources.  These  initiatives  are  developing  a 
culture of cross-sectoral cooperation within central and local governments and thus more coherent 
policy initiatives. More importantly, there is recognition that a place-based approach requires more 
bottom-up as opposed to top-down initiatives.  
 
7.4.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Designing rural development policy for different communities involves pooling the knowledge held 
by  multiple actors and increased use of partnerships between the public, private and voluntary 
sectors.  There  is  a  focus  on  local  specificities  as  a  means  of  generating  new  competitive 
advantages, such as amenities (environmental or cultural) or local products (traditional); and more 
attention to quasi public goods or “framework conditions” that support enterprise indirectly.  A key 
governance challenge is to build the political will and institutional capacity to promote sustainable 
livelihoods and this requires a particular focus on developing practical linkages to translate national 
policies,  laws  and  regulations  into  action  at  the  local  level.  Support  for  local  institutions,  to POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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strengthen  their  ability  to  deliver  services  (government)  and  to  make  claims  on  entitlements 
(citizens),  is  an  area  on  which  there  needs  to  be  considerable  focus  in  the  years  ahead.  This 
research has shown how local authorities have a far greater impact in practice than the design of 
decentralisation policies at a national level, and therefore much greater attention should be paid to 
the issue of building and strengthening the social and political capital of the rural poor. 
 
Strengthening rural citizens’ involvement in the management of their own resources will help to 
reduce  the  pressure  on  natural  resources  by  promoting  community-driven  and  congruent 
sustainable use of natural resources and wildlife conservation. It will assist local authorities and 
existing resource management organisations to integrate local communities around conservation 
areas into the planning, management, and decision-making processes on NRM. At the same time, 
involving  citizens  will  capacitate  communities  to  learn  skills  in  mapping  resources,  identifying 
environmental  goals,  conducting  rapid  response  planning,  and  operating  their  nature-based 
businesses. Involving local populations in decision-making (design and implementation of activities) 
may: (i) Better emphasise users’ preferences and priorities, give greater voice and representation to 
citizens,  stress  local  ownership  as  an  effective  instrument  of  implementation,  and  bring  greater 
grassroots-level control over resources and their utilisation; (ii) Facilitate collective action in the 
provision of public goods and in the protection/management of natural resources, and improve the 
efficiency of public service delivery; and (iii) Make central government more responsive to citizen 
needs and produce more acceptable government decisions.   
 
This will require strengthening the role of local authorities so that they can become activists for 
visible change and gender equality by sensitising community leadership and women to the benefits 
of  effective participation  by  women.  This  in  turn  will  require  a  strong gender  component  in  the 
training  in  community  mobilisation  skills.  This  will  require  the  identification  of  strategic  partners 
amongst civil society and community-based organisations. Gender differences in roles, authority, 
power, and access to resources are pervasive. In most societies, there are important differences 
between  the  roles,  needs,  networks,  skills,  and  knowledge  of  men  and  women.  It  cannot  be 
assumed, even at community level, that what is appropriate for men is appropriate for women. Nor 
can  it  be  assumed  that  programmes  that  reach  men  should  reach  or  empower  women.  This 
produces new ways of coordinating vertically across levels of government, with a better use of local 
knowledge being one of the central pillars without which rural economic development cannot take 
place.  
 
Local governments must be open, receptive, sensitive and responsive, and must internalise, accept 
and institutionalise partnerships at appropriate levels. Local people, particularly the rural poor, must POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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develop  skills  in  negotiation  and  claim-making  so  as  to  effectively  engage  in  participatory  local 
development through small business development and outsourcing with local governments. The 
study shows that while communities and other groups can influence local decision-making, they 
have less opportunity to express themselves regarding the possession of natural resources and to 
decide about their management at local level. The land law provides mechanism of consultation, 
but does not say enough about how local communities can strengthen their partnerships with the 
private  sector  and  gain  from  the  natural  resources.  Arguments  that  local  populations  lack  the 
capacity  to  use  and  manage  natural  resources  and  to  manage  local  conflicts  are  most  often 
baseless. Many local natural resource decisions do not require any special capacities. To proceed 
with decentralisation, the risk of transferring power before assessing or building capacity must be 
taken. 
 
Mechanisms and systems of participation require creative thought if the initiatives discussed here 
are to improve and to acknowledge local rights. The emerging international regime identifies some 
key issues. The starting point of many multilateral environmental agreements is that the full diversity 
of interests related to resource management must be acknowledged – systems for acknowledging 
these,  and  mediating  and  negotiating  between  different  perspectives,  need  to  be  created.  This 
suggests  that  the  recognition  of  customary  law  and  values  might  offer  opportunities  for  more 
effective participation. The process of developing appropriate structures for local conservation must 
be seen as just that – a process. The challenge facing conservation initiatives is to move beyond a 
focus on benefits to finding a place within the broader “culture” of humanity. Rural development and 
NRM requires a high degree of policy fine-tuning to different local conditions. An advantage of 
traditional institutions is that they are genuinely local, and that they may also be, as in Mali, present 
at higher levels of government. The literature review revealed that in both Mozambique and Yemen, 
the lowest state representation is the district, while in Mali it is the rural commune. In any case, it is 
never the village, which does not have legal personality. But it is precisely at this level that one 
normally finds the traditional institutions that could sustain genuinely community-based NRM. 
 
Local authorities play a critical role in development. They are composed of different systems and 
segments and they define the drivers of development by looking at how agents, institutions and 
structures shape and are shaped by one another. It thus becomes possible to engage with political 
interests  and  power  relations  and  to  come  to  terms  with  how  political  choices  and  demands 
influence policy outcomes and institutional incentives, rules and patterns. Development literature 
and concepts are good at identifying what needs to be done to improve the lives of the poor in 
developing countries, but they are not always clear about how to make this happen most effectively. 
The Drivers of Change Approach, developed by the DFID, is a concept to identify, describe and to POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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better  understand  the  interaction  between  them  (agents,  institutions  and  structures).  Typically, 
development agenda has sought to bring about change through technically sound programmes, 
supported in-country by individual champions of reform or change. Increasingly, the importance of 
understanding the underlying political systems and the mechanics of pro-poor change has been 
acknowledged. In particular the role of institutions – both formal and informal – and underlying 
structural features is being recognised.  
 
It is pointed out that central government cannot devolve significant power to local institutions and to 
local authorities, because they lack essential technical capacity. Improved and participatory local 
governance in the rural areas is considered to be one of the necessary pre-conditions for improving 
the living conditions of the rural population. The process of building good local governance requires 
long-term  strategies  and  procedures,  which  encourage  consistent  local  civic  participation.  It  is 
necessary to prevent failure on the part of regulatory frameworks to adequately address the issue of 
incentives and failures as a result of the withholding of benefits by local power structures. 
 
It  is  recognised  that  qualitative  variables  have  influence  and  potential  importance  in  efficiency. 
Governance is considered within the framework of power, process and practice, and how these 
shaped  peasant  access,  control  and  use  of  natural  resources.  Decentralising  natural  resource 
management gives local governments allocative powers over lucrative opportunities, both of which 
can help build local government legitimacy. This is in part because the policy thrust seeking to 
empower  the  peasant  communities  is  supply-led,  and  thus  defined  according  to  the  terms  and 
processes of external agents, including funders and central governments. Decentralising natural 
resource management and using local decision-making powers are considered critical to improving 
the revenue-generation ability of citizens and local authorities. Local representative bodies need 
power over the resources that affect their sustainable livelihoods and economic improvement.  
 
It is the cumulative outcomes at local levels that determine the national-level success or failure of 
DNRM. Accordingly, DNRM must establish significant economic incentives at the community level 
for managing and conserving the resources, which is closely related to clearly defined and officially 
supported tenure systems, as well as revenue-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, DNRM should 
coordinate resource use among numerous individuals to establish an “optimal” rate of production 
and consumption at the local level, as well as for society at large. The rationale of DNRM as a 
development strategy is that by means of policy and legal frameworks, as well as administrative 
support, the state may establish attractive and fair economic incentives for communities to manage 
natural resources, whereby resource conservation, poverty reduction and good governance will be 
promoted at community level. Good governance at the local level is seen both as a means to POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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achieve  resource  conservation  and  poverty  reduction  and  as  an  objective  in  itself.  In  practical 
terms, it is the elaboration, implementation and experience-based revision of resource management 
plans at local levels that determine the actual performance of DNRM on the ground. Furthermore, 
the results and experiences of implementing DNRM at community level should be used to adjust 
and revise the policy and legal frameworks, including the choice of administrative setup. 
 
The  research  found  that  by  improving  the  capacity  of  institutions,  citizens  and  communities  to 
address local governance and decision-making through prominent decentralised natural resource 
management policies, they could participate more effectively in local development, gain experience 
in  democratic  processes,  and  hold  local  officials  responsible  for  their  decisions.  The  study 
concludes that access by the poor to natural resources (land, forests, water, fisheries, pastures, 
etc.)  is  essential  for  sustainable  poverty  reduction.  Many  rural  communities  are  dependent  on 
natural resources in one way or another. Natural resources play a strategic role in rural economies 
both as a potential source of long-term development and as the essential contributor to sustained 
food  security.  Local  representative  bodies  need  power  over  the  resources  that  affect  their 
constituencies in order to become legitimate actors around which civic organisations and citizens 
rally for justice, sustainable livelihoods and economic improvement. Decentralising NRM can give 
local governments allocative powers over lucrative opportunities, both of which can help build local 
government legitimacy. In short, local development can emerge. 
 
7.5.  FUTURE RESEARCH  
The  findings  of  this  research  may  be  relevant  to  agricultural  development  in  the  country  of 
Mozambique. Similar studies have been conducted in the following areas: 
·  Influence  of  sectoral  policies  in  agriculture  and  rural  development:  Policymakers  and 
development managers need to be aware of the pros and cons of giving a (more) prominent 
role to traditional and neo-traditional leaders in envisaged initiatives, and of the implications of 
making  them  (again),  consciously  or  against  their  intentions,  intermediaries  between 
government (and international development agencies) and civil society. Yet, due to a mix of 
historical, cultural and socio-political circumstances, the social capital embodied in traditional 
community leaders should sometimes be “tapped” only with great care, as much of that capital, 
although grounded in traditional networks of mutual assistance and solidarity, is also nested in 
clientelistic relations among kinship groups of unequal social status.  
·  Land tenure rights and agricultural development: Customary systems in Mozambique are, 
as in many other areas, highly dynamic and complex. The implication of their recognition in 
formal law is that inequalities, where these exist in the “customary” systems, can be reinforced. 
The position of women as a commonly marginalised group may be changing as a result of the POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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messages transmitted by the land law, although there are community groups that contend that 
this marginalisation never existed in customary systems. The role of the customary leadership 
as regards responsibilities outside of the conventional traditional sphere is thus undefined, due 
to this overlap and the gap in the existing laws.  POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
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9.  APPENDIX AND ANNEXES :   
Main policies and legislation after 1990 
POLICY  DESCRIPTION (KEY ASPECTS) 
Land  Policy 
(Resolution  10/95  of 
17 October, 1995) 
(i) Ensure the population’s and investors’ access to land; 
(ii) Ensure women’s access to and use of land; 
(iii) Enforce an ecologically sustainable use of the resources; 
(iv) Promote national and foreign private investment without prejudicing 
the resident populations, and ensuring benefits to the State; and 
(v)  Ensure  active  participation  by  nationals  as  partners  in  private 
enterprises. 
Forestry and Wildlife 
Policy 
Resolution 10/97 of 7 
April)  
The  main  objective  of  this  policy  is  the  conservation,  utilisation  and 
development of forestry and wildlife resources for social, ecological and 
economic benefit of present and future generations of the Mozambican 
people. Other key aspects include: 
i) Establishment of an economic value for Mozambique; 
ii) Rural development through involvement of the communities in the 
management of profits obtained from forestry and wildlife exploration; 
iii) Ecologically sustainable use of resources; 
iv) Strengthening and organisation of the institutional capacity within the 
processes  of  decentralisation  and  community  handling  of  natural 
resources. 
Agrarian  Policy 
(1995) 
It defends the sustainable use of natural resources for the development 
of agriculture 
Water  Policy 
(Council  of  Ministers 
Resolution  7/95  of  8 
August)  
It postulates the rational and economical use of water resources, with 
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Legislation 
LAW (ACT)  DESCRIPTION (KEY ASPECTS) 
Land  Law 
(Law  19/97  of  1 
October) 
The key aspect of the new law is its recognition of the right to land 
through  occupation  on  the  part  of  rural  families,  based  on  verbal 
testimonial.  This  is  particularly  important  because  it  opens  up 
opportunities for safeguarding the right to land of many Mozambicans 
who cultivate it. This law compels for: 
(i) Recognition of the right to land use and/or utilisation according to 
customary norms and practices; and 
(ii) Compulsory consultation to the communities when demarcating and 
titling the right to use and/or utilise land. 
Environmental  Law 
(Law  20/97  of  1 
October 1997) 
(i) Rational utilszation and management of environmental components; 
(ii) Recognition and valorisation of traditions and community knowledge; 
(iii)  Participation  of  the  citizens  in  the  environmental  management 
programme; 
(iv)  International  cooperation  in  view  of  finding  solutions  to 
environmental problems. 
Forestry and Wildlife 
Law 
(Law  10/99  of  7  July 
1999)  
(i) Integration of local communities’ interests, of the private sector and 
civil society; 
(ii) Ecologically sustainable use of resources; 
(iii) Establishment of mechanisms for private appropriation; and 
(iv) Recognition of customary rights. 
Fishery  Law 
(Law 3/1990) 
This  law  emphasises  the  development  of  small-scale  fishing  and 
envisages  establishing  conservation  measures  for  fishing  resources, 
and this includes determination of resting periods, areas of forbidden or 
limited  access,  maximum  quantities  of  exploration,  prohibition  or 
regulation  of  fishing  as  far  as  internationally  protected  species  are 
concerned, and protection of rare and endemic species. POLICIES,  NATURAL RESOURCES  GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE:  
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Water Law  
(Law  16/91  of  3 
August 1991)  
The law postulates that all traditionally established common uses must 
be recognised and recorded, and that there must not be any private 
utilisation of water in prejudice of the populations’ right to potable water. 
It also adds that the holders of rights and of private utilisation will have 
to allow access of the neighbouring population to potable water. 
The law also defends the participation of the populations in the main 
decisions  relating  to  the  policy  on water  management.  As  one  of  its 
objectives, the Law states that the National Policy on Water must be 
geared towards the continuous and sufficient provision of potable water 
to the populations so that they meet their domestic and hygienic needs. 
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 Annex 1 
Descriptive Statistical of Efficiency 
 
  TE  AE  EE 
Mean  0,830229167  0,137052083  0,115953125 
Standard Error  0,006875993  0,010016867  0,009505479 
Median  0,825  0,1015  0,083 
Mode  1  0,087  0,056 
Standard Deviation  0,095276559  0,138797783  0,131711778 
Sample Variance  0,009077623  0,019264824  0,017347993 
Kurtosis  -0,392319748  16,1874763  21,99192609 
Skewness  -0,078763099  3,642840458  4,293256311 
Range  0,412  0,981  0,985 
Minimum  0,588  0,019  0,015 
Maximum  1  1  1 
Sum  159,404  26,314  22,263 




 Annex 2   CROP PRODUCTION  
Provinces  2001/02  VAR%  2002/03  VAR%  2003/04  VAR%  2004/05  VAR%  2005/06 
                             
Cabo 
Delgado 
116,000  -13  100,700  47  147,900  -27  108,553  -15  92,412 
Niassa  195,000  4  202,600  5  213,500  -20  171,284  -13  148,790 
Nampula  206,000  14  234,800  3  242,100  2  247,060  -22  192,305 
Zambézia  297,000  6  315,600  -7  292,400  17  341,133  -11  303,317 
Tete  117,000  33  155,800  10  171,100  40  239,030  -27  174,941 
Manica  180,000  4  186,500  4  193,800  54  298,341  -22  232,425 
Sofala  124,000  0  123,600  22  150,800  18  178,463  -30  125,497 
Inhambane  92,000  -22  71,700  16  83,400  54  128,265  -20  102,473 
Gaza  38,000  145  93,100  5  97,500  -32  66,308  3  68,484 
Maputo  20,000  124  44,700  -17  37,000  12  41,356  -17  34,129 
                             
Total 
Nacional 
1,385,000  10  1,529,100  7  1,629,500  12  1,819,793  -19  1,474,772 
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 Annex 3  MAIZE PRODUCTION 
Provinces  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06 
Cabo Delgado  81,000  62,200  97,400  57,265  49,836 
Niassa  163,000  175,800  173,500  144,568  120,087 
Nampula  101,000  117,200  120,400  129,197  104,360 
Zambézia  184,000  190,600  212,500  192,366  166,029 
Tete  92,000  125,700  125,300  177,544  139,031 
Manica  155,000  160,100  158,600  260,829  200,450 
Sofala  64,000  64,700  71,800  105,333  73,254 
Inhambane  65,000  47,900  59,800  104,466  83,053 
Gaza  27,000  61,200  74,100  38,811  51,796 
Maputo  15,000  36,800  30,200  35,699  30,965 
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 Annex 4 
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Annex 5: DEA MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
   Unit Farms   TE  AE  EE 
    1    0.922  0.062  0.057 
    2    1.000  1.000  1.000 
    3    0.818  0.144  0.118 
    4    0.999  0.062  0.062 
    5    0.719  0.348  0.250 
    6    0.920  0.150  0.138 
    7    0.757  0.295  0.223 
    8    0.981  0.127  0.125 
    9    0.765  0.103  0.079 
   10    0.863  0.104  0.090 
   11    0.838  0.089  0.075 
   12    1.000  0.095  0.095 
   13    0.750  0.043  0.033 
   14    0.926  0.065  0.060 
   15    0.735  0.120  0.089 
   16    0.853  0.111  0.095 
   17    0.814  0.551  0.449 
   18    0.930  0.171  0.159 
   19    0.752  0.106  0.080 
   20    0.987  0.109  0.107 
   21    0.740  0.055  0.041 
   22    0.964  0.165  0.159 
   23    0.792  0.131  0.104 
   24    0.805  0.119  0.096 
   25    0.954  0.058  0.056 
   26    0.912  0.203  0.186 
   27    0.841  0.207  0.174 
   28    0.771  0.096  0.074 
   29    0.787  0.321  0.253 
   30    0.882  0.057  0.050 
   31    0.787  0.076  0.059 
   32    0.829  0.200  0.166 
   33    0.732  0.181  0.133 
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   35    0.618  0.059  0.036 
   36    0.880  0.027  0.023 
   37    0.825  0.164  0.136 
   38    0.600  0.068  0.041 
   39    0.770  0.090  0.069 
   40    0.848  0.042  0.036 
   41    0.786  0.025  0.019 
   42    0.840  0.287  0.241 
   43    0.645  0.213  0.138 
   44    0.763  0.191  0.146 
   45    0.807  0.141  0.114 
   46    0.660  0.051  0.034 
   47    1.000  0.087  0.087 
   48    0.992  0.083  0.083 
   49    0.896  0.048  0.043 
   50    0.899  0.041  0.037 
   51    0.914  0.092  0.084 
   52    0.862  0.088  0.076 
   53    0.802  0.178  0.143 
   54    0.868  0.179  0.156 
   55    0.787  0.019  0.015 
   56    0.818  0.074  0.061 
   57    0.784  0.214  0.167 
   58    0.982  0.115  0.113 
   59    0.919  0.026  0.024 
   60    0.767  0.100  0.077 
   61    0.991  0.118  0.117 
   62    0.956  0.138  0.132 
   63    0.996  0.064  0.064 
   64    0.716  0.115  0.082 
   65    0.720  0.113  0.081 
   66    0.823  0.087  0.071 
   67    0.664  0.084  0.056 
   68    0.959  0.087  0.084 
   69    1.000  0.860  0.860 
   70    0.841  0.061  0.051 
   71    0.831  0.028  0.023 
   72    0.859  0.027  0.023 
   73    0.814  0.095  0.078 
   74    0.783  0.120  0.094 
   75    0.699  0.032  0.022 
   76    0.882  0.143  0.126 
   77    0.894  0.049  0.043 
   78    0.899  0.199  0.179 
   79    0.856  0.020  0.017 
   80    0.772  0.126  0.097 
   81    0.853  0.172  0.147 
   82    0.733  0.192  0.141 
   83    0.825  0.124  0.102 
   84    0.858  0.115  0.099 
   85    0.835  0.067  0.056 
   86    0.716  0.115  0.082 
   87    0.720  0.113  0.081 
   88    0.823  0.087  0.071 
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   90    0.959  0.087  0.084 
   91    1.000  0.860  0.860 
   92    0.841  0.061  0.051 
   93    0.831  0.028  0.023 
   94    0.859  0.027  0.023 
   95    0.814  0.095  0.078 
   96    0.783  0.120  0.094 
   97    0.699  0.032  0.022 
   98    0.882  0.143  0.126 
   99    0.894  0.049  0.043 
  100    0.899  0.199  0.179 
  101    0.744  0.111  0.083 
  102    0.864  0.063  0.054 
  103    0.808  0.076  0.062 
  104    0.964  0.096  0.093 
  105    0.809  0.080  0.065 
  106    0.930  0.371  0.345 
  107    1.000  0.234  0.234 
  108    0.829  0.173  0.143 
  109    0.808  0.091  0.073 
  110    0.812  0.189  0.154 
  111    0.841  0.183  0.154 
  112   0.872  0.060  0.052 
  113    0.794  0.078  0.062 
  114    0.788  0.084  0.067 
  115    0.740  0.137  0.102 
  116    0.671  0.294  0.198 
  117    0.593  0.064  0.038 
  118    0.976  0.028  0.027 
  119    0.817  0.071  0.058 
  120    0.588  0.067  0.040 
  121    0.777  0.079  0.061 
  122    0.928  0.062  0.057 
  123    0.794  0.024  0.019 
  124    0.798  0.138  0.110 
  125    0.701  0.471  0.330 
  126    0.734  0.124  0.091 
  127    0.826  0.194  0.160 
  128    0.634  0.056  0.036 
  129    1.000  0.150  0.150 
  130    0.926  0.081  0.075 
  131    1.000  0.083  0.083 
  132    0.927  0.165  0.153 
  133   0.904  0.055  0.050 
  134    0.875  0.401  0.351 
  135    0.767  0.109  0.084 
  136    0.931  0.111  0.103 
  137    0.758  0.096  0.072 
  138    0.974  0.065  0.063 
  139    0.825  0.154  0.127 
  140    0.879  0.142  0.125 
  141    0.936  0.106  0.099 
  142    0.826  0.091  0.076 
  143    0.784  0.136  0.107 
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  145    0.740  0.341  0.252 
  146    0.856  0.059  0.051 
  147    0.820  0.123  0.101 
  148    0.780  0.046  0.036 
  149    0.681  0.150  0.102 
  150    0.727  0.157  0.114 
  151    0.648  0.070  0.045 
  152    0.945  0.025  0.024 
  153    0.844  0.088  0.075 
  154    0.726  0.204  0.148 
  155    0.698  0.082  0.057 
  156    0.817  0.157  0.128 
  157    0.725  0.150  0.109 
  158    0.990  0.150  0.148 
  159    0.785  0.108  0.085 
  160    0.911  0.059  0.053 
  161    0.879  0.034  0  0.034 
  162    0.824  0.026  0.022 
  163    0.760  0.096  0.073 
  164    0.783  0.179  0.140 
  165    0.758  0.272  0.207 
  166    0.909  0.181  0.165 
  167    0.942  0.053  0.050 
  168    0.882  0.345  0.305 
  169    0.830  0.111  0.092 
  170    0.864  0.089  0.077 
  171    0.755  0.064  0.048 
  172    0.944  0.092  0.087 
  173    0.833  0.103  0.086 
  174    0.777  0.300  0.233 
  175   0.935  0.082  0.077 
  176    0.852  0.156  0.133 
  177    0.776  0.087  0.067 
  178    0.817  0.093  0.076 
  179    0.676  0.113  0.076 
  180   0.736  0.126  0.093 
  181    0.831  0.090  0.075 
  182    0.725  0.114  0.082 
  183    1.000  0.684  0.684 
  184    0.801  0.070  0.056 
  185    0.806  0.061  0.049 
  186    0.815  0.033  0.027 
  187    0.842  0.028  0.024 
  188    0.739  0.067  0.050 
  189    0.876  0.646  0.566 
  190    0.750  0.116  0.087 
  191    0.855  0.090  0.077 
  192    0.947  0.100  0.095 
  Mean    0.830  0.137  0.116 
Note: TE = Technical Efficiency 
          AE = Allocative Efficiency = EE/TE 
          EE = Economic Efficiency 